In the United States, growth is holding up, unemployment remains low and consumer spending shows no sign of slowing. On paper, that should flatter the president’s party ahead of the midterms. Yet, Republicans could lose control of Congress. The rise in the cost of living, which weighs on households far more than macroeconomic aggregates suggest, could be one of the reasons. On top of persistent inflation, rekindled by the war in Iran, there is also a slowdown in wage growth and rising housing costs. The election could hinge on affordability, yet whichever party wins will lack the means to address it. A change in the majority in Congress will nonetheless have an impact on the country’s economy.
European households are now facing a new energy shock, following that of 2022. Since the start of the year, Eurozone inflation has climbed from 1.9% y/y in February to 3.8% in September. Energy is the main driver, in the wake of the conflict in the Middle East. The shock is feeding straight through to consumer prices, mainly via fuel and gas prices.
China has never exported as much as it does now, and its trade surplus has never been higher. At the same time, its economic growth is slowing, held back by weak domestic demand. The imbalances in China’s growth model, and the external imbalances they give rise to, are therefore continuing to worsen. With Europe taking a tougher line and the United States, with which China shares nothing more than ‘strategic stability’, the standoff looks set to continue. However, the European Union and China would have a great deal to lose from a lasting deterioration in their relationship. It is in the interests of both parties to seek to restore the balance. To this end, it is important to understand Beijing’s objectives and the constraints facing China
Growth looks to have held up in Q3 despite successive shocks, as it did in 2025 and H1 2026. A longer Middle East conflict has fed into more persistent inflation; drought has worsened in many countries, and interest rates have risen further – at the short end, with both the ECB and the Fed raising policy rates in September, and even more at the long end. However, our nowcasts show that growth is bending without breaking in most advanced economies.
Since June 2026, the ECB has been publishing a new indicator that helps to assess the transmission of its monetary policy to the economy: the Broad Intermediation Gauge (ECB-BIG). This new tool has revealed that, thus far, strong credit growth has limited the restrictive impact of tightening financial conditions caused by rising interest rates in the Eurozone. However, this offsetting effect is beginning to fade.
On 8 and 9 October, the European Commissioner for Trade and Security, Maroš Šefcovic, will visit Beijing. The European Union’s trade deficit with China on manufactured goods stands at EUR 400 billion over a twelve-month period, driven by a surge in imports. That said, as a proportion of GDP, it is below its 2022 peak (2.1% compared with 2.5%). Furthermore, the aggregate figure masks contrasting realities: 1) with the exception of the automotive sector and Germany, exports are holding up, including service exports; 2) the loss of the Chinese market has been largely offset by third markets; and 3) the real challenge lies in the move upmarket of products imported from China
The overall picture from the confidence surveys available for September is globally positive. According to the PMIs, the business climate in services has indeed seen a clear improvement, and that in the manufacturing sector remains comfortably in expansion territory for the 8th month in a row. However, household confidence has recorded its first decline in 5 months, likely driven by rising inflation and concerns over purchasing power.
US macroeconomic performance has remained solid since the onset of the shock, as illustrated in particular by Q2 growth of +3.8% and +9% (annualized quarterly rate) in consumer spending and private nonresidential investment, respectively. In the manufacturing sector, business sentiment has gained momentum despite the shock, while the impact of this shock on the services sector has remained very limited. The immediate reaction of consumer confidence was, however, more negative before beginning to improve, which was nevertheless interrupted in August.
Oil and gas markets rose in September, primarily due to the resurgence of significant disruptions to hydrocarbon traffic in the Gulf. Red Sea flows have been constrained, while the substantial oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz remains fragile. In variation, the current rise in oil and gas prices exceeds the one recorded during the 2022 crisis, although in value, gas prices remain significantly lower than in 2022.
Among emerging markets, Argentina and Türkiye stand out for their particularly high consumer price inflation, currently standing at around 30% year-on-year in both countries. However, the monthly increase rate has fallen sharply – from around 8% in Argentina and 4% in Türkiye on average in 2023 to around 2% for both countries during the summer of 2026. The economic policy strategies adopted by governments and monetary authorities to bring inflation under control are very different. However, their consequences are too, and they are not positive for Argentina.
Due to robust economic growth, India’s contribution to global GDP has increased by 1.8 times over the past twenty years, reaching 8.2% in 2025. However, this achievement conceals a significant issue: India is failing to develop a substantial, consumer-driven middle class. The underlying cause is the predominance of employment in low-value-added and largely informal sectors. The few high-value-added manufacturing sectors with strong job potential such as electrical equipment, electronics, automotive, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are hindered by an unfavourable business environment, while a skills shortage is obstructing their advancement up the value chain. Furthermore, the highest-paying service jobs, particularly in IT, are threatened by artificial intelligence.
