ECOWEEK

Issue 24.07 19 February 2024





The bank for a changing world

TABLE OF CONTENT

3

EDITORIAL

Addressing the public debt challenge in the EU: the role of the new economic governance

5

MARKETS OVERVIEW

Recent market developments (foreign exchange, stock markets, interest rates, commodities, etc.)

7

ECONOMIC PULSE

Analysis of some recent economic data: uncertainty

9

ECONOMIC SCENARIO

Main economic and financial forecasts

10

FURTHER READING

Latest articles, charts, videos and podcasts of Economic Research



EDITORIAL


ADDRESSING THE PUBLIC DEBT CHALLENGE IN THE EU: THE ROLE OF THE NEW ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Recently an agreement has been reached between representatives of the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission on a new economic governance framework. It focuses on risk-based surveillance, differentiation between member states based on their specific situation, the integration of fiscal, reform and investment objectives in a medium-term fiscal plan. The single operational indicator in the form of a net expenditure path should facilitate communication and emphasizes the key role of discretionary primary spending rather than tax increases in bringing public finances under control. The reference trajectory, in combination with the debt safeguard and the deficit resilience safeguard, implies that many EU countries will have to undertake a sustained adjustment effort lasting several years.

With the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, an EU economic governance framework was established to coordinate economic policies to achieve the EU's economic objectives¹. The latter concern the soundness and sustainability of public finances, sustainable economic growth and convergence, addressing macroeconomic imbalances as well as reforms and investments to enhance growth and resilience. A key component of the framework is the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) -adopted in 1997- and its rules for the monitoring and coordination of national fiscal and economic policies.2 Its preventive arm sets for each EU member state a budgetary target. In addition, Eurozone countries are also subject to the corrective arm, which "ensures that member states adopt appropriate policy responses to correct excessive deficits (and/or debts) by implementing the Excessive Deficit Procedure."3

Economic convergence and sustainable public finances are important because they bring economic stability and reduce the contagion risk between countries. It is crucial in the Eurozone in view of its influence on the transmission of monetary policy. Healthy public finances also provide fiscal policy leeway to address the consequences of adverse shocks and avoids that monetary policy would be the only instrument that can be deployed. In February 2020, a debate was launched on reviewing EU economic governance. On that occasion, the European Commission argued that "the surveillance framework has supported the correction of its existing macroeconomic imbalances and the reduction of public debt" and considers that it has also promoted sustained convergence of economic performances and closer fiscal policy coordination in the Eurozone. 4 However, looking at the Commission estimates for 2023 budget deficits and public debt, one is struck by the huge dispersion (chart). Moreover, the Commission also noted that the fiscal stance had often been pro-cyclical and that member states had consistently favoured current expenditures rather than investments.

EUROZONE: PUBLIC BUDGET BALANCE AND DEBT



SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BNP PARIBAS

Recently, an agreement has been reached between representatives of the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission on a reform of the fiscal rules.5 Reducing debt ratios and deficits should be done "in a gradual, realistic, sustained and growth-friendly manner while protecting reforms and investment in strategic areas such as digital, green, social or defence." Member states must submit national medium-term fiscal structural plans.

⁵ Source: Economic governance review: Council and Parliament strike deal on reform of fiscal rules - Consilium (europa.eu). 10 February 2024. This came after the presentation by the Commission on 26 April 2023 of its proposals for a reformed economic governance and the approval on 21 December 2023 by the European Council of a mandate for negotiations and consultation with the European Parliament.



The reference trajectory, in combination with the debt safeguard and the deficit resilience safeguard, implies that many EU countries will have to undertake a sustained adjustment effort lasting several years.



¹ Source for this paragraph: Economic governance framework - Consilium (europa.eu). The framework focuses on policy coordination and the surveillance of member states' economic policies and "relies on the principles of monitoring, prevention and the correction of imbalances that could pose risks for member states' economies."

