Since taking office, President Trump has confirmed his threats to raise tariffs, but fears of universal and widespread application have abated somewhat. He will decide whether to carry out his threats once an audit of the United States' trade relations with all its trading partners has been completed, which should be by the beginning of April. Between now and then, and even over 2025 as a whole, the divergence in the trajectory of world trade between advanced countries and emerging and developing countries (EMDs) is set to increase. Trade between EMDs is expected to grow significantly faster in 2025 (5%) than during the 2012-2018 pre-COVID period (+3.9% per annum on average), whereas it will be the opposite for advanced countries
We inform you that, as of February 2025, we will no longer publish new issues of EcoEmerging. From now on, you will find your quarterly publication concerning emerging economies in EcoPerspectives.We invite you to read the latest issue here:ECO PERSPECTIVES - EMERGING ECONOMIES | 1ST QUARTER 2025
After a good start to the year, Chinese economic growth will slow down in 2025 due to still weak domestic demand and the effects of the upcoming protectionist shock on exports. China has tools at its disposal to respond to President Trump’s new tariff plans, even though its room for manoeuvre to offset the effects of rising tariff barriers with a depreciation of the yuan and a drop in export prices has narrowed compared to 2018. The authorities will continue to ease their monetary and fiscal policies in the short term to stimulate activity and boost private consumption, and try to support a rebalancing of China’s economic growth model.
Economic growth forecasts for the fiscal year 2024/2025, which ends on 31 March, have been revised significantly downwards. The outlook for the next three years could also be downgraded unless the government and the private sector significantly increase their investment. However, the international economic climate is not conducive to either domestic or foreign investment, even if the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs on Indian economic growth would be limited. The recent downward pressure on emerging currencies has not spared the Indian rupee, and the depreciation trend is likely to continue, especially as the new Governor of the Central Bank seems to be focusing on supporting economic growth rather than currency stability.
South Korea's economic growth slowed throughout 2024, with limited prospects for a rebound. The political crisis and unprecedented government instability in the country are likely to result in a marked slowdown in domestic demand. The outlook for the export sector (mainly semiconductors) will depend in part on the trade policy adopted by the new US administration. South Korea is not directly targeted by tariff measures for the time being, but the resulting upheaval in value chains will adversely affect exports. Economic policy will remain accommodative: the Central Bank and the interim government have already proposed support measures, but the stimulus will not be enough to significantly boost growth, which is likely to continue to slow in 2025.
GDP growth remained robust in 2024 and the outlook for 2025 is favourable. Consumer spending is expected to remain strong, but investment is expected to slow. Monetary easing by the central bank is expected to be constrained by pressures on the rupiah, while real interest rates - already high - have risen further. In fiscal terms, the government is expected to favour its social policy over capital expenditure. This will impact economic growth in the short and medium term. Exports are expected to suffer from the Chinese economic slowdown. In addition, although modest, the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs could also have a negative impact on the Indonesian economy.
The Vietnamese economy posted strong growth of 7.1% in 2024. The conditions for this success could continue on into 2025: the export sector is benefiting from buoyant global demand for electronic goods and is continuing to increase its production capacities thanks to FDI; the property sector is recovering from the 2022-2023 crisis; private consumption is likely to increase further; and the government has some room for manoeuvre for increasing its spending and investment. However, Vietnam’s economic outlook is also exposed to high downside risks. Firstly, a strong dollar and unchanged interest rates in the US pose a risk of capital outflows, and pressures on the dong and external liquidity would then constrain monetary policy
Poland stands out from neighbouring countries with an outperformance of its economy. It has also experienced an uninterrupted positive GDP growth since 1992, with the exception of 2020. Growth prospects are strong in 2025 and 2026, due to the expected rebound in public investment and despite the uncertainties related to the presidential elections in May 2025. Inflation is accelerating once again this year and is not expected to converge towards its target before 2026. Monetary authorities are likely to maintain their status quo for the time being, and then move towards policy easing later in the year. Regarding the impact of "Trump 2.0," Poland has limited direct trade exposure to the US, but remains vulnerable to the rise of protectionism.
