

“ Gas supplies to European countries remain a key issue, not only in terms of exposure to geopolitical risk but also in terms of economic stability. ”



ECONOMIC RESEARCH



**BNP PARIBAS**

The bank  
for a changing  
world

# TABLE OF CONTENT

2

---

3

## EDITORIAL

Gas supply: will Europe soon be less vulnerable?

---

4

## ECONEWS

Key points of the economic week

---

6

## MARKETS OVERVIEW

Recent market developments (foreign exchange, stock markets, interest rates, commodities, etc.)

---

7

## FURTHER READING

Latest articles, charts, videos and podcasts of Economic Research



**BNP PARIBAS**

The bank  
for a changing  
world

## EDITORIAL

3

## GAS SUPPLY: WILL EUROPE SOON BE LESS VULNERABLE?

Since the cessation of most Russian gas supplies, reducing Europe's energy vulnerability, and thus improving its economic security, has been a key issue for European decision-makers. However, recent pressure from the United States on Europe to increase its purchases of US hydrocarbons could raise fears of a new significant dependence on US liquefied natural gas (LNG).

In general, gas supplies to European countries remain a key issue, not only in terms of exposure to geopolitical risk but also in terms of economic stability. Despite significant progress in decarbonisation, natural gas still accounts for a quarter of the total European energy mix and around 18% of the electricity mix. Above all, its price is the key factor in setting wholesale electricity prices in Europe: according to the 'merit order' principle, priority is given to energy sources with the lowest marginal cost for electricity supply, while the price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) is set at the highest marginal cost. Given the structure of the European electricity mix, gas-fired power stations are generally the last to be called upon, and therefore determine the European price per kWh on the wholesale market.

## SHARP RISE IN US LNG IMPORTS

Europe's dependence on Russian gas has fallen sharply since 2022. It has fallen from around 50% of total gas imports until 2021 to 13% in the first half of 2025. Only the flows transported by the Turkstream gas pipeline, which supplies certain Eastern European countries, and LNG flows remain.

Since 2022, European demand for gas has fallen for three main reasons: 1/ the sharp rise in gas prices in 2022-23, 2/ the shutdown of certain energy-intensive industrial production, replaced by imported products, and 3/ the increase in the share of renewable energies in the European energy mix. At the same time, European demand that was no longer met by Russian gas has been largely satisfied by US LNG imports. These have quadrupled since the end of 2021 and now account for more than a quarter of European gas imports.

Since this summer, US pressure to increase hydrocarbon purchases has intensified. An agreement provides for a record, and unrealistic, number of European purchases of US energy: it would result in a tripling of US fossil fuel imports (oil, gas and coal), which would reach 70% of imports (compared to around 20% currently). US pressure has intensified in recent weeks, prompting the European Commission to propose bringing forward the end of Russian LNG imports by one year (to the beginning rather than the end of 2027). In this context, and given the ongoing increase in US gas liquefaction capacity, it is questionable whether we will see one dependency being replaced by another.

## POSSIBLE TENSIONS ON THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET IN THE SHORT TERM

In 2025, European demand for US LNG is strong and is expected to remain so due to the need to replenish European gas stocks and the halt, since the beginning of the year, of Russian gas imports via Ukraine. European gas stocks are currently at a satisfactory level (around 82%) compared to the (revised downwards) target of 80% by 1 November. Seasonal factors (sharp drop in temperatures during the winter period) and geopolitical factors (disruption of gas flows in the eastern Mediterranean) could push European gas prices up – but to a moderate extent – and support US exports.

## LIMITED RISK OF EXCESSIVE DEPENDENCE IN THE MEDIUM TERM

Looking ahead to 2030, our projections put the risk of increased dependence on US suppliers into perspective. European gas demand is following a structurally downward trend. So far, this decline is in line with the objectives of the RePower programme (approximately -10%

EUROPEAN GAS IMPORTS BY SOURCE (% OF TOTAL GAS IMPORTS)




CHART 1

SOURCE: BRUEGEL DATASETS, BNP PARIBAS

per year by 2030). Taking a more conservative scenario (the European 'Fit for 55' programme, which assumes a reduction in European demand of around 3% per year), we estimate that European dependence on US gas could remain significant but is unlikely to increase significantly between now and 2030, despite the planned halt to Russian imports from 2027 onwards.

