The September FOMC meeting kick-started the Fed’s easing cycle with a significant 50bps cut in the Federal Funds Target Rate, leaving it at +4.75% - +5.0%. Unusually, this large step was taken even as the US economy remains strong, and explicitly with a view to keeping it so. Effectively, macroeconomic conditions having induced a shift in the Fed’s priorities towards the ‘maximum employment’ component of its dual mandate, while still not declaring mission accomplished on the inflation side
We expect September 17-18 FOMC Meeting to result in a 25bps decrease in the Federal Funds Target Rate to 5.0% - 5.25% - barring a huge surprise. This move will launch the beginning of an easing cycle for monetary policy. The combination of improved data and outlook for inflation and the ‘unmistakable’ softening of the labour market leads to a shift in the Fed’s priorities, paving the way for rate cuts. A few thoughts beyond the direction change:
While the date of the Fed's first rate cut is now foreseeable (it will be at the FOMC on 17-18 September), everything else remains uncertain: the size of the cut, as well as the overall extent of the easing cycle and the timing of the cuts. Developments on the US labour market are key in this calibration. In terms of inflation, significant progress has been made regarding the return to price stability on both sides of the Atlantic, but the battle is far from won. This calls for caution in the monetary easing that is beginning
Historical relationships between economic data play a key role in shaping expectations. In the US, the Sahm rule is such an important stylised fact: when the recent increase in the unemployment rate reaches a certain threshold, a recession tends to follow shortly or has even already begun. The jobs report published early August showed that this critical value had been reached, triggering a drop in investor sentiment. At the Jackson Hole conference, Jerome Powell explained that the Fed’s focus is shifting to the labour market and brought an unambiguous message that the rate cutting cycle is to start in September
Expectations in terms of growth for Q2 remain favourable: we expect it to be +0.6% q/q compared to +0.5% q/q for the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow. However, several elements suggest a more difficult Q3. The ISM surveys in June returned a negative signal: mixed for the manufacturing component, which deteriorated marginally, to 48.5 (-0.2 points), against a backdrop of falling production (48.5, -1.7 points), more marked for the non-manufacturing index, which fell to 48.8 (-5.0 points), against a backdrop of a correction in activity (49.6, -11.6 points), and a deterioration in new orders (47.3, -6.8 points). The NFIB (Small Business Optimism Index) again rose only slightly in June (91.5, +1
US growth has clearly moderated in the first half of the year and the latest data for the Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation metric (core personal consumption expenditures inflation) have been welcomed by the Fed and financial markets. The latter are now pricing in a high likelihood of a first rate cut in September. Faced with a still low but rising unemployment rate, the focus of the Federal Reserve is shifting. From exclusively looking at inflation, economic activity and employment also start to matter now, even more so considering the latest progress in terms of disinflation.
Having a good understanding of a central bank’s reaction function is important. It influences inflation and interest rate expectations, the level of bond yields, investor risk appetite and economic confidence in general. In the US, different types of information help to improve our understanding of the Federal Reserve’s reaction function: monetary policy rules -which play a prominent role in the material prepared by the Fed staff for the FOMC meetings-, the relationship between inflation, growth, unemployment and the federal funds rate in the Summary of Economic Projections of FOMC members as well as speeches and press conferences
Since a 1977 act, the dual mandate of the Federal Reserve (Fed) has de jure entrusted it with the objectives of maximum employment and price stability (the latter being expected to favour the former in the long term). However, these objectives can come into conflict and, as has been the case since March 2022, the Fed may have to give clear priority to reducing inflation at the risk of damaging employment and output. This refers to the concept of sacrifice ratio or trade-off, i.e. the expected cumulative deterioration of the latter to help bring inflation back to its target (2%).
US inflation seems to have resumed its downward trajectory in Q2 2024, after a Q1 of price acceleration that led the Federal Reserve (Fed) to revise, in June, its expectations for rate cuts for the year (from three to one, in line with our own forecasts). At the same time, economic activity remains strong, although it has lost some of its momentum.
The massive monetary tightening policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve, starting in March 2022, in order to combat soaring inflation, has driven up mortgage interest rates. This sharp uptick in rates has in turn led to a significant deterioration in demand metrics of the US residential real estate market (notably mortgage applications and existing home sales).Nevertheless, the buoyancy of the US economy at the aggregate level and the healthy financial situation of households have prevented the housing crisis from turning into a systemic crisis. The surge in mortgage rates has also affected the existing home supply, prompting a lock-in effect which has led to an unprecedented divergence between new and existing home sales, which was although insufficient to support the whole market.
The still-elevated level of inflation in annual change and its increasing momentum have continued to adversely affect morale in US households. In April, consumer confidence, as measured by the Conference Board, fell for the third month in a row (97.0, -6.1 pp), ultimately cancelling out the progress seen at the end of 2023. Similarly, the University of Michigan survey reported a drop in its Index of Consumer Sentiment in May, with a score of 69.1 (-10.5), the lowest since November.
