In June 2026, corporate creations cumulated over one year remained dynamic, reaching a historic peak according to INSEE, with 1,233,123 corporates set up, representing a 11.1% year-on-year increase. This momentum is not a recent phenomenon, as corporate creations have doubled over the last decade. During this same period, the rise in bankruptcies has been ten times lower, which serves to put current levels (approximately 70,000 bankruptcies cumulated over one year in March 2026) into perspective. Historically, the peaks and troughs in corporate bankruptcies are following those of corporate creations, with an average lag of 24 to 36 months
For the first time since 2009 (excluding COVID), the GDP of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to contract this year (-0.8%), whereas pre-conflict forecasts had predicted growth of 4.7%. Far from benefiting from the sharp rise in energy prices triggered by the conflict, the scale of the downturn reflects the severity of a shock that is undermining many of the pillars of the Gulf economies. Nevertheless, the consequences are varying from one country to another, depending on the level of diversification and, above all, on the degree of vulnerability to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
The share of intra-EU exports in total European exports currently stands at around 62%, a level comparable to that seen in the early 2000s. Behind this apparent stability, however, lies a deep reshuffling of the major blocs that make up the European Union.
In the years following the pandemic, labour productivity in Italy has stalled. Artificial intelligence is identified as a potential catalyst for reversing this trend, with projections indicating possible annual productivity growth increases of up to 1.1 p.p. in a scenario of rapid adoption. However, the actual adoption of AI in Italy is still low, despite a faster growth rate compared with its main Euro area counterparts. As of 2025, only 16.4% of Italian companies with more than 10 employees were using AI. In the financial and insurance sectors, adoption rates are above average (39%, peaking at 70% in insurance)
The global race for artificial intelligence and the electrification of economies is leading to an increase in demand for metals. A recent study by S&P Global indicates that global electricity consumption is projected to grow by nearly 50% by 2040, fuelling a sustained rise in demand for copper, lithium, nickel, and other critical minerals. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for copper could rise by 30 to 40% by 2040, while demand for lithium could increase four- to sixfold, depending on the pace of adoption of low-carbon technologies.
23 June will mark the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum, which led to the UK’s official exit from the European Union on 31 January 2020 (followed by a transition period). Since then, the country has indeed regained control over certain policy domains, such as trade, migration and regulatory frameworks. However, both the anticipation of Brexit and its actual implementation in 2021 have been linked to a decline in the country’s performance across several key indicators. Against a backdrop of escalating geopolitical tensions and mounting shared challenges, the UK is now seeking to re-establish practical collaboration with its main economic partner: the European Union.
As US regulators had hoped, the easing of the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) applied to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has improved intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market. However, this measure has not prompted banks to significantly increase their Treasury holdings.
Latin America is not exposed to the risk of a disruption in hydrocarbon supplies due to the conflict in the Middle East. However, the rise in international energy prices is exerting pressure on the region’s public finances. In Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, fuel subsidies are increasing the risk of fiscal slippage; however, this risk is somewhat mitigated by the projected rise in oil-related fiscal revenues. In Chile and Peru, the lack of subsidies points to a significant inflationary impact that could result in a monetary tightening. This would increase the interest burden on public debt, but the moderate fiscal deficits in these countries should enable them to absorb the shock
The outperformance of US growth is underpinned by productivity gains that are significantly higher than those of the previous decade. This acceleration is due more to the spillover effects of past investments and post-pandemic changes (such as remote working) than to artificial intelligence (AI). The roll-out of AI is too recent for productivity gains to have already made their mark at the macroeconomic level. In the medium term, however, AI is expected to support the upward trend.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz over the past two and a half months has significantly reduced the amount of oil available globally. The use of regional bypass, and the release of commercial stocks and strategic reserves are only partial and temporary solutions. Without the restoration of oil flows through the strait, the growing shortfall in petroleum products will accelerate the rise in oil prices and destruction in global oil demand.
Emerging Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Beyond supply issues, rising prices pose a significant risk to these countries, where domestic demand is a major driver of economic growth. To limit the impact, some Asian countries (notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have opted to partially subsidise energy and fertilisers. The additional cost to their public finances is expected to remain manageable provided that the average crude oil price does not exceed USD 100 per barrel over the year. However, this subsidy policy poses risks to their public finances, particularly if external financing conditions tighten. Indonesia is the country most exposed to a rise in US long-term interest rates.
The energy shock is beginning to feed through into French inflation. In March and April, inflation was limited to refining activities and fuel prices. It is expected to affect more sectors in the second quarter, according to the European Commission’s survey on three-month selling price expectations. In France, the pass-through is expected to mainly affect intermediate goods in Q2. However, inflationary pressures on consumer goods and services or construction are expected to remain quite moderate. These factors are consistent with our scenario of a limited acceleration in French inflation and a moderate impact of the energy shock on growth.