The natural decline in output from European fields (EU, UK and Norway) should be offset by increased imports from Azerbaijan from 2027 onwards. We also assume that current LNG import volumes (excluding Russia and the US) will remain stable. Under this scenario, European imports from the United States would peak in 2027, accounting for 74% of LNG imports and 35% of total gas imports. These proportions would fall to 70% and 31% respectively in 2030, in line with the reduction in import volumes. Dependence on US LNG imports is therefore not expected to increase significantly, unless European nations sever ties with their traditional suppliers (notably North Africa, Norway and the United Kingdom).

Furthermore, the geopolitical risk associated with dependence on gas transported via pipelines is not the same as that associated with the LNG market. Indeed, LNG suppliers are relatively easy to replace, albeit with a certain delay and additional cost. The global outlook for the LNG market is favourable to increased market fluidity. Massive quantities of LNG are expected to come onto the market by 2030, mainly from Qatar and, to a lesser extent, Canada and sub-Saharan Africa. This will enable Europe to diversify its portfolio of suppliers.

Overall, while the outlook for the European gas market remains relatively tense in the short term, making price increases and increased dependence on US suppliers likely, in the medium term it is likely that the risk of excessive dependence will diminish and that abundant supply will weigh on prices.

Pascal Devaux

pascal.devaux@bnpparibas.com



BNP PARIBAS

The bank  
for a changing  
world

[Find out more in our scenario and forecasts](#)

## PROTECTIONISM/INTERNATIONAL TRADE

**Surprise new salvo from the US.** On 25 September, Donald Trump announced new tariffs to take effect on 1 October: 100% on "branded" and/or "patented" medicines (unless production units are opened in the United States), 50% and 30% on bathroom and kitchen furniture respectively, and 25% on heavy goods vehicles. Agreements between the European Union and Japan with the United States cap the tariff on these products at 15%. See our [Focus on international trade](#).

## ADVANCED ECONOMIES

### UNITED STATES

**Growth remains strong, no indication of the Fed's next decisions.** GDP growth for Q2 has been revised by +0.5 pp to +3.8% annualised q/q (after -0.6% in Q1), due to household consumption (+0.9 pp to +2.5%) and non-residential investment (+1.6 pp to +7.3%). In August, core orders for durable goods rose (+0.4% m/m, -0.7pp), and consumer spending accelerated (+0.6% m/m, +0.1pp). New home sales, up +20.5% m/m, reached their highest level in nearly four years: 800k (annualised). Existing home sales were relatively stable (4.1 million, -0.1k, annualised). **The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow suggests annualised growth of 3.9% q/q in Q3, compared with +2.9% according to our forecasts. As for the Fed,** we anticipate two 25bp rate cuts, in October and December. J. Powell maintains the scenario of a temporary rise in inflation due to tariffs but indicates that his board will ensure that this does not "become an inflation problem", without giving any indication of future rate decisions. Inflation, as measured by the PCE, rose to +2.7% y/y (+0.1pp, m/m to +0.3% +0.1pp) in August. Core PCE remained stable at +2.9% y/y and +0.2% m/m. *The next employment report (Friday 3 October) will be closely scrutinised. Also coming up: risk of government shutdown (Thursday); ISM manufacturing (Wednesday) and non-manufacturing (Friday).*

### EUROZONE / EU

**PMI indices were broadly stable in September.** The composite PMI (+0.2 points to 51.2) was in expansion territory in September for the 9<sup>th</sup> consecutive month. The services PMI is at its highest level in a year (+0.9 points to 51.4) and the manufacturing PMI (49.5, down 1.2 points over the month) remains well above its December 2024 level (45). Household confidence was largely unchanged (+0.6 points to -14.9 in September). Median household inflation expectations for the next 12 months rose by 0.2pp m/m to 2.8% in August (the highest level in three months). *Coming up: Economic sentiment index (Monday), flash inflation (Wednesday), unemployment rate (Thursday), PPI (Friday).*