2 The other components are the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and its reference values for government deficit and public debt levels (3 % and 60 % of gross domestic product respectively, the so-called Maastricht criteria), the six-pack and two-pack regulations -fiscal surveillance, macroeconomic imbalance procedure- and the code of conduct documents with guidelines to interpret the six-pack and two-pack regulations. 3 Source: European Commission.

⁴ Source: Commission presents review of EU economic governance and launches debate on its future, European Commission, 5 February 2020 (Commission presents review of EU economic governance (europa.eu)

When government debt exceeds 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) or where the government deficit exceeds 3% of GDP, the Commission will submit a 'reference trajectory', indicating "how member states can ensure that by the end of a fiscal adjustment period of four years⁶, government debt is on a plausibly downward trajectory or stays at prudent levels over the medium-term." The agreement contains two safeguards that the reference trajectory must comply with. Under the debt sustainability safeguard, the "projected general government debt-to-GDP ratio decreases by a minimum annual average amount of 1 percentage point of GDP as long as the general government debtto-GDP ratio exceeds 90% and 0.5 percentage point of GDP as long as the general government debt-to-GDP ratio remains between 60% and 90%."7 To this end, a net expenditure path is determined and incorporated in the national medium-term fiscal structural plans.8 The plans and expenditure paths need to be endorsed by the Council. The net expenditure path would be such that it brings the general government deficit below 3% by the deadline set by the Council. The minimum annual structural improvement is set at 0.5% of GDP. The deficit resilience safeguard requires that fiscal adjustment would continue until a structural resilience margin of 1.5% of GDP relative to the 3.0% of GDP reference value of the Maastricht Treaty has been built. Under this safeguard, the annual improvement in the structural primary balance to achieve this margin is set at 0.4% of GDP (0.25% if the adjustment period has been extended to 7 years).9

Finally, a control account set up by the Commission will keep track of the annual and cumulative deviations of net expenditures compared to the target path. Under specific circumstances, the Council, upon a recommendation from the Commission, could allow deviations from this path.10

To conclude, the new economic governance framework has several key characteristics: risk-based surveillance, differentiation between member states based on their specific situation, the integration of fiscal, reform and investment objectives in a medium-term fiscal plan. The single operational indicator in the form of a net expenditure path should facilitate communication and emphasizes the key role of discretionary primary spending rather than tax increases in bringing public finances under control. The reference trajectory, in combination with the debt safeguard and the deficit resilience safeguard, implies that many EU countries will have to undertake a sustained adjustment effort lasting several years.

William De Vijlder

^{6 &}quot;Member states will be allowed to ask for an extension of the four-year fiscal adjustment period to maximum seven years, if they carry out certain reforms and investments that improve resilience and growth potential and support fiscal sustainability and address common priorities of the EU. These include achieving a fair, green and digital transition, ensuring energy security, strengthening social and economic resilience and, where necessary, the build-up of defence capabilities."

⁷ Source: European Council, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective coordination of economic policies and multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 - Mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament, Brussels, 20 December 2023.

8 More specifically, the path concerns "nationally financed net primary expenditure, that is to say expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and excluding interest expenditure, cyclical unemployment expenditure as well as expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by revenue from Union funds." One-offs and other temporary measures are excluded from net expenditure.

9 Source: see footnote 7.

³ Source set positions 7.

To "In the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, or in the event of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the government with a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned, provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term." The increase of government investment in defence should also be considered as a relevant factor.

