Rising energy prices are pushing inflation higher in Europe and the United States, while energy’s contribution is slightly negative in Japan. Over recent months (3m/3m), core indices have been firming in the euro area and Japan: a signal to watch. In Europe and Japan, pressure on producer prices is building. The risk of the energy shock spilling over to other CPI items is increasing. Markets (swaps) are pricing this rise in inflation into short-term measures. Long-term expectations (5y5y) are rising in Japan and the UK.
The average CPI inflation rate across the fifteen leading emerging economies stabilised at 4.3% year-on-year in August. The inflationary impact remains weaker than in 2022, due in particular to reduced spillover effects on agricultural and food prices. Manufacturers’ views on the trend in input and finished product prices have returned to their pre-conflict levels.
This latest issue of MacroWaves is devoted to the repercussions of the energy shock and the rise of AI in emerging economies. The spring of 2026 saw mounting risks: war in Iran, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and soaring energy prices. Yet, against all expectations, emerging economies withstood the shock remarkably well.Lucas Plé and Hélène Drouot, both economists in the Emerging Economies team, help us understand this resilience. Why did the energy crisis not cause the economy to derail? Can the rise of artificial intelligence offset the negative impact of rising energy prices? What are the identified risks of this increased dependence on technology?
Six months have passed since the start of America’s and Israel’s military intervention in Iran and Lebanon. What picture is emerging around the impact of this external shock on the financing conditions of the major emerging economies and on exchange rate movements? And what parallels can be drawn with the 2022 energy shock?
Inflation eased in June and July. The average CPI inflation rate across the fifteen leading emerging economies fell to 4.3% year-on-year in July, down from 4.8% in April. The inflationary impact remains weaker than in 2022, due in particular to reduced spillover effects on agricultural and food prices. Manufacturers’ views on the trend in input and finished product prices have returned to their pre-conflict levels. However, against a backdrop of increasingly frequent and destructive extreme weather events, pressure on agricultural and food prices is likely to continue.
The acceleration in consumer price inflation since February 2026 is much less significant than in 2022, and it stopped in May and June 2026. The average CPI inflation rate for the fifteen main emerging economies was estimated at 4.6% y/y in June, against 4.8% in April. The inflationary shock is more moderate than in 2022 notably due to more limited spillovers to agricultural and food prices.
In advanced economies, June inflation declined temporarily but bounced back in July, reflecting the moves in energy prices. Forward indicators of price pressures eased again in July. Long-term inflation expectations held steady as near-term expectations pulled back (UK excepted). At this stage, there is no sign of a wage-price spiral. In emerging economies, average CPI inflation fell back slightly in June after three months of increase. As for commodities, we see a broad-based rebound as tensions resurface.
Since the Trump administration returned to power, the already considerable disparity in energy policy between the United States and Europe has significantly increased. Admittedly, both are seeking energy sovereignty. But, while European policies remain focused on the low-carbon transition, the current US administration is focused on enhancing US dominance in the fossil fuel sector and rolling back measures that support the energy transition. At first glance, the energy crisis is exacerbating this divergence. The US has consolidated its position as the world’s leading exporter of hydrocarbons, and its strategic oil reserves have served as a buffer against the crisis
Emerging economies have so far withstood the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East better than expected. The surge in oil, gas and energy-related input prices was rapid, but less inflationary than in 2022. While monetary policy easing cycles have been interrupted in many countries, most central banks have been able to keep their policy rates unchanged since last February. Emerging financial markets have not faced a widespread loss of confidence, while macroeconomic buffers are stronger than in the summer of 2022, helping to absorb the rise in energy costs.
Despite the war in Iran, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the temporary surge in energy prices, emerging economies have so far avoided a crisis scenario. Their growth is slowing marginally, inflation remains contained in most countries and financial markets have not collapsed. The most powerful growth engine is coming from Asia: global demand for chips, data centers and electronic goods linked to artificial intelligence is offsetting part of the oil shock and reshaping the external balances of several emerging countries.
A few months after the onset of a new global energy crisis, one might wonder about its implications for the low-carbon transition in emerging countries. The answer is not straightforward, as geopolitical uncertainties and the low-carbon transition are progressing according to different timelines, at least in part. The energy shock triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz calls for immediate action to secure hydrocarbon supplies, such as using strategic reserves. Conversely, the transition to low-carbon energy is a long-term process. However, the current circumstances are unusual: the low-carbon transition was initiated several years ago, and the Hormuz crisis marks the second major energy crisis in four years.
The impact of the energy shock on the economic variables of emerging countries.
Key indicators for emerging countries: Real GDP, inflation, credit, current account balance, fiscal balance, public debt.
Panoramas as of 13 July 2026: a severe shock with varying effects in the North Africa/Middle East region; heightened fragilities in Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America less exposed to the energy shock; Asia with strengths to face the energy crisis.
