Faced with the need to find the necessary funding for the massive investments required for the energy and technological transitions identified by Mario Draghi in his report, and for Europe's defence remobilisation (Readiness 2030), on 19 March, the European Commission unveiled its strategy for a Savings and Investments Union (SIEU), of which securitisation is an essential part. On 17 June, the Commission also proposed new measures to boost securitisation activity in the EU while preserving financial stability. These measures are a good basis for relaunching the securitisation market. However, certain aspects could benefit from improvement.
Many European countries have decided to significantly increase their military spending, led by Germany. Will this effort be conducive to growth? This will depend on whether or not Europe is able to increase its production of military equipment. It will also depend on the possible crowding-out effects (inflation, interest rates) associated with an increase in public debt. The ability of European industry to meet demand (an increase in EU military spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP) will be decisive. A reallocation of currently underutilised production capacity (mainly in the automotive and intermediate goods sectors) could help to increase production.
The gradual recovery in demand, which has been noticeable for almost six months, seems to be continuing in the Eurozone. It remains to be confirmed given the uncertainties surrounding US trade policy. Nevertheless, the trend towards improvement has not been called into question by the decisions taken so far. In the medium term, the implementation of the European rearmament plan and the German investment plans should strengthen this dynamic.
The EU-UK summit on 19 May marks a new phase in economic rapprochement, more than five years after the Brexit, which has undeniably weakened the UK economy. The structural challenges facing the UK – high inflation, sluggish business investment, low productivity – partly result from this event.
The investment required to meet the challenges of competitiveness and energy and technology transition in the European Union is huge, and the need for it is imminent (2025-2030). To this must now be added expenditure to strengthen the European Union's military capabilities. To finance this, the EU must of course speed up its roadmap towards a Savings and Investment Union. But given the urgency, it must also take account of its financial ecosystem and rely on its banks. The postponement of the FRTB (Fundamental Review of Trading Book) until 2027 and the European Commission's legislative proposal on securitisation, expected in June, are steps in this direction.
• The euro area government deficit decreased in 2024 to -3.1% of GDP.• Italy and Greece posted primary surpluses even though their interest costs remain high• The fiscal adjustment that still needs to be provided by the countries whose deficits increased in 2024 (France, Austria, Belgium, Finland) will nevertheless act as a brake on growth in the zone.
The economic scenario for the Eurozone remains dependent on the evolution of the trade conflict and implementation of possible US reciprocal tariffs of 20%. The increase in defence spending will nevertheless support GDP.
On Wednesday 5 March, the 10-year Bund yield increased 30bp, the biggest rise since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It continued to move higher the following days, reaching a peak on 11 March. The trigger was the announcement by Friedrich Merz (CDU) and the heads of the CSU and SPD during an evening press conference on Tuesday 4 March 2025 that they agreed to reform the debt brake, that defence spending above 1 percent of GDP would be exempt from this debt brake and that a EUR 500bn fund for infrastructure investments would be created. The developments in the German bond market had sizeable spillover effects across markets in the Eurozone. This didn’t come as a surprise.
Faced with US disengagement, the European Union has decided to close ranks and reinvest massively in its defence. On 6 March, the European Council therefore approved a plan that would theoretically raise EUR800 billion. This plan is split into two parts. The first will allow each Member State to deviate from its spending trajectory by 1.5% of GDP on average over a four-year period, without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In theory, this mechanism would provide an additional EUR650 billion of budgetary leeway. For the time being, several national governments have announced that they will not make use of the escape clause (France) or are not favourable to it (Italy, Spain).
As a result of the post-Covid debts surge and rising interest rates, the financial burden on governments is increasing. In the OECD, it has reached 3.3% of GDP, its highest level since 2010. For the European Union, the end of the period of cheap money coincides with a substantial increase in its borrowing requirements, partly linked to the need of rearmament. Public finances, already confronted with climate change and ageing populations, are under pressure and will not be able to meet all the challenges alone.
The tug of war between the United States and the European Union has begun. On March 12, the US administration raised tariffs on imports of aluminum and steel by 25%. In response, the EU has announced that it will reinstate, in mid-April, tariffs introduced during Donald Trump's first term, suspended since 2020
Peace talks have started. We do not know how soon or exactly where they will land. But things are moving fast. While much of the focus is, rightly, on the unexpectedly daunting geostrategic challenges, it’s not too soon to start mapping out the key economic implications for Europe.
In France, we could think that the increase of public debt is a general consequence of the Covid-19 crisis. However, the chart we are commenting here shows that it is not.
