The protectionist shock imposed by the United States will lead to further adjustments in production chains and global trade. Will emerging countries (excluding China) be able to benefit once again, even as competition from Chinese products intensifies on their domestic markets? Will they be able to gain market share in the United States, or even in China? Will they be able to reduce their dependence on either of the two superpowers?
Under the impact of the Trump administration's tariff policy and the acceleration of US-China decoupling, global economic growth is expected to slow, international trade to reconfigure and the reorganization of value chains to continue. These changes will have multiple effects on emerging countries. Their export growth will slow and competition from Chinese products will increase. Some countries could nevertheless take advantage of new opportunities to attract FDI and develop their manufacturing base.
The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and the acceleration of the US-China decoupling will lead to a slowdown in global economic growth, a further reconfiguration of international trade, and the continued reorganization of value chains. These changes will have multiple consequences for emerging countries. All will suffer negative effects linked to the slowdown in their exports and increased competition from Chinese products. Some may also seize new opportunities to attract FDI and develop their export base.
The two most recent shocks to emerging countries (the 2022-2023 tightening of US monetary policy, and the election of Donald Trump at the end of 2024) have not affected their financing conditions. However, supporting factors have weakened since the second half of last year. In the coming months, financing conditions could tighten as a result of rising geopolitical risk in particular. However, the adverse impact on emerging economies should be viewed in perspective, given the low transmission of the two recent external shocks to interest rates. Although exchange rates have continued to depreciate against the dollar, the vulnerability of debt to foreign exchange risk is moderate or low for households and non-financial companies
Resilience of external financing conditions overall. The election of Donald Trump to the White House has caused a rally in the US dollar and revived uncertainties about the external financing conditions of emerging countries. The Argentinean peso, the Turkish lira and the South African rand are among the emerging market currencies that recorded the largest depreciations between November 5th, 2024, and February 24th, 2025, losing 6.3%, 5.7% and 5.2% of their value against the US dollar, respectively. Overall, emerging sovereigns should be relatively resilient against a stronger dollar and the risk of increased investor selectivity towards risky assets. However, all of them are not in the same boat
Since taking office, President Trump has confirmed his threats to raise tariffs, but fears of universal and widespread application have abated somewhat. He will decide whether to carry out his threats once an audit of the United States' trade relations with all its trading partners has been completed, which should be by the beginning of April. Between now and then, and even over 2025 as a whole, the divergence in the trajectory of world trade between advanced countries and emerging and developing countries (EMDs) is set to increase. Trade between EMDs is expected to grow significantly faster in 2025 (5%) than during the 2012-2018 pre-COVID period (+3.9% per annum on average), whereas it will be the opposite for advanced countries
Since 2019, private sector debt in emerging countries as a whole has risen as a percentage of GDP, while at the same time private sector debt in advanced countries has fallen. However, a country-by-country analysis shows that China alone is responsible for this increase and that, even excluding China, debt ratios show positive aggregation effects. In fact, on the basis of median ratios and credit gaps, excluding China, the private sector has develeraged in a large number of countries, until the third quarter of 2024. Current and future economic and financial conditions point more to a continuation of the decline than to a rebound.
While emerging economies (EMEs), apart from China, have contributed little to global warming, the future CO2 emissions curve and the resulting additional temperature rise will largely hinge on their ability to conciliate growth and decarbonisation. However, due to limited financial resources, their investments in the "green" transition are low, at around 50 dollars a year per capita, compared to investments which are around seventeen times higher (850 dollars a year per capita) in developed countries. This disparity gave rise to the idea of securing transfers from developed to developing countries at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), in 2009.
The election of Donald Trump has not triggered any major financial tensions in the main emerging markets. Nevertheless, the dollar has strengthened, which should delay the easing of monetary policies. More worryingly, emerging economies will be the direct or collateral victims of the trade war promised by the incoming United States administration. They will face a double shock: a sharp slowdown in global trade and the re-routing of Chinese exports. The first shock is bound to be recessionary or even inflationary. The impact of the second is not clear cut as it hinges on the types of Chinese exports (complementary or competing) and, most of all, on their link with direct investment.
The economic slowdown in China and the implementation of its industrial policy will have large consequences for the rest of the world. Effects will vary from country to country, depending on the transmission channels. For emerging countries, the overall impact will not be necessarily negative, notably thanks to the foreign direct investment channel, which could well change the situation. We are discussing this with Christine Peltier.
Since the start of the year, growth in emerging countries has held up quite well. This is reflected not only in business and household confidence, but also in the confidence of foreign investors in the local bond and stock markets. The tightening of US monetary policy from early 2022 to mid-2023 did have a major negative impact on portfolio investment flows. However, this impact was largely offset by the attractiveness of emerging markets for both private and institutional investors, whether for purely financial reasons (carry trade strategies) or as part of a diversification strategy
Monetary and exchange rate conditions in emerging economies are more favourable in this early part of the year than they were at the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023. The relaxation of monetary policies made possible by lower inflation and upward revisions of economic growth forecasts has attracted portfolio investment. Despite the increase in geopolitical risk, sovereign risk is likely to reduce except for the most fragile countries, which were already under pressure in 2023. For low-income countries, 2024 will be a high-risk year as governments’ external debt repayments will remain very heavy, just as they were in 2023.
Monetary and forex conditions in emerging economies are more favourable in this early part of the year than they were at the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023. The relaxation of monetary policies made possible by lower inflation and upward revisions of growth forecasts have attracted portfolio investment. Despite the increase in geopolitical risk, sovereign risk is likely to reduce except for the most fragile countries, which were already under pressure in 2023. For low-income countries, 2024 will be a high-risk year as governments’ external debt repayments will remain very heavy, just as they were in 2023.
