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ECONOMIC RESEARCH



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# TABLE OF CONTENT

---

3

## EDITORIAL

16/21: A near-universal central banks *status quo* today; what about tomorrow?

---

6

## ECONEWS

Key points of the economic week

---

8

## MARKETS OVERVIEW

Recent market developments (foreign exchange, stock markets, interest rates, commodities, etc.)

---

9

## FURTHER READING

Latest articles, charts, videos and podcasts of Economic Research



## 16/21: A NEAR-UNIVERSAL CENTRAL BANKS STATUS QUO TODAY; WHAT ABOUT TOMORROW?

The week of 16–20 March was particularly busy on the monetary policy front. No fewer than 21 central banks met against the backdrop of a common exogenous factor: the conflict in the Middle East that broke out in late February 2026. Prior to the onset of the conflict, 12 to 15 of these banks were either in an easing cycle or preparing to implement rate cuts. Ultimately, regarding policy rates, sixteen banks maintained the *status quo*, two opted for an increase and three for a cut. We present an overview of the context and the terms of the debate around several questions: 1/ What impact has the war in the Middle East had on these monetary policy decisions (how has the outcome shifted from what was expected before the offensive began to the current situation)?; 2/ How concerned are central banks about current developments and the risk of stagflation (are they prepared to change course, and in what direction)?

It is not surprising that a cautious and wait-and-see approach largely prevailed, with the vast majority of central banks adhering to the decisions that had been anticipated. As for the level of concern among central banks, while most confirmed the expected *status quo*, this was accompanied by a notable and logical shift in tone, marked at the very least by increased vigilance regarding the re-emergence of inflationary risk and, for around half of our sample, by a 'hawkish' bias, i.e. the readiness / willingness to hike if needed to mitigate this risk (see table on page 5).

Let's start with a reminder. At the time of writing, the shockwaves from the war in the Middle East are still intensifying, and many uncertainties persist regarding the course, duration and scale of the conflict. One clear outcome of the conflict is the sudden return of the risk of a stagflationary scenario, characterised by lower growth and higher inflation, which stands in stark contrast to our previous baseline scenario. The extent of this stagflationary shock remains uncertain, but the likelihood of a significantly adverse scenario is growing<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, this vulnerability is compounded by the multitude of shocks that have similarly impacted the global economy since the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, it is occurring within a broadly supportive and healthy macroeconomic environment.

### A CAUTIOUS AND OBSERVANT APPROACH AS AN INITIAL MEASURE

In this uncertain context, an immediate reaction from central banks was neither expected nor warranted, whether in the form of a rate cut to mitigate the downside risk to growth, or a rate hike to counter the upside risk to inflation. Caution and a wait-and-see approach were the order of the day and largely prevailed. The vast majority of central banks have not deviated from their planned (or expected) decisions, with only a few making minor adjustments to their previously anticipated course.

This situation is exemplified by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), which opted for a 25-basis-point rate cut instead of the 50-basis-point cut initially planned. While the initiation of monetary easing was not called into question, its extent was indeed reduced<sup>2</sup>. A similar scenario may apply to the 25-basis-point rate hike by the CBI (Central Bank of Iceland). Would this hike have taken place without the war in the Middle East? It is conceivable that it would not. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the trade-off between signs of weak growth and rising inflation argued for maintaining the *status quo*. The conflict and the subsequent rise in price pressures likely tipped the balance in favour of tightening.

<sup>1</sup> For further details, see our Ecolnsight '[War in the Middle East: Shockwaves are spreading](#)', 20 March 2026.

<sup>2</sup> The opposite occurred with the Bank of Ghana (BoG), whose 150-basis-point cut in the policy rate went beyond the expected 100 basis points, reflecting heightened concerns about growth despite upside risks to inflation.

<sup>3</sup> Leaving aside the Bank of Japan, which has been on a desynchronised cycle of rate hikes since March 2024.

<sup>4</sup> For further information on emerging markets' exposure, see François Faure's Ecoweek editorial, '[Emerging and developing countries: how will they weather the energy shock?](#)', 16 March 2026.

The most striking outcome is probably that of the Bank of England (BoE). A rate cut was neither guaranteed nor widely expected, but just a few days before the meeting, we were forecasting a 25bp cut to align with growing signs of disinflation. However, in light of recent events, we revised this forecast in favour of a hold. And the decided *status quo* was 'resounding', with all nine members voting unanimously for the first time since September 2021, thereby reinforcing the hawkishness signal.

