On 20 January, Donald J. Trump will be sworn in as President of the United States for the second time.With him, there will be no "soft trade" or multilateralism, but a logic of nations governed by power relations.Faced with this new order, in which historic partners become rivals and alliances are now only circumstantial, what will Europe do?Between its desire to assert its power and its concern to protect its interests,Which card will China play? Will the "multi-aligned" countries such as India be able to maintain their position?Finally, as the United States prepares to withdraw from the Paris agreements once again, will the climate be the big loser?Find out more with this replay of the latest conference of the Economic Research department of BNP Paribas, held on 10 December.
The U.S. Foreign Trade is structurally in deficit.In 2023, the deficit in the balance of goods exceeded one trillion dollars, which amounted to 3.8 percent of GDP.While this may be seen as a reflection of the strength of the American consumer, Donald Trump analyzes it as the result of ‘violent treatment’ and ‘abusive practices’ from his trading partners.
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has raised fears that protectionist measures will be stepped up. Customs duties would be applied to all products from all of the United States' trading partners. In addition to China, the main country targeted, concerns about the macroeconomic and financial consequences of such a policy have risen sharply in Mexico.
The outcome of the US presidential elections on 5 November will decide the extent of the protectionist turn taken across the Atlantic. However, global exports have so far resisted the rise in tariff barriers. By the end of the decade, the IMF forecasts growth in exports of goods similar to or even slightly higher than that of world GDP. Tighter protectionist measures will affect global growth, but the effects on international trade will be more nuanced.
In its latest forecast dated 10 October, the WTO revised slightly its growth figures for global goods trade in 2024, to 2.7% (compared to an initial estimate of 2.6%) and to 3.0% in 2025 (compared to 3.3% previously). Although down 0.6% m/m in July, global export volumes remained on an upward trajectory until this summer. However, there are significant differences between geographical areas.
The Chinese export sector has weathered well the rise in trade tensions and tech rivalry with the US since 2018. The Chinese industry has shown a solid capacity to adapt to the increase in trade barriers and it has kept its leadership position in global trade.
The increase in global shipping flows, and the resulting logistical problems, continue to push up freight rates and container ship prices, but are not, at this stage, causing a significant slowdown in business activity or a major rise in import prices. The increase in prices gained momentum in June: the Freightos Index climbed by 43% m/m last month, compared with an increase of almost 15% in May. At the end of June, the index was 30% above the previous peak seen in mid-February, but still 60% below the record levels reached in autumn 2021.
Europe is experiencing a losing trend in market share, due to the growth of other producers (Japan in the 1980s, China subsequently). In Germany, it even increased after the Covid-19 pandemic (-0.7 points in 2023 compared to 2019). The German chemical industry has been hit hard by rising energy prices and increasing competition from China and the US. Its automotive industry (which accounted for 17% of its exports in 2023) is suffering directly from Chinese competition.
After easing, tensions in global maritime trade are resurfacing. According to the Freigthos index, global freight rebounded by 40% between the last week of April and the last week of May (chart 5). Freight has returned to the levels seen in February, when the conflict in the Red Sea had intensified. The rise in transport costs varies markedly between shipping routes, and is more pronounced for trade from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of China.
In this Audiobrief, Guillaume Derrien discusses recent evolution of the European Union's trade balance. The latter moved back to a surplus in 2023. Despite China’s ramping up to higher value-added sectors, the EU trade surplus in traditionally buoyant industries (pharmaceuticals, automotive) remains at historically-high levels.
Since China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, the European Union's bilateral deficit with the country has widened from EUR 39 billion to EUR 292 billion in 2023 (Eurostat data). This is by far the largest deterioration recorded by the Old Continent with a trading partner, even though, as a whole, the EU's trade balance with the rest of the world returned to surplus in 2023.
L’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) a publié en avril son dernier jeu de prévisions dont le message est plutôt positif1. Après un repli de 1,2% en 2023, le volume des échanges mondiaux en biens rebondirait de 2,6% en 2024, une progression peu ou prou en ligne avec la croissance de l’économie mondiale, attendue par l’OMC à 2,7%. Parmi les principaux soutiens au commerce mondial, l’organisation de Genève met en avant la baisse anticipée de l’inflation en 2024 et 2025. Celle-ci permettrait de soutenir le pouvoir d’achat et, par conséquent, la consommation de biens manufacturés.
