Flux Publicationshttps://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Italy-Strategic-Import-Risk-Exposure-Europe-Deeper-Fault-Lines-Energy-4/29/2026,53451simona.costagli@bnpparibas.comItalyEurozoneInternational TradeEnergyEconomic policyThe trade openness of EU countries represents both a strength and a weakness, making active initiatives necessary to enhance economic security. According to the World Bank, in 2024 the EU’s trade openness stood at 92%, compared with 25% for the United States and 37% for China. For Italy, the figure was 63%, among the highest among Member States, with particularly strong exposure to extra-EU demand. The evolution of the international geopolitical and economic context, together with the country’s dependence on the import of energy materials, suggests that careful consideration should be given to the potential vulnerability of Italian imports to possible total or partial disruptions in the external supply of strategically significant products.Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/France-rise-interest-rates-2022-affected-household-financial-investment-flows-4/22/2026,53405laurent.quignon@bnpparibas.comFranceFinancial markets and investmentsBanking economicsInflationReal estateConsumption and purchasing powerFollowing a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Latin-America-exposed-inflationary-pressures-than-disruptions-hydrocarbon-supplies-4/15/2026,53361helene.drouot@bnpparibas.comMonetary policyBanking economicsInflationEnergyEconomic policyLatin America is considerably less exposed than other emerging regions to the repercussions of the war in the Middle East. This is mainly due to its very low risk of hydrocarbon supply disruptions: the vast majority of imported hydrocarbons come from the United States and other countries in the region, with only a negligible portion coming from the Middle East. Furthermore, several countries are net exporters (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador).Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Demand-should-contribute-less-inflation-2026-than-2022-Eurozone-United-States-4/8/2026,53347stephane.colliac@bnpparibas.comUnited StatesEurozoneInternational TradeInflationConsumption and purchasing powerEconomic policyWill a different situation lead to different outcomes? In other words, will the combination of weaker demand and more moderate supply constraints in 2026, as compared to 2022, help to limit the rise in inflation? Having illustrated the impact of the energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East on six key variables in the Eurozone in our previous Chart of the Week, we now move on to a new comparison between these two dates, this time focusing on the relative levels of supply and demand issues. In the Eurozone, weaker demand has resulted in a more pronounced decline in inflation, unlike in the United States, where both demand and inflation have remained more sustained. In both regions, business climate surveys have recently shown a deterioration in some supply-side indicators (input prices), while demand indicators have not weakened yet. This asymmetry is likely to push inflation upwards in the coming months, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2022.Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Eurozone-charts-comparing-impact-2026-energy-crisis-2022-4/1/2026,53335helene.baudchon@bnpparibas.comIranEurozoneFinancial markets and investmentsBanking economicsEconomic growthInflationEnergyEconomic policyWill the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of war in Iran and the associated surge in oil prices (+44% to date) and gas prices (+64%) lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that of 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those of the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy shock (a rise in oil prices of around 30% between 23 February and its peak in early June 2022, and a rise in gas prices of around 210% between 23 February and the peak in late August 2022)? The risk cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there are similarities and numerous uncertainties.Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/European-manufacturing-sector-heading-into-2026-energy-crisis-lower-ratio-performing-loans-than-2022-3/25/2026,53321thomas.humblot@bnpparibas.comEuropean unionFiscal policyMonetary policyBanking economicsEmployment and labour market EnergyEconomic policyDuring her hearing on 18 March 2026 before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Claudia Buch (Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank) highlighted the absence of decline in the quality of bank assets and the stability of non-performing loan ratios. These ratios are a good indirect indicator of the financial health of borrowing corporations in the European Union (EU), particularly in the manufacturing sector. When viewed from this perspective, the proportion of firms in this sector facing severe financial difficulties appears to be lower at the start of 2026 than at the start of 2022. This suggests, by extension, that these firms are in better financial health and have a greater ability to absorb shocks. Nevertheless, comparing the current energy shock with the previous one poses difficulties. Apart from the uncertainty surrounding the duration and scale of the 2026 shock, the effects of the 2022 shock were largely mitigated by public and private support measures. This time, such measures are likely to be more limited, given budgetary constraints.Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Central-European-economies-performing-well-despite-significant-demographic-challenges-3/18/2026,53308cynthia.kalasopatanantoine@bnpparibas.comEurozoneEmerging EconomiesFinancial markets and investmentsEmployment and labour market Economic growthEnergyEconomic policyFor several years, Central Europe has been facing a marked demographic decline. Its magnitude varies from one country to another. The total population decline from 2004 to 2025 ranges from -0.3% in Slovakia to -17.2% in Bulgaria. The Czech Republic is the only country in the region to have seen a population increase over the same period. The working-age population (ages 15–64) is also declining. However, the situation is less unfavourable in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a more significant decline due to migration patterns. Net migration flows were negative for Bulgaria until 2019 and for Romania until 2021. However, this trend has reversed in recent years. Recently, the arrival of Ukrainian refugees has eased the pressure on the working-age population, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ukrainian refugees now account for around 5% of the workforce in Poland.Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/European-neighbourhood-important-growth-driver-EU-exports-3/11/2026,53298guillaume.a.derrien@bnpparibas.comEuropean unionInternational TradeEconomic growthEconomic policyMarket opportunities in China are shrinking dramatically due to the country's shift towards higher-end products and its import substitution policy. 2025 marked an unprecedented turning point in this regard: European exports to China fell by 14% in nominal terms and by 10.2% in volume, as the country's share of total EU exports (7.5%) reached its lowest level in nearly fifteen years. Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/US-China-Tariffs-Global-Reallocation-Chinese-Exports-Implications-Italy-3/4/2026,53252simona.costagli@bnpparibas.comChinaGlobalItalyInternational TradeEconomic growthIn 2025, US–China trade tensions led to a sharp drop in US imports from China, while Chinese exports to other regions increased, indicating early signs of trade diversion. For Italy, estimates point to limited but notable export displacement, concentrated in specific sectors, alongside potential gains from lower-cost Chinese intermediate and capital goods. Italian firms report stronger competitive pressures and heightened uncertainty, particularly among exporters. Despite the challenges posed by tariffs and the redirection of Chinese exports in 2025, Italian exports have proved resilient, with growth recorded especially towards the United States.Wed, 04 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Credit-Eurozone-towards-tightening-credit-standards-targeting-households-limited-scope-2/25/2026,53241thomas.humblot@bnpparibas.comEurozoneBanking economicsReal estateConsumption and purchasing powerAccording to the ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS), some banks in the Eurozone may tighten their credit standards for households more significantly in 2026 than in 2025. The reason for this is the more constraining calculation of regulatory capital requirements. In contrast, the tightening would be less severe for corporations. This desynchronisation is unusual. It tends to illustrate the effect of the ramp-up of the output floor, which would particularly affect housing loans. However, the effect would remain very limited: only one in ten banks is considering to change its standards. New loans to households and corporations would keep their momentum largely unchanged.Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Southeast-Asian-countries-gaining-market-share-despite-higher-tariffs-2/18/2026,53229johanna.melka@bnpparibas.comInternational TradeArtificial intelligenceAsian economies, excluding China, have experienced minimal disruption to their global trade shares despite higher US tariffs. This resilience stems from their export composition, which remains concentrated in electronics, a sector largely spared by US tariff increases and buoyed by AI-driven demand. While the strategy of redirecting Chinese exports from the United States to Asia and other global markets has intensified, it has not been sufficient to fully compensate for China’s decline in U.S. market share.Wed, 18 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Insights-from-24-Fiscal-Consolidations-Europe-2/11/2026,53220European unionFiscal policyFinancial regulationsEconomic growthEconomic policyAgeing populations, rising long-term interest rates and increased defence spending are adding to the difficulties for public finances across the OECD. While fiscal consolidation – which can be measured by an improvement of the primary balance by at least 3% of GDP in 4 years – is essential for several member states, this is easier said than done. What can we learn from analysing 20 years of European public finance? Historical examples from EU countries show that expenditure-led consolidation can be an effective approach and tends to support stronger growth after it is completed.Wed, 11 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Heading-towards-recovery-household-consumption-Eurozone-2/5/2026,53200lucie.barette@bnpparibas.comEurozoneConsumption and purchasing powerHousehold spending intentions have been improving in the Eurozone for two years, and in January 2026, they returned to their early 2022 levels, despite a much more gradual improvement in the household confidence index. Households’ fears about unemployment and living standards in general have weighed on consumption and have contributed to its moderate growth. Moreover, these fears have continued to dampen consumer sentiment. However, these concerns are easing and no longer seem to be hindering a potential rebound in consumption, as evidenced by purchasing intentions.Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Gulf-GCC-investing-heavily-abroad-despite-falling-current-account-surplus-1/28/2026,53182stephane.alby@bnpparibas.comGulf countriesFinancial markets and investmentsInternational TradeEconomic policyAccording to estimates from the Institute for International Finance, net resident capital outflows from the Gulf reached USD 271 billion in 2025, while net non-resident capital inflows amounted to USD 228 billion. Since their 2022 peak, the oil prices and export revenues of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been declining. However, the GCC has never before invested abroad as much, despite the drop in its current-account surplus. The surplus fell from 15.7% of GDP in 2022 to 8% in 2023, 5.9% in 2024 and 3.8% in 2025. At the same time, net resident capital outflows from the region rose by 10% (2023–2025).Wed, 28 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0100© BNP Paribas - 2016