Meanwhile, the Reserve Bank of Australia's (RBA) 25bp rate hike is part of a trend that began in February, in response to signs of a resurgence in inflation prior to the current energy shock, which is specific to Australia. The February hike attracted attention as it was the first among the major central banks of developed countries<sup>3</sup>, raising questions about its potential knock-on effects.

The Bank of Canada (BoC), the US Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the Swedish Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and numerous central banks in emerging economies opted for the *status quo*, as expected. For the Fed in particular, this appears to be a forced pause.

However, the nature of this *status quo* has changed in the current context. It is now accompanied by a notable and logical shift in tone, marked at the very least by increased vigilance regarding the re-emergence of inflationary risk and, for roughly half of our sample, by a hawkish bias, i.e. the readiness / willingness to hike if needed to mitigate this risk. The ECB is among them.

### UNIFORMITY OF REACTIONS AT PRESENT; DIVERGING REACTIONS TO FOLLOW?

What happens next remains to be seen, but the trajectories of monetary policy could become more varied. Firstly, although the shock is global and spares no one, its impact is likely to vary considerably due to different levels of exposure among countries<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, the starting points differ from one country to another. The task facing central banks in countries where inflation is low (such as Switzerland and Sweden) is therefore less complicated than in countries where inflation was already high and sticky, while also facing upside risks (the United States, to name but one). The starting point in terms of growth naturally matters too, and in this regard, the US is in a more favourable position than the Eurozone.



### Policy rates of the nine advanced markets' central banks who held a meeting between the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> March 2026




CHART 1

SOURCE: MACROBOND, BNP PARIBAS

### Policy rates of the twelve emerging markets' central banks that held a meeting between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> March 2026




CHART 2

SOURCE: MACROBOND, BNP PARIBAS

The central bank's actions will also depend on the measures taken by governments. On the one hand, fiscal support (which is very limited at present) may help to mitigate the disinflationary effect of the negative demand shock, thereby further complicating the task facing monetary authorities. On the other hand, this same support, if aimed solely at limiting the rise in energy prices rather than directly bolstering demand, would help to reduce observed inflation. This, in turn, would mitigate the risk of inflation expectations becoming unanchored and prevent other second-round effects.

In any case, central banks face the same dilemma to varying degrees: as the conflict constitutes a classic negative supply shock, which simultaneously pushes inflation up and growth down, should they respond by raising interest rates to contain inflation, at the cost of further weakening growth, or should they lower interest rates to stimulate growth, thereby fuelling inflation? The central banks' response will depend not only on their own reaction functions but also on which risk manifests first and with what intensity.

Economic theory posits that the best response to an energy shock affecting an economy in equilibrium is to do nothing. Faced with an exogenous negative supply shock of this kind, central banks can, in fact, only manage the consequences, as they lack the ability to influence the causes. Assuming these consequences remain limited, central banks may simply look through them. However, while doing nothing may seem sensible in theory, it is not necessarily the most suitable response in practice, as highlighted by Jerome Powell. In the current situation, it is difficult to determine the precise scale of the consequences, yet there is little doubt that the risk of inflation has returned. The adjustments in central bank forecasts currently available to us bear this out: inflation forecasts have been revised upwards more than growth forecasts have been revised downwards.

As the future trajectory of inflation is currently a greater cause for concern than that of growth, we should expect interest rate hikes<sup>5</sup>. This is now our scenario for the ECB (three hikes of 25 basis points in June, July and September). For the BoJ, we maintain our expectation of a further 25 bp hike in April. For the BoE, a rate hike as early as April cannot be ruled out, but it is contingent on the severity and duration of the ongoing energy shock. Therefore, our BoE call remains under review. Should the stagflationary shock prove limited, the *status quo* – of a very different nature from what was envisaged hitherto – could be extended to navigate between the two risks. This is the scenario we are currently adopting for the Fed.

Hélène Baudchon

<sup>5</sup> If the energy shock persists and causes growth to falter significantly, scenarios involving rate cuts could emerge.

