In the USA, as elsewhere, the paralysis of activity caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has affected the production of statistics, which have become harder to interpret. The rebound in hourly wages in April indicated by the “pulse” is a false signal and should be treated with caution: it can be explained by the collapse in hours worked, against which wages always show a certain inertia. Not only is the information gathered from companies incomplete, but there may well have been a lag between the shutdown of businesses and the stopping of wages [...]
Pressure on dollar liquidity created an urgent need for action from the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). Assuming its role as the global lender of last resort - the consequence of its position as the issuer of the international trade and reserve currency - the Fed reactivated the permanent or temporary swap agreements that it established with 14 other central banks in 2008. In order to extend the reach of its dollar supply, the Fed has also created a repo facility for the central banks of countries that do not have dollar swap agreements. The high fees charged, however, will limit take-up, depriving the markets of what could be a significant calming influence.
The measures taken by the US Federal Reserve (Fed) since 15 March have already had a major impact on the balance sheets of commercial banks resident in the United States*. Their reserves held at the Central Bank have considerably increased following their role as intermediaries for the Fed’s securities purchases, emergency loans and liquidity swaps. As in 2008-2014, the Fed’s quantitative easing policy has also created a disconnect between growth in loans and growth in deposits on banks’ balance sheets. Since most of the Fed’s securities purchases have been from non-bank agents, customer deposits have grown more quickly than loans
Americans and the US economy, like many other countries, will pay a heavy price for the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the virus seemed to be slowing for a moment, it was spreading rapidly again as we went to press, with more than 30,000 new cases reported daily. The economy is beginning to show signs of slumping...
The American people and the US economy will no longer be spared the coronavirus pandemic, no more than any other country. Arriving belatedly on US soil and long belittled by President Trump, the virus is now spreading rampantly, to the point that WHO is now preparing to declare the United States the pandemic’s new epicentre. With its federal structure, the US has taken a scattered approach, leaving each state to decide whether or not to introduce lockdown measures. Although the White House has closed the country’s borders (to the European Union and Canada, among others), it was reluctant to restrict domestic movements of goods and people. Foreseeing recession, the markets have plunged and the central bank has launched a veritable monetary “Marshall Plan”.
In the end, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) did not wait for the next corporation tax payment deadline in April before intervening in the money market. In an attempt to stave off the risk of pressures on the market as a result of the coronavirus outbreak, it increased the scale of its repo transactions on Monday 9 March. At the end of last week, demand for cash from primary dealers far outstripped what the Fed was offering. Although the Fed has injected nearly USD 480 billion in additional central bank money since mid-September, the liquidity position (immediately available cash) at major US banks has not improved. On the one hand, bank reserves with the Fed have increased by only USD 280 billion, due to the growth in the Treasury’s general account
As part of the Federal Reserve’s strategy review, the introduction of a target range for inflation is being discussed. Such a range could provide flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy. It could also take into account past shortfalls in inflation. Introducing a range when inflation is below target runs the risk of being perceived as not being bothered by the inflation shortfall. This would call for an asymmetric range but this increases the risk of market turbulence when a tightening cycle starts.
According to its first estimate, Q4 19 US growth reached 2.1% q/q (saar), matching expectations. No bad news is good news. The fact that the growth rate is keeping pace with the two previous quarters (it has notably been its average pace since the start of the cycle mid-2009) can also be seen positively. Growth remains moderate however and its breakdown paints a mixed picture. In fact, the very positive contribution of net exports saves the day. But this positive contribution results from a negative evolution: the plunge in imports, also to be weighed against the very negative contribution of change in private inventories. On the personal consumption expenditures side, the significant deceleration was expected after two quarters of very strong growth
The dichotomy between economic and market trends has widened, in a context of accommodating monetary policy and rising corporate debt. Risks taken by institutional investors (pension and investment funds, life assurance companies) have increased, as has the vulnerability to any adverse shocks or changes in expectations. 2020 – an election year – is unlikely to bring calm. Welcome as it is, the truce in the trade war with China takes in the bulk of existing tariff increases, without producing any fundamental changes in the position of the US administration and its limited appetite for multilateralism.
In the last three months, the US Federal Reserve has injected more than USD 360 bn of central bank money through repurchase agreement operations (repo) and outright purchases of T-bills. It will ramp up its intervention further between now and 31 December, to remove the risk of losing control of short-term rates again because of the specific needs of market participants as they approach their financial year-end. By the year-end, if the volume of demand for repo transactions reaches the total amount offered by the Fed, USD 650 bn of central bank money will have been injected. However, even that huge amount of support could prove insufficient
The latest data on unemployment and job creation have surprised on the upside. They continue to be better than the long-term average. This strong labour market supports household confidence, which remains well above the long-term average, and retail sales, which did slightly better than expected. However, several numbers have come in below expectations and are below historical averages. This points towards a slowing economy, despite the satisfactory GDP data for the third quarter. Noteworthy in this respect are the two ISM indices. In addition, like in numerous other countries, industrial production is under pressure.