The economy ended 2024 in a state of overheating (reacceleration of inflation, tensions in the labour market) – a situation fueled, in large part, by the prolonged extension of public support measures. Throughout the year, the fiscal trajectory has steadily undermined market confidence – eventually culminating in significant capital outflows in December. The resulting pressures on equities, interest rates and the exchange rate, prompted the Central Bank to take defensive measures to stabilize the BRL. In 2025, a gradual slowdown in economic activity appears inevitable, as domestic demand will be constrained by fiscal adjustment measures, tighter credit conditions, persistent inflation and a deteriorating business climate
The Mexican economy is slowing down and the short-term outlook is not favourable. The constitutional reforms enacted in recent months (including the reform of the judicial system) are damaging the institutional framework and deterring investment. In addition, consumption could be hit hard by the fiscal consolidation plan announced by the government. Above all, Mexico is one of the most vulnerable countries to the US economic policy change. The new migration measures could significantly reduce money transfers from foreign workers, which significantly support the country's growth. The expected customs tariffs applied would also have severe consequences for the Mexican economy in terms of growth and inflation.
Argentina's economy is back on track. Since mid-2024, growth has returned and inflation has slowed significantly. There has been a high social cost to the severe cuts in public spending, but the government budget is in surplus for the first time since 2010. With the recessionary impact of fiscal austerity, the current account balance has turned into a surplus as well. But exports have also been rebounded , despite low prices of agricultural commodities. For the time being, the central bank's foreign exchange reserves are still insufficient for exchange controls to be lifted before the mid-term elections in October. The renewal of an agreement with the IMF is already a prerequisite
Economic growth is being restrained by OPEC+ restricting oil production. Excluding hydrocarbons, activity is holding up well however, driven by consumption and the government’s intensive investment policy under the Vision 2030 economic diversification programme. This solidity comes with large budget deficits, and now also current account deficits, which are requiring record-high debt issuance. Fortunately, the country still has comfortable financial leeway. However, Donald Trump's return to the White House could have a deep impact on a number of areas.
The massive support of international donors has restored a degree of optimism to the Egyptian economic outlook. The depreciation of the exchange rate is under control and inflation is clearly on a downward trajectory, which should make it possible to ease monetary policy. Nevertheless, structural problems remain and will only be resolved very gradually, both in terms of public finances and external accounts. The policies of the new US administration should have a limited impact on Egypt's external accounts.
In Kenya, further fiscal consolidation is proving increasingly difficult. The efforts required of the population were strongly protested over the summer of 2024, forcing the government to withdraw the finance bill it had drafted with the IMF. Now, for the current fiscal year, the deficit is to be reduced mainly through spending cuts, which are adversely affecting economic growth. While this alternative offers a brief respite, a sustained increase in public revenues remains essential to ensure debt sustainability and safeguard the IMF’s financial support in the medium term. This could prove all the more necessary as Donald Trump's return to the White House could pose new risks for Kenya's public and external accounts.
Chinese economic growth accelerated in Q4 2024 (+1.6% q/q and +5.4% y/y), driven by strong export performance and a recovery in private consumption. These supporting factors should persist in early 2025, but economic growth will then resume its downward trend. Domestic demand is likely to remain fragile and the rise in US tariffs will be a significant negative shock to exports.
Despite negative net long-term public debt flows over the period 2021-2023 (see chart), China remains the top lending country to Sub-Saharan African states, ahead of France, the UK and the US. However, long-term public debt owed to China contracted by 4.5% in current dollars between 2019 and 2023, while debt owed to all creditors increased by 15.6%.
While emerging economies (EMEs), apart from China, have contributed little to global warming, the future CO2 emissions curve and the resulting additional temperature rise will largely hinge on their ability to conciliate growth and decarbonisation. However, due to limited financial resources, their investments in the "green" transition are low, at around 50 dollars a year per capita, compared to investments which are around seventeen times higher (850 dollars a year per capita) in developed countries. This disparity gave rise to the idea of securing transfers from developed to developing countries at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), in 2009.
