Globally, based on the data available up to October 2026, the 2026 energy shock has had a less pronounced impact on activity and inflation than that of 2022. The deterioration in business climate surveys following the outbreak of the conflict in Iran was, overall, less severe, and an improvement followed fairly quickly, driven by the positive impact of the AI boom. Household confidence has been more affected by the rise in energy prices, without benefiting from the cushioning effect of the AI boom. On the emerging markets side, while non-resident portfolio investment flows have been highly volatile since the start of the conflict in Iran, financing conditions have held up well and continue to withstand both the energy shock and the pressures on advanced economies' sovereign rates
The overall picture from the confidence surveys available for October is one of contained erosion. According to the PMIs, the business climate in the services sector showed a significant decline (seen as a technical backlash from September’s strong print) and a slight decrease in the manufacturing sector. The two indices remain well above the 50 threshold, indicating expansion. Household confidence also deteriorated, quite significantly, affected by the rise in inflation, concerns about unemployment and purchasing power.
The US macroeconomic performance has seemingly been unaffected by the energy shock. GDP growth came in at 3.4% AR in Q3 2026 (up 0.8pp), its highest print since Q3 2025. This result was underpinned by buoyant private domestic demand. Consumer spending held at 3.8% AR, despite higher inflation and still-gloomy household sentiment. Business investment jumped 12.7M AR, the fastest since Q3 2020, on the back of the AI capex cycle.
The average CPI inflation rate of the fifteen leading emerging economies rose again year-on-year in September (4.6% compared with 4.3% in August); a similar acceleration had already been observed in the Spring. However, the inflationary impact of the conflict remains lower than in 2022. Manufacturers’ views on trends in the prices of inputs and finished goods have returned to their pre-conflict levels. However, agricultural and food prices have been rising more rapidly in recent months against a backdrop of increasingly frequent and destructive extreme weather events.
Oil and gas markets remained tilted to the upside in October due to the increased risk of re-escalation in the Gulf conflict. Added to this geopolitical risk premium is a regional component for gas: the beginning of the winter season with historically low inventories in Europe. The price variations for oil and gas are currently greater than those recorded during the 2022 crisis, but in terms of levels, gas prices remain well below 2022 levels.
Europe’s vulnerability to the gas market has changed in recent years. Whilst its reliance on imports has remained stable, its gas supply has been more vulnerable to global market conditions since 2022, due to a shift in the composition of its imports. Furthermore, in 2026, the combination of high geopolitical risk in one of the main production regions and the pressure of climate change on European consumers has created an unprecedented situation, leading to price pressures and significant uncertainty regarding the short-term outlook. Even if they ease, tensions in the European gas market could persist beyond the winter, largely due to the need to refill inventories.
India continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience in the face of external shocks. Following 7.8% growth in FY2025-2026, its economy is expected to remain strong this year, despite rising energy prices and an unfavorable monsoon.Although the external accounts have deteriorated, foreign exchange reserves amply cover short-term financing needs. The banking sector remains robust enough to absorb the expected increase in credit risks. However, rising bond yields are narrowing the government’s fiscal room for maneuver, slowing the consolidation of public finances. Refinancing risks remain contained.
The significant increase in business creations since mid-2025 in the United States, France and Germany – and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom – is continuing. Across the board, this trend is being driven by the information and communication sector and mostly by AI. It is spreading to other business services, while developments in consumer services, industry and construction are more mixed. However, in both the United States and France, the trend is broadening, suggesting that AI is facilitating business creation across all sectors.
Eurozone growth continues to prove resilient, notwithstanding the volatility of the Irish figures. The Q3 data reinforce our forecast of 1.1% growth this year, which could even be slightly exceeded, as German and Spanish momentum shows no sign of fading. In France, the negative surprise (-0.1% q/q against a consensus of +0.1% q/q) stems from a new one-off factor (the sharp fall in aerospace output caused by delays in input deliveries) and masks an encouraging rebound in household consumption. In the United States, growth reached its highest level since Q2 2025 (0.8% q/q), driven by buoyant private domestic demand.
China has never exported as much as it does now, and its trade surplus has never been higher. At the same time, its economic growth is slowing, held back by weak domestic demand. The imbalances in China’s growth model, and the external imbalances they give rise to, are therefore continuing to worsen. With Europe taking a tougher line and the United States, with which China shares nothing more than ‘strategic stability’, the standoff looks set to continue. However, the European Union and China would have a great deal to lose from a lasting deterioration in their relationship. It is in the interests of both parties to seek to restore the balance. To this end, it is important to understand Beijing’s objectives and the constraints facing China
The 2022 energy crisis clearly highlighted the issue of electricity prices in Europe – and, more broadly, the issue of energy prices. As a result, European manufacturers’ competitiveness has been severely undermined when compared with the United States and China. By reigniting tensions over electricity prices, the conflict that began in the Middle East in late February 2026 further underscores the continent’s vulnerability to fossil fuel imports, despite the expansion of renewable energy. Faced with an environment of potential sharp and sudden price rises, European governments do not have the same room for manoeuvre.
