The private credit market raises many questions, and its lack of transparency is not helping. Official public data remain scarce. The available estimates come mainly from private sources, whose methodologies vary widely. The Financial Accounts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) now shed new light on the matter. They reveal that private credit finances 7.1% of US corporate debt through households (31% of funds’ total financing), insurers and pension funds (20%), and banks (19%).
Seven months after the start of the war in the Middle East, which has led to a sharp rise in oil prices, sub-Saharan Africa is holding up well overall. The deterioration in external accounts and the rise in inflation are more contained than in 2022, during the last oil shock. However, this resilience is fragile and is eroding as the conflict drags on. Furthermore, an exceptional El Niño event could significantly worsen the macroeconomic environment in 2027.
The September PMI surveys confirm that growth in the Eurozone is getting stronger, boosted in particular by new export orders, which are still rising. Sectors that were already performing well – technology and capital goods (including for defence) – are continuing to grow, while those that had been struggling until now – aeronautics, consumer goods and financial services – are seeing their production indices recover. This strong performance is particularly noteworthy, given that it has not yet been undermined by higher inflation.
Business creations rose by 12% y/y over the first eight months of 2026. This is significantly higher than the 5.3% y/y growth recorded in 2025. This increase was driven by sectors linked to information and communication technologies.
Eco Charts | Business creations and bankruptcies is a new publication aimed at providing an overview of the dynamics of business creations and bankruptcies in France, as well as the risks associated with the latter. We will publish regular updates to this publication on a quarterly basis.
Since June 2026, the ECB has been publishing a new indicator that helps to assess the transmission of its monetary policy to the economy: the Broad Intermediation Gauge (ECB-BIG). This new tool has revealed that, thus far, strong credit growth has limited the restrictive impact of tightening financial conditions caused by rising interest rates in the Eurozone. However, this offsetting effect is beginning to fade.
This month, we are launching Country Risk Profiles, an extension of EcoInsight dedicated to the risk profiles of a selection of countries. The first Country Risk Profile focuses on Vietnam, which continues to benefit from very strong economic growth despite external shocks.
As we begin the 2026 financial year, long-term sovereign bond yields are reaching unprecedented highs not seen for decades. Why is this happening? Is it sustainable? What are the implications for the world’s various economies? These are just some of the questions addressed in this new Special Edition video, introduced by Chief Economist Isabelle Mateos y Lago.Drawing on insights from the banking sector and teams specialising in emerging and advanced economies, the economists from Economic Research will explain why the rise in bond yields is problematic.
Among emerging markets, Argentina and Türkiye stand out for their particularly high consumer price inflation, currently standing at around 30% year-on-year in both countries. However, the monthly increase rate has fallen sharply – from around 8% in Argentina and 4% in Türkiye on average in 2023 to around 2% for both countries during the summer of 2026. The economic policy strategies adopted by governments and monetary authorities to bring inflation under control are very different. However, their consequences are too, and they are not positive for Argentina.
The FOMC meeting on September 15–16 is expected to mark a turning point with the Fed’s first rate hike since May 2023. While there may have been economic reasons to hold off and maintain the status quo until now (some negative signals on the employment front and some encouraging ones on the inflation front), the conditions for a necessary recalibration now appear to be in place.
Six months have passed since the start of America’s and Israel’s military intervention in Iran and Lebanon. What picture is emerging around the impact of this external shock on the financing conditions of the major emerging economies and on exchange rate movements? And what parallels can be drawn with the 2022 energy shock?
In June 2026, corporate creations cumulated over one year remained dynamic, reaching a historic peak according to INSEE, with 1,233,123 corporates set up, representing a 11.1% year-on-year increase. This momentum is not a recent phenomenon, as corporate creations have doubled over the last decade. During this same period, the rise in bankruptcies has been ten times lower, which serves to put current levels (approximately 70,000 bankruptcies cumulated over one year in March 2026) into perspective. Historically, the peaks and troughs in corporate bankruptcies are following those of corporate creations, with an average lag of 24 to 36 months
Gathered in Sintra, Portugal, from 29 June to 1st July, the members of the ECB Governing Council adopted a notably cautious stance, just three weeks after raising key interest rates. This unanimous decision was in response to the energy shock triggered by the conflict in the Middle East. Since then, energy prices have fallen sharply, and the inflation and survey data from June have shown positive trends. However, the indirect effects of the energy shock are still difficult to assess fully. We maintain our scenario of an additional ECB rate hike in September, despite the easing of inflation risks, which makes such a move less likely.
