Following in the footsteps of the US inflation figures for October, Eurozone inflation also surprised favourably by coming in below estimates. Eurostat’s flash estimate of an annual rate of 10% in November was lower than the consensus figure of 10.4%. This raises hopes that Eurozone inflation has finally peaked, and indeed this looks likely. It is our scenario, but considerable uncertainty remains and caution is required.
Since the start of this year, the European Commission’s industry sentiment survey has seen a significant decline, yet companies continue to report that labour remains a key factor limiting production. This is probably due to order books that remain at record high levels in terms of duration of assured production. Through their impact on the growth of employment and wages, labour market bottlenecks should provide some resilience to consumer spending when the economy is turning down. This support will probably not last however. Hiring intentions of companies have started to decline, which should ease the bottlenecks through a slowdown of employment growth.
Harmonised inflation in the Eurozone surprised again unfavourably in October, reaching 10.7% year-on-year according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate, compared to the Bloomberg consensus forecast of 10.2%. It was the second month in a row of such a large acceleration in prices (+0.8 points). This was not the only bad news: half of this acceleration can be attributed to core inflation, 0.3 points to food inflation and 0.1 points to the energy component. Inflation therefore continues to spread and to strengthen. While the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI) seems to have peaked in May this year (at 6.4%), its decline since then (5.5% in September, latest available figure) is not yet visible in the other measures of inflation.
After posting negative figures for most of 2021, the credit impulse returned to positive territory in early 2022 and rose to unprecedented levels (+3.8 points in August 2022 and +3.7 points in September 2022). This growth contrasts starkly with the sharp slowdown in the eurozone’s GDP in Q3 2022 (+0.2% quarter-on-quarter, compared to +0.8% during Q2 2022), which it undoubtedly helped to limit. After accelerating hugely since spring, in September 2022, outstanding loans to the private sector showed their strongest increase since December 2008 (+6.9% year-on-year), with outstanding loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) showing their largest increase since January 2009 (+8.9%)
The latest ECB survey of professional forecasters (SPF) shows a downward revision of the growth outlook and an upward adjustment of the inflation forecast. For next year, the real question is not about the direction of inflation but about the speed and extent of its decline. Slower than expected progress could convince the ECB of the need for more rate hikes than currently priced by markets, implying a bigger output cost of bringing down inflation. Disinflation could indeed take longer than expected. Over the past two years, a variety of factors have led to an exceptionally elevated but also broad-based inflation. Not all shocks have occurred simultaneously and it often takes time for them to work their way through the system, from the producer to the wholesaler to the retailer
Eurozone inflation reached the 10% y/y mark in September, according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate, the highest-ever reading since the zone’s inflation rate has been measured. Energy prices were a major factor (up 40.8% y/y). In parallel, food prices rose at an increasingly rapid pace, with the harmonised index (also including alcohol and tobacco) up 11.8% y/y in September. Some of this increase in food prices stemmed from the impact of the surge in energy prices on the sector’s production costs. Even so, supply-side constraints linked to production difficulties also appear to have had a hand in this
Due to the recent significant increase in interest rates, Eurozone countries now have a borrowing cost on newly issued debt that, for an equivalent maturity, is higher than that of the existing debt. From a debt sustainability perspective, this necessitates a smaller primary deficit or a larger surplus, depending on whether the average interest cost is, respectively, lower or higher than the long-term nominal GDP growth rate. However, this effect will only be fully operational when the entire debt has been refinanced at the higher interest rate. Given the long average maturity of existing debt, the annual adjustment effort is small for the time being but it will grow over time. However, debt sustainability is about more than keeping the debt ratio stable under certain circumstances
Dark clouds are continuing to gather over the Eurozone economy. The first set of data available for September is not positive and this can be seen in our Pulse. Looking at the survey data, the blue area (recent conditions) is shrinking when compared to the dotted line (conditions four months earlier) and even, on some indicators, when compared to the grey dodecagon (the long-term average). The opposite is true for the inflation data. In fact, inflation reached a new level, at 10% y/y in September according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate. Not only did inflation reach double figures – which was predictable, but still bad news – but its 0.9–points rise compared to July was broad-based across all its main components.