The global economy’s unexpected resilience might have invited the self-congratulation that is a trademark of international official meetings. But policymakers gathered in Bangkok for the 2026 IMF Annual Meetings were wearily aware that “continued resilience cannot be taken for granted”, as noted in the prologue to the closing Chair’s Statement to the International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting. Growth forecasts remain in line with those made a year ago, when interest rates were much lower and no energy shock was in the cards, and even with those made in April, when a short shock was the base case
The September PMI surveys confirm that growth in the Eurozone is getting stronger, boosted in particular by new export orders, which are still rising. Sectors that were already performing well – technology and capital goods (including for defence) – are continuing to grow, while those that had been struggling until now – aeronautics, consumer goods and financial services – are seeing their production indices recover. This strong performance is particularly noteworthy, given that it has not yet been undermined by higher inflation.
In 2026, the European economy will not perform better than it did in 2025. At 1.4% (IMF estimate), its growth remains half as fast as in the United States. Still, there are more and more signs that Europe is regaining strength. The energy crisis, which has now been ongoing for eight months, would have caused it to halt in other times. Beneath an apparent sluggish activity, productivity is rebounding, while many sectors are picking up steam.
GDP growth is proving more resilient to shocks than anticipated. Second-quarter figures confirm this trend: despite rising oil prices, growth remains supported by various reflationary forces. At the heart of this cycle lies a clear driver: Artificial Intelligence (AI). Consequently, major global economies are ramping up investment in capital goods.
On 8 and 9 October, the European Commissioner for Trade and Security, Maroš Šefcovic, will visit Beijing. The European Union’s trade deficit with China on manufactured goods stands at EUR 400 billion over a twelve-month period, driven by a surge in imports. That said, as a proportion of GDP, it is below its 2022 peak (2.1% compared with 2.5%). Furthermore, the aggregate figure masks contrasting realities: 1) with the exception of the automotive sector and Germany, exports are holding up, including service exports; 2) the loss of the Chinese market has been largely offset by third markets; and 3) the real challenge lies in the move upmarket of products imported from China
Overall, based on data available through September 2026, economic activity continues to show resilience. The high levels of business climate surveys illustrate this well. Household confidence, however, is more vulnerable and sensitive to energy price pressures. Financing conditions in emerging economies also continue to hold up well against the shock (much better than in 2022) as well as against the tensions in DM bond markets.
The overall picture from the confidence surveys available for September is globally positive. According to the PMIs, the business climate in services has indeed seen a clear improvement, and that in the manufacturing sector remains comfortably in expansion territory for the 8th month in a row. However, household confidence has recorded its first decline in 5 months, likely driven by rising inflation and concerns over purchasing power.
US macroeconomic performance has remained solid since the onset of the shock, as illustrated in particular by Q2 growth of +3.8% and +9% (annualized quarterly rate) in consumer spending and private nonresidential investment, respectively. In the manufacturing sector, business sentiment has gained momentum despite the shock, while the impact of this shock on the services sector has remained very limited. The immediate reaction of consumer confidence was, however, more negative before beginning to improve, which was nevertheless interrupted in August.
The average CPI inflation rate across the fifteen leading emerging economies stabilised at 4.3% year-on-year in August. The inflationary impact remains weaker than in 2022, due in particular to reduced spillover effects on agricultural and food prices. Manufacturers’ views on the trend in input and finished product prices have returned to their pre-conflict levels.
Oil and gas markets rose in September, primarily due to the resurgence of significant disruptions to hydrocarbon traffic in the Gulf. Red Sea flows have been constrained, while the substantial oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz remains fragile. In variation, the current rise in oil and gas prices exceeds the one recorded during the 2022 crisis, although in value, gas prices remain significantly lower than in 2022.
In Europe, the possibility of a US ban on diesel exports has heightened concerns about price trends for this widely used fuel, which has already risen significantly since the outbreak of the conflict in Iran. It has become a major political issue on both sides of the Atlantic in the run-up to decisive elections.
The 2026–2027 El Niño climate event is expected to be one of the most intense in the last fifty years, with sea-surface-temperature anomalies potentially exceeding +3°C in the equatorial Pacific. According to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), El Niño is expected to persist until February 2027, with asymmetrical effects, as South-East Asia and northern Latin America will experience droughts, while southern Brazil and Argentina could see heavy rainfall. Above all, El Niño is compounding the effects of global warming and exacerbating existing extreme-weather events (droughts, floods and heatwaves). The economic effects of this climate shock mainly play out through three avenues: agricultural commodity prices, energy and logistics.
“Germany is too dependent on the US for its security, on Russia for its energy and on China for its exports.” That was, in essence, Brookings’ Constanze Stelzenmüller’s diagnosis in June 2022, and it was – and is – valid as well for Europe as a whole. But does this dependency also apply to technological and industrial products? The European Commission’s EXternal Vulnerability Index (EXVI) answers that very question, mapping out the EU’s exposure to foreign supply chains.
Overall, based on data available through August 2026, the inflationary impact and the negative effect on activity of the current energy shock remain significantly lower than the 2022 shock. Due to renewed tensions in the conflict in Iran and, consequently, on hydrocarbon prices, inflation is moving up again, but still in a limited way for now and driven solely by energy prices. Overall, confidence surveys do not show any signs of these negative trends.