In the coming months, a relaxation of the Basel leverage ratio (Supplementary Leverage Ratio, SLR) could be proposed in the United States. The aim is to ease the balance sheet constraints on primary dealers, most of which are subsidiaries of large banks, and thereby improve intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market.
Bad Signs For The Business Climate. The ISM manufacturing index fell for a fourth consecutive month in May, to 48.5 (-0.2pp). Trade tensions were reflected in the slowdown in supplier deliveries (56.1, +3.9pp inverted indicator) and the contraction in inventories (46.7, -4.1pp). Most notably, imports reached their lowest since 2009 (39.9, -7.2pp) and new export orders their lowest since spring 2020 (40.1, -3.0pp). The ISM non-manufacturing index contracted (49.9, -1.7pp) on the back of the fall in new orders (46,4, -5.9pp).
A Downbeat Business Climate. The ISM Manufacturing index has declined for 4 consecutive months, and reached 48.6 in April (-0.2pp). Production, employment and new orders were all in contraction territory. The price-paid index (69.8) stood at its highest since 2022. Meanwhile, the ISM Non-Manufacturing index remained positive but slowed (50.8 in March vs. 54.1 in December 2024).
Since WWII ended, 80 years ago this week, the US dollar has been the unparalleled dominant currency at the center of the international monetary and financial system. Every now and then, questions have arisen about this dominance and for brief periods became front page material in the financial press. Despite the excitement invariably elicited, the answer was always, sit tight, nothing is going to change. This time feels different. In particular, financial markets’ reaction to the “Liberation Day” tariff announcements, whereby the dollar and US Treasuries sold off instead of being bought as the safe haven of last resort like in all previous crises. But it would be premature to call the end of dollar dominance.
Every Spring and Fall, economic and financial policymakers from the whole world gather in Washington DC for the IMF/WB Meetings. Thousands of private financial sector professionals tag along. All over town, in both formal and informal settings, participants share and compare with their peers their own assessments of the world’s economic prospects. In my 25 years of taking part in these Meetings, this was one of the most interesting ones, with a pervasive sense among participants of living through a pivotal moment of economic history. In what follows, I offer a distillation of what this global pulse-check revealed.
The tariff offensive led by Donald Trump since his return to the White House has quickly shifted into a face-off with China. Following a cycle of announcements and retaliation, the extra-tariffs applied by the United States to China amount to 145%, compared to 125% in the opposite direction. The shock is of unprecedented magnitude, and the two superpowers are engaged in a negative-sum game.
Since June 2022, the U.S. Federal Reserve has largely reduced its holdings of U.S. Treasury debt as part of its quantitative tightening program, or QT, after having massively expanded them between March 2020 and May 2022, as part of its quantitative easing program, or QE.
After the outperformance of 2023-2024, US growth is expected to slow sharply under the impact of the uncertainty and tariff shocks triggered by the new administration. Recession concerns are returning into the spotlight.
By accelerating the fall in oil prices, the timing between OPEC+'s decision to accelerate quota easing, and the Trump administration’s announcement of the start of a tariff war could limit inflationary pressures for US consumers and put pressure on the cartel's undisciplined members. However, the convergence of interests between the heavyweights of the oil market is likely to be short-lived. This policy is likely to make the economic equation increasingly difficult for US producers. At the same time, by putting pressure on public finances, it poses a risk to the cohesion of the cartel.
Last week, the Trump administration announced tariffs against the entire world which, added to those of previous weeks, will raise the average external tariff of the United States to 22%, compared with 2.5% at the end of 2024. Financial markets have reacted extremely badly, and suggest even more serious fears for US growth than for global growth. Many unknowns remain, but this scenario is the most plausible. For the United States' trading partners, it would be better to resist the temptation to escalate and instead to double down on strengthening the engines of domestic growth. Europe is particularly well placed to do this.
The tug of war between the United States and the European Union has begun. On March 12, the US administration raised tariffs on imports of aluminum and steel by 25%. In response, the EU has announced that it will reinstate, in mid-April, tariffs introduced during Donald Trump's first term, suspended since 2020
In recent weeks, with the erratic announcements and implementation of the first Trumponomics 2.0 measures, a less favorable wind has been blowing across the US economy, whether it be Main Street or Wall Street. Between rising fears about inflation and growth, how long can the Fed extend the status quo on its policy rates?