The concept of ‘emerging economies’ as opposed to advanced economies is multifaceted and often poorly defined. The simplest and most commonly used indicator is GDP per capita, on which the classification used by international financial institutions (IFIs) is largely based
In May 2026, the average CPI inflation rate for the main emerging economies was broadly stable at 4.7% y/y after 4.8% in April. The shock is still contained compared to 2022 due to limited spillover to agricultural and food prices. Manufacturers’ opinion on the trend in input & output prices has stopped deteriorating but remains higher than in 2022.
In April 2026, the inflationary impact of the oil price shock is spreading as the average CPI inflation rate for the main emerging economies reached 4.8% year-on-year, compared with 3.9% in February. The shock is still contained compared to 2022 due to limited spillover to agricultural and food prices. However, manufacturers’ opinion on the trend in input & output prices have deteriorated significantly. The contagion of oil and gas prices to fertiliser and oil-derived input prices is being felt more acutely.
Emerging Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Beyond supply issues, rising prices pose a significant risk to these countries, where domestic demand is a major driver of economic growth. To limit the impact, some Asian countries (notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have opted to partially subsidise energy and fertilisers. The additional cost to their public finances is expected to remain manageable provided that the average crude oil price does not exceed USD 100 per barrel over the year. However, this subsidy policy poses risks to their public finances, particularly if external financing conditions tighten. Indonesia is the country most exposed to a rise in US long-term interest rates.
The economies of Central Europe have weathered several shocks since 2020, demonstrating remarkable resilience. In 2025, the US tariff shock had a limited impact on economic activity. In fact, regional growth even accelerated, driven by strong consumer spending. In 2026, the war in the Middle East is once again putting the region to the test, while its fiscal flexibility has been considerably reduced. Uncertainties over the duration of the war are casting a shadow over the economic outlook. In any case, Central Europe can count on four key strengths to weather this shock. Firstly, its direct exposure to risks associated with disruptions in energy and industrial material supplies remains limited
We have selected a set of indicators to track the impact of this new energy shock, caused by the war in the Middle East, on activity and prices in the Eurozone, the United States, oil and gas markets and emerging countries, and to see how much the current situation resembles the situation in 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.This dashboard featuring graphs and comments will be updated on a monthly basis for as long as necessary.
In March 2026, the inflationary impact of the surge in oil and gas prices remained moderate, both in absolute terms with an average inflation rate for the main emerging countries of 4.3% compared to 3.9% in February, and relative to 2022. The absence of contagion to agricultural and food prices is the main explanation. Manufacturers' opinion on input prices is, moreover, less degraded than in 2022. However, a catch-up should occur with the expected release of the rise in fertilizer and petroleum-derived input prices to all prices.
In this new episode of MacroWaves, we examine how artificial intelligence is reshaping growth in emerging economies. We hear from three economists at BNP Paribas Economic Research: Lucas Plé, Christine Peltier, and Hélène Drouot.While Asia dominates semiconductor production, other countries, such as those in Latin America and Africa, are either exploiting their mineral resources or falling behind.What challenges will they face? The answers lie in moving upmarket, securing energy supplies and avoiding increased geopolitical dependence in order to transform this opportunity into sustainable productivity gains.
As in 2022, the energy shock will affect emerging and developing economies. Today, as in the past, this shock is a negative-sum game between importing and exporting countries. Furthermore, although this is basically a supply shock, central banks in emerging economies may tighten their policies if they need to counter downward pressure on exchange rates, in order to prevent inflation from rising too sharply. However, compared to 2022, there are mitigating factors: 1/ the absence of a shock to agricultural commodity prices so far; 2/ AI, which is an external growth driver for Asian countries in particular; and 3/ the Fed is expected to adopt a more accommodative stance than in 2022 in response to the anticipated rise in inflation
This issue was completed on February 27, 2026 and does not take into account the repercussions of the military attacks that have since occurred in the Middle East. Emerging countries with strategic resources, such as critical metals and semiconductor production capacities, have become key players in the rise of artificial intelligence (AI). Those that are well positioned in AI supply chains have both a growth engine and a major geopolitical advantage. Asia's industrialised economies, which account for over 85% of the world's exports of electronic chips, are best placed to benefit from the increasing demand for AI. However, this advantage also exposes them to a potential correction in the technology boom
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) depends largely on the availability of abundant and reliable electricity. The sector currently accounts for 4.5% of electricity demand in the United States, 2% in Europe and around 1% in Asia (including China), where the vast majority of data centres are located. In contrast, this figure is less than 0.5% in the rest of the world, but is set to increase in the coming years. To attract investment in the AI sector, emerging countries must therefore consider significantly increasing their electricity generation capacity and establishing networks capable of continuously powering data centres. Massive investments in infrastructure, along with the use of flexible energy sources (gas, renewables), are assets for attracting AI projects
