Faced with the need to find the necessary funding for the massive investments required for the energy and technological transitions identified by Mario Draghi in his report, and for Europe's defence remobilisation (Readiness 2030), on 19 March, the European Commission unveiled its strategy for a Savings and Investments Union (SIEU), of which securitisation is an essential part. On 17 June, the Commission also proposed new measures to boost securitisation activity in the EU while preserving financial stability. These measures are a good basis for relaunching the securitisation market. However, certain aspects could benefit from improvement.
In the first quarter of 2025, real estate purchasing capacity of households in France continued its recovery, enabling the first rise in property prices in two years.
The rise in interest rates seen in the advanced economies since the end of Covid has been continuing in scattered order. Long-term interest rates have generally been on the rise, but with significant divergences. The general situation of uncertainty and the undeniably upward trajectories of public debt in advanced countries are having negative repercussions on the bond markets, which are likely to have a similar impact on the financing of the economy.
The German government has presented its draft budget for 2025, which is expected to be adopted in September. It is a breakaway budget marked by a clear return to public investment and support for business investment, at the cost of a significant increase in debt. This budget is one of the pillars of Germany's new policy, which should have a rapid positive impact on growth.
“Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted to resolve these crises,” wrote Jean Monnet. Faced with tariffs and the isolationist temptation of the United States, Europe has cards to play, such as intra-zone trade. The momentum of European growth over the next decade will depend on the financing and implementation of the European rearmament programme and Germany's ambitious investment plan.
The unexpected decline in Hungarian GDP in Q1 2025 will probably be followed by modest growth over the next few quarters, with consumption as the main pillar. However, Hungary will not escape the negative consequences of the US tariff shock, as it is a very open economy. More intense competition from China is expected, particularly on medium and high-tech products. Nonetheless, China remains a major investor in Hungary, mainly in the automotive sector.
Our growth forecasts have been revised downwards due to the tariff shock initiated by the United States, and the country's industrial specialisation. Slovakia is the most exposed Central European country to the Trump administration's tariff measures. The economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade and the automotive sector. The Slovak economy should avoid a recession thanks to public investment and consumption. The rise in inflation at the start of the year, following the increase in the VAT rate, is temporary and limited, and should not weigh heavily on consumption. In the medium term, the German stimulus plan and FDI inflows will be supportive factors for the economy.
The Slovenian economy is very open, making it highly sensitive to the economic situations of its main partners and to trends in world trade. The slump at the start of the year is due to the disruption in world trade. Household consumption and public investment should continue to underpin activity. Inflation is edging up on the back of wage pressures and a possible rise in energy prices. The resumption of government spending should lead to an increase in the budget deficit, but without causing any slippage and while keeping debt trends under control. The effects of US trade policy should remain moderate. However, the German economy remains the key factor in Slovenia's external performance.
Many European countries have decided to significantly increase their military spending, led by Germany. Will this effort be conducive to growth? This will depend on whether or not Europe is able to increase its production of military equipment. It will also depend on the possible crowding-out effects (inflation, interest rates) associated with an increase in public debt. The ability of European industry to meet demand (an increase in EU military spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP) will be decisive. A reallocation of currently underutilised production capacity (mainly in the automotive and intermediate goods sectors) could help to increase production.
Not so long ago, money market interest rates were negative in Europe, and the French government could borrow almost for free, even for long maturities...
The quantitative theory of money — the idea that inflation in an economy depends on the quantity of means of payment in circulation — is a very old one. It is generally attributed to the French philosopher and jurist Jean Bodin, who, around the middle of the 16th century, was the first to have the intuition that the causes of the "rise in the price of all things" in Europe were to be found in the influx of precious metals from the New World.
Stabilisation in manufacturing, deterioration in services. The manufacturing PMI continues to improve in May, rising above the services index for the first time since March 2022. The composite indicator fell back below 50. The European Commission's economic sentiment index climbed in May (+1 pt to 94.8) but remains well below its long-term average (100).
Business climate: better prospects. According to the Ifo survey, the business climate continued to improve in May (+0.6 points m/m to 87.5), driven by the improvement in the economic outlook (+1.5 points). The services index declined for the second consecutive month, while the manufacturing sector continued to show signs of improvement. Nevertheless, the index remains below its long-term average (95.6), signaling a fragile recovery amid high uncertainty.
