The UK economy shows increasing signs of deterioration. An upturn in unemployment is visible, and the PMI employment data fell sharpy in September. The consequences of monetary tightening are spreading and no sector has been spared; first and foremost, the housing market and even the public sector, recently shaken by the bankruptcy of several councils, including the city council of Birmingham, the country’s second largest city. While inflation in the UK is falling, it remains high compared to its European neighbours, notably due to stronger wage increases. However, the Bank of England is not expected to raise the Bank rate again, even though the vote in September (when a hike was expected) was decided by a single vote
The impact on financial expenses of rising interest rates - the result of the European Central Bank tightening its monetary policy - is very mixed, depending on the euro zone country. The impact depends on the proportion of variable-rate loans in outstanding amounts, and also on levels and changes in the amounts borrowed.
In the Euro zone, the European Commission economic uncertainty index resumed its decline in August, continuing the trend started in autumn 2022. Uncertainty is declining in almost all sectors, but the construction sector where it has increased again.
In August and September, the economic indicators of the main OECD economies point to a downturn. Business climate surveys in the UK and the euro zone - and especially in Germany and France - point to an already marked weakening of the economy. In the United States, this is expected, particularly by households. We predict this will happen from Q4 onwards. Japan is the exception, with the Services PMI remaining high.
While Germany is barely coming out of a recession recorded in Q4 2022 and Q1 2023, economic surveys emphasise the risk that the country will fall back into recession in H2. The deterioration identified by IFO’s business climate is clear
The first hard data for July were relatively good (manufacturing production up 0.7% m/m) in France. Nevertheless, economic surveys point to a deterioration. Insee's business climate indicator was stable at 100 during the last 5 months (from May to September), while manufacturing confidence was below 100 during the last 2 months
Italy is still facing mixed developments but is likely to take advantage of the ongoing decrease of inflation. The Composite PMI weakened to 48.2 (-0.7pp) in August due to a sharp decline in the Services index, which crossed the contraction threshold for the first time in 2023 (49.8, -1.7pp). The Manufacturing sector reported a fifth consecutive month in contraction, despite a slight upturn
The slowdown in activity in the second half of 2023 should be contained: real GDP growth would only decline, from +0.4% q/q in Q2 2023 to +0.3% q/q in Q3, and +0.2% q/q in Q4. The deterioration in the PMI surveys is continuing in both the manufacturing sector and the services sector.
The United States has observed an improvement in the business climate in August, which should postpone the risk of recession for a few more months. The ISM Manufacturing rose by 1.2 pp and reached 47.6. However, the index has been well in contraction territory since November 2022, the longest period since the GFC.
Growth in Q2 2023 was a positive surprise, with an increase in real GDP of 0.2% q/q, driven by corporate investment, and in particular by spending on transport equipment. Nevertheless, signs of deterioration in activity are multiplying and extending to all sectors.
Japanese economic surveys remain positive overall, despite contrasting results for August: the composite PMI was up 0.4 points to 52.6, while the Economy Watchers Survey fell by 0.8 points, returning to its June level of 53.6.
Economic surveys pointed once again to a downturn, including the ifo Business Climate Index (88.5 in June compared to 93.4 in April) and the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment (-14.7 in July compared to 28.1 in February). The erratic momentum of factory orders, which were up 6.4% m/m in May (after a low point in April 2023 not seen since May 2013), underlines one of the constraints at work: the irregularity of activity in transport equipment, which remains subject to sporadic supply difficulties. This phenomenon is generating high volatility in production, both in the aeronautics sector and the automotive sector (lower in April with an upturn in May, as also seen in France).
The downturn in economic surveys highlights a drop in demand (contraction of balance of opinion on global and export order books), particularly in the manufacturing sector. The sectors most sensitive to the economic cycle (chemicals, plastics, metals, packaging, wholesale trade and transport services) are all experiencing a marked drop in their synthetic confidence index. In the construction sector, the balance of opinion on the activity in new housing fell again to -22.5 in July (-10.7 in April). By contrast, leisure-related services, information-communication, transport equipment and part of the construction sector (new building excluding housing, maintenance-renovation) are still growing.
Real GDP growth should halve in the second quarter compared to the previous quarter, at 0.3% q/q, before a further slowdown in Q3. Industrial production (down 0.5% over the first two months of Q2) and retail sales (slightly up by 0.1%) demonstrate the fragility of activity in the country. The composite PMI for new export orders also continued to deteriorate in June (-4.4 points to 43.3).
Although in May, the business climate might well have suggested a future recession, in June, things looked less clear. Admittedly, the further drop in the manufacturing ISM, to 46 in June, brought it to its lowest level since the 2008 crisis (excluding the Covid period). However, the message conveyed by the non-manufacturing ISM was noticeably different, with a rebound to 53.9 in June, compared to 50.3 in May.