Faced with a significant increase in official interest rates, companies have been surprisingly resilient. Can this last in an economy which is bound to slow given the ‘high policy rates for longer’ environment? The Federal Reserve’s latest Financial Stability Report gives some comfort based on a comparison of corporate bond yields and spreads to their historical distribution. Moreover, resilient earnings imply a robust debt-servicing capacity. Does this assessment hold in a stress test scenario? A recent analysis of the Federal Reserve concludes that the debt-servicing capacity of the U.S. public corporate sector as a whole is robust to sustained elevated interest rates, unless in case of a severe economic downturn
After being left reeling by the unexpected money market crisis during its first round of quantitative tightening (QT1), the Federal Reserve (Fed) intends to manage the reduction of its balance sheet better. This means destroying some of the reserves held by banks at the Fed without triggering a shortage in central bank money, given the liquidity requirements imposed on banks.
In the US, household deleveraging, fixed rate mortgages, rising financial income on the back of higher interest rates and dividends, in combination with an increase in net worth have contributed to the resilience of households in an environment of aggressive monetary tightening. Nevertheless, some caution is warranted. Aggregate data, by construction, do not shed light on the heterogeneity of households. The financially fragile categories will need to be monitored closely in an environment of high rates for longer, in view of possible spillover effects to the broader economy should their situation worsen significantly.
This week's FOMC meeting followed by the statement and press conference on 1 May 2024 are eagerly awaited considering the change in tone from the Fed in recent weeks, which has signaled that rate cuts will come later than expected.
In the first quarter, the median economic projections of the FOMC members maintain the scenario of three rate cuts for 2024. “Wait” is now the Federal Reserve’s watchword: wait for the data, wait for more data, wait for the full effects of tightening, and wait for evidence that inflation is definitely on the way to 2% to become more substantial. In this respect, the first quarter of 2024 was disappointing. On the other side of the balance of risks, economic activity is still buoyant and does not need the timetable to be accelerated. Thus, the event of a delayed and smaller decrease in the policy rate has gained credibility, and we are now forecasting two rate cuts in 2024, bringing the Fed Funds rate to 4.75-5.00% at the end of the year.
The Federal Reserve releases the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) following the last meeting of the quarter. These forecasts are closely scrutinized as they include the “dot plots”, i.e. the median trajectory of the medium-term policy rate by the members of the Committee. The Q4 2023 projections included three rate cuts (of 25 bps each) in 2024, for a rate target of 4.6% at year-end. At the same time, the Fed Chair, Jerome Powell, noted progress on the inflation front (CPI at +3.2% y/y in Q4 2023, v. +7.1% y/y a year earlier), but refused to declare victory.
The data dependent nature of monetary policy has intensified the mutual influence between economic data, financial markets and central banks. Inflation releases play a dominant role given that central banks pursue an inflation target. In the United States, when CPI numbers are published, the change in the financial futures contracts on the federal funds rate has the highest correlation with the monthly change in core inflation. Going forward, Fed watching will consist of monitoring the inflation surprises -the difference between the published number and the consensus forecast- as well as the ensuing market reaction
US economic activity slowed slightly in February, according to the ISM survey. It reported a deterioration in the business climate in the manufacturing sector, putting a halt to three months of increases, with the associated index standing at 47.8 (-1.3pp).
The US 2-10s yield curve has been inverted since mid-2022, with no clear signs of an impending recession in the US economy. Thanks to the current risk-on mood, this looks like a “false positive”, as it did in the mid-1990s.
Since June 2022, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has scaled back its balance sheet, by limiting the reinvestment of maturing debt in its securities portfolio. The scale of the effects of this quantitative tightening (QT2) will depend in particular on the nature of buyers of newly issued securities.
Canada has experienced sluggish economic growth in 2023, owing to rising prices and higher credit costs, which had a direct impact on the investment and consumption channels, despite the benefits of the country’s growing population. Furthermore, one cannot expect a significant improvement over the short run. Canadian households are amongst the most indebted in the world. Admittedly, their level of net wealth contributes to offset this fact, but it still implies an increased vulnerability against the backdrop of monetary tightening and a deteriorating labour market
The start of 2024 has seen an unexpectedly strong non-farm payrolls gain, hitting 353,000 in January (+30,000 m/m) – the highest figure seen for more than a year. In addition, this figure was coupled with a significant upward revision to the December data (330,000 jobs created, compared to the initial figure of 216,000). At the same time, the unemployment (+3.7%) and participation (+62.5%) rates remained stable.
‘Economic voting’ — the possible influence of the economic environment on voting behavior — has been the subject of intense debate over the past three decades. A key question in this respect is whether individual economic perceptions are influenced by the political affiliation of voters and if so, whether this influences spending. On both questions, the results of empirical research in the US are not conclusive. With respect to company investments, the conclusion is unambiguous: polarization exerts a negative influence. This last point is enough a reason to argue that the significant increase in political polarization in the US in recent decades matters from an economic perspective
The possibility of a US recession triggered by monetary tightening is looking less and less likely given the resilience of an economy that continued to grow by 0.8% q/q in Q4 2023 and by 2.5% on average over the year. Our central scenario is now that of a marked slowdown albeit without an economic recession in H1 2024. The Federal Reserve can now look forward to a soft landing and consider rate cuts in 2024 – a year in which political events will take centre stage.