The year 2024 is coming to an end, but political and economic uncertainties persist and are expected to continue into 2025, albeit in new forms. Donald Trump’s economic agenda is known. On the other hand, the measures that will actually be implemented, their timing and their economic impact are among the great known unknowns of 2025. In any case, uncertainty itself is expected to be a major drag on growth next year. A convergence of growth rates between the US and the Eurozone is expected in the course of 2025, via a slowdown in US growth. The latter would suffer from the inflationary effects of Trumponomics and the resulting more restrictive monetary policy, with the Fed's expected status quo on rates throughout 2025
Since 2019, private sector debt in emerging countries as a whole has risen as a percentage of GDP, while at the same time private sector debt in advanced countries has fallen. However, a country-by-country analysis shows that China alone is responsible for this increase and that, even excluding China, debt ratios show positive aggregation effects. In fact, on the basis of median ratios and credit gaps, excluding China, the private sector has develeraged in a large number of countries, until the third quarter of 2024. Current and future economic and financial conditions point more to a continuation of the decline than to a rebound.
Would you expect a politician who promises to raise taxes on both households and corporates as a key plank of their growth strategy to get elected? Or the Parliament of an EU member state to vote against an EU initiative to cut such taxes? Probably not. And yet both just happened, with Donald Trump and fellow Republicans taking control of both the White House and Congress, and the French Parliament voting against the EU-Mercosur trade deal.
For the time being, Donald Trump has not specified his intentions on banking regulation. However, there is a risk that he will push for an incomplete translation of the finalisation of Basel 3 into US law. This would undermine efforts to harmonise international prudential frameworks and introduce significant distortions of competition between US and European banks.
Much has happened since Q4 Outlooks published in September cheeringly predicted, as a matter of consensus, that the global economy was heading for a soft landing after the sharpest inflation surge and most abrupt monetary tightening in decades. On the economic front, more data have been released, helpfully adding pixels to the growth, labour market and inflation pictures. On the politics and policy fronts, China unveiled a large stimulus package, the US voted in a new President and Congress, the UK released a radical 2025 budget, and France and Germany limped into new governing arrangements.
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has raised fears that protectionist measures will be stepped up. Customs duties would be applied to all products from all of the United States' trading partners. In addition to China, the main country targeted, concerns about the macroeconomic and financial consequences of such a policy have risen sharply in Mexico.
In Spain, Italy and Portugal, the five largest banking groups recorded, on average and on a consolidated basis, an annualised return on average equity (ROAE) of 15.0%, 15.6% and 18.1%, respectively, in the first three quarters of 2024. These are levels not seen since 2007.
The second-last FOMC Meeting of 2024 has resulted in a 25bps cut in the Fed Funds Target Range, to +4.5% - +4.75%. The steps ahead promise to prove trickier for the Fed, as the landing is still pending, and in view of Trump’s win. Indeed, the President-elect’s hostility towards Powell is common knowledge, while many of his policy plans are associated with an increased inflation-risk.
The sun was shining last week in Washington, DC during the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the imminent US elections cast a shadow over the meetings of the Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors, and private sector economists and finance professionals from all around the world who gathered in town. The better-than-expected state of the global economy was obscured, and all other conversations relegated to second or third billing, including the IMF’s usual warnings about various dangers (excessive debt, insufficient growth, protectionism), the outlook for Europe (improving), for China (as well), for other EM (generally good) and digital finance (further gaining status).
On 30 September, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced its intention to raise counterparty exposure limits on the deposit accounts of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) to the same level as those limits set for their federal funds loans, an approach already discussed in its December 2023 report. This harmonisation could lead FHLBs to favour deposits with banks, as these are better remunerated. Supply on the federal funds market, on which FHLBs occupy a prominent position as lenders, would be reduced, driving up the effective rate of federal funds.
The Italian real GDP over the past three years is higher than previously estimated, thanks to the 2024 general revision of the national accounts. This revision, which is undertaken every five years and was published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) on 23 September, includes the basis change with reference year 2021. As a result, real GDP is finally, albeit only slightly, above the level posted before the 2008 financial crisis (0.6 pp higher in Q2 2024 than in Q4 2007).
