US Treasury yields have increased significantly since the end of July and this movement has accelerated in the past three weeks. It seems that the increase in the term premium has been a key driver although there is ambiguity about the underlying causes. There is no ambiguity however on the economic consequences: they are negative. A key channel of transmission is the housing market. Credit demand in general should suffer and another factor to monitor is the equity market considering that the earnings yield of the S&P500 is now lower than 10-year Treasury yields. All these factors represent a headwind to growth and may convince the FOMC that an additional rate hike before the end of the year is not warranted
In the world of central banking, nothing is what it seems. The ECB’s recent rate hike was considered dovish whereas the pause by the Federal Reserve received the label hawkish. These reactions show that, beyond the rate decision, the accompanying message also matters. That of the ECB was interpreted as signaling that the terminal rate had been reached. In the US, the latest rate projections of the FOMC members -the dot plot- point toward another hike before year end and a federal funds rate that would stay elevated for longer. This is unsurprising given the resilience of the US economy in reaction to the aggressive monetary tightening and the concern that bringing inflation back to the 2% target would take more time
The United States has observed an improvement in the business climate in August, which should postpone the risk of recession for a few more months. The ISM Manufacturing rose by 1.2 pp and reached 47.6. However, the index has been well in contraction territory since November 2022, the longest period since the GFC.
Jerome Powell’s opening remarks at the US Federal Reserve Symposium in Jackson Hole were at the center of attention and focused on the short term and inflation. What is the main takeaway? The fight against inflation is not yet over – a message echoed and supported by Christine Lagarde in her own address.
Although in May, the business climate might well have suggested a future recession, in June, things looked less clear. Admittedly, the further drop in the manufacturing ISM, to 46 in June, brought it to its lowest level since the 2008 crisis (excluding the Covid period). However, the message conveyed by the non-manufacturing ISM was noticeably different, with a rebound to 53.9 in June, compared to 50.3 in May.
On average, over the past year, US money market funds (MMFs) have “deposited” almost USD 2,200bn in cash with the Federal Reserve (Fed) every day in exchange for the overnight reverse repurchase of Treasury securities held on the Fed’s balance sheet (Overnight Reverse Repo Facility, ON RRP). In recent months, these “deposits” have fallen sharply. On 17 July, they stood at «only» USD 1,730 bn.
The US economy continues to grow and create jobs, albeit at a gradually slower pace, and the Federal Reserve has not quite finished with rate hikes. We continue to anticipate a recession, from Q3 2023 until Q1 2024, under the effect of monetary tightening. Having opted for the status quo in June on the back of inflation continuing to fall and in order to take time to assess the effects of the monetary tightening implemented to date, the Fed is expected to make a final 25 bps increase in July, bringing the Fed funds range to 5.25-5.50%.
The interest rate projections (‘dots’) of the FOMC members represent a reference point that can help investors and economic agents in general in forming their own interest rate expectations This can be particularly welcome when the monetary environment is changing swiftly like has been the case over the past two years. To explore this, a comparison has been made between the federal funds rate projections of the Survey of Market Participants (SMP) and those of the FOMC members. It seems that the dots may play a role in anchoring long-term interest rate expectations. The private sector forecasts closely follow the dots for 2023 and to a lesser extent for 2024, beyond which they are essentially stable. This is important considering that it might influence the pricing of bonds
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's GDPNow estimate, US growth stands at +0.5% q/q in Q2 2023, a figure slightly higher than our forecast (+0.4% q/q) and slightly better than Q1 (+0.3% q/q). As Q1 growth was largely driven downwards by the negative contribution of inventories (-0.5 pp), we can expect a more favourable development in Q2. Although a further decline in residential investment is hardly in doubt (it would be the 9th in a row), the resistance of household consumption and non residential investment will be closely scrutinised.
With the return of elevated inflation, the debate on the output cost of bringing down inflation that was very lively in the early 80s has made a comeback. This debate is centered around the sacrifice ratio -the loss in output compared to its trend level for a given decline in inflation- and whether the landing of the economy will be hard or soft. Recently, the semantics have evolved and commentators now speak of the possibility of immaculate disinflation, whereby inflation is brought back to target by the Fed through a restrictive monetary policy but with a very small cost in terms of unemployment. For this to happen, labour tensions should ease and lead to a drop in wage growth. This will take time. In addition, the US economy should do a better job in filling vacancies
According to the latest data, inflation in both the euro area and the US is mainly driven by its core component and thus, at first glance, by demand. Supply factors are also at work through the spillover effects of the shock on energy and commodity prices and food inflation. These first-round effects show first signs of fading, which should pull inflation down more sharply in the coming months. Wage dynamics are closely monitored given their inflationary nature, which is modest but persistent, justifying the monetary response.