The current unprecedented combination of shocks (inflation, health crisis, geopolitical issues, energy crisis, climate, monetary issues) is likely to overburden the Eurozone resilience and push the region into recession over the coming quarters. The deterioration in confidence surveys this summer provides an early indication of this likely outcome. However, we expect the recession to be limited in scope, in large part due to budgetary support. This recession should be followed by a moderate recovery as the various shocks start to ease. Faced with the continued surge in inflation, the ECB has moved up a gear
An exceptional response to exceptional circumstances. There is a high probability that the ECB will raise its policy rates by 75 basis points at its meeting on 8 September. The fact is that the ECB has little choice but to respond with extraordinary measures to the continuing surge in inflation, despite the increased risk of recession. This is putting into practice the hawkish statements of Jackson Hole and the unconditional determination displayed to maintain price stability.
In the first half of 2022, large non-financial companies in the euro area were more inclined to take out new bank loans than to issue debt securities. According to the latest data available, bond issuance remained depressed in July and August. At the beginning of 2022, the average costs of negotiable debt and business bank loans were at comparable levels (for example, 1.1% for French companies in January 2022, according to calculations by the Banque de France1). The cost of bank loans is now, on a relative basis, markedly lower (1.65%) since the surge in inflation and tensions on the bond market have led to a much more perceptible average increase in the cost of negotiable debt issued by non-financial companies (3.69% in June 2022)
With strong acceleration since spring 2021, bank loans to private sector outstanding recorded, in June, its highest annual increase since 2009 (+6.1% year-on-year in June 2022). Annual increase and credit impulse for non-financial companies (NFC) reached levels not seen since 2006 (+6.8% and +4.9%, respectively). According to the banks surveyed by the ECB in June as part of its Bank Lending Survey (published on 19 July), supply chain bottlenecks and the rise in commodity prices increased working capital requirements and strengthened demand for loans with a maturity of less than a year.
The ECB Governing Council has surprised markets by a 50 bp rate hike and by dropping its forward guidance and moving to a data-dependent tightening cycle. This may reflect unease about how quickly the euro area economy might react to the policy moves and about the consequences of uncertainty about gas supply during the winter months. Another key decision was the introduction of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), a tool to address unwarranted spread widening that would weigh on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. The data dependency of further rate hikes and the vagueness about the triggers for using the TPI may lead to an increase of the volatility in interest rates and sovereign spreads whereby investors try to understand the ECB’s reaction function.
Next Thursday’s meeting of the ECB Governing Council is eagerly awaited. The rate hike decision has been pre-announced so the more important question is whether the new tool to address unwarranted sovereign spread widening will be unveiled. The rationale for such an instrument is well understood but its design and use raise several questions. One is easy to answer. To avoid a conflict with the monetary policy stance, bond purchases by the central bank would need to sterilized. The others are more challenging. Where is the threshold to call a spread widening ‘unwarranted’? Should the ECB be clear or ambiguous on this threshold and on its reaction when it would be reached? The final question concerns moral hazard and, hence, conditionality
Outstanding amounts of overdrafts, revolving loans, convenience and extended credits granted by banks to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) in the euro area stood at EUR 535 bn as of May 2022 after five months of consecutive increases, a level comparable to May 2020. From their low point of EUR 452 bn in August 2021, NFCs' overdrafts have increased by 18.3%, following a fall of 35.6% which began in February 2015.The fall in the outstanding amounts of NFC overdrafts became more marked in 2020, probably as a result of public support measures implemented in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic
On the economic front the eurozone has seen a succession of similar-looking months, with inflation continuing to rise and confidence surveys continuing to fall to different extents. Although there is a clear deterioration in the economic situation and outlook, its scale and duration remain uncertain. A recession is getting more likely but is not (yet) a certainty, first because activity levels remain strong and not all the economic indicators are flashing red (particularly when it comes to the labour market) and secondly because growth has some tailwinds or, at the very least, shock-absorbers.
Until May, Eurozone growth has been relatively resilient to the series of shocks that have swept the region, but its pace should slow more significantly in the months ahead. We cannot rule out the possibility of a recession, even though that is not our base case given the numerous sources of growth: post Covid-19 catch-up potential, surplus savings, investment needs and fiscal support measures. Our scenario appears to signal stagflation (inflation will be much higher than growth in 2022 and 2023), but with the big difference that the unemployment rate is not expected to rise much. The ECB is preparing to begin raising its key policy rates to counter the inflationary shock. We are looking for a cumulative 250bp increase in the deposit rate, bringing it to 2% by fall 2023.