**France: wait-and-see attitude in the private sector, as budget discussions are slow to deliver a verdict (see [French economy: four strengths and one weakness](#)).** The composite PMI fell to 48.4 in September (-1.4 points m/m), to 48.9 in services (-0.9 points) and to 48.1 in manufacturing (-2.3 points), bringing these indicators back to their July levels. Weak demand weighed heavily, but industry and services continued to create jobs. Household confidence remained stable at 87 in September (13 points below its historical average). The balance of opinion on the advisability of making major purchases contracted by 4 points m/m to -31, although the intention to purchase real estate continued to rebound (9.5% of households, +0.5 points m/m, +2.5 points over 3 months). **As the deadline approaches, the first elements of the budget framework are emerging:** a draft finance bill must be submitted to Parliament by 13 October. The Prime Minister has announced a target budget deficit of 4.7% of GDP in 2026 (compared with 4.6% for his predecessor and 5.4% in 2025). Without giving details, he announced EUR 6 billion in savings on government spending, with increases limited to EUR 6 billion for pensions and EUR 5 billion for health. The details could be revealed after the government's announcement, or even during the budget debate in the Assembly. *Coming up: government announcement, September inflation and August housing construction (Tuesday), August industrial production (Friday).*

**Germany: Mixed business climate (see our [EcoFlash on the September IFO](#)).** The IFO index fell to 87.7 in September (-1.2 pts m/m) due to services. This decline does not call into question the recovery observed in industry (8 out of 21 industrial sectors are recovering or expanding, compared with 3 in December), but it is not spreading to other sectors. Contrary to the IFO, the composite PMI continued its rebound in September (52.4, +1.9 pts m/m), driven by services (52.5, +3.2 pts m/m). The PMI associated with manufacturing production remained in expansion territory (52.2, -0.7 pts m/m). The decline in new orders could affect future activity. Household confidence (GfK index) rebounded in September (to -22.3, +1.2 m/m), but remains lower than between April and July (-20.7 on average). *Coming up: inflation and unemployment (September) and retail sales (August).*

**Spain: Good news.** Producer prices fell in August (-1.5% y/y, the lowest level since October 2024), dragged down by energy (-4.5%, compared with +7.5% y/y on average over the last nine months). **Q2 GDP growth was revised upwards** to +0.8% q/q (+0.1 pp). Following S&P on 12 September, Fitch and Moody's upgraded Spain's sovereign rating (from A- to A and from Baa1 to A3 respectively). *Coming up: inflation, retail sales (Monday), current account (Tuesday), manufacturing PMI (Wednesday), unemployment (Thursday), composite and services PMI (Friday).*

### UNITED KINGDOM

**Decline in PMIs,** including the manufacturing PMI at 46.2 (-0.8 points, lowest in four months). The production index underpins the decline (45.4, -3.9 pts). The services PMI returned to its July level after a sharp rise in August (51.9 in September, -2.3 pts). The composite PMI reached 51.0 (-2.5 pts). Sentiment regarding retail sales (CBI) recovered to -29 (from -32 previously). The Governor of the BoE indicated that further monetary easing was possible (we anticipate two 25bp rate cuts, one in Q4 2025 and the other in Q1 2026).

### JAPAN

**Slowdown in production in September.** The composite PMI fell to 51.1 (-0.9pp) in September (47.3, -2.5pp for manufacturing; 53, -0.1pp for services). The manufacturing PMI highlights a contraction in hiring, the first since November 2024. *Coming up: industrial production, retail sales and BoJ Summary of Opinions (Tuesday), Q3 Tankan (Wednesday), LDP leadership election (Saturday).*





## EMERGING ECONOMIES

## ASIA

**China: Profits of industrial enterprises rebounded in August**, rising 20.4% y/y after three months of decline. In the first eight months of 2025, profits rose slightly by +0.9% y/y. This rebound is partly due to base effects (profits had fallen by -17.8% y/y in August 2024 after four months of increase). It can also be seen as the first effects of anti-involution measures, which aim to combat "disorderly" competition and deflation.