MARKETS OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW

MONEY & BOND MARKETS

| Week 9-2 24 to 16-2-2- | 4 | | | Interest Rates | | highest | 24 | lowest | 24 | Yield (%) | | highe | st 24 | lowes | t 24 |
|---------------------------|---------|-------|----------|----------------|-------|----------|-------|----------|-------|--------------|------|--------|----------|---------|-------|
| 7 CAC 40 | 7 648 ▶ | 7 768 | +1.6 % | € ECB | 4.50 | 4.50 at | 01/01 | 4.50 at | 01/01 | € AVG 5-7y | 2.64 | 2.64 | at 01/01 | 2.64 at | 01/01 |
| ≥ S&P 500 | 5 027 ▶ | 5 006 | -0.4 % | Eonia | -0.51 | -0.51 at | 01/01 | -0.51 at | 01/01 | Bund 2y | 2.93 | 2.99 | at 19/01 | 2.53 at | 01/02 |
| | | | | Euribor 3M | 3.93 | 3.97 at | 18/01 | 3.88 at | 01/02 | Bund 10y | 2.38 | 2.38 | at 16/02 | 2.02 at | 03/01 |
| ⊅ Volatility (VIX) | 12.9 ▶ | 14.2 | +1.3 pb | Euribor 12M | 3.65 | 3.69 at | 14/02 | 3.51 at | 01/02 | OAT 10y | 2.80 | 2.81 | at 13/02 | 2.47 at | 01/01 |
| ■ Euribor 3M (%) | 3.89 ▶ | 3.93 | +4.2 bp | \$ FED | 5.50 | 5.50 at | 01/01 | 5.50 at | 01/01 | Corp. BBB | 4.04 | 4.06 a | at 17/01 | 3.75 at | 01/01 |
| 7 Libor \$ 3M (%) | 5.57 ▶ | 5.58 | +0.5 bp | Libor 3M | 5.58 | 5.59 at | 01/01 | 5.53 at | 01/02 | \$ Treas. 2y | 4.65 | 4.66 | at 13/02 | 4.22 at | 15/01 |
| ■ OAT 10y (%) | 2.81 ▶ | 2.80 | -1.2 bp | Libor 12M | 6.04 | 6.04 at | 01/01 | 6.04 at | 01/01 | Treas. 10y | 4.31 | | at 13/02 | 3.86 at | |
| 7 Bund 10y (%) | 2.35 ▶ | 2.38 | +2.7 bp | £ BoE | 5.25 | 5.25 at | 01/01 | 5.25 at | 01/01 | High Yield | 7.92 | 8.10 | at 05/01 | 7.82 at | 01/01 |
| 7 US Tr. 10y (%) | 4.19 ▶ | 4.31 | +12.0 bp | Libor 3M | 5.33 | 5.33 at | 16/02 | 5.31 at | 16/01 | £ gilt. 2y | 4.63 | 4.68 a | at 13/02 | 3.98 at | 01/01 |
| ≥ Euro vs dollar | 1.08 ▶ | 1.08 | -0.1 % | Libor 12M | 0.81 | 0.81 at | 01/01 | 0.81 at | 01/01 | gilt. 10y | 4.18 | 4.22 | at 13/02 | 3.60 at | 01/01 |
| ■ Gold (ounce, \$) | 2 021 ▶ | 2 010 | -0.6 % | At 16-2-24 | | | | | | At 16-2-24 | | | | | |
| 7 Oil (Brent, \$) | 81.7 ▶ | 83.2 | +1.8 % | | | | | | | | | | | | |

EXCHANGE RATES


| 1€ = | | high | est | 24 | low | est | 24 | 2024 |
|----------|--------|--------|-----|-------|--------|-----|-------|--------|
| USD | 1.08 | 1.10 | at | 01/01 | 1.07 | at | 13/02 | -2.5% |
| GBP | 0.86 | 0.87 | at | 02/01 | 0.85 | at | 13/02 | -1.2% |
| CHF | 0.95 | 0.95 | at | 14/02 | 0.93 | at | 08/01 | +2.0% |
| JPY | 161.83 | 161.83 | at | 16/02 | 155.33 | at | 02/01 | +3.9% |
| AUD | 1.65 | 1.66 | at | 17/01 | 1.62 | at | 02/01 | +1.9% |
| CNY | 7.75 | 7.86 | at | 10/01 | 7.71 | at | 13/02 | -1.1% |
| BRL | 5.35 | 5.41 | at | 22/01 | 5.31 | at | 13/02 | -0.3% |
| RUB | 99.79 | 100.17 | at | 03/01 | 95.72 | at | 19/01 | +1.0% |
| INR | 89.42 | 91.92 | at | 01/01 | 88.97 | at | 13/02 | -2.7% |
| At 16-2- | -24 | | | | | | | Change |