The global race for artificial intelligence and the electrification of economies is leading to an increase in demand for metals. A recent study by S&P Global indicates that global electricity consumption is projected to grow by nearly 50% by 2040, fuelling a sustained rise in demand for copper, lithium, nickel, and other critical minerals. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for copper could rise by 30 to 40% by 2040, while demand for lithium could increase four- to sixfold, depending on the pace of adoption of low-carbon technologies.
In Colombia, the right-wing populist candidate Abelardo de la Espriella won the second round of the presidential election on Sunday, 21 June, which achieved a record voter turnout of 63.4%. Preliminary estimates indicate that he secured 49.7% of the votes, narrowly surpassing left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who garnered 48.7% and represented a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Gustavo Petro (2022-2026). This election marks a significant shift to the right for the country, following the lead of Argentina and Chile, now governed by President Javier Milei (since December 2023) and President Antonio Kast (since March 2026), respectively
Advanced economies proved resilient in 2025 despite a tariff shock that disrupted global trade. By early 2026, they were on track for faster growth and lower inflation. A fresh shock linked to the war in the Middle East, however, is reigniting inflation while slowing growth. This mix primarily reflects the impact of a likely decline in purchasing power on consumer spending. However, many of the factors that underpinned 2025 growth — AI development, higher defense spending (especially in Europe), and continued trade growth — are set to persist in 2026. They would be reinforced by an acceleration of electrification, against a backdrop of rising oil prices and an AI-driven rise in electricity demand.
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Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the war in Iran and the resulting surge in oil and gas prices lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that seen in 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those for the war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy shock? Although there are similarities, there are many uncertainties.
The assessment of the available data for April is more negative than in March. Inflation rose by 1.1 percentage points in two months, an increase that is however still solely driven by the "energy" component. Excluding energy as well as excluding “energy and food," inflation recorded a new slight decline in April. However inflationary pressures are mounting, through rising input prices and — new development in April — the beginning of an increase in output prices according to PMIs surveys.
The growing loss of barrels available on the market due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, repeated attacks on production capacity in the Gulf, and restrictions on traffic through the Strait increase the risk of a physical oil shortage in the short term. This has led to a sharp reaction in the prices of physical barrels (dated Brent). In recent weeks, better pricing of this risk of shortage has caused the prices of futures (Brent) to converge with that of the physical barrel (dated Brent). Furthermore, the sharp rise in oil exports from the United States and, to a lesser extent, the decline in Chinese imports have eased tensions in the physical market and pushed prices lower.
The energy shock is beginning to feed through into French inflation. In March and April, inflation was limited to refining activities and fuel prices. It is expected to affect more sectors in the second quarter, according to the European Commission’s survey on three-month selling price expectations. In France, the pass-through is expected to mainly affect intermediate goods in Q2. However, inflationary pressures on consumer goods and services or construction are expected to remain quite moderate. These factors are consistent with our scenario of a limited acceleration in French inflation and a moderate impact of the energy shock on growth.
French growth was lower than expected in the first quarter, at 0% QoQ, mainly hampered by exceptional factors, mostly aeronautics deliveries and public investment. These factors explain why this figure is significantly lower than our nowcast and that of the Banque de France, which estimated that growth had reached 0.3% in Q1, based on production indicators in industry and services. This lead taken by production is reflected in a strongly positive contribution from changes in inventories (+0.8 percentage points), driven mainly by transport equipment.
The war in the Middle East has caused prices of several commodities to rise, in particular oil which has neared historic highs. Although conflict’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, weaker supply and demand constraints compared to 2022 should limit the upward pressure on inflation. Household consumption and sectors least able to pass on rising production costs to sales prices (primarily consumer goods) are likely to be hit hardest. The ultimate effect on GDP growth will depend on the duration and severity of the damage. According to our baseline scenario, a recession should be avoided. However, if the conflict were to escalate to the point of causing shortages (of fuel or inputs), its impact on growth and inflation could lead to such a recessionary outcome
Following a prolonged period of low interest rates (2015-2020), the inflationary shock of 2021-2023 caused interest rates to rise sharply across the Eurozone, including France. This rate shock, the scale and speed of which had not been seen since the early 1990s, made borrowing more expensive, curbed investment in housing, and altered the relative returns among deposits, regulated savings accounts, life insurance and market investments.
Solid growth in Q1 2026. According to our nowcast, growth is expected to strengthen in the Eurozone (+0.4% q/q, after +0.2% in Q4) and in France (+0.3% q/q, after +0.2% in Q4), driven by a positive momentum despite the energy shock that began in March. In the United States, the rebound suggested by the GDP Now (+0.3% q/q, after +0.1% in Q4) is underestimated. This is because this indicator does not take into account the favourable post-shutdown effect (which our forecast of 0.9% q/q, non-annualised, does). In the other major Eurozone economies, growth is expected to have remained broadly stable: in Germany and Italy, the pace is expected to remain close to Q4 2025 levels (+0.3% q/q), thanks to public demand (investment and consumption)