**Thailand: Negative outlook on sovereign rating.** Fitch has placed the sovereign rating (BBB+) on negative outlook due to growth risks and political uncertainty. Although US tariffs on Thailand are similar to those imposed on other Asian countries, exports already slowed in August (+5.8% y/y vs. +14.4% in the first seven months of 2025). The economic growth outlook is downwards, while public debt continues to rise (+3 pp of GDP over the last twelve months). It reached 59.4% of GDP in August (vs. 33.7% in 2019).

## EUROPE

**Czech Republic and Hungary: Monetary status quo.** The Czech Central Bank kept its policy rate unchanged at 3.50% for the 4th consecutive month after two cuts (50 basis points in total) at the beginning of the year. In Hungary, the policy rate, unchanged at 6.50% since September 2024, is the highest in Central Europe. In both countries, caution remains the order of the day, even though inflation has slowed over the last three months (Czech Republic: +2.5% y/y in August; Hungary: +4.3%) and currencies have appreciated against the dollar and the euro since the start of the year. These factors need to be tempered by persistent wage pressures, credit growth and rising property prices, particularly in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, inflation may resurge after the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2026, and a return to target is not expected before 2027.

**Poland and Hungary: Unemployment rate increase.** In Poland, the unemployment rate, at 5.5% in August, deteriorated for the third consecutive month. It is now at its highest level since February 2023. However, the labour market remains broadly buoyant, with strong growth in real wages. In Hungary, the unemployment rate deteriorated slightly in August.

## LATAM

**Argentina: Potential financial support from the United States and measures to support USD liquidity.** US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has committed to President Milei to consider "all options for stabilising" the country's dollar liquidity. These options include, but are not limited to, a currency swap line or direct purchases of Argentine dollar-denominated government debt from the US Treasury's foreign exchange stabilisation fund. In addition, the Argentine government announced the temporary suspension of export taxes on many of the country's key crops in order to encourage exporters to repatriate their dollars more quickly. Following these announcements, the peso appreciated to 1329 (above its lower limit).

**Brazil: Budget rule relaxed to offset the effects of US tariffs.** The Senate approved a bill excluding BRL 9.5 bn (EUR 1.5 bn) in spending from the budget targets for 2025 and 2026. This exemption is intended to accommodate measures deployed to offset the 50% tariffs imposed in August by the US on many Brazilian products. Rather than opting for retaliation, Brazil has favoured local measures focusing on three areas: credit lines, export guarantees for SMEs and a commitment to purchase stocks of perishable goods. The markets barely reacted to these announcements, as the "Brazil Soberano" support package, which is behind the measures, had already been presented in August.

**Mexico: Monetary easing continues.** The Central Bank lowered its key interest rate by 25 basis points (to 7.5%, its lowest level in three years) on 25 September. Easing could continue, and the Central Bank's statement mentions the appreciation of the peso (more than 10% against the USD since the end of January), the economic slowdown (confirmed by the decline in retail sales and the monthly activity index) and the high level of uncertainty surrounding US trade policy. The Central Bank confirmed its goal of converging inflation towards 3% in Q3 2026. Inflation accelerated in August to 3.6% y/y after three months of decline. Core inflation remained relatively stable at around 4.2% y/y.

**Peru and Chile: Joint copper mining development project.** At the PERUMIN 37 mining convention held last week, the Chilean and Peruvian energy ministers announced a major cooperation project aimed at supplying 51% of global copper demand within 15 years. The details are not yet known, but the stated objective is to upgrade the industries of both countries by offering a growing proportion of high value-added products, particularly for car manufacturers.

## AFRICA

**Morocco: The Central Bank has left its policy rate unchanged at 2.25%.** Inflation is under control (averaging 1.1% since the beginning of 2025) and economic activity is robust. Global uncertainties have tipped the balance in favour of the monetary status quo. Reforms are continuing, with a shift to inflation targeting planned for early 2027. However, making the exchange rate regime more flexible no longer seems to be on the agenda, as the governor believes that the economy as a whole is not ready to cope with increased currency volatility. **S&P has assigned Morocco's sovereign an investment grade rating (BBB-).** The economy's resilience to shocks, sectoral changes and the credibility of the fiscal consolidation policy are the main reasons for the upgrade.

