In June 2022, the US Federal Reserve kick-started a programme to reduce the size of its balance sheet (QT2). However, banking regulations could hinder its ambitions. The first quantitative tightening (QT1) programme, which was launched by the Fed in October 2017, had already been curtailed early due to the liquidity requirements imposed on banks. Balance sheet constraints could in turn bring QT2 to an early end. The tightened leverage standard is already reducing the ability of banks to act as intermediaries in the secondary markets for US Treasury securities while federal government financing needs continue to grow.
In 2021, 28% of housing loans made by French banks to individuals were guaranteed by mortgage. This tangible security consists of assigning the real estate asset financed as collateral to the lender, in order to offset the consequences of default by the borrower where these are not covered by any borrower’s insurance against death, incapacity or invalidity.
Our households’ property purchasing capacity indicator tracks the development in the maximum purchasable area of a representative household in France. Before rebasing (Q1 2000=100), it compares borrowing capacity expressed as an amount (calculated according to the average household income, fixed interest rates and the average duration of loans) to the price of old housing per square meter. In the provinces, Households’ property purchasing capacity was significantly higher than its 1990–2021 average (+21%) in the second quarter of 2022; however, in Paris, where the long-term average takes into account the 1990 property bubble which had undermined households’ property purchasing capacity, it was almost equal to its 1990–2021 average (+2%)
In just seven months, the share of floating rates in the total of new loans for house purchase to Italian households has more than tripled, from 15.8% in February 2022 to 60.9% in September 2022. This latest figure has not been seen since February 2015 and, at that time, the share of floating rates was in a period of sharp decline, falling from 81.1% in February 2014 to 37.7% in August 2015. The recent revival in interest in floating-rate loans for house purchase among Italian households is evidently a result of the average increase of 136 basis points (bps) in fixed-rate loans between January 2022 (1.48%) and September 2022 (2.84%). The increase recorded by floating-rate loans for house purchase since the beginning of 2022 has been more modest (55 bps)
After posting negative figures for most of 2021, the credit impulse returned to positive territory in early 2022 and rose to unprecedented levels (+3.8 points in August 2022 and +3.7 points in September 2022). This growth contrasts starkly with the sharp slowdown in the eurozone’s GDP in Q3 2022 (+0.2% quarter-on-quarter, compared to +0.8% during Q2 2022), which it undoubtedly helped to limit. After accelerating hugely since spring, in September 2022, outstanding loans to the private sector showed their strongest increase since December 2008 (+6.9% year-on-year), with outstanding loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) showing their largest increase since January 2009 (+8.9%)
The share of new loans to Spanish households for house purchase with a fixed rate remained at a record high level of 80% in July 2022 after peaking at 81% in June 2022. This percentage is the result of a complete reversal of the financing model of residential real estate in Spain in 12 years, driven by the low interest rate environment. Fixed rates used to represent a very small and relatively stable share of total loans for house purchase before 2010 (11% on average between January 2003 and December 2009). The increase in the percentage of fixed-rate loans protects a larger proportion of borrowers against the increase in repayments resulting from interest rate hikes and preserves their creditworthiness, which is likely to curb the rise in the cost of risk for banks
In the first half of 2022, large non-financial companies in the euro area were more inclined to take out new bank loans than to issue debt securities. According to the latest data available, bond issuance remained depressed in July and August. At the beginning of 2022, the average costs of negotiable debt and business bank loans were at comparable levels (for example, 1.1% for French companies in January 2022, according to calculations by the Banque de France1). The cost of bank loans is now, on a relative basis, markedly lower (1.65%) since the surge in inflation and tensions on the bond market have led to a much more perceptible average increase in the cost of negotiable debt issued by non-financial companies (3.69% in June 2022)
With strong acceleration since spring 2021, bank loans to private sector outstanding recorded, in June, its highest annual increase since 2009 (+6.1% year-on-year in June 2022). Annual increase and credit impulse for non-financial companies (NFC) reached levels not seen since 2006 (+6.8% and +4.9%, respectively). According to the banks surveyed by the ECB in June as part of its Bank Lending Survey (published on 19 July), supply chain bottlenecks and the rise in commodity prices increased working capital requirements and strengthened demand for loans with a maturity of less than a year.