Central European countries are relatively well-positioned in industrial sectors with high technological content. However, there are differences, with regards to the respective percentages of tech products in value added and in manufacturing sector exports. The share of the high-tech sector, consisting of only three segments in the sector approach (pharmaceuticals, IT/electronics/optical and air/spacecraft), is relatively modest, but the percentage of “medium-high-technology” sector (chemicals, weapons, electrical equipment, machinery, motor vehicles, other vehicles, medical devices) is high. However, these two sectors are also very technology-intensive
In Central Europe, economic activity slowed in Q3 2024. Over the first three quarters, the Polish economy performed better than its neighbours. In the region, inflation has picked up again and a return to the inflation target is not expected until 2026. With the exception of the Czech Republic, all Central European countries are under excessive deficit procedure. Moreover, several countries have tapped international capital markets. This is accompanied by a higher currency risk, but generally, Central European countries have adopted a cautious management of foreign currency debt. Meanwhile, capital flows rebounded in Q3. The region remains an attractive destination for short-and medium-term capital flows.
In Spain, Italy and Portugal, the five largest banking groups recorded, on average and on a consolidated basis, an annualised return on average equity (ROAE) of 15.0%, 15.6% and 18.1%, respectively, in the first three quarters of 2024. These are levels not seen since 2007.
Last week’s news made for grim reading for many in Europe. First came the choice by our American friends to bring back to the White House a man who said just weeks ago that the EU would have to “pay a big price” if he won. Then the German governing coalition collapsed. Following factory closure announcements by VW in Germany a week before, the two largest German banks reported massive increases in their provisions for bad loans. Meanwhile, in France, lay-offs were announced by two high profile French companies in the automotive industry but also in retail a sector hitherto thought to be fine
Would you rather find yourself barreling down towards a cliff edge, or mis-stepping onto a slippery slope? The answer seems obvious. The former predicament typically ends with multiple traumas, the latter with bruises at worst, albeit ultimately it also leads to the bottom if one keeps going. European policymakers have shown a knack for U-turning at cliff edges; they now need to learn to get off slippery slopes. It may prove even harder.
In order to achieve its climate targets, the European Union will not only have to green its electricity production, but also increase it. This is a daunting industrial and financial challenge, echoed in the “Draghi” report on the future of European competitiveness, as well as the new Green Deal proposed by the re-elected President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen.
In 2019, the European Union (EU) adopted a very ambitious Green Deal, setting a 2050 climate neutrality target for the 27 member states. Since then, the Fit for 55 legislative package (in 2021) has been introduced, followed by the series of REPowerEU directives (in 2023) detailing the process to speed up reducing greenhouse-gas emissions (to at least twice the current pace). The main focus has been on developing renewable energies, whose share is set to double within six years, accounting for 42.5% of end-energy use by 2030.
Following the first rate cut at the June meeting of the ECB, the focus has now shifted to the timing and speed of further reductions in the deposit rate. The guidance is vague: decisions will be data-dependent. For investors, estimating policy rules -the relationship between past decisions and inflation and other relevant variables- has merits to get a better understanding. Such a rule shows the key role played by the difference between observed inflation and the inflation target. However, there are important caveats. The estimated rule implies a very slow adjustment of the deposit rate, which is difficult to justify when the ECB is in easing mode
In this Audiobrief, Guillaume Derrien discusses recent evolution of the European Union's trade balance. The latter moved back to a surplus in 2023. Despite China’s ramping up to higher value-added sectors, the EU trade surplus in traditionally buoyant industries (pharmaceuticals, automotive) remains at historically-high levels.
Since the adoption of the European Green Deal on 11 December 2019, European climate strategy has stepped up. Far from paralysing its climate action, the health crisis was the backdrop for the adoption of NextGenerationEU. This recovery plan has mobilised considerable resources to meet the European Union’s needs in terms of climate and digital transition, healthcare and education. While its implementation is only halfway through, the first positive effects can already be observed. Other mechanisms (including REPowerEU, the carbon border adjustment mechanism and the Critical Raw Materials Act) have been added to this plan to respond to the new challenges that have arisen since the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine (supply security, energy dependence)
Since China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, the European Union's bilateral deficit with the country has widened from EUR 39 billion to EUR 292 billion in 2023 (Eurostat data). This is by far the largest deterioration recorded by the Old Continent with a trading partner, even though, as a whole, the EU's trade balance with the rest of the world returned to surplus in 2023.
Our Western Europe business insolvencies index has risen above its pre-COVID level. However, it is still far below the peaks seen after the 2008 crisis and during the eurozone crisis (between 2011 and 2015). In most countries, the business insolvencies level is now higher than it was before the pandemic. This has been the case since 2022 for the UK and Sweden, which were joined by France, Belgium and Germany during 2023. However, in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the insolvency levels are still far below their pre-COVID peaks. These diverging evolutions are also being reflected in sectors, with sharper deterioration in construction, trade and real estate agencies in the countries that have suffered the steepest decline in business activity.