**Nigeria: GDP growth continues to accelerate.** Measured over four quarters, it reached 3.8% in Q2 2025 (+0.2pp compared to Q1). It is driven in particular by the hydrocarbon sector (+7.4% over the same period). The Central Bank lowered its policy rate for the first time in five years (-50bp to 27%). Inflation fell to 20.1% y/y in August, compared with 21.8% in July.

**Democratic Republic of Congo: The embargo on cobalt exports has been replaced by quotas.** The embargo, in force since February, has enabled the cobalt price to rebound by 60% to USD 35,000 per tonne. The Congolese authorities have set the export quota at 96,600 tonnes for 2026, hoping to stabilise prices around current levels.



# MARKETS OVERVIEW

6

## Bond Markets

	In %	In bps			
	26/09/2025	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
Bund 2Y	2,00	+0,4	+8,5	-5,6	-36,8
Bund 5Y	2,29	+0,9	+7,0	+17,6	+30,5
Bund 10Y	2,70	-0,2	+2,6	+33,9	+60,4
OAT 10Y	3,49	+0,6	-0,9	+36,9	+61,3
BTP 10Y	3,59	+3,4	+1,9	+16,9	+23,3
BONO 10Y	3,25	+1,1	-0,6	+23,1	+34,0
Treasuries 2Y	3,69	+8,4	-2,5	-56,5	+2,7
Treasuries 5Y	3,75	+9,0	+2,4	-63,2	+18,9
Treasuries 10Y	4,16	+5,7	-7,5	-41,2	+37,6
Gilt 2Y	4,03	+4,5	+5,5	-11,3	+25,6
Treasuries 5Y	4,19	+5,0	+4,1	-16,0	+33,5
Gilt 10Y	4,75	+3,2	1,2	+17,7	+74,1

## Currencies & Commodities

	Level	Change, %			
	26/09/2025	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
EUR/USD	1,17	-0,6	+0,3	+12,9	+4,7
GBP/USD	1,34	-0,6	-0,6	+7,0	+0,0
USD/JPY	149,51	+1,1	+1,4	-4,9	+3,2
DXY	111,99	+7,9	+11,5	+10,5	+6,1
EUR/GBP	0,87	+0,0	+0,9	+5,5	+4,7
EUR/CHF	0,93	-0,1	-0,4	-0,5	-1,3
EUR/JPY	174,80	+0,5	+1,7	+7,4	+8,1
Oil, Brent (\$/bbl)	70,12	+5,1	+4,3	-6,2	-3,0
Gold (\$/ounce)	3775	+2,8	+11,6	+43,8	+41,6

## Equity Indices

	Level	Change, %			
	26/09/2025	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
<b>World</b>					
MSCI World (\$)	4276	-0,4	+2,4	+15,3	+14,9
<b>North America</b>					
S&P500	6644	-0,3	+2,7	+13,0	+15,6
Dow Jones	46247	-0,1	+1,8	+8,7	+9,7
Nasdaq composite	22484	-0,7	+4,4	+16,4	+23,6
<b>Europe</b>					
CAC 40	7871	+0,2	+2,1	+6,6	+1,7
DAX 30	23739	+0,4	-1,7	+19,2	+23,4
EuroStoxx50	5500	+0,8	+2,2	+12,3	+9,3
FTSE100	9285	+0,7	+0,2	+13,6	+12,1
<b>Asia</b>					
MSCI, loc.	1605	+0,6	+1,9	+12,0	+14,1
Nikkei	45355	+0,7	+7,0	+13,7	+16,5
<b>Emerging</b>					
MSCI Emerging (\$)	1326	-1,1	+4,0	+23,1	+13,9
China	87	-0,9	+4,2	+34,6	+34,0
India	1009	-3,9	-1,5	-1,9	-13,3
Brazil	1564	-0,9	+7,1	+32,9	+3,9

## Performance by sector

### Eurostoxx600

Year 2025 to 26-9, €


+47,1%	Banks
+20,3%	Industry
+18,2%	Insurance
+15,9%	Oil & Gas
+14,9%	Utilities
+13,3%	Construction
<b>+9,2%</b>	<b>Eurostoxx600</b>
+9,0%	Telecoms
+5,6%	Commodities
+2,7%	Financial services
+1,7%	Technology
+1,6%	Retail
-0,9%	Food industry
-1,2%	Travel & leisure
-1,6%	Real Estate
-4,5%	Chemical
-7,3%	Health
-8,5%	Consumption Goods
-14,0%	Media