President Donald Trump has promised to bring manufacturing jobs back to the USA and make America again “the manufacturing superpower of the world that it once was”. This, of course, is the foremost objective of his radical tariff policy (alongside raising revenue and pressuring trading partners to deliver non-trade-related concessions). In his analysis, the US persistent trade deficit is evidence that the rest of the world is “ripping off” the US, through unfair trade barriers and overly weak exchange rates. As a result, the argument goes, the US industrial base is being hollowed out, undermining the living standards of Americans.
After being left reeling by the unexpected money-market crisis during its first round of quantitative tightening (QT1), the US Federal Reserve (Fed) intends to manage the second (QT2) with the utmost caution. This means reducing its securities portfolio without creating a shortage in central bank money, in view of the liquidity requirements imposed on banks under the Basel 3 framework. As it is unable to estimate the optimum amount of central bank reserves needed to ensure that its monetary policy is properly implemented, the Fed aims to reduce the stock of reserves to a sufficiently "ample" level.If QT2 is ended too early, it would have to activate its liquidity draining tools in order to limit the downwards pressure on short-term market rates
The FOMC kept the target range for the Fed Funds rate at 4.25% - 4.5% at the 18-19 March meeting, as widely expected. Jerome Powell and the committee have started to price in downward risks to economic activity and upward risks to inflation. In the short term, the stability of the dot plots, the downplaying of the long-term tariff related risks and the consistent message of patience are aimed, implicitly, at providing stability in the midst of the current turmoil. In our scenario, the FOMC is expected to cut the rates quite sharply in 2026.
In a 1933 article on national self-sufficiency, British economist John Maynard Keynes advised “those who seek to disembarrass a country from its entanglements” to be “very slow and wary” and illustrated his point with the following image: “It should not be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction”. Nearly a century later, what are the precepts of the author of the General Theory worth?
They say the Davos consensus is always wrong, but it usually takes longer than a couple of months to be apparent. Not so in 2025.
Concerns are mounting over US growth. Fears of a rebound in inflation and the shock of political uncertainty are weighing on households and businesses. Initial hard data for Q1 are adding to fears of an ongoing deterioration. And at this stage it is unlikely that the Fed will come to the rescue of the economy. Here is a quick overview of the warning signals sent out by the US economy.
Household sentiment deteriorated in February according to the Conference Board (98.3, -7.0 pts) and even more in March according to the University of Michigan (57.9, -6.8 pts), dragged down by worsening expectations. According to the University of Michigan survey, the jump in 1-year inflation expectations (+4.1%, +1.0 pp) was accompanied by a 30-year record for 5-year expectations (+3.5%, +0.3 pp).
Inflation is no longer the No. 1 economic problem that it has been for the past three years, but it remains a major challenge. While it has not reached its 2% target yet, and the last pockets are slowly deflating, new inflationary pressures are mounting. At this stage, those pressures are limited but not negligible and new inflationary risks, linked to the economic and geopolitical context, are taking shape. The Fed's task is becoming more complicated by the risk of a US stagflation, and the ECB's one happens to be slightly trickier when balancing between downside and upside risks on growth.
To reduce the United States' bilateral trade deficits, a subject already raised in a previous Chart of the week, the Trump administration has broadened its angle of attack, by attacking the differences in customs duties between the country and its trading partners. The introduction of reciprocal tariffs, still under study, would be specified at the beginning of April.
In France, we could think that the increase of public debt is a general consequence of the Covid-19 crisis. However, the chart we are commenting here shows that it is not.
Who's next? As soon as he became the 47th President of the United States, Donald J. Trump drew the weapon of tariffs, “the most beautiful word in the dictionary”, as he put it. Mexico, Canada and China were the first to be hit, while the European Union (EU) was explicitly targeted.
While the Fed lowered its target rate by 100 bps from 18 September 2024, bond yields rose by around 80 bps (as at 7/2/2025). This rare divergence is reminiscent of an inverse version of the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ (2004–2005): during this episode, which spread to Europe, the rise in short-term rates had little effect on long-term rates. What are the reasons for these contrary movements between short- and long-term rates, and what might the implications be?
The US economy ended 2024 with its real GDP growing +0.6% q/q in Q4, a solid figure, though slightly down on the previous quarter (-0.2 pp). Household consumption (+1.0% q/q, +0.1 pp) was once again the main growth driver. The government also contributed positively, in contrast to private fixed investment (-0.1% q/q), despite the growth in residential investment and intellectual property products.