The September FOMC meeting kick-started the Fed’s easing cycle with a significant 50bps cut in the Federal Funds Target Rate, leaving it at +4.75% - +5.0%. Unusually, this large step was taken even as the US economy remains strong, and explicitly with a view to keeping it so. Effectively, macroeconomic conditions having induced a shift in the Fed’s priorities towards the ‘maximum employment’ component of its dual mandate, while still not declaring mission accomplished on the inflation side
In June 2022, the US Federal Reserve kick-started a programme to reduce the size of its balance sheet (QT2). However, banking regulations could hinder its ambitions. The first quantitative tightening (QT1) programme, which was launched by the Fed in October 2017, had already been curtailed early due to the liquidity requirements imposed on banks. Balance sheet constraints could in turn bring QT2 to an early end. The tightened leverage standard is already reducing the ability of banks to act as intermediaries in the secondary markets for US Treasury securities while federal government financing needs continue to grow.
The public and private moratoria granted since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic to the Portuguese non-financial private sector[1] have, to a very large extent, now expired. The outstanding amount of loans under moratoria stood at EUR3.1 bn in October 2021, from EUR3.6 bn in March 2020 and a peak of EUR46.3 bn in September 2020. Moratoria now cover only 1.5% of outstanding loans to households and non-financial corporations, from 1.9% in March 2020 and 23.5% in September 2020. The expiry of moratoria since September 2021 has not, so far, resulted in a significant increase in non-performing loans[2]. Their outstanding amount (EUR4.0 billion) and ratio (2.0% of loans) have returned to their July 2008 levels
No sooner had the divorce agreement with the European Union been signed than the UK started disputing its terms. On 16 March, the British government was formally notified by the European Union for breaches of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland and violation of the duty of good faith. The final outcome, which can include sanctions, is yet to be decided. The fact remains that Brexit, described as a “historic mistake” by the remaining 27 members of the EU, appears as nothing more or less than what it is: a clear break. Admittedly, it will not stop the UK economy from recovering
Looking beyond the short-term economic shock, the Covid-19 pandemic and the exceptional health protection measures introduced to contain the virus raise many questions as to the lasting consequences of the crisis. The issue of zombie firms, which is far from new, has taken on a whole new dimension, as their weight in developed economies has progressively increased since the 1980s. Massive public interventions to tackle the effects of the pandemic, whether by governments – debt moratoriums, cancellations of employer social security contributions, widespread use of short-time working schemes, etc. – or by central banks – increase and prolongation of asset purchases schemes – could result in keeping non-viable companies afloat, raising fears of a zombification of economies.
Due to the lengthening of the health crisis, the European Banking Authority decided on 2 December 2020 to reactivate its guidelines on legislative and non-legislative moratoria on loan repayments. This decision aims at easing credit instructions criteria for granting moratoria. Moratoria granted in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic before 31 March 2021 will not automatically be considered as a forbearance measure. However, such moratoria must have benefitted a sufficiently large set of borrowers and their granting must have been based on a criterion other than solvency. The beneficiaries of moratoria that aim at preventing a default will no longer automatically be considered in default
On 16 September, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the euro zone announced the temporary exclusion of reserves with the Eurosystem from the calculation of leverage ratios at major banks. Similar relaxations had been introduced a few months earlier in the USA, Switzerland and the UK. The exceptional measures taken by public authorities to bolster liquidity have resulted in a significant expansion of banks’ balance sheets. Fearing that leverage requirements could hamper the transmission of monetary policy and affect banks’ abilities to lend to the economy, first regulators and then supervisors have temporarily relaxed such requirements
In response to the crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, in April the US Congress set up the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a small business lending programme guaranteed by the Federal government with an overall budget of nearly USD 650 billion. Under certain conditions, the loans can be converted into subsidies within the limit of payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent and utilities paid during the 24 weeks after the loan was granted. The loans will be partially or completely forgiven on condition that employment and wages are maintained by the end of the year. At 22 June, 4.6 million SME had borrowed more than USD 515 billion under the programme, virtually all of which was borrowed as early as mid-May
