﻿<rss xmlns:a10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>RSS Publication : Charts of the Week</title><description>Flux Publications</description><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/decade-referendum-UK-facing-consequences-Brexit-6/17/2026,53559</link><author>marianne.mueller@bnpparibas.com</author><category>United Kingdom</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Financial regulations</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Artificial intelligence</category><title>A decade after the referendum, the UK is facing the consequences of Brexit </title><description>23 June will mark the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum, which led to the UK’s official exit from the European Union on 31 January 2020 (followed by a transition period). Since then, the country has indeed regained control over certain policy domains, such as trade, migration and regulatory frameworks. However, both the anticipation of Brexit and its actual implementation in 2021 have been linked to a decline in the country’s performance across several key indicators. Against a backdrop of escalating geopolitical tensions and mounting shared challenges, the UK is now seeking to re-establish practical collaboration with its main economic partner: the European Union.</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/US-regulatory-easing-offers-limited-support-Treasuries-market-6/10/2026,53537</link><author>celine.choulet@bnpparibas.com</author><category>United States</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Banking economics</category><title>The US regulatory easing offers limited support to the Treasuries market</title><description>As US regulators had hoped, the easing of the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) applied to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has improved intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market. However, this measure has not prompted banks to significantly increase their Treasury holdings.</description><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Latin-America-energy-crisis-expected-have-moderate-impact-public-finances-6/3/2026,53527</link><author>lucas.ple@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Brazil</category><category>Chile</category><category>Colombia</category><category>Mexico</category><category>Peru</category><category>Fiscal policy</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Monetary policy</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>In Latin America, the energy crisis is expected to have a moderate impact on public finances</title><description>Latin America is not exposed to the risk of a disruption in hydrocarbon supplies due to the conflict in the Middle East. However, the rise in international energy prices is exerting pressure on the region’s public finances. In Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, fuel subsidies are increasing the risk of fiscal slippage; however, this risk is somewhat mitigated by the projected rise in oil-related fiscal revenues. In Chile and Peru, the lack of subsidies points to a significant inflationary impact that could result in a monetary tightening. This would increase the interest burden on public debt, but the moderate fiscal deficits in these countries should enable them to absorb the shock. Furthermore, governments in the region are expected to manage any tightening of international financial conditions with relative ease.</description><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/United-States-Labour-productivity-growth-continue-5/27/2026,53509</link><author>anis.bensaidani@bnpparibas.com</author><category>United States</category><category>Monetary policy</category><category>Employment and labour market </category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Artificial intelligence</category><title>United States: Labour productivity growth set to continue</title><description>The outperformance of US growth is underpinned by productivity gains that are significantly higher than those of the previous decade. This acceleration is due more to the spillover effects of past investments and post-pandemic changes (such as remote working) than to artificial intelligence (AI). The roll-out of AI is too recent for productivity gains to have already made their mark at the macroeconomic level. In the medium term, however, AI is expected to support the upward trend.</description><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Blockade-Strait-Hormuz-market-soon-options-5/20/2026,53499</link><author>pascal.devaux@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Global</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><title>Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: the oil market soon to run out of options</title><description>The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz over the past two and a half months has significantly reduced the amount of oil available globally. The use of regional bypass, and the release of commercial stocks and strategic reserves are only partial and temporary solutions. Without the restoration of oil flows through the strait, the growing shortfall in petroleum products will accelerate the rise in oil prices and destruction in global oil demand.</description><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/impact-energy-crisis-public-finances-emerging-Asia-5/13/2026,53477</link><author>johanna.melka@bnpparibas.com</author><category>India</category><category>Indonesia</category><category>Malaysia</category><category>Emerging Countries</category><category>Thailand</category><category>Fiscal policy</category><category>Emerging Economies</category><category>Banking economics</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>The impact of the energy crisis on public finances in emerging Asia</title><description>Emerging Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Beyond supply issues, rising prices pose a significant risk to these countries, where domestic demand is a major driver of economic growth. To limit the impact, some Asian countries (notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have opted to partially subsidise energy and fertilisers. The additional cost to their public finances is expected to remain manageable provided that the average crude oil price does not exceed USD 100 per barrel over the year. However, this subsidy policy poses risks to their public finances, particularly if external financing conditions tighten. Indonesia is the country most exposed to a rise in US long-term interest rates.</description><pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/France-inflation-starting-spread-still-sparing-consumer-goods-services-5/6/2026,53467</link><author>stephane.colliac@bnpparibas.com</author><category>France</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Consumption and purchasing power</category><category>Energy</category><title>France: inflation is starting to spread but is still sparing consumer goods and services</title><description>The energy shock is beginning to feed through into French inflation. In March and April, inflation was limited to refining activities and fuel prices. It is expected to affect more sectors in the second quarter, according to the European Commission’s survey on three-month selling price expectations. In France, the pass-through is expected to mainly affect intermediate goods in Q2. However,  inflationary pressures on consumer goods and services or construction are expected to remain quite moderate. These factors are consistent with our scenario of a limited acceleration in French inflation and a moderate impact of the energy shock on growth.</description><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Italy-Strategic-Import-Risk-Exposure-Europe-Deeper-Fault-Lines-Energy-4/29/2026,53451</link><author>simona.costagli@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Italy</category><category>Eurozone</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Italy's Strategic Import Risk: Same Exposure as Europe, Deeper Fault Lines in Energy </title><description>The trade openness of EU countries represents both a strength and a weakness, making active initiatives necessary to enhance economic security. According to the World Bank, in 2024 the EU’s trade openness stood at 92%, compared with 25% for the United States and 37% for China. For Italy, the figure was 63%, among the highest among Member States, with particularly strong exposure to extra-EU demand. The evolution of the international geopolitical and economic context, together with the country’s dependence on the import of energy materials, suggests that careful consideration should be given to the potential vulnerability of Italian imports to possible total or partial disruptions in the external supply of strategically significant products.