COMMODITIES

| Spot price, \$ | highest 24 | | | lov | vest | 24 | 2024 | 2024(€) | |
|----------------|------------|-------|----|-------|-------|----|-------|---------|--------|
| Oil, Brent | 83.2 | 83.2 | at | 16/02 | 75.8 | at | 08/01 | +7.1% | +9.8% |
| Gold (ounce) | 2 010 | 2 067 | at | 02/01 | 1 989 | at | 14/02 | -2.7% | -0.2% |
| Metals, LMEX | 3 673 | 3 762 | at | 01/01 | 3 558 | at | 09/02 | -2.4% | +0.1% |
| Copper (ton) | 8 409 | 8 512 | at | 30/01 | 8 065 | at | 09/02 | -0.6% | +1.9% |
| wheat (ton) | 215 | 2.3 | at | 01/01 | 213 | at | 15/02 | -7.6% | -5.2% |
| Corn (ton) | 155 | 1.7 | at | 01/01 | 155 | at | 16/02 | -1.1% | -8.8% |
| At 16-2-24 | - | | | | | - | | | Change |

EQUITY INDICES

PERFORMANCE BY SECTOR (Eurostoxx50 & S&P500)



Change


SOURCE: REFINITIV. BNP PARIBAS



MARKETS OVERVIEW

6

EURO-DOLLAR






2022

2024




VOLATILITY (VIX, S&P500)






3 400


2021



MSCI EMERGING (USD)




10Y BOND YIELD, TREASURIES VS BUND




10Y BOND YIELD




10Y BOND YIELD & SPREADS



OIL (BRENT, USD)



METALS (LMEX, USD)



GOLD (OUNCE, USD)




SOURCE: REFINITIV, BNP PARIBAS



ECONOMIC PULSE

TRENDS IN UNCERTAINTY INDICATORS IN JANUARY: A SLIGHT INCREASE ON BALANCE



After a short respite in December, uncertainty about US economic policy, based on media coverage, rose again in January. This resurgence in uncertainty was likely caused by the latest US inflation figures, which proved more persistent than expected: it remained above 3% in January (3.1% year-on-year, according to the BLS Consumer Price Index) and turned out to be higher than consensus expectations (2.9%). During its mid-December meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) made it clear that it would not be appropriate to cut rates in the absence certainty as to whether inflation was on a sustainable downward path towards its 2% target




However, in January, American companies expressed renewed confidence in their revenue growth. This positive development is probably due to Q4 2023 GDP growth, which remained high and above expectations. It should be noted that the uncertainty indicator currently stands at its lowest level since April 2020




The geopolitical risk index, which is also based on media coverage, rose in the final week of January after falling during the first and third weeks of the month. Despite this fairly high volatility, the index was still high in January, excluding the peaks seen at the beginning of a major shock (such as Covid-19,


the war in Ukraine, the Middle East conflict and the 2015 terrorist attacks in France)



 $Uncertainty\,around\,employment\,prospects\,also\,fell\,in\,January\,for\,the\,second\,month\,in\,a\,row.\,This\,followed$ three months of rising uncertainty, likely due to the continuing resilience of the US labour market (reacceleration of nonfarm payroll gains, stability of the unemployment rate, and hourly wage growth dynamism).



The market-based uncertainty indicator* continued to fall in the United States in January, whereas it started rising again in the Eurozone in the last week of the month.



In the Eurozone, the European Commission's economic uncertainty index rose slightly in January, mainly due to the increase in the services sector. Conversely, uncertainty decreased in the retail trade and construction sectors and, to a lesser extent, in industry and among consumers. All of these developments are still limited and the economic uncertainty indicator has been on a slightly downwards general trajectory since the end of 2022.

