Although artificial intelligence (AI) has been around for a long time, its widespread use in the world of work, particularly in the service sector, is a new phenomenon that raises many questions. Which sectors or professions will be affected? Which others will benefit? Will the expected productivity gains materialise? Observing trends in the United States, where it all began, already provides some answers.
Artificial intelligence is emerging as a major driver of US economic growth. More specifically, expectations of sustained productivity gains and strong future profits are fueling the expansion.
When Donald Trump ran and won in 2024 on a campaign to “make America Great Again” by building a tariff wall around the US, very few voices rose to defend free trade, outside of international organisations whose creed it is to defend it. After “Liberation Day”, economic forecasters braced themselves for a global trade war. But nothing of the sort happened. Instead, 2025 ended up being an all-time record year for trade liberalisation measures. 2026 is not even two-month-old and has already seen several giga-trade deals signed, two of which by India, one of the countries with the highest tariffs in the world, and there are more signs that the tide is turning
The US dollar fell again markedly in the second half of January, particularly against the euro. What does this depreciation, which began in early 2025 and follows a long period of appreciation, reflect? What are its effects on the European economy?
Optimism surrounding the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a key driver of economic growth in the United States. But this is not without its drawbacks: the energy-intensive nature of AI is putting pressure on the electricity markets and pushing prices higher – a trend that is set to continue in 2026. This poses a challenge not only for the competitiveness of American businesses but also, due to the resulting inflationary pressures, for households. It also creates a political problem for the Trump administration as the midterm elections draw near, where the issue of affordability will take centre stage
President Donald Trump has picked former governor Kevin Warsh to replace Jerome Powell as Fed Chair from mid-May. This decision has been perceived as reassuring by the financial markets. Nevertheless, his term could prove to harbour some surprises.
Kevin Warsh is set to succeed Jerome Powell as Federal Reserve Chair in May 2026, pending Senate confirmation. President Donald Trump has picked a figure whose public and private track record is likely to reassure the financial markets. While Warsh has advocated lower rates and a reduction in the central bank's balance sheet, he will probably be constrained in his plans. Therefore, we do not expect any material shift in monetary policy in the short term.
The FOMC decided to keep interest rates steady at 3.5% – 3.75% at its 27–28 January meeting, following three consecutive rate cuts at the end of 2025. Solid economic growth and easing concerns about employment prompted this decision, and we now expect the Fed Funds target range to remain stable throughout 2026, with no interference from the question of Chair Jerome Powell's replacement. As such, the Fed would join the ECB in maintaining the status quo. The Bank of Japan and the Bank of England would continue to be exceptions: the former by raising rates and the latter by continuing its gradual easing.
In the US, business sentiment improved significantly in services, but household sentiment worsened. The slowdown in job growth continues.
Today, we're looking at household consumption, which remains the main driver of growth in both the Eurozone and the United States. As we all know, household consumption suffered a major negative shock during the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 10 December, the US Federal Reserve surprised everyone by announcing that it would resume expanding its balance sheet on 12 December, just days after it had stopped reducing it. Although it came earlier and was more substantial than expected, the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet should not be viewed as a new phase of quantitative easing, or QE.
Private fixed investment in the United States is ‘K-shaped’. Investment in artificial intelligence has become a major driver of US growth, whereas non-AI adjacent components are contracting. However, AI investment is particularly import-intensive.
Growth in the United States is expected to come close to its potential pace in 2026. This resilience would mask “K-shaped growth”, supported by AI-optimism related investment and consumption by the wealthiest. Investment in other areas of the economy is not as dynamic, while most Americans face persistent inflation and a deteriorating labour market. At the end of Q1 2026, the Fed is expected to end its cycle of monetary easing, due to an emphasis on the employment component of its dual mandate. The fiscal impulse is expected to remain slightly negative in 2026 due to tariffs, with their scope still a key issue.
While the Fed eased its monetary policy on 10 December for the third consecutive FOMC meeting, without making any guarantees about future action, the Bank of England (BoE), the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are holding their respective meetings this week. The BoE is expected to cut its key interest rate, the ECB to keep it steady, and the BoJ to raise it. These decisions come amid resilient growth performance despite shocks, which should lead central banks to remain cautious, whether in terms of easing (a residual cut expected for the BoE and none for the ECB) or raising key rates (which should remain a gradual process in Japan). This climate of monetary policy neutrality could be accompanied by greater pressure on long-term sovereign rates than during the period of monetary easing.