## 21 CENTRAL BANK DECISIONS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

Country / Central bank	Meeting date	Change in key interest rate (bp)	Key interest rate level	Bias	Change in market expectations (number of cuts/hikes by end-2026)	Latest growth figure (y/y)	Change in central banks' 2026 growth forecasts	Latest inflation figure (y/y)	Change in central banks' 2026 inflation forecast	Exposure to stagflationary shock
Australia / RBA	17/03	+25	4.10%	Hawkish	3 rate hikes as of 23/03 (compared with 1 as of 27/02)	2.6% (Q4 25); 2.0% (2025)	n.a	3.8%	n.a	Moderate
Indonesia / BI	17/03	=	4.75%	Somewhat hawkish		5.2% (2025)	n.a	4.8%	n.a	Low
Armenia / CBA	17/03	=	6.5%	Balanced		6.9% (2025)	n.a	4.3%	n.a	Moderate
Morocco / BAM	17/03	=	2.25%	Balanced		4.0% (Q3 2025)	+0.9pp	-0.6%	-0.5pp	Low
Uzbekistan / CBU	18/03	=	14%	Somewhat hawkish		7.7% (2025)	n.a	7.3%	n.a	Moderate
Iceland / CBI	18/03	+25	7.50%	Hawkish		-0.6% (Q4 25)	n.a	5.2%	n.a	High
Ghana / BoG	18/03	-150	14%	Balanced		+5.8% (Q4 25)	n.a	3.3%	n.a	Average
Canada / BoC	18/03	=	2.25%	Balanced	3 rate hikes as of 23/03 (compared with a 44% probability of 1 cut on 27/02)	0.7% (Q4 25); 2.0% (2025)	n.a	1.8%	n.a	Moderate
United States / Fed	17-18 March	=	3.50-3.75%	Somewhat hawkish	75% probability of 1 rate hike (compared with 2 cuts on 27/02)	2.0% (Q4 25); 2.1% (2025)	+0.1pp	2.4% (CPI - Feb.); 2.8% (PCE - Jan.)	+0.3pp (PCE)	Average
Brazil / BCB	18/03	-25	14.75%	Between neutral and dovish		2.3% (2025)	No change (forecast: 1.8%)	3.8%	+0.4pp (if Petrobras passes on the rise in oil prices)	Moderate
Japan / BoJ	18-19 March	=	0.75%	Hawkish	2 hikes as of 23 March (compared with 1 as on 27/02f 27 February)	0.5% (Q4 25); 1.2% (2025)	n.a	1.5%	n.a	High
Sweden / Riksbank	19/03	=	1.75%	Balanced	2 rate hikes by 23/03 (compared with a 50% probability of 1 rate cut on 27/02)	2.0% (Q4 25); 1.8% (2025)	-0.4pp	0.5% (1.7% for the target measure)	+0.2pp (+0.6pp for the target measure)	High
Switzerland / SNB	19/03	=	0%	Balanced		0.7% (Q4 2025); 1.3% (2025)	No change	0.5%	+0.2pp	Moderate
Taiwan / CBC	19/03	=	2%	Balanced		8.7% (2025)	+3.6 pp (carry-over effect)	1.2%	+0.2pp	Moderate
Ukraine / NBU	19/03	=	15%	Balanced		3.2% (Q4 2025); 1.8% (2025)	n.a	7.6%	n.a	High
Moldova / NBM	19/03	=	5%	Balanced		3.6% (Q4 2025); 2.4% (2025)	n.a	5.1%	n.a	High
United Kingdom / BoE	19/03	=	3.75%	Hawkish	3 rate hikes as of 23/03 (compared with 2 rate cuts as of 27/02)	1.0% (Q4 2025); 1.3% (2025)	n.a	3.0%	+0.9 pp in Q2 and +1.5 pp in Q3	High
Eurozone / ECB	19/03	=	2%	Hawkish	3 rate hikes by 23/03 (compared with a 55% probability of 1 rate cut on 27/02)	1.2% (Q4 25); 1.5% (2025)	-0.3 pp (new baseline); -0.6 percentage points (adverse); -0.8 percentage points (severe)	1.9%	+0.7pp (new baseline); +1.6pp (adverse); +2.5pp (severe)	High
Czech Republic / ČNB	19/03	=	3.50%	Somewhat hawkish		2.6% (Q4 2025); 2.6% (2025)	n.a	1.4%	n.a	Moderate
Russia / CBR	20/03	-50	15%	Close to balance		0.6% (Q3 2025)	n.a	5.9%	n.a	Moderate
Paraguay / BCP	20/03	=	5.50%			6.6% (Q3 2025)	n.a	2.3%	n.a	High

[Find out more in our scenario and forecasts](#)

## WAR IN THE GULF

Strikes on oil and gas facilities from both sides have intensified, driving up commodity prices. This escalation is expected to fuel inflation and dampen growth. Central banks have maintained their monetary policies as they await greater clarity, but the markets are bracing for tighter policies, as are we ([see our analysis](#)).