The US regulatory framework is becoming more favourable to intermediation conditions within the US Treasuries market. The easing of leverage requirements has enabled the largest banks, known as Global Systemically Important Banks, or G-SIBs, to fulfil their role as intermediaries during the first months of the year. The ongoing reassessment of the G-SIB capital surcharge calculation method could also benefit market liquidity. However, the capacity of large US banks to absorb federal debt is expected to remain limited.
As expected, the European Central Bank raised its key interest rates by 25 basis points, bringing the deposit facility rate to 2.25%. This decision, taken unanimously, reflects the Governing Council's conviction that the persistence of the energy shock warrants a monetary policy response. The ECB revised its inflation outlook upward more significantly than its growth forecasts downward. It also updated its alternative scenarios relative to the central scenario (one more favorable, two adverse). Christine Lagarde emphasized that today's decision was "robust" across all scenarios.
As US regulators had hoped, the easing of the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) applied to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has improved intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market. However, this measure has not prompted banks to significantly increase their Treasury holdings.
Energy transition, reindustrialisation, digital transition, innovation, defence: these strategic priorities require annual funding flows far greater than those historically seen in the European Union (EU). The consultation conducted by the European Commission on the competitiveness of the banking sector, which concluded on 19 April, highlights the need for a banking system that can finance these ambitions.
Emerging Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Beyond supply issues, rising prices pose a significant risk to these countries, where domestic demand is a major driver of economic growth. To limit the impact, some Asian countries (notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have opted to partially subsidise energy and fertilisers. The additional cost to their public finances is expected to remain manageable provided that the average crude oil price does not exceed USD 100 per barrel over the year. However, this subsidy policy poses risks to their public finances, particularly if external financing conditions tighten. Indonesia is the country most exposed to a rise in US long-term interest rates.
US banking regulators have recently launched a sweeping overhaul of capital requirements. Their primary goal is to restore banks to the forefront of mortgage origination. Yet it seems unlikely that the new credit-risk calibration, taken alone, will reshape the market. The widespread use of loan securitization and leverage constraints could limit its impact. By reducing risk weights on credit lines extended to non-bank mortgage lenders, the reform could even undermine its intended purpose—potentially encouraging banks to remain in the shadow of non-banks.
French growth was lower than expected in the first quarter, at 0% QoQ, mainly hampered by exceptional factors, mostly aeronautics deliveries and public investment. These factors explain why this figure is significantly lower than our nowcast and that of the Banque de France, which estimated that growth had reached 0.3% in Q1, based on production indicators in industry and services. This lead taken by production is reflected in a strongly positive contribution from changes in inventories (+0.8 percentage points), driven mainly by transport equipment.
The central banks of the world’s leading advanced economies met this week, and all decided to leave their policy rates unchanged despite significantly higher inflation prints and outlooks. In the words of Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey, these were “active holds”. They are not fully hawkish yet, but the hawks have made their dissent heard while still in the minority. But they are no longer in a pure passive “wait-and-see” mode. We expect hikes to come through in June, at least for the BoE, BoJ and ECB.
Following a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.
Latin America is considerably less exposed than other emerging regions to the repercussions of the war in the Middle East. This is mainly due to its very low risk of hydrocarbon supply disruptions: the vast majority of imported hydrocarbons come from the United States and other countries in the region, with only a negligible portion coming from the Middle East. Furthermore, several countries are net exporters (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador).
Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of war in Iran and the associated surge in oil prices (+44% to date) and gas prices (+64%) lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that of 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those of the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy shock (a rise in oil prices of around 30% between 23 February and its peak in early June 2022, and a rise in gas prices of around 210% between 23 February and the peak in late August 2022)? The risk cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there are similarities and numerous uncertainties.
The US is pushing forward with banking deregulation. Following an in-depth review of capital requirements, the authorities have now prioritised easing liquidity rules, in a move aimed at restoring the Fed’s role as lender of last resort and potentially enabling it to shrink its balance sheet. Yet one key lesson from the March 2023 banking turmoil could potentially be overlooked: the need to expand the scope of liquidity regulations, which currently apply to far fewer institutions in the US than in Europe.
