Trade integration with China (including Hong Kong and Macau) has changed tremendously over the past 20 years. In 2022, bilateral trade amounted to some USD 150 bn – a 37-fold increase relative to trade in 2001. Since 2009, China has been Brazil’s main trading partner absorbing today close to 27% of its exports (vs 11% for the US).
International trade data show quite clearly that the slowing of activity has been accentuated over recent months. Global export volumes, have continued to fall, according to the latest figures (December 2022). Health restrictions in China, which were only relaxed in mid-December, weighed on this dynamic. Nevertheless, global exports saw a 2.6% increase over the whole of 2022, relative to 2021.
Global PMI indices improved slightly in January but remain at a very low level and cannot be taken as a sign of global activity regaining momentum at the start of 2023.
The second half of 2022 was marked by a significant and generalised fall in global transportation costs, accompanied by a freeing up of supply chains. Global maritime freight fell back to levels almost five times lower than at the peak in autumn 2021. Only transportation costs for liquefied natural gas (LNG) increased significantly, due to Russian gas shortages, although prices have also fallen back since December.
Since 2016 China has become Germany’s main trading partner. German imports from China account for almost 12% of Germany’s total trade, and exports account for 8%. Overall, trade with China now accounts for almost 20% of total German trade.While Germany's trade deficit with China has always been relatively modest in the past, it has widened substantially since the start of 2021.Germany, which has a particularly high level of industrial production, has a significant degree of dependence on China for imports of strategic inputs, particularly in relation to its supply of rare earths. The key German industries are also dependent on Chinese domestic demand, because on average around 20% of their sales are made there, and this proportion is continuing to increase
The United Kingdom’s exit from the European single market and the customs union on 31 January 2020 caused a significant economic shock which has had an adverse impact on growth and inflation in the UK, particularly on foreign trade. Since 1st January 2021 and the coming into effect of the post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), bilateral trade in goods between the United Kingdom and the European Union has fallen sharply. The United Kingdom has made changes which mean that some of its imported goods now come from countries outside the European Union.
Disruption in global trade has continued to abate. Despite this, there could still be major trade friction this winter, in addition to the direct repercussions of the war in Ukraine. China is facing a record rise in Covid-19 infections, and its Zero-Covid policy has shut down several plants in Henan province, which is home to the production lines for major global technology groups.
UK, Greece, South Africa: the strikes in the ports industry have multiplied in recent days, leading to disruptions to activity, in particular in South Africa. However, global maritime traffic continued to decongest and freight, as measured by the Freightos index, fell to its lowest level since the end of December 2020 (Figure 5). This represents a fall of 70% from the peak in September 2021 and a two-thirds drop in costs since the beginning of 2022.
On the whole, global trade tensions are continuing to subside, but new areas of friction are emerging as a result of the war in Ukraine. The New York Federal Reserve’s supply-chain pressures index has fallen significantly since the beginning of the year to reach its lowest level in 18 months in August. Another visible indicator of this reduction in bottlenecks is shortening delivery times: the global manufacturing PMI (purchasing managers' index) rose to 44.8 in August from 35.8 four months previously. A rising figure indicates a reduction in delivery times. However, this remains below its historical pre-pandemic average.
Although supply timescales are still historically long, the PMI index which assesses them has gradually improved since last autumn. According to the PMI sector survey, this reduction in delivery times can also be seen in most industries, particularly in the automotive, electronic equipment and agri-food sectors. As a result of these reductions, the backlogs of work indicator recorded its biggest fall in over two years. The aggregate value chain pressures index, which is published by the Federal Reserve of New York, confirms these positive developments. It has fallen to its lowest level since March 2021. These gradual but continuous improvements should help to ease some of the inflationary pressures currently weighing on the manufactured goods sector in particular.
Although some signs of improvement are visible on certain trade routes—notably between China and the West Coast of the US—the overall situation is still far from a return to normal. The lockdown in Shanghai will continue to have significant repercussions for the operation of ports in China and elsewhere in Asia throughout the second half of 2022.
Global PMI numbers point to a significant slowdown in global economic activity. The new export orders sub-index dropped to 48.1 in March, below the threshold for expansion, and was unchanged in April. More specifically, new export orders for Taiwan recorded a heavy fall (down 17.2% m/m), the biggest drop for fourteen months. Although a pullback was expected, following a strong rise in March (21.6%), the scale of the decline was surprising.
After an extremely solid performance in 2020 and 2021, export growth will slow steeply in 2022. Export growth rates have already been normalising in recent months, and the slowdown is expected to deepen in Q2 2022. This is the consequence of supply-side constraints due to disruptions in factories, supply-chain difficulties in the manufacturing sector and problems with goods transport following lockdowns in several main industrial and port regions (notably Shanghai). Exports to other Asian countries (47% of China’s total exports) were the first to be hit by China’s logistics problems and slowed markedly in March. On the demand side, the outlook has been worsening since the beginning of the war in Ukraine
After the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund also revised significantly lower its forecast for global trade for 2022. Exports are now expected to rise by 4.4%, compared with an estimate of 6% in October. This is above the WTO’s projections of 3% growth in 2022. Given the sharp rebound seen in 2021 – an increase of 9.8% – a lower rate of growth in goods exchange was expected. However, the war in Ukraine and the difficulties facing China in terms of its economy and the public health situation are important headwinds to growth. Some signs of this slowdown can already be seen: the global manufacturing PMI index for new export orders dropped sharply in March (-2.8 points to 48.2), reaching its lowest level in 18 months (chart 2)
The direct consequences of the war in Ukraine on the Mexican economy should remain limited, because trade links are almost non-existent. However, indirect consequences could have a significant impact on an economy that has already been weakened by the Covid-19 crisis. Higher commodity prices will increase inflation pressure and worsen the current account deficit in Mexico, which has been a net importer of energy since 2015. In addition, supply chain disruption arising from the conflict and new coronavirus variants could drag down exports. The investment outlook is continuing to deteriorate as discussions about reforming the energy sector continue.