## ADVANCED ECONOMIES

### UNITED STATES

**The prospect of rate cuts is receding, the economy is performing well and the administration is responding to the energy shock.** The Fed's policy rate was kept at 3.5%–3.75%. The Summary of Economic Projections revises the long-term estimate for this rate to 3.1% (+0.1pp) and forecasts core PCE to be +2.7% y/y by end-2026 (+0.2pp), while still upholding the dot plot, indicating a potential rate cut this year. However, this cut is unlikely to materialise, as the FOMC's requirement for a reduction in inflation is becoming increasingly unattainable, with J. Powell hesitating to assert that energy and tariff inflation will only have a temporary impact that monetary policy can overlook. The probability of a rate hike in 2026 now exceeds 50%. In February, industrial production improved (+0.2% m/m, -0.5pp), while producer prices rose sharply (+0.7% m/m), driven by food, energy and core inflation. In order to curb petrol inflation, the Trump administration has announced a 60-day suspension of the Jones Act (which requires that ships sailing between US ports be US-flagged and US-built) for vessels transporting hydrocarbons and other raw materials. Added to this is a partial easing of sanctions targeting oil from Venezuela and Iran. **Banking deregulation is intensifying** with proposals targeting capital requirements: 1. an end to Basel III agreements for the nine largest banking groups; 2. reform of the method for calculating capital surcharges imposed on the eight global systemically important banks (G-SIBs); 3. a review of the standardised approach to measuring credit risk for other banks. These measures, along with the proposed reform of stress tests, could reduce CET1 capital requirements by an average of 4.8% for the eight G-SIBs, by 5.2% for mid-sized groups (those with assets of between USD 100bn and USD 750bn) and by 7.8% for small institutions. These proposals are open for comments for 90 days. *Upcoming: Q4 current account (Tuesday); consumer confidence (Michigan, Friday).*

### EUROPEAN UNION

**Progress on all fronts.** The European Council meeting on 19 March approved the 'One Europe, One Single Market' roadmap, which sets out a tight schedule: 2026 for most deliverables and by the end of 2027 for the rest. Among the most significant measures, the Commission introduced the 28th regime on 28 March, which facilitates the establishment of a business online within 48 hours, with no minimum capital requirement and under a unified legal framework. To speed up its adoption, opting for a regulation will avoid the need for 27 national transpositions. On the energy front, the Commission will propose temporary, targeted and coordinated measures, including state aid for industries that are significantly affected, long-term supply contracts to stabilise prices, and gas price caps. **Towards the ratification of a trade agreement with the United States and another with Australia.** The ratification process for the agreement with the United States has been relaunched with several safeguard clauses: 1. expiry at the end of March 2028 of the tariff relief enjoyed by the United States; 2. suspension in the event of a US breach; 3. entry into force conditional upon verification of all commitments. Ratification is expected in April or May, following negotiations with Member States. A free trade agreement with Australia is nearing completion.

### Eurozone

**With inflation projected to exceed its target, the ECB is expected to raise interest rates.** The ECB maintained its key interest rates in March but revised its growth forecasts (-0.3 pp to 0.9% in 2026; -0.1 pp to 1.3% in 2027) and inflation forecasts (+0.7 pp to 2.6% in 2026; +0.2 pp to 2% in 2027). A return to the 2% target is expected in 2027 (the baseline scenario includes two rate hikes according to market expectations), or potentially in 2029 under an adverse scenario. Some governors (Nagel, Makhlouf) do not rule out a key rate hike as early as April. The ECB's wage tracker anticipates negotiated wage growth of 2.3% in 2026 (a decline compared with 2025). Long-term rates have continued to rise: the German 10-year bond yield has crossed the 3% threshold for the first time since 2011 (+40 bp since the end of February). The spread stands at 73 bp with the French 10-year and 96 bp with the Italian 10-year (+17 and +33 bp compared to the end of February respectively). *Upcoming: consumer confidence (Monday), PMI (Tuesday), private credit and monetary aggregates (Thursday).*

