They say the Davos consensus is always wrong, but it usually takes longer than a couple of months to be apparent. Not so in 2025.
The unemployment rate held steady at 6.2% in January, an all-time low. Declines are most marked in southern Europe and Ireland, while the unemployment rate is relatively stable in France and Germany. Negotiated wages rose by 4.1% y/y in Q4 2024, less than in Q3 (5.4% y/y) but still well ahead of inflation.
Inflation is no longer the No. 1 economic problem that it has been for the past three years, but it remains a major challenge. While it has not reached its 2% target yet, and the last pockets are slowly deflating, new inflationary pressures are mounting. At this stage, those pressures are limited but not negligible and new inflationary risks, linked to the economic and geopolitical context, are taking shape. The Fed's task is becoming more complicated by the risk of a US stagflation, and the ECB's one happens to be slightly trickier when balancing between downside and upside risks on growth.
Against a backdrop of falling interest rates, new banking loans (excluding renegotiations) to households and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the Eurozone continued to accelerate in January 2025. Cumulated over one year, new loans to the non-financial private sector (NFPS) increased by 8.6% year-on-year, after 7.4% in December 2024, to EUR 3,437 bn.
In France, we could think that the increase of public debt is a general consequence of the Covid-19 crisis. However, the chart we are commenting here shows that it is not.
Economic surveys - for households and companies - started the year on a slightly more positive note. Consumer confidence (+0.3 points) benefited from a slight fall in indicators for unemployment and inflation prospects. The composite PMI index returned to expansion territory (+0.6 points to 50.2), with the contraction in the manufacturing industry easing slightly (+1.5 points to 46.6), while the services index fell dipped (-0.2 points to 51.4).
The impulse of bank lending to the private sector continued to recover in the Eurozone in Q4 2024 (1.5 after between 1.1 and 1.2 since September 2024). It was back in positive territory since August (0.8), and in December 2024 it reached its highest level since November 2022 (2.7). The ECB bank lending survey in the Eurozone confirms the recovery in the demand for loans in Q4 2024. However, political uncertainties have resulted in a tightening of credit standards for lending to companies in France and Germany.
At the end of 2024, the household saving rate in the Eurozone was higher than it was before the COVID crisis. Among the four main economies of the Eurozone, France is no exception. Only in Spain and Italy has this trend been accompanied by an increase in investment in housing. In France and Germany, these additional savings are exclusively financial in nature. The factors at the root of the high financial saving rate will not prevent it from falling in 2025, but will contain it.
According to an unpublished study conducted within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), if it were to perform its functions in the Eurozone, the US supervisor would be stricter, in terms of risk-weighted capital requirements, with respect to the systemically important banks (G-SIBs) established there, than the single supervisor of the Eurozone. The methodology of the exercise on which this conclusion is based has not been shared. However, it seems very complex to define.
The upcoming protectionist shift in the United States, the structural difficulties in industry and the political instability in France and Germany will limit the eurozone's economic growth margins in 2025. However, the labour market is holding up well in many countries (the unemployment rate in the eurozone is still at a record low level). In addition, some of the shock will be cushioned by inflation falling back down to its target level and by the continued cycle of interest rate cuts. Under these conditions, there is still anticipation of a slight increase in eurozone economic growth in 2025, to 1.0%, which will, again, be underpinned by significant differences in growth levels between Member States.
The ECB is still keeping control of things. This was the general message from Christine Lagarde at her press conference on Thursday 12 December. As expected, the ECB cut its key rates by 25 basis points for the fourth time since monetary easing began in June, taking the refinancing rate down to 3.5% and the deposit facility rate down to 3.0%. Inflation forecasts have been lowered slightly, with the forecast brought down to 2.1% for headline inflation and 2.3% for core inflation, before the two measures converge at 1.9% in 2026.
The eurozone’s net international investment position in terms of direct and portfolio investment recovered significantly between 2015 and 2022, becoming positive from 2021 onwards, meaning that the eurozone has become a net creditor to the rest of the world. However, the income it receives from these assets is lower than the income it pays to non-resident investors. What are the reasons for this?
The PMI indicator for the manufacturing sector fell further into contraction territory in November, down from 46 to 45.2. In particular, the employment index hit its lowest level since August 2020 (45.3). The momentum in services also reversed, with the PMI indicator slipping back below 50 in November, to 49.2. In addition, consumer confidence deteriorated in November (-1.2 points to -13.7, according to the European Commission's flash index) and only marginally increased in the second half of the year.