Growth in emerging countries held up quite well in H1 2023, thanks to countries in Asia, Brazil and Mexico. In Asia, inflation returned to very moderate levels in August or September (with the exception of India) and, compared to other areas, monetary tightening between mid-2021 and mid-2023 was on a much smaller scale. This helped offset the drop in exports. However, Central European countries did not benefit from this offset effect. Business and household surveys indicate that disparities between areas became more pronounced over the summer. These surveys also show that the heavyweights in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico) are better positioned within the major EM regions.
Emerging markets exports contracted sharply in late 2022-early 2023, particularly in Asia due to the turnaround in the global electronic cycle. But US/China structural decoupling is probably already at work.
The scenario of a slowdown in the emerging economies in 2023 is based on two hypotheses: 1) a slowdown in global trade and 2) the recessionary impact of inflation and monetary tightening. The first hypothesis is now a certainty: exports have clearly contracted in recent months, in both the advanced countries and emerging economies. The causes are partially circumstantial, and hopefully the cooling of world trade will only be cyclical. It is possible, however, that the trade and technological decoupling of the US and China are also a contributing factor.
In 2022 as a whole, average economic growth in Emerging Markets (EMs) slowed to an estimated 3.8% down from 6.6% in 2021. The slowdown followed the post-Covid shock rebound of 2021 and was much aggravated by the rise of powerful headwinds throughout the year, including: the repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine on activity in Europe and global inflation, monetary tightening to fight against price pressures, the weakening in Chinese economic growth (notably resulting from Covid-related disruptions and the crisis in the property sector), and the downturn in world trade.
Over the past few months, the equity markets of the main emerging financial centres have shown a little more optimism. They are betting on a recovery in growth in China after the lifting of health restrictions, on the positive effect of the drop in commodity prices for importing countries and on the impact of US monetary tightening and the appreciation of the dollar to be less severe than expected. The first two arguments are uncertain and must be put into perspective. The financial shock is probably behind us. But its negative impact on investment will continue this year. Likewise, the acceleration of inflation in 2022 could have diffuse effects on household consumption, even if wages were to catch up.
Excluding China, activity in emerging countries was stagnant in Q2 2022 and business and household confidence surveys indicate that the economic slowdown will continue. Inflation continues to rise and is being accompanied by new decisions of monetary tightening, including by central banks in Asia. The deterioration in external demand and tighter domestic financial conditions have combined with the monetary tightening in the United States and USD appreciation to trigger the slowdown in activity. This is a double whammy for emerging countries. But developing countries, which are also facing the food crisis and a situation of over-indebtedness, are in a more worrisome situation.
Emerging countries have recently faced a series of unexpected and severe shocks that will significantly dampen their economic performance in 2022. Global inflation has increased due to rising commodity prices and world supply disruptions resulting from the conflict in Ukraine. The lockdowns in China’s industrial regions during the spring have aggravated supply problems and further worsened the global economic outlook. Moreover, monetary policies have tightened in most countries, while external financing conditions have also deteriorated due to the weakening in global investor sentiment and US monetary policy tightening. Emerging markets have already faced a bout of large capital outflows since the beginning of the year
Over the past few weeks, Central Europe has experienced a spike in Government bond yields. Five-year yields have surged respectively by 338 bp in Poland, 331 bp in Hungary, 350 bp in Romania and 216 bp in Czech Republic since January 2022 and are at present similar to 2008 levels. The trend is also the same for 10-year yields. The recent move can be explained to some extent by markets’ overreaction as regards to the relatively high exposure of Central European countries to Russia in terms of exports and energy supply. Moreover, their geographical proximity with Ukraine and Russia have contributed to markets’ perception of higher geopolitical risk. In the meantime, monetary policy tightening, a consequence of higher inflationary pressures (respectively +16
Emerging countries are now facing another major shock whereas the post-pandemic recovery has remained fragile. The war in Ukraine will impact emerging countries through its negative effects on foreign trade, capital flows and, above all, inflation. The indirect effect of soaring global commodity prices on inflation households’ purchasing power may be particularly severe, and affect mostly low-income countries in Africa, Central Europe and the Balkan region. In spite of these gloomier prospects, we do not expect a broad-based worsening in sovereign and external solvency in emerging countries in the short term. However, a few governments, especially in Africa and the Middle East, may rapidly experience payment difficulties.
For emerging economies, the balance prospects/risks has been deteriorating since end-2021. For 2022, a bigger than expected growth slowdown is very likely, sometimes with social instability as already seen in Kazakhstan. Over the last three months, Turkey has experienced a mini financial crisis again. Monetary and exchange rate policy is betting on exports and investment to support growth and rebuild the major economic balances over the medium term, albeit at the price of short-term financial instability. This is a daring gamble that could force the authorities to introduce genuine foreign exchange controls instead of the incentive measures they have implemented so far.
The recovery in emerging economies since mid-2020 has been accompanied by a tightening of monetary policy in Latin America and Europe but not in Asia so far (except South Korea). The main reasons for this lie in the level and dynamics of inflation. Inflation is strong and accelerating in Latin America and Europe, more modest and still contained in Asia
Emerging economies have faced mounting inflation pressures since the beginning of 2021. Headline inflation has continued to accelerate over the summer (except in Asia), primarily reflecting the rise in food and energy prices and weaker currencies against the USD. However, core inflation has also accelerated across the board. As a result, a growing number of central banks in Latin America and Central Europe have started to raise their policy rates. In Asia, inflation has remained low (North Asia) or has levelled off (India), allowing central banks to stay accommodative. So far, central banks engaged in a tightening cycle have increased their policy rate cautiously; even the more reactive ones (in countries such as Brazil and Russia) have remained behind the curve (i.e