### S&P500


Year 2025 to 26-9, \$

+34,7%	Semiconductors
+25,9%	Media
+24,1%	Bank
+20,7%	Capital Goods
+19,0%	Real Estate
+14,5%	Utilities
+14,4%	Telecoms
<b>+13,0%</b>	<b>S&amp;P500</b>
+10,6%	Automobiles
+7,5%	Energy
+7,1%	Tech. Hardware & Equip.
+6,7%	Materials
+5,4%	Consumer Services
+5,3%	Retail
+5,0%	Food, Beverage & Tobacco
+3,6%	Consumer Discretionary
+3,4%	Insurance
+2,1%	Commercial & Pro. Services
-1,1%	Healthcare
-1,8%	Pharmaceuticals


### Bund 10Y & US Treas. 10Y




### Bund 10Y & OAT 10Y




### EUR/USD & GBP/USD




### EUROSTOXX 50 & S&P500



### Oil, Brent (\$/bbl)




### Gold (\$/ounce)



### MSCI World (\$)



### MSCI Emerging (\$)



SOURCE: LSEG, BLOOMBERG, BNP PARIBAS  
DATA VISUALISATION AND CARTOGRAPHY: TARIK RHARRAB


**BNP PARIBAS**

The bank  
for a changing  
world

# FURTHER READING

7

<a href="#">Germany: despite the decline in the IFO index in September, there are signs that the recovery is progressing slowly but surely</a>	EcoFlash	25 September 2025
<a href="#">Monetary policy: What's next?</a>	Special Edition	25 September 2025
<a href="#">Eurozone: Forecast disagreement declines during the forecasted year... but not in 2025</a>	Chart of the Week	24 September 2025
<a href="#">EcoPerspectives — Advanced Economies   3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 2025</a>	EcoPerspectives	24 September 2025
<a href="#">French economy: four strengths and one weakness</a>	EcoWeek	22 September 2025
<a href="#">FOMC: Easing Under Constraints</a>	EcoFlash	18 September 2025
<a href="#">Increase in US tariffs: Europe fares best</a>	Chart of the Week	17 September 2025
<a href="#">Domestic credit supporting growth in emerging countries</a>	EcoWeek	15 September 2025
<a href="#">The US Treasuries market: an idol with feet of clay. A safe haven put to the test</a>	EcoInsight	12 September 2025
<a href="#">CO2 emissions: when the trend in China reverses...</a>	Chart of the Week	10 September 2025
<a href="#">Productivity, growth and employment in the AI era: a literature review</a>	EcoInsight	9 September 2025
<a href="#">In China, economic growth remains resilient but the fight against deflation is far from won</a>	EcoWeek	8 September 2025
<a href="#">United States: lackluster summer employment data will prompt the Fed to act</a>	EcoFlash	5 September 2025
<a href="#">United States: Will the Genius Act have the desired effect on demand for T-bills?</a>	Chart of the Week	3 <sup>rd</sup> September 2025
<a href="#">India: fiscal policy to support growth</a>	EcoFlash	2 <sup>nd</sup> September 2025
<a href="#">How high can they go? A longer-term perspective on long-term interest rates, with a focus on the US</a>	EcoInsight	2 <sup>nd</sup> September 2025
<a href="#">What should we take away from this summer's economic developments, and what should we monitor this fall ?</a>	EcoWeek	1 <sup>st</sup> September 2025
<a href="#">The US Treasuries Market: An Idol with Feet of Clay. US Federal Debt: The Risks of Abundance</a>	EcoInsight	29 August 2025
<a href="#">What Made Powell Blink?</a>	EcoWeek	25 August 2025
<a href="#">United States: Yellow Alert on Activity</a>	EcoFlash	6 August 2025
<a href="#">Tariff tracker - 31 July 2025 update</a>	Tariff Tracker	31 July 2025



# GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH

<b>Isabelle Mateos y Lago</b> Group Chief Economist	+33 1 87 74 01 97	isabelle.mateosylago@bnpparibas.com
<b>Hélène Baudchon</b> Deputy Chief Economist, Head of Global Macroeconomic Research	+33 1 58 16 03 63	helene.baudchon@bnpparibas.com
<b>Stéphane Alby</b> Maghreb, Middle East	+33 1 42 98 02 04	stephane.alby@bnpparibas.com
<b>Lucie Barette</b> Europe, Southern Europe	+33 1 87 74 02 08	lucie.barette@bnpparibas.com
<b>Anis Bensaidani</b> United States, Japan	+33 1 87 74 01 51	anis.bensaidani@bnpparibas.com
<b>Céline Choulet</b> Banking Economics	+33 1 43 16 95 54	celine.choulet@bnpparibas.com
<b>Stéphane Colliac</b> Head of Advanced economies – France	+33 1 42 98 26 77	stephane.colliac@bnpparibas.com
<b>Guillaume Derrien</b> Europe, Eurozone, United Kingdom – World Trade	+33 1 55 77 71 89	guillaume.a.derrien@bnpparibas.com
<b>Pascal Devaux</b> Middle East, Western Balkans – Energy	+33 1 43 16 95 51	pascal.devaux@bnpparibas.com
<b>Hélène Drouot</b> Latin America	+33 1 42 98 33 00	helene.drouot@bnpparibas.com
<b>François Faure</b> Head of Country Risk – Türkiye	+33 1 42 98 79 82	francois.faure@bnpparibas.com
<b>Salim Hammad</b> Head of Data & Analytics – Brazil	+33 1 42 98 74 26	salim.hammad@bnpparibas.com
<b>Thomas Humblot</b> Banking Economics	+33 1 40 14 30 77	thomas.humblot@bnpparibas.com
<b>Cynthia Kalasopatan Antoine</b> Central Europe, Ukraine	+33 1 53 31 59 32	cynthia.kalasopatanantoine@bnpparibas.com
<b>Johanna Melka</b> Asia	+33 1 58 16 05 84	johanna.melka@bnpparibas.com
<b>Marianne Mueller</b> Europe, Germany, Netherlands	+33 1 40 14 48 11	marianne.mueller@bnpparibas.com
<b>Christine Peltier</b> Head of Emerging economies – Asia	+33 1 42 98 56 27	christine.peltier@bnpparibas.com
<b>Lucas Plé</b> Sub-saharan Africa, Colombia, Central America	+33 1 40 14 50 18	lucas.ple@bnpparibas.com
<b>Jean-Luc Proutat</b> Head of Economic Projections	+33 1 58 16 73 32	jean-luc.proutat@bnpparibas.com
<b>Laurent Quignon</b> Head of Banking Economics	+33 1 42 98 56 54	laurent.quignon@bnpparibas.com
<b>Tarik Rharrab</b> Data scientist	+33 1 43 16 95 56	tarik.rharrab@bnpparibas.com
<b>Mickaëlle Fils Marie-Luce</b> Media contact	+33 1 42 98 48 59	mickaelle.filsmarie-luce@bnpparibas.com



**BNP PARIBAS**

**The bank  
for a changing  
world**



# GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH

## ECOINSIGHT

Structural or thematic topics

## ECOPERSPECTIVES

Analyses and forecasts with a focus on developed and emerging economies.

## ECOFASH

Data releases, major economic events

## ECOWEEK

Recent economic and policy developments, data comments, economic calendar, forecasts

## ECOPULSE

Monthly barometer of key economic indicators of the main OECD countries

## ECOCHARTS

Easy-to-read monthly overview of inflation dynamics

## ECOATLAS

The key economic figures for France and major European economies

## CHART OF THE WEEK

A weekly chart highlighting points of interest in the world economy

## ECOTV

What is the key event of the month?

You will find the answer in our economy broadcast.