While the German economy continues to underperform and France remains in a middle ground, Southern European countries have become the driving force behind economic momentum in the Eurozone.
After a long, unfavourable period of low rates lasting almost six years, European banks have seen their interest margins and profitability improve overall with the rise in ECB rates in 2022 and 2023. As we now enter a period of falling rates, Laurent Quignon talks to us about their effects on the interest margins of European banks.
After becoming positive again in August 2024, the private sector credit impulse in the Eurozone continued to recover in September, hitting its highest level in nearly two years (November 2022). Among other factors, it contributed to the pleasant surprise in terms of the development of Eurozone GDP in the third quarter (+0.4% q/q after +0.3% in the first and +0.2% in the second). Credit impulse to non-financial corporations has recovered more quickly since dipping below credit impulse to households in autumn 2023, when the restrictive effects of monetary policy peaked. The impulse of lending to households remained slightly negative in September.
The gradual improvement in household confidence indices in the Eurozone (financial situation and purchase intentions), supported by falling inflation, is still not leading to a rebound in consumption. Retail sales have been stable for a year, even though a slight rise of 0.2% m/m was recorded in August. Motor vehicle sales, which often display a significant change from one month to the next, rose by 8.2% m/m in September, but were down to their lowest level in three years on a three-month moving average basis.
Growth in the Eurozone is expected to stabilise at 0.3% q/q in the second half of 2024, before picking up slightly in 2025, supported by the cycle of interest rate cuts. However, the difficulties in industry, highlighted by the deterioration in PMI indices in September, and the uncertainty about the Chinese economy, increase the downside risks to our forecasts. A more adverse scenario, in which the manufacturing sector drags the rest of the economy along with it, is not the preferred one at the time of writing. Although less pronounced, the differences in dynamism between countries and sectors are expected to continue into 2025.
In September, the U.S. Federal Reserve at last followed suit with the ECB and the Bank of England and cut its policy rates for the first time since March 2020. But the Fed marked its difference, favoring a significant 50-basis-point cut instead of a more gradual 25. At least on that point, the suspense is over. But the rest of the story has yet to be written.
The household savings rate in France has risen further, up from 17.6% of households' gross disposable income (GDI) in Q1 2024 to 17.9% in Q2 2024, according to the INSEE, i.e. 1 point more in a year. This is also an early sign of an upward trend underway in the Eurozone. While the figures for Q2 are not yet available, the Q1 figures pointed to a savings rate 3 points higher than its pre-COVID level (at 15.4%).
Historical relationships between economic data play a key role in shaping expectations. In the US, the Sahm rule is such an important stylised fact: when the recent increase in the unemployment rate reaches a certain threshold, a recession tends to follow shortly or has even already begun. The jobs report published early August showed that this critical value had been reached, triggering a drop in investor sentiment. At the Jackson Hole conference, Jerome Powell explained that the Fed’s focus is shifting to the labour market and brought an unambiguous message that the rate cutting cycle is to start in September
The difficulties in the Eurozone manufacturing sector are intensifying. Industrial production fell again in May, by -0.6% m/m (-0.8% m/m for the manufacturing index). The deterioration in the PMI indicators for the euro area in June does not bode well for Q3, with a fall in the manufacturing index (-1.5 points to 45.8) and a decline in all the subcomponents (production, employment, new orders, stocks of purchases, delivery times). The input price index (which is not included in the calculation of the aggregate manufacturing index) is back above the expansion zone for the first time since February 2023. This is consistent with the trend in producer prices, for which the monthly decline has been slowing for several months and is now close to zero
The first cut in policy rates by the European Central Bank on 6 June came as no surprise, as the committee members had largely prepared the ground ahead of the decision. The timing and scale of future easing is more uncertain, given the continuing strong pressure on wages, high inflation in services, and the resurgence of tensions in global shipping. We expect two further interest rate cuts in 2024, at a pace of one per quarter (September and December).
In recent weeks the guidance from several ECB Governing Council members had become increasingly clear that the June meeting would see its first rate cut in this cycle. Against this background, not acting was out of the question, despite the uptick in the latest inflation data.
Following the first rate cut at the June meeting of the ECB, the focus has now shifted to the timing and speed of further reductions in the deposit rate. The guidance is vague: decisions will be data-dependent. For investors, estimating policy rules -the relationship between past decisions and inflation and other relevant variables- has merits to get a better understanding. Such a rule shows the key role played by the difference between observed inflation and the inflation target. However, there are important caveats. The estimated rule implies a very slow adjustment of the deposit rate, which is difficult to justify when the ECB is in easing mode