Outstanding amounts of overdrafts, revolving loans, convenience and extended credits granted by banks to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) in the euro area stood at EUR 535 bn as of May 2022 after five months of consecutive increases, a level comparable to May 2020. From their low point of EUR 452 bn in August 2021, NFCs' overdrafts have increased by 18.3%, following a fall of 35.6% which began in February 2015.The fall in the outstanding amounts of NFC overdrafts became more marked in 2020, probably as a result of public support measures implemented in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic
Growth in outstanding bank loans to NFCs decelerated in March 2022 (4.2%, from 4.5% in February) for the first time since September 2021 (by way of comparison, real year-on-year GDP growth was 5% in Q1 2022, from 4.7% in Q4 2021 according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate, masking a slowdown on a quarterly basis, +0,2% q/q in Q1 2022 against +0,3% q/q in Q4 2021). Because of a substantial comparison effect (between March and August 2021, the virtual cessation of new guaranteed loans to NFCs and a first wave of loan repayments put the brakes on growth in lending), the impulse of credit to NFCs (reflecting the change, over a year, of the annual growth in outstanding loans) continued to improve – whilst remaining negative – to -1.0% in March 2022, from -2.6% in February.
The outstanding amounts of loans and advances that are still subject to banking support measures, introduced in response to the Covid-19 pandemic[1], continues to decrease in the eurozone. It was EUR444 billion in the fourth quarter of 2021, or 3.1% of total loans, from EUR494 billion, 3.5% of the total, in the third quarter of 2021. This decrease related nearly exclusively to loans subject to moratoria compliant with the European Banking Authority guidelines[2], for which preferential prudential treatment came to an end on 31 December 2021. The outstanding amounts of loans subject to public guarantee schemes and loans subject to forbearance measures almost stabilised in the fourth quarter of 2021, at EUR438 billion
The ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) at Spanish specialised credit institutions (consumer credit, mortgages, leasing and factoring[1]) hit 6.9% in January 2022, its highest January level since 2016. Conversely, the NPL ratio for commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks[2] stabilised at 4.2%, its lowest level since March 2009.The increase in the NPL ratio of specialised credit institutions was due to a faster rise in the outstanding amounts of NPLs than in total loans (8.7% and 2.0% respectively between January 2021 and January 2022). Meanwhile, the fall in the outstanding amounts of NPLs at the banks, that began in 2014, has continued, against a background of stable total loans (-5.5% and -0.2% respectively between January 2021 and January 2022)
In Japan, possibly more than anywhere else, it is important to distinguish the dynamics between headline and core inflation. Headline inflation – at 0.5% in January – is bound to rise further, led by higher energy prices. By contrast, core inflation is still deeply in deflationary territory, and this trend is amplifying. Excluding perishable food products and energy, the consumer price index (CPI) declined by 1.2% year-on-year in January, the biggest decline since March 2011. The services sector even has reported the strongest deflation since 1970 (-2,8%), mainly due to the sharp drop in mobile phone charges, down more than 50% since March 2021. Medical services were also down (-0.8% y/y), as was durable household goods (-3,0% y/y), and leisure goods (-1.1% y/y)
The number of contactless card payments[1] increased by 61% in France between 2019 and 2020, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The Covid-19 pandemic has encouraged the increasing use of this payment method, which respects social distancing measures. In addition, in order to increase the number of transactions eligible for contactless payments, the cap was raised from EUR30 to EUR50 per payment. As a result, nearly 60% of payments at point of sell of less than EUR50 were made by contactless bank cards in 2020, worth a total of EUR71 billion (from EUR38 billion in 2019) according to Groupement des Cartes Bancaires[2]. As a result, the share of total digital payments[3] made by non-contactless bank cards fell sharply
Against the background of economic recovery (real year-on-year GDP growth of 14.4% in Q2 2021, followed by 3.9% in Q3 and 4.6% in Q4 according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate), outstanding bank loans to non-financial companies (NFCs) and households continued to accelerate in the eurozone between May and December 2021. Although substantial comparison effects mean that the figure is still in negative territory, its impulse (measuring the variation in annual growth in outstanding loans over one year) improved to -0.6% in December 2021.
Since November 2020, there has been a significant increase in repurchase1 agreements by the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) with foreign central banks as part of the Foreign Repo Pool (FRRP). Two statistical series can be used to identify the Fed’s main counterparts.The structure of official foreign reserves2 indicates the amount of deposits (in the broad sense of the term, including repurchase agreements) made by each economy with “foreign central banks, the Bank of International Settlements, and the International Monetary Fund”. Given the weight of the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP in global foreign reserves, the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bank of England are probably the main beneficiaries
Last July, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded its scope of intervention in the money markets. It now has a permanent repo facility (Standing Repo Facility or SRF) in addition to its reverse repo facility (Reverse Repo Program or RRP). These tools should allow the Fed to modulate its supply of central bank money, downwards as well as upwards, in periods of pressure on short-term market rates. In the current context of abundant central bank liquidity and limited supply of government securities, money market funds have made considerable use of the RRP. The ability of the SRF to reduce tension in the event of a drying up of central bank liquidity could, however, be countered by various factors such as the leverage constraints to which primary dealers and banks are subject.
