Against a backdrop of rising regional geopolitical pressures, the economic crisis is deepening further in Egypt and now poses a threat to public finances. With no agreement reached with the IMF, the balance of payments crisis is continuing to unfold, and the adjustments needed are being postponed. As a result of the exchange rate depreciating and interest rates rocketing, this crisis has pushed the interest burden on government debt to a level that could quickly become unsustainable. As a matter of fact, it could hit 70% of government revenue this year and remain very high next year
Egypt’s management of external accounts, which consists of buying time thanks to external support between two drastic exchange rate readjustments, is reaching its limits. The persistence of a significant external financing need, notably due to the amortisation of external debt, and international creditors (Gulf States and the IMF) who condition their support on painful and politically costly reforms, have led the Egyptian economy to a dead end. The banks’ net external position is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Restrictions on foreign currency transactions are increasing, with negative consequences on activity in a country highly dependent on imports
For about a decade now, the exploitation of new natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has had significant economic consequences for producing countries, and has been upgrading the region’s position on the international gas market. Egypt still dominates the sector, with significant reserves and export infrastructure, but Israeli production is increasingly impacting the region’s exports. 2022 was a very favourable year for the sector due to rising prices and European demand. Despite the current decline in prices on the European market, this trend should continue in the coming years
Egypt is heavily exposed to the consequences of global warming due to its Mediterranean geographical location, high population growth and the importance of the agricultural sector. Already deemed critical, water stress is likely to increase in the medium and long term. The deteriorating trend of various vulnerability and resilience indicators, currently at medium levels, is increasing climate risk in the long term. The financial resources of the Egyptian government are extremely constrained, given the deteriorating macroeconomic situation and the unfavourable outlook. Transformation of the energy mix may be partially funded by private capital. However, funding for climate change reduction and adaptation policies, by definition less profitable in the short term, remains problematic.
The crisis is taking hold in Egypt, as evidenced by the deterioration in all macroeconomic indicators. Activity is slowing down against a backdrop of high inflation, caused in particular by the depreciation of the exchange rate. The balance of payments crisis has been endemic for a year, and the international support plan initiated by the IMF has not allowed any reduction in tensions regarding foreign currency liquidity. Despite the sharp rise in nominal rates on government securities, international investors remain cautious due to the very high level of inflation and expectations of currency depreciation. The external financing requirement will remain high for at least two years, with the privatisation programme only providing partial relief
Egyptian external accounts have been under pressure since the beginning of the year and the outlook is uncertain. Although the current account was able to withstand external shocks thanks to the rise in gas revenues, only the massive support of the Gulf countries enabled Egypt to cope with portfolio investment outflows and to avoid a foreign exchange crisis. The dynamic remains negative in the short term, given the drop in net foreign currency assets in the banking system and persistent exchange rate pressures, despite depreciation of more than 20% since the beginning of the year
Currency liquidity in Egypt continues to deteriorate at a rapid pace. The banking sector’s net foreign assets (commercial banks and the central bank) are deeply negative (USD -16.6 billion in May 2022) and significantly exceed the lowest level reached during the 2016 crisis (USD -13.8 billion in October 2016). This deterioration comes as no surprise and the effects of the war in Ukraine on commodity prices have only exacerbated a pre-existing trend. Given a large recurring current account deficit (at least USD 20 billion this year) and significant external debt repayments (around USD 9 billion over a whole year), the Egyptian economy relies heavily on volatile portfolio investments
Egypt’s economic prospects have worsened with the outbreak of war in Ukraine and its consequences for commodity prices. The widespread increase in prices will result in a significant drop in consumer purchasing power and will thus stall the main engine of economic activity. The erosion of foreign currency liquidity has accelerated over the last month, with massive outflows of capital and an expected widening of the current account deficit due to the difficulty in reducing imports, a drop in tourist frequentation and the limited effect on exports of the Egyptian pound’s depreciation. This highlights the continued vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and its reliance on external support
The sharp rise in soft commodity prices entails a deepening of the current-account deficit. It should accelerate the deterioration in foreign currency liquidity. In this context, a renewed international financial support could be needed.
Despite a significant improvement in macroeconomic indicators over the past five years, foreign currency liquidity remains a major source of vulnerability for the Egyptian economy. The net foreign asset position of commercial banks has steadily deteriorated over the past year and was in deficit by USD10 billion in December 2021, by far its lowest level for a decade. Meanwhile, gross currency reserves at the central bank grew only very slightly over the year. This deterioration of the external position of the banking system as a whole reflects that of the external accounts. The current account deficit is increasing following a sharp rise in imports
So far, Egypt’s economy has weathered the Covid-19 crisis without any significant worsening of its main macroeconomic indicators. GDP growth has remained positive, and the country's budget and external balances are relatively stable. The macroeconomic stabilisation achieved in previous years and external financial support are the main reasons behind these positive performances. In the short term, the outlook is mixed. The rebound in inflation, if it were to persist, could trigger a cycle of monetary tightening, with negative consequences for public finances. In addition, Egypt's external vulnerability remains significant given structural current account deficits and dependence on portfolio investment flows
Economic growth remained rather strong in FY 2020/21 thanks mainly to the dynamic momentum of household consumption and the moderate support of public spending. This bolstered the retail and construction sectors. Through cautious management of public finances, the government reported a slightly smaller fiscal deficit in FY 2020/21, and it should continue to report an improvement this year despite possible upward pressures on current expenditures. The main obstacle to a more ambitious fiscal policy lies in the government’s debt service, which despite better financing conditions, will only narrow very gradually
The Egyptian economy proved to be resilient last year. Economic growth remained positive thanks to fiscal support, and the main macroeconomic metrics did not deteriorate significantly thanks notably to international support. The good fiscal performance was noteworthy, and will help maintain the attractiveness of Egyptian debt. This said, it would be wise to remain cautious. On the one hand, the rate of vaccination is slow and the pandemic is still active; on the other hand, the external accounts remain vulnerable, and the improvement in the external energy balance seen in 2020 may not continue in the short term.
