﻿<rss xmlns:a10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>RSS Publication : Eco Insight</title><description>Flux Publications</description><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Middle-East-Conflict-Moderate-Impact-Advanced-Economies-High-Uncertainty-Remains-4/24/2026,53407</link><category>United States</category><category>Global</category><category>United Kingdom</category><category>Eurozone</category><category>Developed economies</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Consumption and purchasing power</category><category>Energy</category><title>Middle East Conflict: Moderate Impact on Advanced Economies So Far, but High Uncertainty Remains </title><description>The war in the Middle East has caused prices of several commodities to rise, in particular oil which has neared historic highs. Although conflict’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, weaker supply and demand constraints compared to 2022 should limit the upward pressure on inflation. Household consumption and sectors least able to pass on rising production costs to sales prices (primarily consumer goods) are likely to be hit hardest. The ultimate effect on GDP growth will depend on the duration and severity of the damage. According to our baseline scenario, a recession should be avoided. However, if the conflict were to escalate to the point of causing shortages (of fuel or inputs), its impact on growth and inflation could lead to such a recessionary outcome. High public debt levels and long-term interest rates limit governments’ room for manoeuvre, meaning any support measures are expected to be more limited than in 2022.  If the conflict and its inflationary effects were to worsen, this reduced room for manoeuvre means that any additional response would have to be financed by equivalent savings. With weaker demand dynamics than in 2022, and less fiscal stimulus, central banks may face less pressure to tighten monetary policy to curb inflation. While the next move in interest rates is likely to be a hike in most cases, such action remains premature at this stage.</description><pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/face-ageing-population-eurozone-economies-appear-most-vulnerable-4/10/2026,53348</link><category>United States</category><category>Global</category><category>Japan</category><category>Eurozone</category><category>Fiscal policy</category><category>Developed economies</category><category>Employment and labour market </category><category>Economic growth</category><title>In the face of ageing population, eurozone economies appear to be the most vulnerable</title><description>Most developed countries are ageing rapidly. According to the United Nations population database, the proportion of people aged 65 and over in the group of “more developed countries” is projected to rise from 21.5% in 2026 to 32.3% by 2100. There are however significant differences between countries. Such increases pose a threat to social security systems. Without any specific reforms, pension and healthcare spending will rise while contributions from the shrinking working-age population will decline. Which countries are financially most vulnerable to ageing? We analysed this question for 16 developed countries using five ratios in our ageing vulnerability index.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0200</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Middle-East-Shockwaves-spreading-3/23/2026,53310</link><category>Global</category><category>Emerging Economies</category><category>Developed economies</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><title>War in the Middle East: Shockwaves are spreading </title><description>The conflict in the Gulf has escalated in recent days, with an increase in strikes targeting oil and gas facilities (on both sides). The impact on energy prices has therefore intensified. A relatively rapid de-escalation of the conflict is unlikely, whilst there is a growing prospect of the conflict worsening along with its macroeconomic effects (higher inflation, lower growth). Central banks have taken note of this this week, but are waiting for greater clarity on how events will unfold before deciding how to respond. The markets, too, are taking a more cautious stance and anticipate that central bank will adopt more restrictive policies than previously expected for over the rest of the year. So do we.</description><pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Middle-East-first-assessment-macroeconomic-damage-3/6/2026,53288</link><category>Global</category><category>Emerging Economies</category><category>Developed economies</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Energy</category><title>War in the Middle East: first assessment of the macroeconomic damage </title><description>The conflict in Iran is already having a significant impact on energy prices, particularly oil and gas. Inflation should therefore rise in March. Beyond that, the outlook will depend on the evolution of the conflict, but the situation remains highly uncertain.Three types of scenarios are plausible:1) A return to the status quo ante on the hydrocarbon market after a few weeks;2) A prolonged period of political uncertainty in Iran leading to a relatively modest, but sustained, rise in oil and gas prices;3) Acute and sustained tensions over oil and gas supplies. The latter two scenarios would constitute a stagflationary shock, i.e. one that slows growth and increases inflation.Fortunately, growth was generally robust on the eve of the shock. In addition, inflation was on track to be brought under control, or even better, allowing central banks not to rush to react. Consequently, even in adverse scenarios, growth would slow significantly but remain positive, and major central banks would be forced to tighten their current stance only in the hypothesis of the most severe scenario. Nevertheless, given the latent fragilities in financial markets, which were already apparent in the weeks leading up to this major geopolitical shock, the utmost caution is warranted.This EcoInsight analyses the impact of the various scenarios, first on energy prices and then on inflation, growth, central bank policies and exchange rates, for the main advanced and emerging economies.</description><pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/European-Union-carbon-transition-energy-sovereignty-path-fraught-obstacles-2/20/2026,53231</link><author>pascal.devaux@bnpparibas.com</author><category>European union</category><category>Climate change</category><category>International Trade</category><category>Economic growth</category><category>Consumption and purchasing power</category><category>Energy</category><category>Economic policy</category><category>Artificial intelligence</category><title>European Union: low carbon transition and energy sovereignty, a path fraught with obstacles</title><description>Key aspects of European policy, the low carbon transition and energy sovereignty programmes converge on many issues. Rising geopolitical tensions, the European energy crisis of 2022 and heightened international trade tensions have contributed to this convergence. At first glance, it seems obvious: Europe, which is structurally dependent on fossil fuel imports, has an interest in accelerating the decarbonisation of its energy mix in order to reduce its hydrocarbon imports. Nevertheless, the progress of the transition-sovereignty pairing remains a path fraught with obstacles. </description><pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item><item><link>https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Kevin-Warsh-Lead-Policy-Implications-2/5/2026,53202</link><a10:author><a10:name>Anis BENSAIDANI</a10:name><a10:email>anis.bensaidani@bnpparibas.com</a10:email></a10:author><a10:author><a10:name>Céline CHOULET</a10:name><a10:email>celine.choulet@bnpparibas.com</a10:email></a10:author><category>United States</category><category>Financial markets and investments</category><category>Financial regulations</category><category>Monetary policy</category><category>Inflation</category><category>Economic policy</category><title>Kevin Warsh to Lead the Fed: Policy Implications</title><description>Kevin Warsh is set to succeed Jerome Powell as Federal Reserve Chair in May 2026, pending Senate confirmation. President Donald Trump has picked a figure whose public and private track record is likely to reassure the financial markets. While Warsh has advocated lower rates and a reduction in the central bank's balance sheet, he will probably be constrained in his plans. Therefore, we do not expect any material shift in monetary policy in the short term.</description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><a10:rights type="text">© BNP Paribas - 2016</a10:rights></item></channel></rss>