Business climate slightly down. The deterioration was slight in May (from 97 to 96). The more pronounced decline in industry and services was offset by a slight improvement in construction and retail trade. The composite index remained in a corridor between 95 and 98 over the last three quarters, consistent with a weak, but positive growth.
A slow improvement. The business climate indices improved slightly in May for all sectors (industry, services, retail, construction). The economic sentiment index is close to its long-term average (+2.8 points to 98.6). Industrial production recorded a modest rise in Q1 (+0.5% q/q), putting an end to five consecutive quarters of contraction.
Spanish outperformance. Business sentiment contracted by 0.4 points in May, but remains above its long-term average and Eeurozone’s (94.8). The industrial indicator dropped by 0.8 points, after 3 months of improvement, but also remained above the European average (at -10.3). While the export orders index improved, those for production and employment weakened slightly.
The dollar is involved in nine out of ten foreign exchange transactions and still accounts for 58% of total foreign exchange reserves. Commodities, interest rates, derivatives: it is the dominant currency in almost all markets, with one exception: green bonds, which are mainly denominated in euros and whose take-off is mainly driven by companies and public actors based in Europe. In 2025, the green bond market is expected to see another record volume of issuance. It remains to be seen whether the US counteroffensive on social and environmental responsibility will be a threat or an opportunity for sustainable finance. There are many arguments in favor of the latter hypothesis.
European energy policy is focused on two objectives: firstly, to progress in the low-carbon transition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, and secondly, to increase energy sovereignty by diversifying sources of supply and reducing external dependencies.
The gradual recovery in demand, which has been noticeable for almost six months, seems to be continuing in the Eurozone. It remains to be confirmed given the uncertainties surrounding US trade policy. Nevertheless, the trend towards improvement has not been called into question by the decisions taken so far. In the medium term, the implementation of the European rearmament plan and the German investment plans should strengthen this dynamic.
The EU-UK summit on 19 May marks a new phase in economic rapprochement, more than five years after the Brexit, which has undeniably weakened the UK economy. The structural challenges facing the UK – high inflation, sluggish business investment, low productivity – partly result from this event.
The investment required to meet the challenges of competitiveness and energy and technology transition in the European Union is huge, and the need for it is imminent (2025-2030). To this must now be added expenditure to strengthen the European Union's military capabilities. To finance this, the EU must of course speed up its roadmap towards a Savings and Investment Union. But given the urgency, it must also take account of its financial ecosystem and rely on its banks. The postponement of the FRTB (Fundamental Review of Trading Book) until 2027 and the European Commission's legislative proposal on securitisation, expected in June, are steps in this direction.
France's fiscal deficit worsened in 2023 and 2024. Spending growth was maintained, despite the slowdown in public revenues growth. The 2025 budget should enable consolidation to begin thanks to a rebound in revenues. However, spending as a share of GDP is expected to remain relatively stable. The challenge of continuing fiscal consolidation in 2026 therefore remains intact. This exercise will be constrained by the expected increase in interest payments and military spending.
The recovery in loans for house purchase spread to all eurozone countries in March 2025, but the picture is still mixed. New loans to households for house purchase, excluding renegotiations, saw a year-on-year increase in all eurozone countries in March 2025, which is unprecedented since April 2022. However, it was a very mixed picture in terms of year-on-year increases, ranging from 4.3% in Croatia to 48.6% in Lithuania, with a volume-weighted average of 24.3% across the eurozone. As a result, new loans in the eurozone (EUR 60.3 billion) has returned in March 2025 to its August 2022 level, after hitting a low in January 2024 (EUR 37.0 billion).
Key figures for the French economy compared with those of the main European countries, analysis of data on the population and the French labour market, activity by sector, publication administration figures, inflation, credit and interest rates, corporate and household accounts.
Central European economies have defied pessimist predictions in recent years on their ability to cope with shocks. The region posted a less pronounced GDP contraction in 2020 compared to advanced EU countries. In 2022, at the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the region was viewed as the most exposed within Europe due its high energy dependence on Russia. However, the widely expected recession did not occur as these economies implemented generous fiscal stimulus. Central European countries are now facing the tariff shock imposed by the US administration. Will this time be different?