In the first quarter of 2023, US growth was +0.3% q/q. This is well below expectations: the figure is half the GDPNow estimate of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and our forecast (0.6%). Growth appears then not to be so impervious to the inflationary shock and the monetary tightening implemented to cope with it.
In his latest press conference, Federal Reserve Chair Powell argued that monetary policy might already be sufficiently restrictive. In future decisions, economic data will be particularly important but this does not imply that the latest data are the only thing that matters. The delayed effects of past rate hikes need to be taken into account, considering that they will only show up in the data published over the following months. This is why in past tightening cycles, the Fed has tended to stop hiking rates although the pace of job creation was still rather healthy and well before the unemployment rate picked up significantly
In March 2023, the M2 measure of money supply contracted for the fifth consecutive month in the United States (-4.5% over one year).
According to the Atlanta Federal Reserve's latest GDPNow estimate for Q1 2023, US growth has remained high (2.5% on an annualised quarterly basis). The pace is almost identical to that of Q4 2022 (2.6%), as if growth was impervious to the inflationary shock and the significant monetary tightening.
After last year’s significant depreciation versus the dollar, the euro has found a new strength. Key factors are the reversal in the current account balance, which after moving into negative territory last year is back into surplus, and, since the autumn of 2022, the narrowing of the 1-year interest rate differential with the US.This reflects the view that the Federal Reserve is approaching the end of its tightening cycle whereas the ECB still has more work to do. We expect that this factor will continue to drive the exchange rate in the coming months. Moreover, there is also a higher likelihood that the Federal Reserve will cut rates before the ECB does
According to the latest indicators, the US labour market continues to progressively slow down. The pace of both job creation and wage growth remains high. The unemployment rate has fallen slightly, whilst the participation rate has increased. Hiring difficulties remain acute, according to the falling but still very high ratio of unfilled job vacancy per unemployed person. The picture painted by confidence surveys is mixed. The gradual nature of the labour market’s slowdown allows the Fed to continue its monetary policy tightening. A further – and probably final – 25bp increase in Fed Funds rates is expected in May.
According to the Atlanta Fed GDPNow Estimate, US growth will remain high in Q1 2023 (annualised quarterly growth rate of 3.2%). News on the labour market front also remains good. Everything would be fine if inflation were not also continuing at a sustained pace, resulting in continuation of the Fed’s rate hikes, the effects of which recently challenged certain banking models. Prior to this, we were expecting the tightening of credit access conditions to lead the economy into recession. Further tightening would weigh even more heavily on activity and ultimately, on inflation. Does this mean to the extent that the Fed will reach its terminal rate faster? This is possible, but the outlook remains very uncertain. Our forecasts for 7 March point to Fed Funds reaching 5
In February, the evolution of business climate survey data was positive. On the other hand, consumer confidence surveys have moved in opposite direction:
The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey sheds light on how changes in monetary policy influence banks’ credit standards and expected loan demand. Based on the historical relationships, the latest survey points towards a high likelihood of average negative growth of the volume of company and household investments over the next several quarters. Moreover, recent research shows that since 2009, the maximum impact of monetary policy on inflation may be reached more quickly. Based on the relationship between credit standards, expected credit demand and investments by companies and households, as well as on the possibility that transmission lags have shortened, decisions by the Federal Reserve will more than ever be data-dependent.
Signs from the ISM business climate surveys were contrasting in January, with a further decline in the manufacturing sector index, going deeper into the contraction zone at 47.4, while the non-manufacturing sector made a strong rebound to 55.2, cancelling out almost its entire December fall.
In the US, it seems that the expansion phase of the business cycle, the period of elevated inflation, the monetary tightening cycle and the ‘risk-on’ mindset in markets are all far from over. Ongoing relatively strong growth increases the risk that inflation would stop declining. Market commentators have started referring to such an outcome as the ‘no landing’ scenario. However, judging by the latest data, a ‘delayed landing’ seems the more likely one. Markets now expect a higher terminal rate whereby the policy easing would come later as well. The higher the terminal rate, the bigger the likelihood that the landing would be bumpy after all.
While goods disinflation is expected to increase, or even turn into deflation in the coming months, services inflation is expected to show more inertia (due in particular to the shelter component), slowing the overall decline in inflation.
In the US, the ratio between the job openings rate and the unemployment rate remains very elevated. It is one sign amongst many of a very tight labour market. As growth slows down, this ratio should decline. Historically, this has been accompanied by slower wage growth. It can be argued that this time, this process may take more time due to labour hoarding, which should limit the increase in layoffs and hence the unemployment rate, and the high level of the vacancy rate, which should underpin the creation of new jobs. This means that there is a genuine risk of disinflation to be slow.
While the US labour market has been very tight since the 2021 economic recovery, first signs of a slowdown are emerging. The extent of this slowdown will be key to ensuring the expected disinflation and the gradual return to price stability.