**France: Inflation is expected to rebound rapidly according to our forecasts.** Fuel prices have risen by nearly 17% since early March (the same increase as in March 2022). The impact on year-on-year inflation is expected to be 0.6pp (1.7% in March compared with 1.1% in February). According to the Energy Regulatory Commission, the tariff for gas consumers is set to rise by 15% in May (a +0.2pp impact on inflation, which would exceed 2% for the first time since August 2024). The rise in gas prices is not expected to affect electricity prices (as gas is not used to generate electricity). The social security deficit reached EUR 21.6 billion in 2025, which is lower than the EUR 23 billion estimated by the government in its budget and EUR 15.3 billion recorded in 2024. *Upcoming: PMI (Tuesday), INSEE business climate and household confidence (Thursday), deficit and public debt in 2025 (Friday).*

**Germany: The initial effects of the energy shock are being felt.** The ZEW index fell by 58.8 points m/m in March to -0.5, although this decline was less severe than in March 2022 (-93.6 m/m to -39.3). Producer prices fell in February (-3.3% y/y; -0.3pp m/m). *Upcoming: PMI (Tuesday), IFO business climate (Wednesday), GfK consumer confidence (Thursday).*

### JAPAN

**Rate hikes still on the table.** The BoJ maintained its key interest rate at 0.75% but signalled a hawkish bias. This position is reinforced by the inflationary consequences of the war in Iran, with the BoJ assessing the downside risks to growth as moderate. *Upcoming: inflation and PMI (Tuesday), BoJ minutes (Wednesday).*

### UNITED KINGDOM

**Rate cuts are becoming less likely.** The BoE maintained its key rate at 3.75% but has not ruled out a further tightening of monetary policy. The yield on the 1-year government bond has risen by 60 basis points over three sessions, and by 110 basis points since early March. The 10-year yield has broken through the 5% mark for the first time since August 2008 (+80 bp since early March). The government has pledged support (GBP 53 million) for 1.5 million households to help with rising heating oil prices. Wage growth reached 3.9% y/y in January, including bonuses (3-month average), compared with 4.2% in December. *Upcoming: PMI (Tuesday), inflation (Wednesday), retail sales (Friday).*



[Find out more in our scenario and forecasts](#)

## EMERGING ECONOMIES

### AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST

#### **Gulf countries are beginning to take action to support their economies.**

Bahrain's Parliament has recently approved four measures, including exemptions from electricity, water and municipal tax bills for affected businesses. In the United Arab Emirates, the Central Bank is implementing measures to facilitate banks' access to liquidity. It has also opted for a temporary easing of capital and credit risk management requirements.

### ASIA

**Increasing pressure on currencies:** Asian currencies have held up well so far, but tensions are mounting. Since 27 February, the Thai baht, the South Korean won and the Philippine peso have recorded the sharpest falls against the USD, falling by 6.5%, 4.7% and 4.3% respectively. The Indian rupee has shown stronger resilience, with a depreciation of 3.1%. It is partly due to the Central Bank's intervention in the foreign exchange markets.

**China: Beijing tightens restrictions on exports of refined petroleum products.** Since the start of the month, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is reported to have instructed the main national oil refineries to suspend exports of certain products, including diesel and kerosene. The Philippines and Vietnam are said to be among the countries most affected, as China supplies 25% and 14% of their refined product imports respectively. Beijing has also reportedly ordered fertiliser exporters to restrict their sales to certain countries, notably India.

**Indonesia: Monetary policy unchanged despite rising inflation.** The central bank is in a more delicate position than other central banks in the region due to inflationary pressures that arose prior to the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East (+4.8% year-on-year in February). However, the rupiah's resilience (-0.9% since 27 February 2026) enabled the central bank to maintain its key interest rates at 4.75% at the monetary policy committee meeting on 17 March. The country's external accounts are less vulnerable to the energy shock than those of Thailand and the Philippines.

**Taiwan: Monetary status quo against a backdrop of low inflation and robust growth.** The Central Bank kept its key interest rate at 2% at its meeting on 19 March. CPI inflation stood at 1.2% year-on-year for the first two months of 2026, and it is not expected to exceed 2% this year, according to the Central Bank's latest forecasts. The Bank is optimistic about the growth outlook, forecasting a growth rate of 7.3% for 2026 (following 8.7% in 2025), which continues to be bolstered by demand for AI-related goods. However, the economy is vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East, due to its heavy reliance on hydrocarbon imports. A helium shortage could also affect the semiconductor sector.