Once protected by the logic of “whatever the cost”, household purchasing power in Europe is now threatened by inflation. After the pandemic, public policies are being solicited once again to help reduce the loss of purchasing power, albeit without really succeeding. In 2022, the real disposable income of Eurozone households is expected to decline by about 2.5%. Consumption is still rising, but only because the household savings rate is declining, a trend that masks extremely diverse situations.
A lasting, unwarranted widening of sovereign spreads in the euro area would represent an excessive tightening of financial conditions and weigh on activity and demand. It would run into conflict with the objectives of the ECB in the context of its monetary policy normalisation. Spreads are influenced by various fundamental variables that are directly or indirectly related to debt sustainability issues. These tend to be slow-moving. Sovereign spreads also depend on the level of risk aversion, a variable that fluctuates a lot and which is influenced by global factors. This complicates the assessment of whether an observed spread widening is warranted or not.
In recent weeks, the prospect of several ECB rate hikes has caused an increase in Bund yields and, unexpectedly, several sovereign spreads. Beyond a certain point, higher spreads may become unwarranted. Under such circumstances, the ECB might consider stepping in to avoid that its policy transmission would be impacted. Determining whether sovereign spreads have increased too much is a real challenge. Historically, based on a 20-week moving window, the relationship (beta) between the BTP-Bund spread and Bund yields fluctuates a lot, so this calls for taking a longer perspective. Using data since 2013, the current spread is in line with an estimate based on current Bund yields. Clearly, other economic variables should be added to the analysis
At its 10 March meeting, the ECB paved the way for raising its key deposit rate, although the timing of the first rate increase remained uncertain at the time: the odds of a September move had declined compared to a few weeks ago and July was excluded, which left December. The wait-and-see approach still seemed appropriate given the increasing downside risks to growth, aggravated by the current inflationary shock, the war in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid strategy. Yet economic data reported in the meantime, as well as the hawkish tone of several ECB members, seems to have accelerated the tempo. Concerning data, it is the combination of high inflation, a weak euro and relatively resilient growth that has moved forward the lift-off date.
The sharp rise in energy prices since April 2021 has been the main driving force behind the current surge in Eurozone inflation. The outbreak of war in Ukraine on 24 February accentuated this trend, sending the energy component of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) up 44.4% y/y in March 2022. Faced with this situation, the governments of the four main Eurozone economies under review in this article have acted to try to buffer the shock on economic players, and notably on household purchasing power, via direct subsidies, tax cuts, price regulations and measures to boost nominal incomes
At first glance, higher inflation seems like good news for governments. After all, inflation erodes the real value of debt and lowers the public debt/GDP ratio through a higher nominal GDP. However, the impact of inflation on public finances depends on whether higher inflation was anticipated by financial markets and on its expected persistence. Both factors would influence the borrowing cost and hence the dynamics of the debt ratio through the difference between this cost and nominal GDP growth. Public finances should benefit from having a central bank that is credible in its ability to keep inflation expectations well anchored and is not afraid of tightening policy when inflation has moved well above target
In the space of just a few months, growth prospects in the eurozone have deteriorated markedly. So much so that the risk of a recession is looming this year. Between our growth forecast from early 2021 – when it peaked at 5.5% – and our current scenario, drawn up in mid-March 2022, expected growth has been about halved; we now expect a figure of 2.8%. As recently as November 2021, we were still forecasting 4.2%. This figure of 2.8% still looks very high, as it is well above the long-term trend rate of 1.6% per year on average between 1996 and 2019. However, it relies on an exceptionally high growth carry-over of 2.1% in Q1 2022 and, for the subsequent quarters, on projected weak but positive growth
At first glance, the significant depreciation of the euro looks like a blessing for the ECB. Via its mechanical effect on import prices, it should remove any remaining doubt about the necessity of hiking the deposit rate. However, upon closer inspection, there is concern that the weaker euro, through its effect on inflation and hence households’ purchasing power, will weigh on growth. This would warrant a cautious approach in terms of policy tightening. On balance, a deposit rate hike in the second half of the year looks like a certainty, but the real question is about the scale and timing of subsequent rate increase. This will depend on how the inflation outlook develops.
