The Covid-19 pandemic weakened Indonesia’s economy. Two years after the crisis, real GDP has returned to 2019 levels, but the labour market is still weak, the poverty rate is higher than before the crisis and investment remains subdued. According to the World Bank, the pandemic’s lasting impact on education and the labour market will cost the country 0.1 points of its long-term growth potential. Today, Indonesia must deal with a new unfavourable economic environment as commodity prices have dramatically increased due to the conflict in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Although growth is bound to be squeezed by the Ukrainian conflict, Indonesia’s external accounts should remain healthy and inflationary pressures should remain moderate
In recent weeks, the prospect of several ECB rate hikes has caused an increase in Bund yields and, unexpectedly, several sovereign spreads. Beyond a certain point, higher spreads may become unwarranted. Under such circumstances, the ECB might consider stepping in to avoid that its policy transmission would be impacted. Determining whether sovereign spreads have increased too much is a real challenge. Historically, based on a 20-week moving window, the relationship (beta) between the BTP-Bund spread and Bund yields fluctuates a lot, so this calls for taking a longer perspective. Using data since 2013, the current spread is in line with an estimate based on current Bund yields. Clearly, other economic variables should be added to the analysis
The significant contraction of the blue area relative to the dotted area illustrates the magnitude of the shock faced by the Chinese economy since March 2022. The resurgence of the Covid epidemic has led to the introduction of mobility restrictions in many provinces, with the most stringent lockdowns affecting major industrial and port regions, notably Shanghai. Restrictions have depressed household demand and dampened activity in factories, disturbed the transportation and export of goods, and led to supply-chain disruptions in China and abroad.
After an unprecedented contraction in activity in 2020, the strong rebound in 2021 did not allow South Africa to return to its pre-crisis level of GDP contrary to most emerging economies. In 2022, activity should remain subdued and growth below 2% in the medium term. The economic outlook remains largely constrained by the need for fiscal consolidation in order to contain the high risk of debt distress, the tense socio-political climate, and structurally by strong infrastructure constraints, first of which the electricity supply. The shock induced by the conflict in Ukraine is also exerting significant pressures that could make fiscal consolidation efforts difficult
The global economy has been hit by multiple shocks this year: new Covid-19 cases in China, the war in Ukraine, rising interest rates. Financial market behaviour and the US Survey of Professional Forecasters point to mounting concerns about the risk of a recession. These worries come with a cost to the economy and may cause growth to slow down further. Some degree of concern is welcome because it enhances the effectiveness of a restrictive monetary policy. There is a tipping point however, beyond which slowdown fears become self-fulfilling. Addressing these would be difficult if by then inflation has not yet converged sufficiently to target.
The negative prospects for the second quarter of 2022 are no longer a risk as suggested by business surveys, they are now taking concrete shape in Germany. After the very sharp worsening in the trade balance in March (a 4% decline in exports in volume terms and a symmetrical 4.1% increase in imports), it barely improved in April and remains at an extremely low level. According to the Kiel Institute’s real-time forecasts, exports probably fell in May (-1.7% m/m) but will see a slight recovery in June (0.6% m/m). Over the second quarter as a whole, Germany’s trade balance could shrink to its lowest level since Q2 2001.
The latest economic data from INSEE have provided detail on the timing and scale of the purchasing power shock to household consumption, with three figures standing out: the 1.8% q/q fall in the purchasing power of gross disposable income over the first quarter; the revised fall of 1.5% q/q in household consumption (from -1.3% in the initial estimate); and the downgrade in GDP growth to -0.2% q/q, from 0% in the initial estimate.
The deterioration of the business climate surveys continued in May, particularly in the manufacturing sector, even though industrial production held up until April. Output rose 1.6% m/m, to its highest level since December 2007. However, the manufacturing PMI dropped 2.6 points to 51.9 in May, its sixth consecutive monthly fall. The sharp fall in this indicator shows up clearly in our barometer.
