We have selected a set of indicators to track the impact of this new energy shock, caused by the war in the Middle East, on activity and prices in the Eurozone, the United States, oil and gas markets and emerging countries, and to see how much the current situation resembles the situation in 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.This dashboard featuring graphs and comments will be updated on a monthly basis for as long as necessary.
In March 2026, the inflationary impact of the surge in oil and gas prices remained moderate, both in absolute terms with an average inflation rate for the main emerging countries of 4.3% compared to 3.9% in February, and relative to 2022. The absence of contagion to agricultural and food prices is the main explanation. Manufacturers' opinion on input prices is, moreover, less degraded than in 2022. However, a catch-up should occur with the expected release of the rise in fertilizer and petroleum-derived input prices to all prices.
As in 2022, the energy shock will affect emerging and developing economies. Today, as in the past, this shock is a negative-sum game between importing and exporting countries. Furthermore, although this is basically a supply shock, central banks in emerging economies may tighten their policies if they need to counter downward pressure on exchange rates, in order to prevent inflation from rising too sharply. However, compared to 2022, there are mitigating factors: 1/ the absence of a shock to agricultural commodity prices so far; 2/ AI, which is an external growth driver for Asian countries in particular; and 3/ the Fed is expected to adopt a more accommodative stance than in 2022 in response to the anticipated rise in inflation
This issue was completed on February 27, 2026 and does not take into account the repercussions of the military attacks that have since occurred in the Middle East. Emerging countries with strategic resources, such as critical metals and semiconductor production capacities, have become key players in the rise of artificial intelligence (AI). Those that are well positioned in AI supply chains have both a growth engine and a major geopolitical advantage. Asia's industrialised economies, which account for over 85% of the world's exports of electronic chips, are best placed to benefit from the increasing demand for AI. However, this advantage also exposes them to a potential correction in the technology boom
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) depends largely on the availability of abundant and reliable electricity. The sector currently accounts for 4.5% of electricity demand in the United States, 2% in Europe and around 1% in Asia (including China), where the vast majority of data centres are located. In contrast, this figure is less than 0.5% in the rest of the world, but is set to increase in the coming years. To attract investment in the AI sector, emerging countries must therefore consider significantly increasing their electricity generation capacity and establishing networks capable of continuously powering data centres. Massive investments in infrastructure, along with the use of flexible energy sources (gas, renewables), are assets for attracting AI projects
Central Europe: Economic growth accelerated slightly to 2.3% for 2025 as a whole - Asia: In 2025, economic growth weathered the rise in US tariffs much better than expected - North Africa/Middle East: The economies of saw a rebound in growth in 2025 - Sub-Saharan Africa: The economic outlook for the region has been positively adjusted in recent months - Latin American: In 2025 these countries experienced slower growth
Key indicators for emerging countries: Real GDP, inflation, credit, public debt.
With the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), emerging countries with strategic resources—such as critical metals and semiconductor production capacities—are becoming key players. Countries that are well positioned within AI supply chains benefit from both an economic growth engine and an asset to leverage in their international relations. Industrialised countries in Asia, which account for over 85% of the global export of electronic chips, are best placed to capitalise on the increasing demand for AI. However, this advantage comes with greater exposure to the risk of a technology market correction
In 2025, emerging economies successfully navigated various shocks, including US protectionism, conflicts, and geopolitical tensions, largely due to Chinese exports, monetary easing, and ongoing disinflation against a backdrop of falling oil prices. Overall, financing conditions remained favorable, at least during the first half of the year, with most currencies appreciating against the dollar. In addition, macroeconomic imbalances, particularly external ones, were kept in check. For 2026, a slowdown in growth is the most likely scenario, but stabilization or even consolidation cannot be ruled out. Asia is expected to remain the most dynamic region.
Growth in emerging economies remained solid in 2025, driven by exports and supportive financial conditions. Global trade was stimulated by export front loading ahead of US tariff increases, as well as by the reconfiguration of trade flows and the boom in the tech sector. In 2026, growth in emerging economies is expected to remain resilient but become more moderate. Supportive factors are likely to fade and global trade is expected to slow down. Fiscal and monetary policies will continue to support domestic demand but will be more constrained than in 2025. Monetary easing will be more measured, and fiscal room for manoeuvre will be reduced by the need to curb the increase in public debt ratios.
Growth in emerging economies has remained solid since the beginning of the year, thanks in particular to buoyant exports and easing financial conditions. Up until the summer, the front-loading of purchases in anticipation of tariff increases in the United States stimulated trade. In addition, global trade flows have been reorganised. In 2026, fiscal and monetary policies will continue to support growth, but will be more constrained. Monetary easing will be less pronounced than in 2025, if only because of the uneven pace of disinflation across countries. Fiscal policy will be constrained by the need to curb the growth of public debt ratios
Central Europe: resilience | Asia: Exports remain buoyant | North Africa/Middle East: Cautious optimism | Latin America: Little impact from the US tariff shock, but fragile public finances
Key indicators for major emerging countries and their public debt and vulnerability to external financial conditions.
