The global race for artificial intelligence and the electrification of economies is leading to an increase in demand for metals. A recent study by S&P Global indicates that global electricity consumption is projected to grow by nearly 50% by 2040, fuelling a sustained rise in demand for copper, lithium, nickel, and other critical minerals. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for copper could rise by 30 to 40% by 2040, while demand for lithium could increase four- to sixfold, depending on the pace of adoption of low-carbon technologies.
In Colombia, the right-wing populist candidate Abelardo de la Espriella won the second round of the presidential election on Sunday, 21 June, which achieved a record voter turnout of 63.4%. Preliminary estimates indicate that he secured 49.7% of the votes, narrowly surpassing left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who garnered 48.7% and represented a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Gustavo Petro (2022-2026). This election marks a significant shift to the right for the country, following the lead of Argentina and Chile, now governed by President Javier Milei (since December 2023) and President Antonio Kast (since March 2026), respectively
Advanced economies proved resilient in 2025 despite a tariff shock that disrupted global trade. By early 2026, they were on track for faster growth and lower inflation. A fresh shock linked to the war in the Middle East, however, is reigniting inflation while slowing growth. This mix primarily reflects the impact of a likely decline in purchasing power on consumer spending. However, many of the factors that underpinned 2025 growth — AI development, higher defense spending (especially in Europe), and continued trade growth — are set to persist in 2026. They would be reinforced by an acceleration of electrification, against a backdrop of rising oil prices and an AI-driven rise in electricity demand.
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Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the war in Iran and the resulting surge in oil and gas prices lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that seen in 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those for the war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy shock? Although there are similarities, there are many uncertainties.
The assessment of the available data for April is more negative than in March. Inflation rose by 1.1 percentage points in two months, an increase that is however still solely driven by the "energy" component. Excluding energy as well as excluding “energy and food," inflation recorded a new slight decline in April. However inflationary pressures are mounting, through rising input prices and — new development in April — the beginning of an increase in output prices according to PMIs surveys.
The growing loss of barrels available on the market due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, repeated attacks on production capacity in the Gulf, and restrictions on traffic through the Strait increase the risk of a physical oil shortage in the short term. This has led to a sharp reaction in the prices of physical barrels (dated Brent). In recent weeks, better pricing of this risk of shortage has caused the prices of futures (Brent) to converge with that of the physical barrel (dated Brent). Furthermore, the sharp rise in oil exports from the United States and, to a lesser extent, the decline in Chinese imports have eased tensions in the physical market and pushed prices lower.
The energy shock is beginning to feed through into French inflation. In March and April, inflation was limited to refining activities and fuel prices. It is expected to affect more sectors in the second quarter, according to the European Commission’s survey on three-month selling price expectations. In France, the pass-through is expected to mainly affect intermediate goods in Q2. However, inflationary pressures on consumer goods and services or construction are expected to remain quite moderate. These factors are consistent with our scenario of a limited acceleration in French inflation and a moderate impact of the energy shock on growth.
French growth was lower than expected in the first quarter, at 0% QoQ, mainly hampered by exceptional factors, mostly aeronautics deliveries and public investment. These factors explain why this figure is significantly lower than our nowcast and that of the Banque de France, which estimated that growth had reached 0.3% in Q1, based on production indicators in industry and services. This lead taken by production is reflected in a strongly positive contribution from changes in inventories (+0.8 percentage points), driven mainly by transport equipment.
The war in the Middle East has caused prices of several commodities to rise, in particular oil which has neared historic highs. Although conflict’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, weaker supply and demand constraints compared to 2022 should limit the upward pressure on inflation. Household consumption and sectors least able to pass on rising production costs to sales prices (primarily consumer goods) are likely to be hit hardest. The ultimate effect on GDP growth will depend on the duration and severity of the damage. According to our baseline scenario, a recession should be avoided. However, if the conflict were to escalate to the point of causing shortages (of fuel or inputs), its impact on growth and inflation could lead to such a recessionary outcome
Following a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.
Solid growth in Q1 2026. According to our nowcast, growth is expected to strengthen in the Eurozone (+0.4% q/q, after +0.2% in Q4) and in France (+0.3% q/q, after +0.2% in Q4), driven by a positive momentum despite the energy shock that began in March. In the United States, the rebound suggested by the GDP Now (+0.3% q/q, after +0.1% in Q4) is underestimated. This is because this indicator does not take into account the favourable post-shutdown effect (which our forecast of 0.9% q/q, non-annualised, does). In the other major Eurozone economies, growth is expected to have remained broadly stable: in Germany and Italy, the pace is expected to remain close to Q4 2025 levels (+0.3% q/q), thanks to public demand (investment and consumption)
Will a different situation lead to different outcomes? In other words, will the combination of weaker demand and more moderate supply constraints in 2026, as compared to 2022, help to limit the rise in inflation? Having illustrated the impact of the energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East on six key variables in the Eurozone in our previous Chart of the Week, we now move on to a new comparison between these two dates, this time focusing on the relative levels of supply and demand issues. In the Eurozone, weaker demand has resulted in a more pronounced decline in inflation, unlike in the United States, where both demand and inflation have remained more sustained
The war in the Middle East has caused significant disruptions in the market for refined petroleum products, affecting not only Asia but also Europe. For the time being, the situation in Europe remains under control, largely thanks to stock levels that provide visibility for around one month. Nevertheless, Europe’s dual reliance on suppliers in the Gulf and Asia calls for caution. Supply status in the European market will be influenced by geopolitical developments in the Gulf and whether Asian producers choose to prioritise supplying their domestic markets.
