How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
After being left reeling by the unexpected money-market crisis during its first round of quantitative tightening (QT1), the US Federal Reserve (Fed) intends to manage the second (QT2) with the utmost caution. This means reducing its securities portfolio without creating a shortage in central bank money, in view of the liquidity requirements imposed on banks under the Basel 3 framework. As it is unable to estimate the optimum amount of central bank reserves needed to ensure that its monetary policy is properly implemented, the Fed aims to reduce the stock of reserves to a sufficiently "ample" level.If QT2 is ended too early, it would have to activate its liquidity draining tools in order to limit the downwards pressure on short-term market rates
Against a backdrop of falling interest rates, new banking loans (excluding renegotiations) to households and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the Eurozone continued to accelerate in January 2025. Cumulated over one year, new loans to the non-financial private sector (NFPS) increased by 8.6% year-on-year, after 7.4% in December 2024, to EUR 3,437 bn.
The impulse of bank lending to the private sector continued to recover in the Eurozone in Q4 2024 (1.5 after between 1.1 and 1.2 since September 2024). It was back in positive territory since August (0.8), and in December 2024 it reached its highest level since November 2022 (2.7). The ECB bank lending survey in the Eurozone confirms the recovery in the demand for loans in Q4 2024. However, political uncertainties have resulted in a tightening of credit standards for lending to companies in France and Germany.
According to an unpublished study conducted within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), if it were to perform its functions in the Eurozone, the US supervisor would be stricter, in terms of risk-weighted capital requirements, with respect to the systemically important banks (G-SIBs) established there, than the single supervisor of the Eurozone. The methodology of the exercise on which this conclusion is based has not been shared. However, it seems very complex to define.
The British example tends to suggest otherwise. Its impact on monthly payments remains modest compared to that of interest rates and rising property prices, and is offset by the higher total cost of the loan. In addition, longer loan maturities are likely to fuel the rise in property values.
While the Bank of England's (BoE) decision to keep its key rates unchanged at 4.75% on December 19th was in line with market expectations, the vote by three MPC members in favour of a 25 basis point cut was less so. This week, which has had a wealth of economic indicators in the UK, will certainly have shifted the lines, between rising inflation in November and heightened fears that an overly restrictive monetary policy could derail the economic recovery. Indeed, the BoE has revised its growth forecast for Q4 downwards, from 0.3% to 0.0%.
Despite negative net long-term public debt flows over the period 2021-2023 (see chart), China remains the top lending country to Sub-Saharan African states, ahead of France, the UK and the US. However, long-term public debt owed to China contracted by 4.5% in current dollars between 2019 and 2023, while debt owed to all creditors increased by 15.6%.
The ECB is still keeping control of things. This was the general message from Christine Lagarde at her press conference on Thursday 12 December. As expected, the ECB cut its key rates by 25 basis points for the fourth time since monetary easing began in June, taking the refinancing rate down to 3.5% and the deposit facility rate down to 3.0%. Inflation forecasts have been lowered slightly, with the forecast brought down to 2.1% for headline inflation and 2.3% for core inflation, before the two measures converge at 1.9% in 2026.
In Spain, Italy and Portugal, the five largest banking groups recorded, on average and on a consolidated basis, an annualised return on average equity (ROAE) of 15.0%, 15.6% and 18.1%, respectively, in the first three quarters of 2024. These are levels not seen since 2007.
The second-last FOMC Meeting of 2024 has resulted in a 25bps cut in the Fed Funds Target Range, to +4.5% - +4.75%. The steps ahead promise to prove trickier for the Fed, as the landing is still pending, and in view of Trump’s win. Indeed, the President-elect’s hostility towards Powell is common knowledge, while many of his policy plans are associated with an increased inflation-risk.
After becoming positive again in August 2024, the private sector credit impulse in the Eurozone continued to recover in September, hitting its highest level in nearly two years (November 2022). Among other factors, it contributed to the pleasant surprise in terms of the development of Eurozone GDP in the third quarter (+0.4% q/q after +0.3% in the first and +0.2% in the second). Credit impulse to non-financial corporations has recovered more quickly since dipping below credit impulse to households in autumn 2023, when the restrictive effects of monetary policy peaked. The impulse of lending to households remained slightly negative in September.
On 30 September, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced its intention to raise counterparty exposure limits on the deposit accounts of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) to the same level as those limits set for their federal funds loans, an approach already discussed in its December 2023 report. This harmonisation could lead FHLBs to favour deposits with banks, as these are better remunerated. Supply on the federal funds market, on which FHLBs occupy a prominent position as lenders, would be reduced, driving up the effective rate of federal funds.