In 2021, sales by foreign subsidiaries of Japanese industrial companies accounted for nearly a quarter of total sales. China is the main anchor country, particularly for the automotive industry. Despite this, Japan has retained a larger industrial base than most other OECD countries. The sector accounted for more than 20% of total national value added in 2021. The share of goods exports in GDP has also increased, reaching 16.4% in Q1 2022. This production structure for Japanese companies, based on the complementarity between domestic facilities and foreign subsidiaries, has helped support profits, which climbed to a record as a share of GDP in Q1 2022
Since the start of the year, media increasingly use the word recession and, over the same period, there was a significant increase in Treasury yields. The common driver behind these developments is, to a large degree probably, the more hawkish tone from the Federal Reserve. Unease about recession risk shows up in the latest quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Recession probabilities across the projection horizon have moved higher and they are now well above what we have seen in the past at this stage of the tightening cycle. Exceptionally high inflation requires aggressive rate hikes to bring it back under control
The global manufacturing PMI continues its sideways movement since March, when it had declined due to the war in Ukraine. May saw a weakening in the US and the euro area, where in particular Italy recorded a considerable decline. In Australia the PMI recorded a big drop. China saw a rebound following the easing of mobility restrictions. In India the PMI has been stable at a high level for several months and Vietnam saw a sizeable improvement in May. The services PMI was down in the US and the euro area, where in particular Germany was confronted with weaker data, although still well above the 50 mark. In the UK, the index recorded a huge drop. Japan is benefiting from better data and in India the already elevated index moved higher again in May.
US GDP growth was revised slightly downwards (-0.1 point) for Q1 2022, bringing the contraction in the annualised quarterly growth rate to -1.5%, contrary to expectations of a smaller contraction of only -1.3%. This correction can be attributed to a lower-than-expected private inventory investment (contribution of -1.1 points) as well as to the smaller contribution of investment (+1.2 point), especially residential investment. These revisions were partly offset by an increase in consumer spending of both goods and services (+2.1 points). Increases in exports and imports of goods cancelled each other out, leaving foreign trade’s net contribution unchanged (-3.2 points).
At its 10 March meeting, the ECB paved the way for raising its key deposit rate, although the timing of the first rate increase remained uncertain at the time: the odds of a September move had declined compared to a few weeks ago and July was excluded, which left December. The wait-and-see approach still seemed appropriate given the increasing downside risks to growth, aggravated by the current inflationary shock, the war in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid strategy. Yet economic data reported in the meantime, as well as the hawkish tone of several ECB members, seems to have accelerated the tempo. Concerning data, it is the combination of high inflation, a weak euro and relatively resilient growth that has moved forward the lift-off date.
Our different uncertainty gauges are complementary, in terms of scope and methodology. US economic policy uncertainty based on media coverage has eased slightly after a significant increase, reflecting concern about the impact of aggressive monetary policy tightening. In the US, business uncertainty about sales revenue growth has been stable but uncertainty about employment growth has rebounded somewhat, probably reflecting ongoing difficulties in filling vacancies. The European Commission’s uncertainty index, after having jumped following the war in Ukraine, has stabilised.
Uncertainty matters greatly for households and businesses when taking decisions. It can have many causes: economic, economic policy, political or even geopolitical. Survey data of the European Commission show that the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a huge jump in uncertainty, followed by a gradual decline. The war in Ukraine has triggered another, albeit more limited, increase. It will be important to monitor the development of uncertainty in the coming months at the level of consumers, businesses and individual countries. In the absence of a decline, one should expect that the negative impact shows up in spending and activity data.
China’s economic growth started to slow down in March, then activity contracted in April (industrial production: -2.9% year-on-year, services production: -6.1% y/y). This rapid deterioration has principally resulted from mobility restrictions implemented in various provinces of the country in response to the epidemic wave. Most importantly, stringent lockdowns have been imposed in some major industrial and port regions (notably Shanghai), which has dampened activity in manufacturing factories, disturbed transport of goods and leading to supply chain disruptions in many sectors. Overall, the health situation and the level of mobility restrictions in China are improving in May. Local economic activity may therefore be able to recover at least slightly.
The Italian economy began 2022 on a wrong footing, with a 0.2% q/q contraction in real GDP in the first quarter. The country has been hit hard by the war in Ukraine and by lasting disruption in world trade. These factors are having a particularly strong effect on economies with a large industrial base, as is the case in Italy. Inflation, which was 6.3% y/y in April (down from 6.8% y/y in March), has also had a significant negative effect on household confidence. According to the European Commission, consumer confidence increased very slightly in April (the balance of opinion rose 1.9 points to -22), but March had been the worst month since January 2014.