In first-half 2020, a massive sell-off of treasury bills by non-resident investors (-USD 12 bn starting in March 2020), combined with a decline in tourism revenues, albeit to a lesser extent, triggered a drop-off in the central bank’s foreign reserves. In May, foreign reserves declined by USD 9 bn to USD 36 bn. At the same time, the net external position of commercial banks swung from a surplus of USD 7.2 bn to a deficit of USD 5.4 bn. At the end of May, foreign currency liquidity in the banking system was still at an acceptable level, since official reserves still accounted for 5.8 months of imports of goods and services
The Egyptian economy has performed pretty well in the face of the pandemic. Activity has been bolstered by major public investment projects, whilst inflation has fallen well below the central bank’s target. The fiscal and current account deficits are likely to increase, but international support and access to capital markets at favourable conditions have contributed to a macroeconomic stabilisation. The continuation of a high policy rate at the central bank has helped keep the Egyptian market attractive to international investors. Thanks to injections of liquidity, lending remains strong, although this increases the exposure of banks to sovereign debt and credit risk in an increasingly uncertain environment.
Since March 2020, the deterioration in the global economic environment has stopped the appreciation of the Egyptian pound. In 2019, the pound appreciated by 12% against the USD with the rise in current account receipts and sustained portfolio inflows. Since March, massive portfolio outflows have entailed the pound’s moderate 1.2% depreciation and a decline in the official foreign reserves of the Central Bank (CBE) by 11%. In the short term, current account revenues should weather the drop in Suez Canal and tourism revenues (20% of current account receipts in total). The CBE’s fx liquidity (8 months of imports of goods and services including tier-2 reserves) and the IMF financial support should allow the CBE to ease pressure on the pound in order to limit imported inflation
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Egyptian economy will be significant and will result in a sharp economic growth slowdown this year. Growth is nevertheless likely to remain positive. In the short term, the expected deterioration in public finances is sustainable, and the government can deal with a temporary downturn in international investors’ appetite for Egyptian debt. Foreign currency liquidity across the whole banking system has improved significantly in recent months, supporting the pound in the currency market. As a result, the financing of the current account deficit, repayment of foreign debt and the ability to cover massive capital outflows are all guaranteed for the short term.
Although still showing a significant deficit, the trade balance has improved substantially since 2017. It has benefited from a recovery in hydrocarbon exports, whilst the steep depreciation of the pound has had only limited consequences on trade in non-hydrocarbon goods. A substantial share of imports is incompressible, whilst structural constraints weigh on the country’s export potential. Moreover, the moderate appreciation of the pound over the past year has not helped price competitiveness. Measures have been introduced to support exports, but we remain cautious on the prospects for a significant improvement in international trade over the medium term.
Through economic consolidation measures implemented since 2016, Egypt has corrected its macroeconomic imbalances and regained the confidence of international investors. Foreign currency liquidity has returned to satisfying levels, the public account deficit is narrowing, although debt service is maintaining the fiscal deficit at a high level. Inflation is still relatively high but easing. Economic prospects are favourable. So far, the macroeconomic recovery has failed to trigger new momentum capable of accelerating growth and creating jobs. The weight of public sector and a large informal sector reduce the economy’s responsiveness to positive macroeconomic signals. Structural reforms are necessary to preserve the achievements of ongoing reforms.
Due to the country’s economic development, the agricultural sector is in relative decline as a share of GDP. Moreover, investment in agriculture is fairly sluggish. Yet the sector still plays a decisive role in food security in Egypt, a country where demographic growth is strong and households are highly sensitive to food prices. The agri-food sector also has an impact on macroeconomic fundamentals, including inflation, foreign trade and the public accounts. For Egypt, like the rest of the region, water resources are a major issue. Yet in Egypt’s case, this issue is especially crucial given the uncertainty that looms over the waters of the Nile and their availability for agriculture in the medium term.
Egypt is a large and diversified economy. It has the largest population in the MENA region (more than 100 million Egyptians). The implementation of economic reforms since 2016 (with International Monetary Fund support) has restored an acceptable macroeconomic situation. However some vulnerabilities and weaknesses remain. External liquidity is subject to volatile portfolio flows and variable tourism activity. The government debt is high (but mostly domestic) and the budget continues to be heavily constrained by the need to service debt. The recourse to IMF financial support to weather the economic consequences of the pandemic highlights the ongoing need for international support.
Economic activity is sustainable thanks to household consumption (driven by the demography) and public investments in infrastructure. Nevertheless, job creation is far from being sufficient to absorb new entrants in the job market. As a consequence, the informal sector is large. The role of the public sector in the economy is very significant. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have been sustained for several years and have been concentrated in the hydrocarbon sector.