The election of Donald Trump has not triggered any major financial tensions in the main emerging markets. Nevertheless, the dollar has strengthened, which should delay the easing of monetary policies. More worryingly, emerging economies will be the direct or collateral victims of the trade war promised by the incoming United States administration. They will face a double shock: a sharp slowdown in global trade and the re-routing of Chinese exports. The first shock is bound to be recessionary or even inflationary. The impact of the second is not clear cut as it hinges on the types of Chinese exports (complementary or competing) and, most of all, on their link with direct investment.
In China, economic policy has taken a firmly expansionary turn since late September. This has given a boost to activity, which is expected to strengthen further in the very short term. However, over 2025 as a whole, economic growth will continue to slow. The constraints weighing on domestic demand persist, as the adjustments in the property sector are not yet complete, private sector confidence remains fragile and households are waiting for conditions in the labour market to improve. In addition, the risks to growth have increased with the election of Donald Trump. China will be able to respond to new US customs barriers in various ways, ranging from retaliatory measures to depreciating its currency and continuing to re-route its trade flows
The difficult recovery in economic activity experienced over the past two years reflects all of the constraints on the Hong Kong economy. Monetary policy, which must follow the United States' monetary policy, was restrictive until September 2024, with particularly painful consequences, as inflation in Hong Kong remained moderate and domestic demand, conversely, needed support. The economic cycle is much more in sync with mainland China's economic cycle. In the very short term, economic growth is expected to accelerate, supported by ongoing monetary easing and the expected strengthening of Chinese demand. In the medium term, Hong Kong’s prospects hinge on its continued economic and financial integration with mainland China.
Indian economic growth slowed in the first quarter of the current fiscal year and leading indicators suggest that it will stand at 6.9% over the fiscal year as a whole (vs. 8.2% last year). There are a number of risks to GDP growth, but they remain moderate. Apart from rising inflationary pressures, which could delay the expected monetary easing in December, the slowdown in foreign demand is the main risk. Weakening Chinese demand, in particular, may hinder the development of India’s manufacturing sector, which is already undersized due to competition from Chinese consumer and capital goods at increasingly competitive prices. While India’s growth is the highest among emerging countries, it clearly cannot supplant China as the engine of global growth
Economic growth remains solid, but it is expected to slow down in 2025. Due to its very open economy, Malaysia is more vulnerable to the slowdown in China than India or Indonesia. In addition, tensions between the United States and China could make it more complicated to implement its New Industrial Master Plan, a key pillar in the country’s efforts to revitalise growth. The authorities have limited room for manoeuvre in order to support the economy. The Central Bank of Malaysia is expected to leave its key interest rates unchanged over the next six months, unlike other central banks in Asia. Inflation risks are on the upside due to the abolition of energy subsidies and wage increases. In addition, fiscal consolidation, which began two years ago, is hurting investment spending.
Brazil's macro-financial portrait is one of striking contrasts: on the one hand, unemployment is at an all-time low, external accounts exhibit a notable resilience, and economic growth continues to outperform expectations as it draws on multiple levers ; On the other hand, the currency has continued to weaken, residents have increased their holdings abroad, and risk premiums have widened – as defiant markets call for additional measures to curb public spending. The Central Bank – bucking the global trend – has initiated a phase of monetary tightening in response to rising inflation. The latter has witnessed upward pressures on both the supply and demand side in recent months
In Chile, the recovery in economic activity seen in 2024 is expected to continue in 2025. Commodity exports will remain strong, while private consumption will benefit from slowing inflation and a gradually improving labour market. Against a political backdrop marked by ongoing tensions, and an opposition coalition strengthened by the results of recent local elections, the government is trying to press ahead with its flagship reforms, relating to the energy sector in particular, before the end of its term, which will be in late 2025. Against this backdrop, public finances are still being gradually consolidated, at a slower pace than initially anticipated.
In Central Europe, economic activity slowed in Q3 2024. Over the first three quarters, the Polish economy performed better than its neighbours. In the region, inflation has picked up again and a return to the inflation target is not expected until 2026. With the exception of the Czech Republic, all Central European countries are under excessive deficit procedure. Moreover, several countries have tapped international capital markets. This is accompanied by a higher currency risk, but generally, Central European countries have adopted a cautious management of foreign currency debt. Meanwhile, capital flows rebounded in Q3. The region remains an attractive destination for short-and medium-term capital flows.