Tarik Rharrab



^{*} dispersion of the daily returns of stock market index components

UNITED STATES

The possibility of a US recession triggered by monetary tightening is looking less and less likely given the resilience of an economy that continued to grow by 0.8% q/q in Q4 2023 and by 2.5% on average over the year, thanks to the resilience of household consumption and the strength of nonresidential investment. Our central scenario is now that of a marked slowdown albeit without an economic recession in H1 2024. The peak in inflation was reached in mid-2022, and core disinflation is becoming more significant. Inflation should approach the 2% target in 2024. Progress on that front should be considered as sufficient by the Fed to now look forward to a soft landing and start cutting rates progressively, from June 2024.

CHINA

The post-Covid rebound in economic growth weakened rapidly in 2023 and proved to be weaker than initially expected. Domestic demand has remained held back by a significant loss in consumer and investor confidence. The crisis in the property sector has persisted, with the continued fall in sales, defaults of developers and growing difficulties of certain financial institutions. Export momentum stalled last year due to the weakening in global demand and tensions with the US. Yet, Chinese exports have recently regained strength and this trend is expected to continue in the short term. Moreover, the government and the central bank have implemented new policy stimulus measures since last summer. Economic activity has strengthened slightly while consumer price inflation has remained very low. The authorities will keep an accommodative policy mix in the short term, still being constrained by the debt excess of the economy and the weak financial situation of local governments.

EUROZONE

The euro area narrowly escaped economic contraction in the last quarter of 2023. Real GDP remained stable in Q4, with annual growth of 0.5% in 2023. The negative effects of monetary tightening are expected to continue to weigh on economic activity this winter. Activity is expected to inch higher in the first quarter of 2024, before a more pronounced recovery from spring onwards. This would be underpinned by a first rate cut by the ECB, which we expect to happen in April. This monetary easing would accompany the inflation decline, which is expected to come close to the 2% target during the second quarter. Disinflation, along with the dynamism of wages, is expected to support household purchasing power and consumption. Growth should also be supported by NGEU disbursements and its deployment on the ground.

FRANCE

France experienced 0% q/q growth in Q3 and Q4 2023 after a short-lived acceleration in Q2 2023 (+0.7% t/t, driven by exceptional factors, such as aeronautics). In Q4, corporate investment has decreased for the first time (after significant growth). In parallel, household consumption eroded and household investment decreased markedly. Disinflation is now visible (the harmonized index grew by 3.4% y/y in January 2024, compared to 5.7% y/y in September 2023), but the impact of higher interest rates should continue to be felt. As a result, we except 0.1% growth q/q during the Q1 2024. Going forward, we expect no clear growth acceleration this year (0.6% in 2024 after 0.9% in 2023).

RATES AND EXCHANGE RATES

The last meetings of 2023 confirmed that the 25bp rate hike of the Fed funds in July and of the ECB policy rates in September (deposit rate at 4.00%, refinancing rate at 4.50%) was very likely to be the last of an exceptional tightening cycle. The possibility of a further monetary tightening has still not completely and officially disappeared, but it has been a lot reduced by the fall in inflation. Positive developments on the inflation front, which is getting closer more visibly to the 2% target, together with the expected weakening of growth, pave the way for the first rates cuts in April for the ECB. For the Fed, the resilience of activity and inflation pushes back the first rate cut to June. On both sides of the Atlantic, policy rates in real terms and the degree of monetary restriction would remain about unchanged. The induced decline in long-term rates should be limited by the importance of bond issuance against a background of quantitative tightening. We expect a halt in the spring of 2024 to the ECB's reinvestments under the PEPP.

On 31 October, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) adjusted its yield curve control policy (YCC) by allowing a wider fluctuation in 10-year sovereign interest rates around the target of 1%. Further adjustments to monetary policy are likely, given that the country currently faces the fastest rate of inflation since the early 1990s. We expect the BoJ to end its negative interest rate policy in March, while significantly easing its yield curve control policy.

