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Inflation continues to rise globally, in both advanced and emerging economies, and remains largely driven by energy prices.
Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the war in Iran and the resulting surge in oil and gas prices lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that seen in 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those for the war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy shock? Although there are similarities, there are many uncertainties.
In April 2026, the inflationary impact of the oil price shock is spreading as the average CPI inflation rate for the main emerging economies reached 4.8% year-on-year, compared with 3.9% in February. The shock is still contained compared to 2022 due to limited spillover to agricultural and food prices. However, manufacturers’ opinion on the trend in input & output prices have deteriorated significantly. The contagion of oil and gas prices to fertiliser and oil-derived input prices is being felt more acutely.
China’s rise is undermining major sectors of European industry. However, as the German economy illustrates most clearly, Europe is shifting, driven by investment cycles in defence, electrification and artificial intelligence. It is redirecting its exports and managing to maintain strong positions, particularly in high value-added services, where exports to China are trending upwards. Yet this repositioning remains fragile and could be hampered by the economic costs of the conflict in the Middle East. To consolidate its positions, Europe must accelerate the unification of its internal market and do more to strengthen its industrial policy. This is the aim of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda.
Emerging Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to the energy shock caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Beyond supply issues, rising prices pose a significant risk to these countries, where domestic demand is a major driver of economic growth. To limit the impact, some Asian countries (notably India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) have opted to partially subsidise energy and fertilisers. The additional cost to their public finances is expected to remain manageable provided that the average crude oil price does not exceed USD 100 per barrel over the year. However, this subsidy policy poses risks to their public finances, particularly if external financing conditions tighten. Indonesia is the country most exposed to a rise in US long-term interest rates.
The 15th Five-Year Plan, which outlines the roadmap for the Chinese economy from 2026 to 2030, does not signify a major shift in direction but rather continues on the path of the previous plan. It confirms, or rather reinforces, China’s development strategy based on asserting its export, industrial and technological power. Rather than focusing on rebalancing the growth model and boosting domestic consumption, Beijing is prioritising industry and innovation, seeking to increase its dominance in critical sectors and guarantee its ‘national security’
Due to the military interventions by the United States and Israel in Iran and Lebanon, emerging economies are experiencing financial strains: rising risk premiums, depreciation of their currencies against the dollar, and a decline in central banks’ foreign exchange reserves. As is often the case, Türkiye is once again in the spotlight due to the sharp fall in the reserves of its central bank.
The economies of Central Europe have weathered several shocks since 2020, demonstrating remarkable resilience. In 2025, the US tariff shock had a limited impact on economic activity. In fact, regional growth even accelerated, driven by strong consumer spending. In 2026, the war in the Middle East is once again putting the region to the test, while its fiscal flexibility has been considerably reduced. Uncertainties over the duration of the war are casting a shadow over the economic outlook. In any case, Central Europe can count on four key strengths to weather this shock. Firstly, its direct exposure to risks associated with disruptions in energy and industrial material supplies remains limited
Economic growth accelerated in Q1, driven by the export-oriented manufacturing sector. The improvement in the business climate within the industry had signalled a strengthening of activity. Industrial production growth reached 6.1% year-on-year in Q1, vs. 5.0% in Q4 2025, supported by a sharp rise in exports – particularly of electronic goods. This momentum contributed to a slight recovery in investment in Q1. Growth in services, meanwhile, slowed from 5.6% y/y in Q4 2025 to 5.0% in Q1 2026. The rebound in retail sales observed in January–February did not last, due in particular to the waning impact of government subsidy schemes. The consumer confidence index has been recovering slowly for several months, but remains very low
In March 2026, the inflationary impact of the surge in oil and gas prices remained moderate, both in absolute terms with an average inflation rate for the main emerging countries of 4.3% compared to 3.9% in February, and relative to 2022. The absence of contagion to agricultural and food prices is the main explanation. Manufacturers' opinion on input prices is, moreover, less degraded than in 2022. However, a catch-up should occur with the expected release of the rise in fertilizer and petroleum-derived input prices to all prices.
In Hungary, Péter Magyar’s pro-European centre-right party won a landslide victory in the general election held on 12 April. According to the latest official estimates, Tisza is reported to have secured a supermajority, which would give it significant room for manoeuvre to drive through institutional reforms. The new government will nevertheless face several challenges, including the release of European funds essential for revitalising the economy, and the consolidation of public finances. Meanwhile, the partnership with China in the field of electric mobility remains a priority.
The conflict in the Gulf has escalated in recent days, with an increase in strikes targeting oil and gas facilities (on both sides). The impact on energy prices has therefore intensified. A relatively rapid de-escalation of the conflict is unlikely, whilst there is a growing prospect of the conflict worsening along with its macroeconomic effects (higher inflation, lower growth). Central banks have taken note of this this week, but are waiting for greater clarity on how events will unfold before deciding how to respond. The markets, too, are taking a more cautious stance and anticipate that central bank will adopt more restrictive policies than previously expected for over the rest of the year. So do we.
