The economic slowdown in China and the implementation of its industrial policy will have large consequences for the rest of the world. Effects will vary from country to country, depending on the transmission channels. For emerging countries, the overall impact will not be necessarily negative, notably thanks to the foreign direct investment channel, which could well change the situation. We are discussing this with Christine Peltier.
Last week’s news made for grim reading for many in Europe. First came the choice by our American friends to bring back to the White House a man who said just weeks ago that the EU would have to “pay a big price” if he won. Then the German governing coalition collapsed. Following factory closure announcements by VW in Germany a week before, the two largest German banks reported massive increases in their provisions for bad loans. Meanwhile, in France, lay-offs were announced by two high profile French companies in the automotive industry but also in retail a sector hitherto thought to be fine
GDP growth, inflation, exchange and interest rates.
Key figures for the French economy compared with those of the main European countries, analysis of data on the population and the French labour market, activity by sector, publication administration figures, inflation, credit and interest rates, corporate and household accounts.
In France, in Q3 2024, for the first time (statistical series dating back to 1949), non-financial companies invested more (in billions of euros, at constant prices) in "information and communication" than in construction. This shift was bound to happen sooner or later, given the trend towards intangible investment (in which "information and communication" is the main item). In particular, this growing weighting goes hand in hand with the increasingly widespread use of electronics and software in today's goods, including in traditional sectors such as the automotive industry.
The outcome of the US presidential elections on 5 November will decide the extent of the protectionist turn taken across the Atlantic. However, global exports have so far resisted the rise in tariff barriers. By the end of the decade, the IMF forecasts growth in exports of goods similar to or even slightly higher than that of world GDP. Tighter protectionist measures will affect global growth, but the effects on international trade will be more nuanced.
GDP growth, inflation, interest and exchange rates.
According to recent economic data, the disparity in economic situations is confirmed, and even accentuated, between the United States, where growth is expected to remain strong in Q3 (0.7% q/q in Q3, according to our forecast) and other regions, notably the Eurozone, where the recovery is seemingly running out of steam (0.2% growth in Q3, according to our forecast and our nowcast).
The gradual improvement in household confidence indices in the Eurozone (financial situation and purchase intentions), supported by falling inflation, is still not leading to a rebound in consumption. Retail sales have been stable for a year, even though a slight rise of 0.2% m/m was recorded in August. Motor vehicle sales, which often display a significant change from one month to the next, rose by 8.2% m/m in September, but were down to their lowest level in three years on a three-month moving average basis.
The business climate in Germany (PMI and IFO surveys) deteriorated steadily from its peak in May to September. The relative optimism of the spring has ebbed away, as illustrated in particular by the deterioration in the PMI for export conditions (standing at 49.8 in September, compared to 51.9 in May). As a result, while our forecast for Q3 growth remains at 0.1% q/q, the German government has highlighted the risk of another negative figure (following the rate of -0.1% q/q in Q2 already) and therefore of a recession. Overall, GDP is likely to be close to its level recorded at the end of 2021 (i.e. three years of stagnation).
The Olympic Games were a brief positive interlude, which has now come to an end, as shown by the services PMI, which peaked at 55 in August in the midst of much more lacklustre performances. However, this Olympic Games effect should have buoyed growth in Q3 (0.4% q/q, according to our scenario). Our nowcast is a little lower (0.3%) and highlights the risk that, excluding the Olympic Games effect (estimated at 0.2% by INSEE), the French economy slowed in Q3 (after 0.2% q/q growth in Q2). It is likely to slow further in Q4, judging by the recent deterioration in the services sector (PMI at 48.3 in October after 49.6 in September) and in industry (production PMI down from 44 to 42.5).
Weakness in manufacturing activity is still one of the black spots in the Italian economic situation. Industrial production remained on a negative trend in August (-0.1% 3m/3m), and purchasing managers in the manufacturing sector continued to indicate a deterioration in activity in September (manufacturing PMI at 48.3; -1.1 points over one month), mainly due to falling demand (with the new orders component down 3.1 points, standing at 45.7).
Business sentiment continued to improve in September. The PMI recorded its tenth consecutive month of growth (56.3; +2.7 points over one month). It was driven by a dynamic services sector (57.0; +2.4 points), buoyed by continued strong tourism activity (+11.2% y/y YTD in tourist arrivals), and by a recovery in manufacturing activity (53.0; +2.5 points). Although industrial production continued to decline in August (-0.2% 3m/3m), the outlook appears more favourable, judging by the rise in business leaders' expectations for their production over the coming months (11.4; +6.2 points, according to the European Commission's economic sentiment survey).