According to the ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS), some banks in the Eurozone may tighten their credit standards for households more significantly in 2026 than in 2025. The reason for this is the more constraining calculation of regulatory capital requirements. In contrast, the tightening would be less severe for corporations. This desynchronisation is unusual. It tends to illustrate the effect of the ramp-up of the output floor, which would particularly affect housing loans. However, the effect would remain very limited: only one in ten banks is considering to change its standards. New loans to households and corporations would keep their momentum largely unchanged.
Key aspects of European policy, the low carbon transition and energy sovereignty programmes converge on many issues. Rising geopolitical tensions, the European energy crisis of 2022 and heightened international trade tensions have contributed to this convergence. At first glance, it seems obvious: Europe, which is structurally dependent on fossil fuel imports, has an interest in accelerating the decarbonisation of its energy mix in order to reduce its hydrocarbon imports. Nevertheless, the progress of the transition-sovereignty pairing remains a path fraught with obstacles.
Household spending intentions have been improving in the Eurozone for two years, and in January 2026, they returned to their early 2022 levels, despite a much more gradual improvement in the household confidence index. Households’ fears about unemployment and living standards in general have weighed on consumption and have contributed to its moderate growth. Moreover, these fears have continued to dampen consumer sentiment. However, these concerns are easing and no longer seem to be hindering a potential rebound in consumption, as evidenced by purchasing intentions.
Growth is expected to have accelerated or at least remain steady across all regions in Q4. This is reflected in our nowcast for the Eurozone (+0.4% q/q) and the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow (+1.3%q/q). In France, after a very good figure in Q3, our nowcast suggests another strong performance (+0.3% q/q), as does our forecast for Spain (+0.7%). Our forecasts point to improving growth figures in the United Kingdom (0.2%), Italy (0.2%) and Japan (0.3%); the same goes for the figure published in China (+1.2% q/q).
Today, we're looking at household consumption, which remains the main driver of growth in both the Eurozone and the United States. As we all know, household consumption suffered a major negative shock during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Since the pandemic, household consumption has evolved very differently between the Eurozone and the United States. In Europe, weak growth in real gross disposable income, moderating wealth effects, and rising real interest rates have dampened demand. In the United States, however, consumption has exceeded what fundamentals would suggest, buoyed by the housing wealth effect and fiscal stimulus. This divergence is likely to narrow, however, with the Eurozone gradually correcting its underperformance, albeit unevenly across countries, while the United States is expected to see an end to its outperformance, without falling into underperformance.
Since the beginning of the year, China’s economic growth has proved to be more robust than expected. Exports have withstood US tariff attacks and household consumption has recovered thanks to government stimulus programs. However, large clouds are casting a shadow over the picture and are likely to slow growth in the second half of the year. On the one hand, trade tensions with the United States remain high and the tech war continues, even though Beijing and Washington have agreed to extend their truce until November. On the other hand, internal structural problems remain (real estate crisis, labour market fragility, low confidence in the private sector, deflation). Despite this gloomy backdrop, economic policy easing remains cautious
Despite the slowdown in inflation and the increase in household purchasing power (measured by real gross disposable income), private consumption in the Eurozone remains weak compared to the pre-Covid period. This sluggishness can be explained by the gap between harmonised inflation and households' perception of price trends. Recent developments in inflation and households' opinions on past price trends show a more marked divergence than before. Since early 2025, the associated opinion balances have not moderated much. This reflects the persistence of inflation in households' perceptions despite the observed slowdown. Households probably still have in mind (at least in part) the cumulative increase over the entire inflationary episode, rather than that over the last 12 months.
The decline in borrowing rates in the Eurozone resumed, except for investment loans. New investment loan rates (IRF > 5 years) to non-financial corporations in the eurozone remained stable in May 2025, at 3.67%, for the third consecutive month. By contrast, rates on new treasury loans (variable rate and IRF < 3 months) to corporates continued to fall (-25 bps m/m) to 3.38%. Rates on new loans for house purchases and loans for consumption to households also declined, but much more modestly (-2 bps m/m). They stood at 3.32% and 7.48%, respectively.