The trade openness of EU countries represents both a strength and a weakness, making active initiatives necessary to enhance economic security. According to the World Bank, in 2024 the EU’s trade openness stood at 92%, compared with 25% for the United States and 37% for China. For Italy, the figure was 63%, among the highest among Member States, with particularly strong exposure to extra-EU demand. The evolution of the international geopolitical and economic context, together with the country’s dependence on the import of energy materials, suggests that careful consideration should be given to the potential vulnerability of Italian imports to possible total or partial disruptions in the external supply of strategically significant products.
Following a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.
Latin America is considerably less exposed than other emerging regions to the repercussions of the war in the Middle East. This is mainly due to its very low risk of hydrocarbon supply disruptions: the vast majority of imported hydrocarbons come from the United States and other countries in the region, with only a negligible portion coming from the Middle East. Furthermore, several countries are net exporters (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador).
Will a different situation lead to different outcomes? In other words, will the combination of weaker demand and more moderate supply constraints in 2026, as compared to 2022, help to limit the rise in inflation? Having illustrated the impact of the energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East on six key variables in the Eurozone in our previous Chart of the Week, we now move on to a new comparison between these two dates, this time focusing on the relative levels of supply and demand issues. In the Eurozone, weaker demand has resulted in a more pronounced decline in inflation, unlike in the United States, where both demand and inflation have remained more sustained
Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of war in Iran and the associated surge in oil prices (+44% to date) and gas prices (+64%) lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that of 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those of the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy shock (a rise in oil prices of around 30% between 23 February and its peak in early June 2022, and a rise in gas prices of around 210% between 23 February and the peak in late August 2022)? The risk cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there are similarities and numerous uncertainties.
During her hearing on 18 March 2026 before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Claudia Buch (Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank) highlighted the absence of decline in the quality of bank assets and the stability of non-performing loan ratios. These ratios are a good indirect indicator of the financial health of borrowing corporations in the European Union (EU), particularly in the manufacturing sector. When viewed from this perspective, the proportion of firms in this sector facing severe financial difficulties appears to be lower at the start of 2026 than at the start of 2022. This suggests, by extension, that these firms are in better financial health and have a greater ability to absorb shocks
For several years, Central Europe has been facing a marked demographic decline. Its magnitude varies from one country to another. The total population decline from 2004 to 2025 ranges from -0.3% in Slovakia to -17.2% in Bulgaria. The Czech Republic is the only country in the region to have seen a population increase over the same period. The working-age population (ages 15–64) is also declining. However, the situation is less unfavourable in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a more significant decline due to migration patterns. Net migration flows were negative for Bulgaria until 2019 and for Romania until 2021. However, this trend has reversed in recent years
Market opportunities in China are shrinking dramatically due to the country's shift towards higher-end products and its import substitution policy. 2025 marked an unprecedented turning point in this regard: European exports to China fell by 14% in nominal terms and by 10.2% in volume, as the country's share of total EU exports (7.5%) reached its lowest level in nearly fifteen years.
In 2025, US–China trade tensions led to a sharp drop in US imports from China, while Chinese exports to other regions increased, indicating early signs of trade diversion. For Italy, estimates point to limited but notable export displacement, concentrated in specific sectors, alongside potential gains from lower-cost Chinese intermediate and capital goods. Italian firms report stronger competitive pressures and heightened uncertainty, particularly among exporters. Despite the challenges posed by tariffs and the redirection of Chinese exports in 2025, Italian exports have proved resilient, with growth recorded especially towards the United States.
According to the ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS), some banks in the Eurozone may tighten their credit standards for households more significantly in 2026 than in 2025. The reason for this is the more constraining calculation of regulatory capital requirements. In contrast, the tightening would be less severe for corporations. This desynchronisation is unusual. It tends to illustrate the effect of the ramp-up of the output floor, which would particularly affect housing loans. However, the effect would remain very limited: only one in ten banks is considering to change its standards. New loans to households and corporations would keep their momentum largely unchanged.
Asian economies, excluding China, have experienced minimal disruption to their global trade shares despite higher US tariffs. This resilience stems from their export composition, which remains concentrated in electronics, a sector largely spared by US tariff increases and buoyed by AI-driven demand. While the strategy of redirecting Chinese exports from the United States to Asia and other global markets has intensified, it has not been sufficient to fully compensate for China’s decline in U.S. market share.
Ageing populations, rising long-term interest rates and increased defence spending are adding to the difficulties for public finances across the OECD. While fiscal consolidation – which can be measured by an improvement of the primary balance by at least 3% of GDP in 4 years – is essential for several member states, this is easier said than done. What can we learn from analysing 20 years of European public finance? Historical examples from EU countries show that expenditure-led consolidation can be an effective approach and tends to support stronger growth after it is completed.
Household spending intentions have been improving in the Eurozone for two years, and in January 2026, they returned to their early 2022 levels, despite a much more gradual improvement in the household confidence index. Households’ fears about unemployment and living standards in general have weighed on consumption and have contributed to its moderate growth. Moreover, these fears have continued to dampen consumer sentiment. However, these concerns are easing and no longer seem to be hindering a potential rebound in consumption, as evidenced by purchasing intentions.
Weekly charts highlighting points of interest in the world economy