Countries neighbouring Russia and Ukraine are more exposed than those in Western Europe. Among the latter, there are differences, with Germany and Italy being more dependent on Russian gas than France, Spain or Portugal. The countries that import the most from Russia are also the most dependent on Ukrainian imports. The exposure of European countries to Russia and Ukraine, and their vulnerabilities to the economic repercussions of the war between these two countries, result primarily from the high weight of their imports of Russian energy supplies and Ukrainian food and agricultural products
Bottlenecks in shipping transport are already intense and could get worse. First, it is becoming very difficult, not to say impossible, to move merchandises by rail and road networks between China and Europe, because of the routes crossing Russia and the conflict zones in Ukraine. Furthermore, many Chinese production lines, and logistics around the country’s ports, have been disrupted by a resurgence of Covid-19 cases and the authorities’ ‘zero-Covid’ policies.
The war in Ukraine influences the euro area economy through different channels: increased uncertainty, financial market volatility, reduced exports, higher prices for oil, gas and certain other commodities. Although the economic channels of transmission are clear, the size of the impact is not. Counterfactual analysis of last year’s jump in oil and gas prices provides a reference point but the geopolitical nature of the economic shock reduces the reliability of model-based estimates. Moreover, the other transmission channels should also have an impact on growth. Finally, there is a genuine concern that, the longer the crisis lasts, the bigger the economic consequences because eventually, months of elevated uncertainty would end up weighing heavily on household and business confidence.
After a spectacular rebound in 2021, global trade in goods is likely to see slower growth this year. The World Trade Organisation’s latest forecasts show that trade in goods will rise by 4.7% this year, following a jump of 10.8% in 2021. The global PMI manufacturing new orders index also fell below the 50 threshold in January, for the first time in a year and a half. That said, the slowdown will not be visible in all sectors. Indeed, demand for semiconductors remains very high, and this dynamic largely explains why Taiwan continues to record rapidly rising export orders.
2022 will be another tense year for international trade. Although some of the tensions are easing, visibility is still limited and supply-chain bottlenecks will probably continue for much of the year, affecting the outlook for growth and inflation.
The current business cycle is atypical and this influences the analytical approach, with a focus on the supply side and whether it will be able to meet the level of demand in the economy, rather than on the demand side. Supply side disruption has been a key issue but recent PMI data suggest that we may have seen the worst. In the euro area and the US, the percentage of companies that are confronted with rising input prices and are contemplating to increase their output prices has started to decline and delivery lags are shortening. The Federal Reserve of New York’s global supply chain pressures index seems to have peaked. However, anecdotal evidence suggests visibility remains very low
The Covid-19 pandemic has laid bare weaknesses and vulnerabilities in global supply chains. It has increased calls for making global value chains (GVCs) more robust and resilient, and reducing the dependence on East and Southeast Asia. Enterprises are in the process of improving the resilience of their supply chains by improving the transparency of their value chains, and building more redundancy in supplier networks, and transportation and logistics systems. At the macro-level, both the United States and the European Union have been updating their industrial strategies to increase their autonomy in strategic sectors. However, we should not forget that GVCs in itself is not the problem
The Covid-19 crisis is still generating lively discussions on the future of globalisation of trade and finances, and global value chains. The share of foreign value added embedded in the exports of a country or region[1] is a good indicator of the level of involvement in global value chains. This share increased rapidly from the early 1990s until the global financial crisis of 2008, under the effect of trade liberalisation (cuts in tariffs and proliferation of free trade agreements) and falling transport costs. This increase was particularly significant in Asia, the emergence of China as the factory of the world leading to the imports of more intermediary goods mainly from Europe and North America
World trade tensions and supply chain frictions will continue to be major sources of uncertainty in 2022, given their impact on imports prices, and in turn, consumer prices. Based on simulations, UNCTAD estimates that an increase in maritime freight costs would drive up global import prices by 10.6% by the end of 2023, with a smaller but non-negligible impact on global consumer prices of 1.5%. There is also a risk that shortages of certain key components, notably semiconductors, persist for several more months.
Although tensions in world trade remain fierce, there were some signs of easing in October. The Baltic Dry Index (BDI), which reflects the cost of maritime transport for dry bulk goods, declined by around 30% after peaking in the first week of October. Nonetheless, the rise in costs since the start of the year remains impressive, nearly a tripling. Looking more closely at October’s figures, we can see that the decline in the BDI was limited solely to very high tonnage container ships, while freight prices continued to rise for smaller vessels.