Economic growth in emerging countries held up well in the first half of 2025. So far, US tariff measures have had little impact on global trade and therefore on their exports. Furthermore, domestic demand, another driver of growth in these countries, remains strong, in particular thanks to the support of domestic credit. Bank lending growth has returned to its pre-COVID level for a large number of countries, it exceeds potential GDP growth in real terms. This is a trend to watch, as it could lead to a deterioration in foreign trade and/or an increase in non-performing loans.
On August 1, the United States published an updated list of its “reciprocal” tariffs. While this new version provides some clarity, it does not offer a long-lasting explanation of the Trump administration's protectionist policy. In the short term, it changes the game for certain countries, particularly India and China.
The latest monetary tightening in the United States between March 2022 and July 2023 resulted in much larger outflows of portfolio investments by non-residents than during the previous tightening (2016-2018) and the famous taper tantrum of 2013. However, emerging economies are less vulnerable to monetary tightening across the Atlantic than they were a decade ago. On the one hand, the impact of "flight to quality" capital movements by non-resident private investors on risk premiums and local currency bond yields is less significant. Secondly, the level and structure of corporate debt have improved.
Under the impact of the Trump administration's tariff policy and the acceleration of US-China decoupling, global economic growth is expected to slow, international trade to reconfigure and the reorganization of value chains to continue. These changes will have multiple effects on emerging countries. Their export growth will slow and competition from Chinese products will increase. Some countries could nevertheless take advantage of new opportunities to attract FDI and develop their manufacturing base.
The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and the acceleration of the US-China decoupling will lead to a slowdown in global economic growth, a further reconfiguration of international trade, and the continued reorganization of value chains. These changes will have multiple consequences for emerging countries. All will suffer negative effects linked to the slowdown in their exports and increased competition from Chinese products. Some may also seize new opportunities to attract FDI and develop their export base.
The two most recent shocks to emerging countries (the 2022-2023 tightening of US monetary policy, and the election of Donald Trump at the end of 2024) have not affected their financing conditions. However, supporting factors have weakened since the second half of last year. In the coming months, financing conditions could tighten as a result of rising geopolitical risk in particular. However, the adverse impact on emerging economies should be viewed in perspective, given the low transmission of the two recent external shocks to interest rates. Although exchange rates have continued to depreciate against the dollar, the vulnerability of debt to foreign exchange risk is moderate or low for households and non-financial companies
Resilience of external financing conditions overall. The election of Donald Trump to the White House has caused a rally in the US dollar and revived uncertainties about the external financing conditions of emerging countries. The Argentinean peso, the Turkish lira and the South African rand are among the emerging market currencies that recorded the largest depreciations between November 5th, 2024, and February 24th, 2025, losing 6.3%, 5.7% and 5.2% of their value against the US dollar, respectively. Overall, emerging sovereigns should be relatively resilient against a stronger dollar and the risk of increased investor selectivity towards risky assets. However, all of them are not in the same boat
Since taking office, President Trump has confirmed his threats to raise tariffs, but fears of universal and widespread application have abated somewhat. He will decide whether to carry out his threats once an audit of the United States' trade relations with all its trading partners has been completed, which should be by the beginning of April. Between now and then, and even over 2025 as a whole, the divergence in the trajectory of world trade between advanced countries and emerging and developing countries (EMDs) is set to increase. Trade between EMDs is expected to grow significantly faster in 2025 (5%) than during the 2012-2018 pre-COVID period (+3.9% per annum on average), whereas it will be the opposite for advanced countries
Since 2019, private sector debt in emerging countries as a whole has risen as a percentage of GDP, while at the same time private sector debt in advanced countries has fallen. However, a country-by-country analysis shows that China alone is responsible for this increase and that, even excluding China, debt ratios show positive aggregation effects. In fact, on the basis of median ratios and credit gaps, excluding China, the private sector has develeraged in a large number of countries, until the third quarter of 2024. Current and future economic and financial conditions point more to a continuation of the decline than to a rebound.
While emerging economies (EMEs), apart from China, have contributed little to global warming, the future CO2 emissions curve and the resulting additional temperature rise will largely hinge on their ability to conciliate growth and decarbonisation. However, due to limited financial resources, their investments in the "green" transition are low, at around 50 dollars a year per capita, compared to investments which are around seventeen times higher (850 dollars a year per capita) in developed countries. This disparity gave rise to the idea of securing transfers from developed to developing countries at the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), in 2009.
The election of Donald Trump has not triggered any major financial tensions in the main emerging markets. Nevertheless, the dollar has strengthened, which should delay the easing of monetary policies. More worryingly, emerging economies will be the direct or collateral victims of the trade war promised by the incoming United States administration. They will face a double shock: a sharp slowdown in global trade and the re-routing of Chinese exports. The first shock is bound to be recessionary or even inflationary. The impact of the second is not clear cut as it hinges on the types of Chinese exports (complementary or competing) and, most of all, on their link with direct investment.
Since the start of the year, growth in emerging countries has held up quite well. This is reflected not only in business and household confidence, but also in the confidence of foreign investors in the local bond and stock markets. The tightening of US monetary policy from early 2022 to mid-2023 did have a major negative impact on portfolio investment flows. However, this impact was largely offset by the attractiveness of emerging markets for both private and institutional investors, whether for purely financial reasons (carry trade strategies) or as part of a diversification strategy