The economic indicators for June and the second quarter of 2023 illustrate widespread sluggish economic activity. Chinese households are cautious and limit their spending. They are worried because of the lasting crisis in the real estate sector and the uncertainties surrounding employment opportunities.
In the major OECD economies, the slow pace of disinflation is expected to continue, while the slow slowdown in growth will eventually lead, because of the monetary tightening (particularly rapid and significant), to a recession in the United States and stagnation in eurozone GDP. Various supportive factors should limit the extent of the reversal, but the ensuing recovery would be equally limited. The slow convergence of inflation towards its 2% target would force central banks to maintain a restrictive policy despite the start of rate cuts in the first half of 2024.
The US economy continues to grow and create jobs, albeit at a gradually slower pace, and the Federal Reserve has not quite finished with rate hikes. We continue to anticipate a recession, from Q3 2023 until Q1 2024, under the effect of monetary tightening. Having opted for the status quo in June on the back of inflation continuing to fall and in order to take time to assess the effects of the monetary tightening implemented to date, the Fed is expected to make a final 25 bps increase in July, bringing the Fed funds range to 5.25-5.50%.
China’s economic growth recovered rapidly following the abandonment of the zero-Covid policy, but it is also running out of steam faster than expected. Domestic demand is held back by a significant loss of consumer and investor confidence, and export momentum is stalling. The authorities are cautiously easing monetary policy, and additional stimulus measures are expected in the short term. They should, among other things, aim to encourage youth employment.
Inflation in Japan continues to rise, spreading to all the items in the consumer price index. Inflation expectations remain anchored around the 2% target and price increases should remain at this level in the medium term. We expect the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to raise the 10-year sovereign rate ceiling to 1% in July, before ending its yield curve control policy by the end of 2024. Real GDP grew by 0.7% q/q in Q1 (+2.7% in annualised terms), mainly supported by household consumption and non-residential investment. The return of foreign tourists (+71% q/q in Q1) also enabled activity to rebound after two disappointing quarters. Although slowing, growth should continue in Q2 (+0.5% q/q) and throughout the second half of the year, reaching 1.1% in 2023.
The eurozone entered a technical recession in Q1 2023, with Eurostat having revised lower its estimate of quarterly GDP growth for Q1 from +0.1% to -0.1%, i.e. the same pace of contraction as in Q4 2022. These results do not profoundly change our assessment for 2023: weak or slightly negative economic activity, quarter-on-quarter, although growth for 2023 as a whole should be more positive thanks to the favourable carry-over growth effect. Our current forecasts are based on a terminal refinancing rate of 4.5%, which would be reached at the monetary policy meeting on 14 September. Nevertheless, the scenario of harsher tightening cannot be completely ruled out, given the ongoing inflationary momentum and still high inflation generalisation indices.
Germany experienced a technical recession in Q4 2022 (-0.5% q/q) and in Q1 2023 (-0.3% q/q), driven by a contraction in household consumption (-1.7% then -1.2%). Although the main cause of this recession was not its industrial core, the German economy showed signs of weakness which hindered growth. While disinflation should allow household consumption to recover in Q2, economic surveys however, are pointing to a further deterioration, which once again exposes the German economy to a risk of recession in H2.
After a second half-year 2022 during which growth weakened markedly, Q1 2023 saw a relative rebound, which should be confirmed in Q2: a rebound rather concentrated in some sectors, mainly transport equipment and tourism. However, economic surveys have deteriorated since March, reaching relatively low levels, particularly in manufacturing. Housing, business services and exports are all areas of concern which, taken together, are likely to have a more pronounced negative impact in the second half of 2023, both in terms of growth and job creation, which are continuing for the time being.
Following a mild contraction in the last three months of 2022, Italian GDP rose by 0.6% in Q1 2023. The carry-over for 2023 is +0.9%. In Q1, domestic demand excluding inventories added 0.7 percentage points to growth, while the contribution of both net exports and inventories was negative. Investment rose by almost 1%, reflecting the improvement of economic and financial conditions for Italian firms. Italian households benefited from the strong recovery of nominal income, but still suffered from the purchasing power loss due to inflation. This latter remains among the highest in the euro zone, at 8% y/y in May (harmonised measure).
The drop in inflation in Spain has provided no respite for the coalition in power. The Socialist Party’s losses in the regional and local elections on 28 May to the People’s Party, led Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to announce a snap general election on 23 July, five months before the originally scheduled date. Despite a still dynamic labour market, the drop in purchasing power and the housing crisis are penalising the party in power, which has fallen even further behind in the polls this spring. The property market is showing signs of a limited correction for the time being, but the continuation of monetary tightening and the resulting hike in lending rates are likely to accentuate this downturn.