U.S. economic growth, a priori, remained robust in the third quarter. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPnow estimates GDP growth at +0.8% q/q (+0.1pp compared to Q2 2024). Household consumption remains the principal driver, as illustrated by the acceleration of the retail sales control group in September (+0.7% m/m, +0.4pp). Activity in services improved in the same month in view of the jump in the ISM non-manufacturing index to 54.9 (+3.4pp). On the other hand, the ISM manufacturing index remained in contraction territory, stable at +47.2 despite the improvement in the “output” component (+5.0pp).
While manufacturing activity in the United Kingdom, like elsewhere in Europe, is in a difficult state, the situation is less worrying across the Channel. Industrial production rose by 1.1% m/m in August, returning to its April levels. The year-on-year fall in output has almost completely subsided (-0.3% y/y). This situation is in line with the manufacturing PMI for October, which was down on the previous month (-1.2 points, to 50.3), but is still in expansion territory. The services PMI fell by 0.6 points to 51.8, and therefore also contributed to the decline in the composite index, which dropped by 0.9 points to 51.7 in October.
Activity surveys were negative in October. Jibun Bank’s preliminary survey reported a decline in the manufacturing PMI to 49.0 (-0.7pp). The decline was more pronounced for activity in the services sector, with the corresponding PMI losing 3.8pp to 49.3, contracting for the first time since June. According to the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) quarterly Tankan survey, the overall business climate improved slightly in Q3, but remained stable for large manufacturing companies. We expect growth to fall to +0.3% q/q in Q3 (-0.4pp compared to Q2 2024), due to the dissipation of the technical upturn that had buoyed it in the previous quarter.
Discussions on the 2025 draft finance law (PLF) have just begun in the French National Assembly. The backdrop for this PLF must be outlined. France is setting out to consolidate its budget, which is a major yet necessary task. However, things are hanging in the balance due to power struggles in the National Assembly. Over the past few years, a high fiscal deficit has been run up, with the 2024 fiscal deficit and interest burden (which is expected to increase by nearly 1 point of GDP by 2027) leaving the French government with no choice but to take action. In order to stabilise its public debt ratio, France will have to bring its fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP and therefore reduce it each year for at least five years
In Q3 2024, Chinese economic growth accelerated to +0.9% quarter-on-quarter (q/q), after its poor performance in the previous quarter (+0.5% q/q). It stood at +4.6% year-on-year (y/y), which is slightly lower than in Q2, and reached +4.8% y/y over the first three quarters of 2024. In order to hit the official growth target of "around 5%" set for 2024, activity will have to rebound strongly during the final quarter of the year. This means that the fiscal stimulus measures announced by the authorities since the last week of September need to be rolled out quickly. These announcements have provided less details than expected on the stimulus measures and were less significant than expected by the markets
The macroeconomic outlook for South Africa is gloomy. After a year of unprecedented electricity shortages in 2023, economic growth is only expected to rebound very slightly in 2024. However, investor confidence has been boosted with new political forces entering into government in June 2024, following the general election in May. The new coalition government, with populist parties largely absent, offers the prospect of a degree of political continuity, continued fiscal consolidation and the implementation of reforms designed to increase the medium-term economic-growth potential. However, this government of national unity is built on uneasy alliances
In the United States, economic policy uncertainty, based on media coverage, picked up again in September, after a brief decline in August. This increase is due to the political uncertainty in the country in the run-up to the presidential elections on 5 November.
Reflecting Jerome Powell's statement that it is time to adjust (i.e., loosen) monetary policy and subsequent action, it is also time to adjust fiscal policy in Europe and the United States, in the direction of tightening in both cases. This is a good time, given the context of monetary easing, falling inflation and positive economic growth. Even more than monetary easing, this fiscal consolidation must be gradual so as not to weigh too much on growth. Like the central banks that have been determined in their response to the inflationary shock, governments will have to show the same determination and perseverance in the coming fiscal consolidation efforts, given their necessity and significance.
The Italian real GDP over the past three years is higher than previously estimated, thanks to the 2024 general revision of the national accounts. This revision, which is undertaken every five years and was published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) on 23 September, includes the basis change with reference year 2021. As a result, real GDP is finally, albeit only slightly, above the level posted before the 2008 financial crisis (0.6 pp higher in Q2 2024 than in Q4 2007).