The context surrounding the December 9-10 FOMC meeting (BNP Paribas scenario: -25bp), which marks the final meeting of 2025, serves as a prelude to the challenges that the Federal Reserve will face in 2026. The outlook for the dual mandate calls for differing responses, and uncertainty prevails, fuelled by divisions among FOMC members that stand in contrast to the institution's pro-consensus stance. In the coming year, a significant test awaits US monetary policy and its autonomy, particularly with the succession of Chair Jerome Powell. However, the potential for an abrupt shift in US monetary policy should not be overstated. The Fed's decisions are expected to continue to be driven by economic fundamentals
Since the pandemic, household consumption has evolved very differently between the Eurozone and the United States. In Europe, weak growth in real gross disposable income, moderating wealth effects, and rising real interest rates have dampened demand. In the United States, however, consumption has exceeded what fundamentals would suggest, buoyed by the housing wealth effect and fiscal stimulus. This divergence is likely to narrow, however, with the Eurozone gradually correcting its underperformance, albeit unevenly across countries, while the United States is expected to see an end to its outperformance, without falling into underperformance.
September's US employment figures reported the highest payroll growth since April (+119k). However, this fairly positive reading could prove short-lived due to the impact of the government shutdown. For the Fed, these developments add to the uncertainty surrounding its December meeting. We are still expecting a 25bp rate cut, which is now a close call.
The US primary deficit is expected to narrow in 2025 and stabilise at around 1.0–1.5% of GDP in the coming years thanks to higher customs revenues.
Responding to tangible signs of tension in the money markets, the Fed announced the end of its QT effective on December 1. In line with its operational framework, the Fed will maintain the size of its balance sheet for some time. Subsequently, to ensure its supply of reserves remains at a sufficiently “ample” level, it will increase it again. However, the Fed should be more cautious.
The Fed eased its monetary policy, with two expected announcements: the end of the central bank's balance sheet reduction process from 1st December; and a second straight cut (-25 bp) in the Fed Funds target, without unanimity, bringing it to +3.75% - +4.0%, due to downside risks in the labour market. We anticipate a further 25bp cut in December, driven by the Fed's bias towards employment and downward revisions to our inflation forecasts for the coming quarters. However, this easing cannot be taken for granted, as J. Powell insisted on keeping options open ahead of the upcoming meeting.
The unexpected element lies in the (highly likely) lack of surprises. The suspense surrounding the outcome of the FOMC meeting on 28-29 October and the ECB meeting on 30 October is, in reality, quite limited: a further 25 bp cut by the Fed and a continuation of the stance for the ECB are expected. In doing so, by narrowing the gap between policy rates and the extent of restriction in US monetary policy, the Fed's stance is aligning more closely with that of the ECB rather than moving away from it. Such a simultaneous lack of suspense for both central banks is uncommon, especially given the overall economic environment, which remains fraught with uncertainty.
The Treasury market is one of the pillars of the global financial system. This is due to its size and liquidity, its role in setting borrowing conditions, and the safety that these securities provide.However, the announcement of so-called 'reciprocal' tariffs last April caused turmoil in the market, reminding us that Treasuries had become more sensitive to periods of stress…
The non-manufacturing ISM fell markedly in September to 50.0. This result was due to a decline in business activity and new orders components. Manufacturing ISM improved to 49.1 in September, driven by output growth (51.0). However, new orders contracted (48.9), particularly those for export (43.0). The rise in prices paid slowed for the third consecutive month (61.9).
Beyond supply factors (see US Federal debt: the risks of abundance) and demand factors (see A safe haven put to the test), banking regulations have also contributed to weakening the Treasuries market. This is the subject of the third instalment of our EcoInsight series on Treasuries.Since 2023, the US authorities have taken various measures to support the liquidity and stability of the Treasuries market (greater transparency of transactions, increased use of centralised clearing of repurchase agreements, programme to buy back the least traded securities).However, the balance sheet constraints faced by the banks responsible for intermediating this market remain an aggravating factor in times of stress
Why might the Fed cut rates despite stubborn inflation? What card will the ECB play in the face of a fragile European recovery?