We remain bearish regarding the US dollar, particularly from Q2 2024 and especially versus the euro, given that we expect fewer rate cuts by the ECB than the Fed. We also expect the yen to strengthen versus the USD, based on the combination of the start of BoJ tightening, of the repatriation by Japanese investors of their foreign holdings, and of the fall in US bond yields.

| GDP GROWTH AND INFLATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|------|--------|--------|--------|--|
| | | GDP | Growth | | Inflation | | | | | |
| % | 2022 | 2023 e | 2024 e | 2025 e | | 2022 | 2023 e | 2024 e | 2025 e | |
| United-States | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 1.4 | | 8.0 | 4.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 | |
| Japan | 0.9 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.9 | | 2.5 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | |
| United-Kingdom | 4.4 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 1.1 | | 9.1 | 7.4 | 2.0 | 2.4 | |
| Euro Area | 3.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.6 | | 8.4 | 5.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | |
| Germany | 1.9 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 1.3 | | 8.7 | 6.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | |
| France | 2.5 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.4 | | 5.9 | 5.7 | 2.2 | 1.6 | |
| Italy | 3.9 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.5 | | 8.7 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 2.5 | |
| Spain | 5.8 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 | | 8.3 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 1.5 | |
| China | 3.0 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 4.3 | | 2.0 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | |
| | 7.2 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 6.5 | | 6.7 | 5.8 | 5.7 | | |
| India* | | | | | | | | | 4.5 | |
| Brazil | 2.9 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | | 9.3 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | |

Source : BNP Paribas (e: Estimates & forecasts)

Last update: 16 February 2024

| | INTEREST AI | ND EXC | HANGE | RATES | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Interest rates, % End of period | | 01 2024 | 02 2024 | 03 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q4 2025 |
| End of period | Fed Funds | Q1 2024 | QZ 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q+ 202+ | Q+ 2023 |
| US | (upper limit) | 5.50 | 5.25 | 5.00 | 4.50 | 3.25 |
| | T-Note 10y | 4.15 | 4.00 | 3.95 | 3.95 | 4.00 |
| Eurozone | deposit rate | 4.00 | 3.50 | 3.00 | 2.75 | 2.50 |
| | Bund 10y | 2.45 | 2.35 | 2.20 | 2.20 | 2.50 |
| | OAT 10y | 3.02 | 2.91 | 2.75 | 2.75 | 3.05 |
| | BTP 10y | 4.25 | 4.00 | 3.95 | 3.90 | 4.20 |
| | BONO 10y | 3.45 | 3.25 | 3.10 | 3.05 | 3.30 |
| UK | Base rate | 5.25 | 5.00 | 4.75 | 4.25 | 3.00 |
| | Gilts 10y | 3.90 | 3.75 | 3.65 | 3.55 | 3.65 |
| Japan | BoJ Rate | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.75 |
| | JGB 10y | 0.80 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 1.35 |
| Exchange Rates | | | | | | |
| End of period | | Q1 2024 | Q2 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q4 2025 |
| USD | EUR / USD | 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 1.15 | 1.18 |
| | USD / JPY | 145 | 141 | 138 | 135 | 130 |
| | GBP / USD | 1.26 | 1.29 | 1.31 | 1.32 | 1.36 |
| EUR | EUR / GBP | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| | EUR / JPY | 160 | 158 | 157 | 155 | 153 |
| Brent | | | | | | • |
| Quarter Average | | Q1 2024 | Q2 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q4 2025 |
| Brent | USD/bbl | 78 | 81 | 86 | 83 | 82 |

Sources: BNP Paribas (Market Economics, Interest Rate Strategy, FX Strategy, Commodities Desk Strategy)