For several years, Central Europe has been facing a marked demographic decline. Its magnitude varies from one country to another. The total population decline from 2004 to 2025 ranges from -0.3% in Slovakia to -17.2% in Bulgaria. The Czech Republic is the only country in the region to have seen a population increase over the same period. The working-age population (ages 15–64) is also declining. However, the situation is less unfavourable in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a more significant decline due to migration patterns. Net migration flows were negative for Bulgaria until 2019 and for Romania until 2021. However, this trend has reversed in recent years
As in 2022, the energy shock will affect emerging and developing economies. Today, as in the past, this shock is a negative-sum game between importing and exporting countries. Furthermore, although this is basically a supply shock, central banks in emerging economies may tighten their policies if they need to counter downward pressure on exchange rates, in order to prevent inflation from rising too sharply. However, compared to 2022, there are mitigating factors: 1/ the absence of a shock to agricultural commodity prices so far; 2/ AI, which is an external growth driver for Asian countries in particular; and 3/ the Fed is expected to adopt a more accommodative stance than in 2022 in response to the anticipated rise in inflation
This issue was completed on February 27, 2026 and does not take into account the repercussions of the military attacks that have since occurred in the Middle East. Emerging countries with strategic resources, such as critical metals and semiconductor production capacities, have become key players in the rise of artificial intelligence (AI). Those that are well positioned in AI supply chains have both a growth engine and a major geopolitical advantage. Asia's industrialised economies, which account for over 85% of the world's exports of electronic chips, are best placed to benefit from the increasing demand for AI. However, this advantage also exposes them to a potential correction in the technology boom
The conflict in Iran is already having a significant impact on energy prices, particularly oil and gas. Inflation should therefore rise in March. Beyond that, the outlook will depend on the evolution of the conflict, but the situation remains highly uncertain.Three types of scenarios are plausible:1) A return to the status quo ante on the hydrocarbon market after a few weeks;2) A prolonged period of political uncertainty in Iran leading to a relatively modest, but sustained, rise in oil and gas prices;3) Acute and sustained tensions over oil and gas supplies. The latter two scenarios would constitute a stagflationary shock, i.e. one that slows growth and increases inflation.Fortunately, growth was generally robust on the eve of the shock
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) depends largely on the availability of abundant and reliable electricity. The sector currently accounts for 4.5% of electricity demand in the United States, 2% in Europe and around 1% in Asia (including China), where the vast majority of data centres are located. In contrast, this figure is less than 0.5% in the rest of the world, but is set to increase in the coming years. To attract investment in the AI sector, emerging countries must therefore consider significantly increasing their electricity generation capacity and establishing networks capable of continuously powering data centres. Massive investments in infrastructure, along with the use of flexible energy sources (gas, renewables), are assets for attracting AI projects
Central Europe: Economic growth accelerated slightly to 2.3% for 2025 as a whole - Asia: In 2025, economic growth weathered the rise in US tariffs much better than expected - North Africa/Middle East: The economies of saw a rebound in growth in 2025 - Sub-Saharan Africa: The economic outlook for the region has been positively adjusted in recent months - Latin American: In 2025 these countries experienced slower growth
Key indicators for emerging countries: Real GDP, inflation, credit, public debt.
China's economic growth model is based on imbalances, characterised by sluggish domestic demand, excess production capacities, strong exports and the pursuit of self-sufficiency, which have implications for its trading partners. While the IMF has recently reiterated the urgent need to boost private consumption, Beijing continues to give the priority to industrial policy and maintains moderately accommodative fiscal and monetary policies. It places cutting-edge sectors, innovation, AI and technological autonomy at the heart of its development strategy. This strategy aims to foster productivity gains and economic growth, while also consolidating China's dominance in global industry and its commitment to "national security".
India’s economic growth is projected to be +7.6% for FY 2025/26, ranking among the highest in Asia. Monetary easing and VAT cuts have bolstered domestic demand. The medium-term outlook remains favourable. The reduction in US tariffs and the gradual rollout of new free trade agreements (FTAs)—including with the US, EU, UK and EFTA—should bolster exports. After decades of protectionism, India is opening up its economy to attract FDI, develop industry, and create high-quality jobs. The government acknowledges the risks that AI poses to employment in the IT services sector.
Malaysia’s economic growth continues to be robust and is projected to remain resilient over the next two years, underpinned by vigorous domestic demand and sustained global consumption of electronic goods. Unlike other ASEAN economies, however, Malaysia has derived little benefit from the decline in Chinese exports to the US market. Moreover, its imports of Chinese products have risen sharply, putting pressure on the manufacturing sector. Like its regional peers, Malaysia is actively expanding its trade and financial partnerships to diversify its exports and attract investment—critical steps to ascending the value chain in artificial intelligence (AI) components.