### EMERGING EUROPE

**Central Europe: Currencies relatively stable over the past week.** However, since the start of the conflict, the depreciation of the Hungarian forint has been significant (-4.4% against the euro and -6.4% against the dollar). In contrast, the depreciation of the Polish zloty (-1.3% against the euro and -3.3% against the dollar) and the Czech koruna (-1.1% against the euro and -3.1% against the dollar) has been less pronounced.

**Czech Republic: Monetary status quo.** The Central Bank voted unanimously to maintain the key interest rate at 3.5%. Its statement indicates that future decisions will be based on the latest available figures and their impact on inflation. The monetary authorities anticipate that inflation will remain below the 2% target this year. Projections, which factor in higher oil prices, have not yet been released.

### LATIN AMERICA

**Chile and Peru: Pressure on currencies has intensified.** Since 27 February, the Chilean peso and the Peruvian peso have depreciated by 5% and 7.5% respectively against the USD. The reason: concerns over developments in the copper market. In Chile, economic activity slowed slightly in Q4 (1.6% y/y, down from 1.7% in Q3, resulting in GDP growth of 2.5% in 2025). The new administration plans to drastically cut public spending. In Peru, the interim president's declaration of a state of emergency has heightened concerns about the political climate, particularly as the presidential campaign enters its final stretch. The first round of the elections will take place on 12 April.

**Brazil: The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) is cautiously beginning its cycle of monetary easing.** The BCB cut its key interest rate (SELIC) by 25 basis points to 14.75%, which is a more moderate cut than the anticipated 50 basis points before the war in Iran. Future decisions by the BCB will be contingent on developments in the energy markets, as they adopt a resolutely cautious stance. This decision follows the government's announcement of a support plan designed to mitigate the impact of rising fuel prices, which includes 1/ tax relief, 2/ targeted subsidies mainly for diesel producers and importers, and 3/ regulatory measures to combat speculation and excessive price rises under the supervision of the National Petroleum Agency.

### COMMODITIES

#### **War in Iran: Attacks on strategic gas facilities in Iran and Qatar indicate prolonged disruptions to production and supply on the gas market.**

The damage caused to infrastructure at Ras Laffan, the world's largest LNG export site located in Qatar, will require 3 to 5 years of repairs before it can return to pre-conflict production levels, according to QatarEnergy, with approximately 17% of Qatar's production capacity affected. The attack on Thursday 18 March on the world's largest gas field, South Pars, which is shared by Iran and Qatar, compelled Iran to suspend its LNG exports to Türkiye (around 8 billion cubic metres in 2024). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), over 40 energy production facilities have been severely or very severely damaged by the ongoing conflict.

**The European Commission has called for greater flexibility from member states to replenish their gas stocks.** It has advised EU members to wait until 1 December to achieve their stock replenishment target of 80% (10 percentage points below the official target, which had already been revised to 80% by 2025) and to avoid hastily replenishing stocks while the market is under strain.

**Saudi Arabia has exported around 4.2 million barrels per day (mb/d) of oil in the last five days via the Yanbu terminal** located on the Red Sea. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, Saudi exports stood at over 7 mb/d.

The European TTF rose by 23% in the past week. It currently stands at around €60/MWh. Brent rose by 13% to reach \$114/bbl on Monday morning.

**The IEA has clarified the composition of the 400 million barrels of oil drawn from the strategic reserves of its 32 member countries:** crude oil accounts for the majority, while European countries are primarily contributing with petroleum products. In addition to releasing reserves, oil-producing countries in the Americas are set to increase their production.

**Gold and silver prices are falling sharply** (on Monday 23 March, down 15% and 20% respectively over the past week) amid fears of a return of inflationary pressures and the prospect of higher interest rates.

# MARKETS OVERVIEW

## Bond Markets

	In %		In bps		
	20/03/2026	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
Bund 2Y	2,63	+25,0	+62,5	+54,3	+46,7
Bund 5Y	2,75	+15,5	+45,2	+28,8	+35,6
Bund 10Y	2,86	+21,7	+1,8	+0,5	+10,9
OAT 10Y	3,51	+29,2	+6,3	-5,4	-3,1
BTP 10Y	3,92	+18,1	+62,5	+41,8	+18,9
BONO 10Y	3,47	+8,9	+42,9	+22,9	+14,3
Treasuries 2Y	3,95	+19,3	+45,2	+46,6	-4,0
Treasuries 5Y	4,02	+14,9	+37,1	+29,3	+0,5
Treasuries 10Y	4,38	+20,1	-6,8	-2,9	-14,0
Gilt 2Y	4,58	+44,4	+97,7	+82,1	+33,6
Treasuries 5Y	4,59	+24,4	+68,8	+73,8	+26,7
Gilt 10Y	5,00	+16,7	57,0	+44,6	+34,8