The resilience of Manufacturing PMI through to April was surprising, given the extent to which constraints on supply and pressure on input prices have increased since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine on 24 February. This is particularly true in Germany where, despite an industrial sector with considerable exposure to the shock, Manufacturing PMI remained well above 50 (54.6 in April 2022). This suggests that activity in the sector remained comfortably in the expansion zone, whereas industrial production contracted by 4.4% between January and March 2022. This conflicting message is due mainly to a methodological bias: the inclusion of delivery lags in the aggregate PMI index. This bias may be an issue when the PMI is used as a nowcast for industrial production or GDP growth
Although Germany returned to positive economic growth in the first quarter of 2022 – with GDP up 0.2 % q/q according to the initial estimate published by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) – March figures already showed the impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and strict lockdowns in several regions of China. Industrial production, which accounts for 24 % of German GDP, fell sharply in March (by 4.6 % m/m) after almost zero growth in February. Industrial production remains well below its pre-Covid level: in Q1 2022, it was 5.2 % lower than in Q4 2019. Worse, the rapid decline in March created a sharply negative growth overhang for the second quarter (-3 %).
Inflation is continuing to spread among the various components of the consumer price index (CPI). The energy component fell slightly in April (-2.5% m/m) after the government introduced a fuel rebate, but that decline was more than offset by faster inflation in other components of the CPI. Food prices in particular rose by 1.4% m/m in April, the sharpest increase for 20 years, beating figures seen in previous waves of food price inflation in 2007-08 and 2011. Food was the main contributor (0.2 points) to monthly inflation in April (0.4% m/m).
Latest inflation figures give the Spanish government a little respite. Having approached 10% in March (9.8%), consumer price inflation fell to 8.4% in April. Measures taken by the authorities to stem the rise in energy prices – mainly through subsidies and tax cuts – had a beneficial effect. However, food price inflation rose to 10.1% y/y in April. In addition, its contribution to overall inflation (1.98 percentage points) is now roughly the same as other energy-related components of expenditure, i.e., transport (1.98 points) and electricity, gas and other fuels (2.30 points).
The UK economy grew 0.8% q/q in Q1 2022, taking GDP 0.7% above its pre-Covid level of Q4 2019 but falling short of the 1% expansion expected. Since the ONS also publishes monthly GDP figures, it is possible to see how the economy fared over the course of the quarter. After a positive January (+0.7% m/m), output was flat in February (growth of 0% m/m as opposed to the initial estimate of +0.1%), and GDP even contracted slightly in March (-0.1% m/m). Although Q1 GDP was disappointing, its composition is also worrying looking ahead.
The global manufacturing PMI edged lower in April. The US and the UK recorded a small increase but there was a big improvement in Australia, Russia and even more so in Hong Kong. The euro area saw a decline but amongst its countries divergences trends were noted with an increase in France and the Netherlands and a decline in Germany and Italy. In China, Covid-19 infections led to a drop in the PMI to 46.0. The services PMI saw a significant decline in the US and a large improvement in the euro area. These developments are the mirror image of what we saw in manufacturing. France and Germany had better data but sentiment jumped in Italy and Spain. Japan had a moderate improvement. Data were significantly better in Brazil
Contrary to expectations (annualised quarterly growth of 1%) US GDP contracted by an annualised quarterly rate of 1.4% in Q1 2022. This surprise fall hides a more nuanced and less negative reality. The economic engines of household consumption and business investment are robust and contributed 1.8 points and 1.3 points of growth respectively. However, reduced inventories at companies (contribution from changes in inventory of -0.8 of a point) and a reduction in public spending (contribution of -0.5 of a point), due to the ending of several support programmes, had a negative effect on growth. But the biggest negative contribution came from international trade (-3.2 points), which was the main reason for the drop in quarterly GDP
In the space of just a few months, growth prospects in the eurozone have deteriorated markedly. So much so that the risk of a recession is looming this year. Between our growth forecast from early 2021 – when it peaked at 5.5% – and our current scenario, drawn up in mid-March 2022, expected growth has been about halved; we now expect a figure of 2.8%. As recently as November 2021, we were still forecasting 4.2%. This figure of 2.8% still looks very high, as it is well above the long-term trend rate of 1.6% per year on average between 1996 and 2019. However, it relies on an exceptionally high growth carry-over of 2.1% in Q1 2022 and, for the subsequent quarters, on projected weak but positive growth