The macroeconomic outlook for South Africa is gloomy. After a year of unprecedented electricity shortages in 2023, economic growth is only expected to rebound very slightly in 2024. However, investor confidence has been boosted with new political forces entering into government in June 2024, following the general election in May. The new coalition government, with populist parties largely absent, offers the prospect of a degree of political continuity, continued fiscal consolidation and the implementation of reforms designed to increase the medium-term economic-growth potential. However, this government of national unity is built on uneasy alliances
Would you rather find yourself barreling down towards a cliff edge, or mis-stepping onto a slippery slope? The answer seems obvious. The former predicament typically ends with multiple traumas, the latter with bruises at worst, albeit ultimately it also leads to the bottom if one keeps going. European policymakers have shown a knack for U-turning at cliff edges; they now need to learn to get off slippery slopes. It may prove even harder.
Less than 2 years after spiking to decades highs, inflation is back in the neighbourhood of central bank targets in most of the world. Yet it is too soon to declare victory, as there are still cross currents for economic policy-makers to navigate. As they have earned a good track record of it, and room to act, the year-ahead baseline scenario is fairly benign for both advanced economies and emerging markets, with gradually easing financial conditions (from lower interest rates and a likely weaker US dollar) allowing activity to stabilize around trend growth.
Bank Indonesia unexpectedly cut its monetary policy rates on 18 September (-25 bps). This easing was largely due to the rupiah strengthening against the USD since August (+6.4%).
The outstanding amount of loans to households for house purchase fell year-on-year by 0.65% in July 2024. It stood at EUR 1,424 billion, compared to EUR 1,433 billion at its record high in July 2023. This fourth consecutive decline is particularly remarkable, given that the first (-0.06% in April 2024) was already unprecedented for this series of data, which has been recorded since April 1994.
While the date of the Fed's first rate cut is now foreseeable (it will be at the FOMC on 17-18 September), everything else remains uncertain: the size of the cut, as well as the overall extent of the easing cycle and the timing of the cuts. Developments on the US labour market are key in this calibration. In terms of inflation, significant progress has been made regarding the return to price stability on both sides of the Atlantic, but the battle is far from won. This calls for caution in the monetary easing that is beginning
US growth has clearly moderated in the first half of the year and the latest data for the Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation metric (core personal consumption expenditures inflation) have been welcomed by the Fed and financial markets. The latter are now pricing in a high likelihood of a first rate cut in September. Faced with a still low but rising unemployment rate, the focus of the Federal Reserve is shifting. From exclusively looking at inflation, economic activity and employment also start to matter now, even more so considering the latest progress in terms of disinflation.
Like their number, the economic weight of corporate bankruptcies has increased to an unprecedented extent since March 2022, starting from an all-time low in 2021. This ratio compares the outstanding amount of bank loans to newly bankrupt corporates to the total outstanding amount of bank loans to corporates (in difficulty or not). These developments are mainly due to the continued catch-up of corporate bankruptcies. This concerns more fragile corporates whose would have already gone bankrupt in the absence of the economic and health measures put in place in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the repayment of State-Guaranteed Loans does not seem to have an excessive impact on the financial situation of the majority of corporates that have benefited from them
On 5 June 2024, Eurobank Ergasias Services and Holdings, National Bank of Greece, Alpha Services and Holdings, and Piraeus Financial Holdings (in that order the first to fourth largest Greek banking groups by CET1 capital) were authorised by the European Central Bank to pay out a weighted average of 24% of their 2023 net income attributable to Equity Holders. This payout, totalling EUR 875 million, 93% of which is in the form of dividends, is the first of its kind since 2008 for these banks, which between them account for some 90% of the Greek banking system’s total assets.
Speaking at a joint press conference in Germany on Tuesday, 28 May 2024, the French President and German Chancellor expressed their desire to create a “European savings product” to “bolster Europe’s competitiveness and growth”. This political will follows on from the Letta[1] and Noyer[2] reports and statements made by the French Minister of the Economy. It’s a new approach to getting Capital Markets Union back on the rails.
Faced with a significant increase in official interest rates, companies have been surprisingly resilient. Can this last in an economy which is bound to slow given the ‘high policy rates for longer’ environment? The Federal Reserve’s latest Financial Stability Report gives some comfort based on a comparison of corporate bond yields and spreads to their historical distribution. Moreover, resilient earnings imply a robust debt-servicing capacity. Does this assessment hold in a stress test scenario? A recent analysis of the Federal Reserve concludes that the debt-servicing capacity of the U.S. public corporate sector as a whole is robust to sustained elevated interest rates, unless in case of a severe economic downturn
