Poland’s economy has generally shown resilience during periods of turbulence since the financial crisis of 2008-2009. For instance, in 2009, the country was able to avoid a recession in contrast to neighbouring countries. Since 2020, successive shocks have constrained GDP growth momentum, but strong fiscal buffers enabled the authorities to implement generous supportive measures. The country remains amongst the best performing economies in the region in the early months of 2024, with its GDP above 11% in Q12024 compared to its pre-COVID levels. Overall, the country reinforced its position in Europe, judging from the increase of Poland’s economic weight in the EU (measured by GDP in purchasing power parity) and gains in market share
In Central Europe, capital flows (foreign direct investments, portfolio flows and bank lending flows) have resisted rather well despite geopolitical uncertainties. Similarly, they do not seem to be affected, for the time being, by the weakening of economic activity in the region.
The current government is running for a third term in the general elections on 15th October. Whatever the outcome, the future government will face three major economic challenges: a marked slowdown in growth, a deterioration in budget deficit and an increase in credit risk. However, this increase in risk is not a real cause for concern. There are safeguards against rising public debt. The country also has comfortable external liquidity and the banking sector is strong. The decline in inflation has facilitated the shift in gear in monetary policy, but this seems premature given strong pressure on wages.
Despite the war in Ukraine, Poland’s economic growth was relatively solid in 2022. However, it was erratic with a sharp GDP contraction in Q2 and Q4. For 2023, despite a negative carry-over effect, recession will probably be avoided due to continuous fiscal support. Inflationary pressures remain high in the short term due to wage pressures and the return of the VAT rate on energy to its initial rate. The temporary blocking of European funds since 2022 might, at first glance, raise concerns against a backdrop in which public and external accounts have worsened. However, the inflow of foreign direct investment is a notable shock absorber. In 2022, these flows more than offset the current account deficit.
The economic slowdown is likely to continue in the coming quarters. Poland is facing several challenges. Firstly, the country is highly dependent on coal imports, and the price of this commodity has soared since the end of 2021. The Central Bank has moved towards a less restrictive monetary policy despite high inflationary pressures. Finally, the moratorium on mortgage repayments in 2022 and 2023 will have a negative impact on banks’ balance sheets in the short term. However, the Polish economy does have numerous strengths and should show resilience.
Poland is well equipped to deal with the economic consequences of the conflict in Ukraine. Its economy had fully absorbed the shock from Covid-19 by the end of 2021. Output was 5% higher than in late 2019, the recovery was well balanced and the unemployment rate had returned to a frictional level. In addition, Poland’s budget deficit fell sharply in 2021 and its public debt/GDP ratio remained well below the Maastricht limit due to a substantial gap between growth and interest rates. The current-account balance is in deficit again, but still comfortably covered by non-debt generating capital flows. The only cloud on the horizon is the acceleration in inflation which has prompted the central bank to tighten monetary policy more aggressively since autumn 2021
Manufacturing in Poland, as in the other central European countries, has been hit by increasingly severe shortages of inputs. Numerous components are in short supply, from semi-conductors to plastic parts. As a result, automobile production is down 15% from the high of year-end 2020, while electrical equipment is down 8% compared to the May 2021 peak. In both cases, production declined even though order books are relatively strong. Moreover, they have had a direct impact on the current account balance, which suddenly dropped from an average monthly surplus of EUR 500 m in H1 2021 to a deficit of about EUR 1.5 bn a month starting in July
Covid-19 was only a temporary brake on Polish growth. The economy is outperforming its neighbours’, with a shallower recession in 2020 and an earlier recovery. Credit risk appears to be under relatively good control, despite high levels of participation for the loan repayment moratorium scheme. Supply side constraints are even raising fears of a temporary overheating of the economy, with an increase in inflation. However, a strong current account surplus and the good control of government debt are stabilising factors. Poland’s economic growth potential remains unchanged, even though the prospect of international tax harmonisation may slow down foreign investment.
The second wave of Covid-19 that swept Poland in Q4 2020 was more severe than the first wave in Q2 2020. In contrast, economic growth was not hit nearly as hard thanks to the resilience of industrial output and demand (exports and household consumption). The authorities’ stimulus measures combined with industry’s competitiveness – which was not undermined much by the pandemic – bolstered growth, and the trade surplus increased. Against the background, a somewhat weak zloty is more a choice than a by-product of deteriorated fundamentals. The European budget agreement, as Poland is one of the main beneficiaries of the Recovery Plan, should provide additional support for growth.
The Polish economy has to smooth the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit not only through the decline in foreign demand but also through the lockdown’s impact on domestic consumption. Yet the country has enough policy leeway to do so, thanks notably to a reasonable level of public debt before the slowdown began. GDP is unlikely to return to pre-crisis levels before mid-2021, which is bound to curb investment. Thereafter, Poland is expected to return to its robust growth trajectory since its strengths remain intact (competitiveness, labour supply, low wage costs and productivity gains), which have transformed the country into the European Union’s 5th biggest industrial sector.
An example of successful economic transition, Poland still enjoys fairly favourable prospects despite the expected slowing of growth against a background of less favourable international conditions. Over the medium to long term, there are factors that will weigh on potential growth and weaken a Polish economic model based on competitiveness and low labour costs. The first section of this article analyses the impact of institutions on productivity, which is a major determinant of the differences in standard of living between countries, as illustrated through the example of Poland. The second section examines the question of Poland’s estimated medium-term potential growth, after an analysis of its pathway since the 1990s.
Poland has a population of 38 million people. The country belongs to the high-income category of countries. It has been a EU member since 2004, but Poland remains outside the Eurozone.
Poland has pursued a policy of economic liberalisation since 1990 and is now considered to be an example of the success of “shock therapy reforms”. The country has increased its manufacturing base during recent decades, and accounted for 4.5% of Europe’s manufacturing output in 2020 (up from 2.2% in 2004). After a limited recession in 2020, growth has recovered to 5.2% in 2021 as a result strong exports growth and manufacturing specialization. The deep domestic market and strong leeway to ease the policy mix are key strengths, resulting mainly from fiscal measures and the central bank’s large asset purchase program. The latter largely reduced government’s residual needs.
In the longer term, demographics, labour supply shortages, and cost pressures may limit the GDP growth potential, but have not undermined overall competitiveness during the last years as a result of strong productivity gains. Attempts at political and judicial reforms performed by the government (in power since 2015) are considered to be harmful to democratic checks and balances and are a serious bone of contention with Brussels.