## MACROWAVES

Our economic podcast

HOW TO RECEIVE OUR PUBLICATIONS

**SUBSCRIBE ON OUR WEBSITE**  
see the [Economic Research website](#)

**&**

**FOLLOW US ON LINKEDIN**  
see the [Economic Research linkedin page](#)

**OR TWITTER**  
see the [Economic Research Twitter page](#)



The information and opinions contained in this document have been obtained from, or are based on, public sources believed to be reliable, but there is no guarantee of the accuracy, completeness or fitness for any particular purpose of such information and such information may not have been independently verified by BNPP or by any person. None of BNPP, any of its subsidiary undertakings or affiliates or its members, directors, officers, agents or employees accepts any responsibility or liability whatsoever or makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy and completeness of the information or any opinions based thereon and contained in this document and it should not be relied upon as such. This document does not constitute research, as defined under MIFID II, or form any part of any offer to sell or issue and is not a solicitation of any offer to purchase any financial instrument, nor shall it or any part of it nor the fact of its distribution form the basis of, or be relied on, in connection with any contract or investment decision. Information and opinions contained in this document are published for the information of recipients, but are not to be relied upon as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgment by any recipient, are subject to change without notice. In providing this document, BNPP does not offer investment, financial, legal, tax or any other type of advice to, nor has any fiduciary duties towards, recipients. Any reference to past performance is not indicative of future performance, which may be better or worse than prior results. Any hypothetical, past performance simulations are the result of estimates made by BNPP, as of a given moment, on the basis of parameters, market conditions, and historical data selected by BNPP, and should not be used as guidance, in any way, of future performance. To the fullest extent permitted by law, no BNPP group company accepts any liability whatsoever (including in negligence) for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of or reliance on material contained in this document even when advised of the possibility of such losses. All estimates and opinions included in this document are made as of the date of this document. Unless otherwise indicated in this document there is no intention to update this document. BNPP may make a market in, or may, as principal or agent, buy or sell securities of any issuer or person mentioned in this document or derivatives thereon. Prices, yields and other similar information included in this document are included for information purposes however numerous factors will affect market pricing at any particular time, such information may be subject to rapid change and there is no certainty that transactions could be executed at any specified price. BNPP may have a financial interest in any issuer or person mentioned in this document, including a long or short position in their securities and/or options, futures or other derivative instruments based thereon, or vice versa. BNPP, including its officers and employees may serve or have served as an officer, director or in an advisory capacity for any person mentioned in this document. BNPP may, from time to time, solicit, perform or have performed investment banking, underwriting or other services (including acting as adviser, manager, underwriter or lender) within the last 12 months for any person referred to in this document. BNPP may be a party to an agreement with any person relating to the production of this document. BNPP may to the extent permitted by law, have acted upon or used the information contained herein or in the document, or the analysis on which it was based, before the document was published. BNPP may receive or intend to seek compensation for investment banking services in the next three months from or in relation to any person mentioned in this document. Any person mentioned in this document may have been provided with relevant sections of this document prior to its publication in order to verify its factual accuracy.

This document was produced by a BNPP group company. This document is for the use of intended recipients and may not be reproduced (in whole or in part) or delivered or transmitted to any other person without the prior written consent of BNPP. By accepting or accessing this document you agree to this.

BNP Paribas is a société anonyme incorporated in France, licensed and supervised as a credit institution by the European Central Bank (ECB) and as an investment services provider by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) and Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), and having its registered office at 16, boulevard des Italiens, 75009 Paris, France.

Some or all of the information contained in this document may already have been published on <https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com>.

For country-specific disclaimers (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Israel, Bahrain, South Africa, Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam) please type the following URL to access the applicable legal notices: [https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com/gm/home/Markets\\_360\\_Country\\_Specific\\_Notices.pdf](https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com/gm/home/Markets_360_Country_Specific_Notices.pdf)

© BNP Paribas (2025). All rights reserved.

Subscribe to our publications:

**ECONOMIC RESEARCH**



Published by BNP PARIBAS Economic Research

Head office: 16 boulevard des Italiens - 75009 Paris France / Phone : +33 (0) 1.42.98.12.34

Internet: [www.group.bnpparibas](http://www.group.bnpparibas) - [www.economic-research.bnpparibas.com](http://www.economic-research.bnpparibas.com)

Head of publication : Jean Lemierre / Chief editor: Isabelle Mateos y Lago

Copyright image: Kentoh



**BNP PARIBAS**

The bank  
for a changing  
world