</description><pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/France-rise-interest-rates-2022-affected-household-financial-investment-flows-4/22/2026,53405</link><author>laurent.quignon@bnpparibas.com</author><category>France</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Banking economics</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Real estate</category><category>Consumption and purchasing power</category><title>France: How has the rise in interest rates since 2022 affected household financial investment flows?</title><description>Following a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Latin-America-exposed-inflationary-pressures-than-disruptions-hydrocarbon-supplies-4/15/2026,53361</link><author>helene.drouot@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Monetary policy</category><category>Banking economics</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Latin America: more exposed to inflationary pressures than to disruptions in hydrocarbon supplies</title><description>Latin America is considerably less exposed than other emerging regions to the repercussions of the war in the Middle East. This is mainly due to its very low risk of hydrocarbon supply disruptions: the vast majority of imported hydrocarbons come from the United States and other countries in the region, with only a negligible portion coming from the Middle East. Furthermore, several countries are net exporters (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador).</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Demand-should-contribute-less-inflation-2026-than-2022-Eurozone-United-States-4/8/2026,53347</link><author>stephane.colliac@bnpparibas.com</author><category>United States</category><category>Eurozone</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Consumption and purchasing power</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Demand should contribute less to inflation in 2026 than in 2022 in the Eurozone and the United States</title><description>Will a different situation lead to different outcomes? In other words, will the combination of weaker demand and more moderate supply constraints in 2026, as compared to 2022, help to limit the rise in inflation? Having illustrated the impact of the energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East on six key variables in the Eurozone in our previous Chart of the Week, we now move on to a new comparison between these two dates, this time focusing on the relative levels of supply and demand issues. In the Eurozone, weaker demand has resulted in a more pronounced decline in inflation, unlike in the United States, where both demand and inflation have remained more sustained. In both regions, business climate surveys have recently shown a deterioration in some supply-side indicators (input prices), while demand indicators have not weakened yet. This asymmetry is likely to push inflation upwards in the coming months, albeit to a lesser extent than in 2022.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Eurozone-charts-comparing-impact-2026-energy-crisis-2022-4/1/2026,53335</link><author>helene.baudchon@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Iran</category><category>Eurozone</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Banking economics</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Eurozone: six charts comparing the impact of the 2026 energy crisis with that of 2022</title><description>Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of war in Iran and the associated surge in oil prices (+44% to date) and gas prices (+64%) lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that of 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those of the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy shock (a rise in oil prices of around 30% between 23 February and its peak in early June 2022, and a rise in gas prices of around 210% between 23 February and the peak in late August 2022)? The risk cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there are similarities and numerous uncertainties.</description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/European-manufacturing-sector-heading-into-2026-energy-crisis-lower-ratio-performing-loans-than-2022-3/25/2026,53321</link><author>thomas.humblot@bnpparibas.com</author><category>European union</category><category>Fiscal policy</category><category>Monetary policy</category><category>Banking economics</category><category>Employment and labour market </category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>European manufacturing sector is heading into the 2026 energy crisis with a lower ratio of non-performing loans than in 2022</title><description>During her hearing on 18 March 2026 before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Claudia Buch (Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank) highlighted the absence of decline in the quality of bank assets and the stability of non-performing loan ratios. These ratios are a good indirect indicator of the financial health of borrowing corporations in the European Union (EU), particularly in the manufacturing sector. When viewed from this perspective, the proportion of firms in this sector facing severe financial difficulties appears to be lower at the start of 2026 than at the start of 2022. This suggests, by extension, that these firms are in better financial health and have a greater ability to absorb shocks. Nevertheless, comparing the current energy shock with the previous one poses difficulties. Apart from the uncertainty surrounding the duration and scale of the 2026 shock, the effects of the 2022 shock were largely mitigated by public and private support measures. This time, such measures are likely to be more limited, given budgetary constraints.</description><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Central-European-economies-performing-well-despite-significant-demographic-challenges-3/18/2026,53308</link><author>cynthia.kalasopatanantoine@bnpparibas.com</author><category>Eurozone</category><category>Emerging Economies</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Employment and labour market </category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Central European economies are performing well despite significant demographic challenges</title><description>For several years, Central Europe has been facing a marked demographic decline. Its magnitude varies from one country to another. The total population decline from 2004 to 2025 ranges from -0.3% in Slovakia to -17.2% in Bulgaria. The Czech Republic is the only country in the region to have seen a population increase over the same period. The working-age population (ages 15–64) is also declining. However, the situation is less unfavourable in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a more significant decline due to migration patterns. Net migration flows were negative for Bulgaria until 2019 and for Romania until 2021. However, this trend has reversed in recent years. Recently, the arrival of Ukrainian refugees has eased the pressure on the working-age population, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ukrainian refugees now account for around 5% of the workforce in Poland.</description><pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/European-neighbourhood-important-growth-driver-EU-exports-3/11/2026,53298</link><author>guillaume.a.derrien@bnpparibas.com</author><category>European union</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>The European ‘neighbourhood’: an important growth driver for EU exports </title><description>Market opportunities in China are shrinking dramatically due to the country's shift towards higher-end products and its import substitution policy. 2025 marked an unprecedented turning point in this regard: European exports to China fell by 14% in nominal terms and by 10.2% in volume, as the country's share of total EU exports (7.5%) reached its lowest level in nearly fifteen years. </description><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item></channel></rss>