Last update: 16 February 2024



^{*} Fiscal year from 1st April of year n to March 31st of year n+1

FURTHER READING

9

| <u>Eurozone</u> : positive momentum of business sentiment but pay attention to prices | EcoTV | 15 February 2024 |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| European electricity: greening gathers pace | Chart of the Week | 14 February 2024 |
| The German debt brake: the merits and limitations of fiscal rules | EcoWeek | 13 February 2024 |
| A selective appetite for EM debt | EcoEmerging | 13 February 2024 |
| Inflation tracker - January 2024 Disinflation likely to continue | EcoCharts | 9 February 2024 |
| Will Africa see free trade take off in 2024? | EcoTV | 8 February 2024 |
| Sovereign risk in Emerging Markets: the usual suspects under pressure | EcoWeek | 5 February 2024 |
| French trade balance in 2023: the deficit is narrowing, including in volume terms | EcoBrief | 5 February 2024 |
| 2024: a critical year | EcoPerspectives | 1 February 2024 |
| Sri Lanka: FX reserves have increased but the situation remains fragile | Chart of the Week | 31 January 2024 |
| The 'last mile of disinflation', a narrative running on its last legs | EcoWeek | 30 January 2024 |
| Eurozone: no recession in 2023 but mixed fortunes among Member States | EcoBrief | 30 January 2024 |
| France: a business climate survey in line with continued disinflation | EcoBrief | 25 January 2024 |
| France: Household financial savings rate remains high despite the sharp contraction in financial investment flows | Chart of the Week | 24 January 2024 |
| Central banks: no hurry, no worry | EcoWeek | 22 January 2024 |
| EcoTV The Graph · Electricity: France goes to 2024 in an Olympic shape | EcoTV | 22 January 2024 |
| FRENCH ECONOMY POCKET ATLAS - JANUARY 2024 | EcoCharts | 19 January 2024 |
| "Lenders of next-to-last resort": too big a role for the Federal Home Loan Banks? | EcoFlash | 19 January 2024 |
| 2024: two anniversaries - And hopes for an inversion of the emissions curve | Chart of the Week | 17 January 2024 |
| Global economy: the year has changed, the economic situation remains mixed | EcoWeek | 15 January 2024 |
| <u>Inflation tracker - January 2024 Inflation picked up in the euro area and the United States in December</u> | EcoCharts | 12 January 2024 |



GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH

| William De Vijlder Chief Economist | +33 1 55 77 47 31 | william.devijlder@bnpparibas.com |
|--|-------------------|--|
| OECD ECONOMIES AND STATISTICS | | |
| Hélène Baudchon Deputy chief economist, Head - United States | +33 1 58 16 03 63 | helene.baudchon@bnpparibas.com |
| Stéphane Colliac France, Germany | +33 1 42 98 43 86 | stephane.colliac@bnpparibas.com |
| Guillaume Derrien Eurozone, Southern Europe, Japan, United Kingdom - Global trade | +33 1 55 77 71 89 | guillaume.a.derrien@bnpparibas.com |
| Anis Bensaidini United States, Japan | +33 1 87 74 01 51 | anis.bensaidini@bnpparibas.com |
| Lucie Barette Southern Europe | +33 1 87 74 02 08 | lucie.barette@bnpparibas.com |
| Veary Bou, Tarik Rharrab Statistics | | |
| ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FREN | CH NETWORK | |
| Jean-Luc Proutat Head | +33 1 58 16 73 32 | jean-luc.proutat@bnpparibas.com |
| BANKING ECONOMICS | | |
| Laurent Quignon Head | +33 1 42 98 56 54 | laurent.quignon@bnpparibas.com |
| Céline Choulet | +33 1 43 16 95 54 | celine.choulet@bnpparibas.com |
| Thomas Humblot | +33 1 40 14 30 77 | thomas.humblot@bnpparibas.com |
| Marianne Mueller | +33 1 40 14 48 11 | marianne.mueller@bnpparibas.com |
| EMERGING ECONOMIES AND COUNTRY RISK | | |
| François Faure Head – Argentina, Turkey – Methodology, Modelling | +33 1 42 98 79 82 | francois.faure@bnpparibas.com |
| Christine Peltier Deputy Head – Greater China, Vietnam – Methodology | +33 1 42 98 56 27 | christine.peltier@bnpparibas.com |
| Stéphane Alby Africa (French-speaking countries) | +33 1 42 98 02 04 | stephane.alby@bnpparibas.com |
| Pascal Devaux Middle East, Balkan countries | +33 1 43 16 95 51 | pascal.devaux@bnpparibas.com |
| Hélène Drouot South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Andean countries | +33 1 42 98 33 00 | helene.drouot@bnpparibas.com |
| Salim Hammad Latin America | +33 1 42 98 74 26 | salim.hammad@bnpparibas.com |
| Cynthia Kalasopatan Antoine Ukraine, Central European countries | +33 1 53 31 59 32 | cynthia.kalasopatan.antoine@bnpparibas.com |
| Johanna Melka India, South Asia, Russia, Kazakhstan | +33 1 58 16 05 84 | johanna.melka@bnpparibas.com |
| Lucas Plé Africa (Portuguese & English-speaking countries) | +33 1 40 14 50 18 | lucas.ple@bnpparibas.com |
| CONTACT MEDIA | | |
| Mickaelle Fils Marie-Luce | +33 1 42 98 48 59 | mickaelle.filsmarie-luce@bnpparibas.com |



