In Spain, Italy and Portugal, the five largest banking groups recorded, on average and on a consolidated basis, an annualised return on average equity (ROAE) of 15.0%, 15.6% and 18.1%, respectively, in the first three quarters of 2024. These are levels not seen since 2007.
Last week’s news made for grim reading for many in Europe. First came the choice by our American friends to bring back to the White House a man who said just weeks ago that the EU would have to “pay a big price” if he won. Then the German governing coalition collapsed. Following factory closure announcements by VW in Germany a week before, the two largest German banks reported massive increases in their provisions for bad loans. Meanwhile, in France, lay-offs were announced by two high profile French companies in the automotive industry but also in retail a sector hitherto thought to be fine
Would you rather find yourself barreling down towards a cliff edge, or mis-stepping onto a slippery slope? The answer seems obvious. The former predicament typically ends with multiple traumas, the latter with bruises at worst, albeit ultimately it also leads to the bottom if one keeps going. European policymakers have shown a knack for U-turning at cliff edges; they now need to learn to get off slippery slopes. It may prove even harder.
In order to achieve its climate targets, the European Union will not only have to green its electricity production, but also increase it. This is a daunting industrial and financial challenge, echoed in the “Draghi” report on the future of European competitiveness, as well as the new Green Deal proposed by the re-elected President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen.
In 2019, the European Union (EU) adopted a very ambitious Green Deal, setting a 2050 climate neutrality target for the 27 member states. Since then, the Fit for 55 legislative package (in 2021) has been introduced, followed by the series of REPowerEU directives (in 2023) detailing the process to speed up reducing greenhouse-gas emissions (to at least twice the current pace). The main focus has been on developing renewable energies, whose share is set to double within six years, accounting for 42.5% of end-energy use by 2030.
Following the first rate cut at the June meeting of the ECB, the focus has now shifted to the timing and speed of further reductions in the deposit rate. The guidance is vague: decisions will be data-dependent. For investors, estimating policy rules -the relationship between past decisions and inflation and other relevant variables- has merits to get a better understanding. Such a rule shows the key role played by the difference between observed inflation and the inflation target. However, there are important caveats. The estimated rule implies a very slow adjustment of the deposit rate, which is difficult to justify when the ECB is in easing mode
In this Audiobrief, Guillaume Derrien discusses recent evolution of the European Union's trade balance. The latter moved back to a surplus in 2023. Despite China’s ramping up to higher value-added sectors, the EU trade surplus in traditionally buoyant industries (pharmaceuticals, automotive) remains at historically-high levels.
Since the adoption of the European Green Deal on 11 December 2019, European climate strategy has stepped up. Far from paralysing its climate action, the health crisis was the backdrop for the adoption of NextGenerationEU. This recovery plan has mobilised considerable resources to meet the European Union’s needs in terms of climate and digital transition, healthcare and education. While its implementation is only halfway through, the first positive effects can already be observed. Other mechanisms (including REPowerEU, the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the Critical Raw Materials Act) have been added to this plan to respond to the new challenges that have arisen since the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine (supply security, energy dependence)
Since China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, the European Union's bilateral deficit with the country has widened from EUR 39 billion to EUR 292 billion in 2023 (Eurostat data). This is by far the largest deterioration recorded by the Old Continent with a trading partner, even though, as a whole, the EU's trade balance with the rest of the world returned to surplus in 2023.
Our Western Europe business insolvencies index has risen above its pre-COVID level. However, it is still far below the peaks seen after the 2008 crisis and during the eurozone crisis (between 2011 and 2015). In most countries, the business insolvencies level is now higher than it was before the pandemic. This has been the case since 2022 for the UK and Sweden, which were joined by France, Belgium and Germany during 2023. However, in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the insolvency levels are still far below their pre-COVID peaks. These diverging evolutions are also being reflected in sectors, with sharper deterioration in construction, trade and real estate agencies in the countries that have suffered the steepest decline in business activity.
To achieve its climate goals, the European Union (EU) should cut by 90% its greenhouse gas emissions by 2040 (compared to 1990 levels), according to a recent recommendation by the European Commission. This means rapidly increasing investment in renewable energies, electricity grids, transport infrastructure and thermal renovation of buildings. The result is a substantial financial burden (estimated at between 58 and 66 billion euros per year in France), but also a heightened quest for technological and human resources. For its ecological transition, the Old Continent is looking for computer scientists, civil engineers, electromechanics, building and public works managers, plasterers, electricians, roofers and more.