## Currencies & Commodities

	Level	Change, %			
	20/03/2026	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
EUR/USD	1,15	-1,6	-1,7	-1,1	+7,7
GBP/USD	1,33	+0,5	-1,5	-1,1	+2,5
USD/JPY	159,26	-0,2	+2,8	+1,6	+7,0
DXY	99,65	-0,7	+1,9	+1,3	-4,0
EUR/GBP	0,87	+0,4	-0,6	-0,6	+3,8
EUR/CHF	0,91	+0,8	-0,2	-2,1	-4,9
EUR/JPY	183,86	+0,7	+0,7	-0,1	+13,9
Oil, Brent (\$/bbl)	112,42	+28,7	+37,0	+53,3	+34,3
Gold (\$/ounce)	4588	-8,8	-9,2	+6,1	+50,8


## Equity Indices

	Level	Change, %			
	20/03/2026	1-Week	1-Month	Year to date	1-Year
<b>World</b>					
MSCI World (\$)	4244	-2,0	-6,8	-4,2	+14,9
<b>North America</b>					
S&P500	6506	-1,9	-5,8	-5,0	+14,9
Dow Jones	45577	-2,1	-8,2	-5,2	+8,6
Nasdaq composite	21648	-2,1	-5,4	-6,9	+22,4
<b>Europe</b>					
CAC 40	7666	-3,1	-10,0	-5,9	-5,3
DAX 30	22380	-4,6	-11,4	-8,6	-2,7
EuroStoxx50	5501	-3,8	-10,3	-5,0	+0,9
FTSE100	9918	-3,3	-7,2	-0,1	+14,0
<b>Asia</b>					
MSCI, loc.	1759	-0,6	-5,2	+4,1	+23,1
Nikkei 225	53373	-0,8	-6,1	+6,0	+41,4
<b>Emerging</b>					
MSCI Emerging (\$)	1463	-0,4	-6,6	+4,1	+28,3
China	77	-2,8	-6,1	-6,7	-0,8
India	906	-1,7	-11,4	-14,5	-6,8
Brazil	1818	-0,9	-10,0	+10,5	+33,1


## Performance by sector

Eurostoxx600		S&P500	
Year 2026 to 20-3, €		Year 2026 to 20-3, \$	
+30,0%	Oil & Gas	+31,8%	Energy
+14,8%	Telecoms	+12,5%	Telecoms
+9,2%	Utilities	+9,1%	Retail
+3,8%	Commodities	+7,1%	Capital Goods
-1,1%	Chemical	+3,9%	Utilities
-2,4%	Food industry	+3,4%	Food, Beverage & Tobacco
-2,8%	Industry	+2,6%	Materials
<b>-3,2%</b>	<b>Eurostoxx600</b>	-1,8%	Semiconductors
-4,1%	Real Estate	-3,0%	Tech. Hardware & Equip.
-4,5%	Technology	-3,9%	Pharmaceuticals
-5,9%	Health	<b>-5,0%</b>	<b>S&amp;P500</b>
-6,9%	Insurance	-6,2%	Media
-7,9%	Construction	-6,4%	Insurance
-8,8%	Financial services	-6,8%	Consumer Services
-9,2%	Banks	-9,2%	Consumer Discretionary
-9,9%	Retail	-9,4%	Commercial & Pro. Services
-13,6%	Travel & leisure	-10,6%	Healthcare
-19,2%	Media	-11,0%	Bank
-19,6%	Consumption Goods	-17,5%	Automobiles
		-24,8%	Real Estate


## Bund 10Y & US Treas. 10Y




## Bund 10Y & OAT 10Y



## EUR/USD & GBP/USD



## EUROSTOXX 50 & S&P500



## Oil, Brent (\$/bbl)



## Gold (\$/ounce)



## MSCI World (\$)



## MSCI Emerging (\$)



SOURCE: LSEG, BLOOMBERG, BNP PARIBAS  
DATA VISUALISATION AND CARTOGRAPHY: TARIK RHARRAB



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
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