In September 2021 a slight acceleration in lending to eurozone non-financial companies (NFCs), which rose 2.1% y/y from 1.9% in June, interrupted the deterioration of the credit impulse (which reflects the year-on-year change in outstanding loans). However, this remained negative (-1.4% in September, from -1.9% in June) due to a high basi of comparison.
The US banking system’s exposure to the Eurozone has significantly increased since 2016, the year of the referendum in favour of the UK’s exit from the European Union. Between 31 March 2016 and 30 June 2021, claims of the eight biggest US banks1 on Eurozone2 residents (excluding the public sector) have grown by more (USD 125.6 billion) than claims on the UK economy have fallen (USD 56.3 billion). The main beneficiaries of this switch include France (up USD 66.3 billion, or +47%), Luxembourg (up USD36.5 billion, +97%), Ireland (USD 28.8 billion, +46%) and Germany (USD 5.8 billion, +7%). Most of this expansion has been concentrated at Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan.US banks’ cross-border exposure to the Eurozone (i.e
The Banker’s rankings of the UK’s five largest banking groups by Tier 1 capital – HSBC, Barclays, NatWest (formerly RBS), Lloyds and Standard Chartered – have generally declined since 2013. This trend, which was initially in step with all of the largest European banks, mainly due to differences in growth rates between geographic regions, has been even sharper in the UK since the vote for Brexit in 2016. HSBC almost maintained its ranking, thanks to its geographic diversification. The decline in the rankings of the UK banks can be attributed to the absolute decline in Tier 1 capital (-12.6% between 2013 and 2020), but also to the increase in the Tier 1 capital of the other largest euro area banks (+29.6%)
In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, bank deposits, which represent the main component of broad money, have seen extremely rapid growth in both the eurozone and the USA. The origins of this newly created money have frequently been imperfectly identified, and the same goes for the possible factors for its destruction. The European methodology for monitoring money supply nevertheless offers a valuable basis for analysis. In this article we will apply this to US data. We learn that between them, the amplification of the Federal Reserve’s securities purchasing programme and the Treasury-guaranteed loan scheme to companies are sufficient to explain the rapid rise in the rate of growth in bank deposits
On 20 October banking regulators finalised the transposition into American law of the Basel Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)* liquidity requirement. This requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile with regard to the theoretical liquidity of their exposure over a one-year period (in order to protect their capacity to maintain exposure in the event of a liquidity crisis). The final rule differs from the Basel standard, by allocating a nil stable funding requirement to high-quality liquid assets (such as Treasuries) and short-term loans guaranteed by such assets (reverse repos)**
CaixaBank and Bankia, respectively the third and fourth largest Spanish banking groups in terms of CET1, formalized on September 3, 2020, the opening of negotiations for a potential merger. If it materialized, this operation would consolidate the Spanish banking system. The level of concentration of the latter is comparable to that observed on average in the euro area, following two successive waves of consolidation between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 from which CaixaBank and Bankia themselves emerged. The question is whether or not this could be the prelude to a broader movement of concentration that the ECB has been in favour of since several years. Indeed, the banking supervisor sees consolidation as a way to improve the financial profitability and resilience of banks1
The analysis of banks' business model responds to strategic as well as regulatory needs. It can also contribute to studying the effects of monetary policy, amongst other things. However, no harmonized definition exists in the literature. The authors therefore regularly use hierarchical cluster analysis to objectively classify banks according to their business model. These empirical, algorithm-based approaches rely heavily on balance sheet variables. Still, the distribution of bank sources of income and assets under management are also relevant variables. We therefore perform our own classification of European banks according to their business model using all these variables
The BoE and UK government have responded to the Covid-19 crisis with a broad range of measures. These were announced swiftly, but some have taken quite a while to implement, particularly when it comes to financial support for private sector companies. These measures share the feature of relying heavily on the country’s banking sector, which is in solid shape despite facing the same challenges as banks in other European countries. All this is taking place against the background of Brexit and the government’s refusal to extend the transition period on the basis that this would increase uncertainty for businesses and could reduce the flexibility they will need to react to the health crisis.