GROUP ECONOMIC RESEARCH

ECOCONJONCTURE

Structural or thematic topics.

ECOEMERGING

Analyses and forecasts for a selection of emerging economies.

ECOPERSPECTIVES

Analyses and forecasts with a focus on developed countries.

ECOFLASH

Data releases, major economic events.

ECOWEEK

Recent economic and policy developments, data comments, economic calendar, forecasts.

ECOCHARTS

Easy-to-read monthly overview of inflation dynamics in the main developed economies.


ECOPULSE

Monthly barometer of key economic indicators of the main ${\tt OECD}$ countries.

ECOTV WEEK

MACROWAVES

Our economic podcast



Published by BNP PARIBAS Economic Research

Head office: 16 boulevard des Italiens – 75009 Paris France / Phone : +33 (0) 1.42.98.12.34 Internet: www.group.bnpparibas - www.economic-research.bnpparibas.com

Head of publication : Jean Lemierre / Chief editor: William De Vijlder

Copyright: Leonardo Alpuin

The information and opinions contained in this document have been obtained from, or are based on, public sources believed to be reliable, but there is no guarantee of the accuracy, completeness or fitness for any particular purpose of such information and such information may not have been independently verified by BNPP or by any person. None of BNPP, any of its subsidiary undertakings or affiliates or its members, directors, officers, agents or employees accepts any responsibility or liability whatsoever or makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy and completeness of the information or any opinions based thereon and contained in this document and it is should not be relied upon as such. This document does not constitute research, as defined under MIFID II, or form any part of any offer to sell or issue and is not a solicitation of any offer to purchase any financial instrument, nor shall it or any part of it nor the fact of its distribution form the basis of, or be relied on, in connection with any contract or investment decision. Information and opinions contained in this document are published for the information of recipients, but are not to be relied upon as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgment by any recipient, are subject to change without notice. In providing this document, BNPP does not offer investment, financial, legal, tax or any other type of advice to, nor has any fiduciary duties towards, recipients. Any reference to past performance is not indicative of future performance, which may be better or worse than prior results. Any hypothetical, past performance simulations are the result of estimates made by BNPP, as of a given moment, on the basis of parameters, market conditions, and historical data selected by BNPP, and should not be used as guidance, in any way, of future performance. To the fullest extent permitted by law, no BNPP group company accepts any liability whatsoical data selected by BNPP, and should not be used as guida

This document was produced by a BNPP group company. This document is for the use of intended recipients and may not be reproduced (in whole or in part) or delivered or transmitted to any other person without the prior written consent of BNPP. By accepting or accessing this document you agree to this.

BNP Paribas is a société anonyme incorporated in France, licensed and supervised as a credit institution by the European Central Bank (ECB) and as an investment services provider by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) and Autorité des marches financiers (AMF), and having its registered office at 16, boulevard des Italiens, 75009 Paris, France.

Some or all of the information contained in this document may already have been published on https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com.

For country-specific disclaimers (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Israel, Bahrain, South Africa, Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam) please type the following URL to access the applicable legal notices: https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com/gm/home/Markets_360_Country_Specific_Notices.pdf © BNP Paribas (2023). All rights reserved.