The 2014 reform of US money market funds led to a massive reallocation of cash from funds invested in private debt (prime funds) to funds invested in public debt (government funds)*. Foreign banks, traditional borrowers of prime funds, were deprived access to US dollars, while the US Treasury, federal agencies and American banks attracted fund inflows**. With the improvement in average returns over the past two years, the savings collected by government funds and prime funds have both increased sharply, up USD 450 bn and USD 430 bn, respectively
In recent weeks, equity markets performed well. Focussing on the US, it is hard to argue that this reflects an improvement in the earnings outlook or a perspective of more rate cuts than hitherto expected. This would imply that a decline in the required risk premium was the key driver. US treasury yields also increased significantly, which probably reflects to a large degree an increase in the term premium. The decline in the equity risk premium and the increase in the bond term premium were driven by a common factor, namely a reduction in economic tail risk on the back of progress in the trade negotiations between the US and China and a stabilisation of certain survey data
On 10 October 2019, US banking regulators increased the application thresholds for the capital and liquidity requirements imposed on large banks. Whilst the new rules do not change the prudential requirements for the eight biggest banking groups, they do reduce the burden for large regional banks. The number of banks subject to the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement will be reduced and the definition of core equity relaxed to some degree. In general terms, the rules as finalised over the past two months will significantly narrow the scope of application of Basel 3 in the USA. Given concern over lending trends in certain segments and the continued economic slowdown in the US, this relaxation of regulations catches attention.
Do fluctuations in uncertainty have a symmetric or asymmetric effect on the economy? The question is important considering that since last year, uncertainty has been acting as a headwind to global growth. Moreover, recent news about the US-China trade negotiations and Brexit have raised hope that uncertainty may have peaked and that growth in activity could accelerate. Empirical research shows that an increase in uncertainty has a bigger effect on the economy than a decline, in particular in a subdued growth environment. This would suggest that, should the decline in uncertainty be confirmed, the pick-up in growth would be very gradual.
Concerned about reducing pressure in the money markets, the Federal Reserve (Fed) will proceed with outright securities purchases in addition to its repurchase agreement operations (repo). At the end of the year, between USD 365 bn and 400 bn* in central bank money could thus be injected into the current accounts of banks. Given the current amount of the outstanding liquidity lent, the upward trend in currency in circulation and the foreseeable rebuilding of the Treasury account with the Fed, the banks’ reserves with the central bank are unlikely to increase by more than USD 130 bn by the end of the year (to a total of nearly USD 1600 bn, the April 2019 level)
The contraction in world trade, exacerbated by President Trump’s tariff offensive against China, has begun to spread to the United States. The economic slowdown, which can also be attributed to domestic factors, has prolonged throughout the summer of 2019, and business surveys do not suggest any improvements in the months ahead. Corporate investment will remain downbeat, while household consumption, which has been resilient so far, should begin to falter. In the face of this environment, the Federal Reserve -- which no longer provides forward guidance on upcoming policy moves – is bound to lower its key rates again.
On 16 and 17 September, US money markets seized up. Excess demand for cash pushed overnight rates sharply higher. The Fed had to step in as a matter of urgency to re-establish control over short-term rates by injecting central bank money through repurchase agreement operations (repo). This lack of liquidity is not a new phenomenon. It is true that the situation was exacerbated by an irksome combination of factors. But there have been clear signs of a shortage of liquidity for more than a year now. The underlying issue is the regulatory liquidity requirements imposed on banks. The rebuilding of the Treasury current account with the Fed, against a background of insufficient reserves at the central bank, threatens further pressure
The manufacturing purchasing managers’ index of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) has continued its decline in September, reaching 47.8%. The non-manufacturing ISM has registered a big drop of 3.8 percentage points and is now at 52.6% — a very low print for a non-recessionary period. Against this background, bond yields have declined significantly reflecting increasing worries about recession risk, rising expectations about additional Fed easing and a greater flight to safe havens. The labour market data for September however brought some relief. Nevertheless, we expect the Fed to continue to cut rates.
Although August industrial production and retail sales beat expectations, key data with respect to September have sent conflicting signals. Both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing ISM came in below expectations, creating a lot of nervousness in the run-up to the release of the all-important labour market data. They brought relief with 136.000 jobs having been added in September (versus a Bloomberg consensus of 145.000) and, in particular, an unemployment rate of 3.5%, which is well below the consensus of 3.7%...
Asset prices can play a useful role when assessing the economic outlook. The big drop in treasury yields during August has raised concern although a nowcast points to satisfactory third quarter growth in the US. This would mean that increased uncertainty about the trade dispute has caused a flight to safe havens and a decline in long term interest rates. Swings in the communication about the trade dispute cause swings in investor uncertainty and hence in risk premiums. This reduces the signal quality of asset prices, which may end up weighing on the real economy.
According to the recently released Beige Book of the Federal Reserve, the United States should continue to see modest growth. Most indicators are above their long-term average, the manufacturing ISM and industrial production being exceptions.
Although household consumption remained rather buoyant at springtime, foreign trade as well as investment may have weakened. In June, the business survey results were lacklustre, while the Federal Reserve opened the door to cutting interest rates. Already back on the campaign trail, President Trump is unlikely to soften his hard line on tariffs, although he will surely remain as unpredictable as ever. The economy is likely going to need some support.
Since October 2017, the Federal Reserve (Fed) has no longer been rolling over all of the debt maturing in its securities portfolio. In other words, it is proceeding with net asset sales (tapering). By 26 June, its holdings of US Treasuries had declined by USD 355 billion while Agency debt securities and Agency mortgage backed securities were down by USD 249 billion. The shrinking of the Fed’s balance sheet has had a notable impact on money market rates due to the pressure it is placing on central bank liquidity. Pressures have picked up since last fall, when declining yields reduced investors’ appetite for Treasuries. As a result, there has been a big increase in the net position of primary dealers in Treasuries: inventory increased by USD 140 billion between October 2018 and June 2019
In the United States, the tide hasn’t turned yet for consumers: on the positive side, our barometer points to low unemployment, strong consumer confidence and dynamic household revenues and spending. Inflation is also mild, which boosts purchasing power. Even so, the horizon is not all rosy. Positioned in the forefront of the economic cycle, industrial leaders report a decline in output, which was one of the barometer’s weakest scores in April, and their expectations did not pick up in May.