Recently an agreement has been reached between representatives of the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission on a new economic governance framework. It focuses on risk-based surveillance, differentiation between member states based on their specific situation, the integration of fiscal, reform and investment objectives in a medium-term fiscal plan. The single operational indicator in the form of a net expenditure path should facilitate communication and emphasizes the key role of discretionary primary spending rather than tax increases in bringing public finances under control
In a recent speech, ECB President Christine Lagarde said that when the financing needs of an economic transformation exceed the capacities of fragmented financial markets, developing a capital markets union becomes crucial. This is the point at which the EU has arrived. According to European Commission estimates, financing the energy and digital transition will require more than EUR 700 billion annually. One way of reducing capital market fragmentation is by lowering the cost of information gathering for investors, e.g. through the harmonisation and, where possible, simplification of standards and regulations. This would increase the risk bearing capacity of investors and lower the cost of financing for issuers
The momentum of private payroll employment has recently slowed in the euro area, as evidenced by job destruction in France and Germany in Q3. This destruction can be partly explained by cyclical sectors, particularly construction. It is a sign that demand constraints are increasingly impacting companies and the labour market.However, labour shortages remain high in the northern countries of the euro area and in Central Europe and, in general, in sectors where demand is not falling (aeronautics and building renovation in particular). Beyond an economic slowdown, which we expect to last until spring 2024, impacting employment, the low level of unemployment and historically high labour shortages should continue to characterise the European economy.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have prompted many advanced countries to rethink and relocate their supply chains in order to secure strategic production and to create a framework that will help to promote the energy and environmental transition.
Recently, the word uncertainty has been frequently used by the Federal Reserve and the ECB in their communication. It is something they must take into account when taking policy decisions. Likewise, households, firms and investors face different types of uncertainty. That of not exactly knowing the current state of the economy, uncertainty about future economic policy and monetary policy in particular, uncertainty about the transmission of past shocks -including interest rate hikes- and the risk of events -geopolitical, climate-related, etc.- that would have economic repercussions. Every month, the European Commission asks firms and households how difficult or easy it is to make predictions about their future business or financial situation
By cutting out Russian hydrocarbons, the EU has accelerated its shift towards renewable energy.
Since 2005, the emission trading system, also called carbon market, is at the heart of the European strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.This device that covers around 45% of carbon emissions is based on the simple principle of "polluter pays".The entities concerned, mainly the most polluting industrial sites, but also the intra-EU airlines, are given emission allowances by public authorities. These are tons of carbon which they can emit into the atmosphere every year.When they reach the limit, they have to obtain additional rights on the markets or bilaterally. This has a cost. So it is a financial incentive to adopt less polluting production methods based on renewable energies for instance.
Polluting has never been so expensive. Since mid-February 2023, CO2 permits have been trading at more than €100 per ton in the European Union for the first time since the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was created in 2005.
Business bankruptcies in the European Union increased significantly in the fourth quarter 2022, reaching their highest level since 2015 according to figures published by Eurostat on Friday 17 February. The overall dynamics conceal large sectoral differences.
Meeting the European Union’s climate-related and digital ambitions will require a huge additional annual investment effort. In the near term, against a background of slowing growth and the prospect of a recession in 2023, this represents a potential source of resilience. In the medium term, this demand impulse may underpin or even increase inflation, in addition to other factors that could lead to greenflation. This would influence the level of official interest rates as well as long-term interest rates. The latter could also be under upward pressure due to the huge additional financing needs compared to the normal financing flows. The financing mix -banks versus capital markets- plays a key role in this respect.
Over the past few weeks, Central Europe has experienced a spike in Government bond yields. Five-year yields have surged respectively by 338 bp in Poland, 331 bp in Hungary, 350 bp in Romania and 216 bp in Czech Republic since January 2022 and are at present similar to 2008 levels. The trend is also the same for 10-year yields. The recent move can be explained to some extent by markets’ overreaction as regards to the relatively high exposure of Central European countries to Russia in terms of exports and energy supply. Moreover, their geographical proximity with Ukraine and Russia have contributed to markets’ perception of higher geopolitical risk. In the meantime, monetary policy tightening, a consequence of higher inflationary pressures (respectively +16
Uncertainty matters greatly for households and businesses when taking decisions. It can have many causes: economic, economic policy, political or even geopolitical. Survey data of the European Commission show that the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a huge jump in uncertainty, followed by a gradual decline. The war in Ukraine has triggered another, albeit more limited, increase. It will be important to monitor the development of uncertainty in the coming months at the level of consumers, businesses and individual countries. In the absence of a decline, one should expect that the negative impact shows up in spending and activity data.
Countries neighbouring Russia and Ukraine are more exposed than those in Western Europe. Among the latter, there are differences, with Germany and Italy being more dependent on Russian gas than France, Spain or Portugal. The countries that import the most from Russia are also the most dependent on Ukrainian imports. The exposure of European countries to Russia and Ukraine, and their vulnerabilities to the economic repercussions of the war between these two countries, result primarily from the high weight of their imports of Russian energy supplies and Ukrainian food and agricultural products
Usually close, French and German inflations, measured on a comparable basis by Eurostat’s harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), have diverged sharply since the beginning of 2021, with inflation on the other side of the Rhine largely exceeding that in France. In November 2021, the gap reached +2.6 percentage points compared with an average of +0.2 pp since 1991. This difference is, for a part, due to a VAT effect: the decrease in the German rates in the second half of 2020 initially pulled down German inflation but the return to their previous level reverted that trend in 2021. In January 2022, with the end of this VAT effect, German inflation fell back quite significantly (to 5.1% y/y according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, from 5.7% in December) but is still very high