After two years of deficit, the EU trade balance returned to positive territory in 2023, supported in particular by falling energy prices. Trade surplus in traditionally buoyant sectors (pharmaceuticals, automotive) remains at historically high levels. China’s ramp-up to higher value-added sectors has, over the years, led to a deterioration in the EU’s trade balance with the country. Among other things, imports of motor vehicles from China tripled between 2019 and 2023.
The publication of INSEE’s business climate survey on Thursday 25 April confirms the prospect of an improvement in demand, which has remained depressed in recent months. Ahead of the publication of important data from 30 April, we anticipate that growth, having remained weak in Q1, should accelerate in Q2, benefiting from the disinflation observed. However, the improvement may not be sufficient to rule out the risk of business insolvencies remaining high.
Tensions on global maritime freight have eased in recent weeks but remain significant and the outlook uncertain due to the disruptions in the Red Sea. The global supply-chain tension index – from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York – rose above its long-term average in February for the first time since January 2023. But the Freightos and Baltic indices both fell nearly 15% in the first three weeks of March.
In terms of the trade balance, 2023 largely unwound the problems of 2022, which, with itsburdens and shocks, constituted an annus horribilis for French foreign trade.
Global maritime freight stabilised in February after the previous month’s sharp rise following the escalation of tensions in the Red Sea. The Freightos index is currently stable, with a decline even observed on routes between China and Europe which had been most directly affected by the conflict in the Middle East and by the rise in transport costs. The New York Federal Reserve’s global supply chain pressure index was unchanged in January but is expected to rise again in February, reflecting longer delivery times in the PMIs.
In 2024, 24 new countries will join the Guided Trade Initiative of the African Continental Free-Trade Area (AfCFTA). With the aim to boost intra-regional trade, the AfCFTA could increase Africa’s revenue and improve its resilience to external shocks. However, beyond tariff barriers, some structural challenges must first be addressed to see the full potential of the largest free-trade area in the world.
According to our estimate, the trade deficit (on trade in goods) stood at almost EUR 101 billion in 2023, down from 165 billion in 2022, but still up from 86 billion in 2021. This improvement is primarily due to the drop in oil prices and the return to normal of electricity exports and intermediate-good imports. The good news is that the trade balance is also improving in volume terms, albeit to a more limited extent and due to effects that are likely to be one-offs.
The Red Sea conflict has already had a substantial impact on global shipping. While maritime freight prices are, at this stage, still well below the levels seen in 2021, when the global economy was recovering post-lockdown, they have spiked in January 2024. The Freightos index (chart 5) shows that transportation costs have tripled on average compared to the end of last year. Due to their geographical locations, China and Europe have been the regions most directly affected by these disruptions, and are already facing threefold (China-Europe route) to fivefold (Europe-China route) increases in transportation costs. However, the effects are gradually being felt on all global shipping routes
The evolution of international trade is sending rather reassuring signals about the state of global demand. New machinery and equipment orders from South Korea, as well as export orders from Taiwan – generally seen as two reliable indicators of global manufacturing activity – rebounded sharply in October.
Global exports have levelled off for almost two years, after a strong increase in 2021. Export growth has stagnated in both emerging and advanced economies. However, the CPB data show a slight rebound in exports in volume terms in August, at 1.1% m/m, although the annual rate is still negative at -2.3%. The monthly increase was driven by China (+5.3% m/m) and the United States (+1.3% m/m),
German exports of goods increased by 2.6% y/y in the first 7 months of 2023 compared with the same period in 2022, but one usual destination is missing: China (-8%).
World trade in goods (exports and imports combined) continued to fall during the first months of the summer, but the trend must be put into perspective: apart from a few sectors, and mainly the automotive sector, the pent-up demand following the pandemic seems to have almost completely vanished; the trend in trade activity is therefore returning to levels more consistent with the ones prevailing before the arrival of Covid-19.
After several months of improvement, global supply-chain disruptions appear to have bottomed out, and some signs of deterioration are emerging again. The synthetic indicator of the Federal Reserve of New York (FRNY; chart 3), which measures these tensions, rose slightly in June, for the first time in 2023, as did the PMI delivery times index, which is part of the FRNY aggregate indicator.
