GDP, inflation, unemployment, current account balance, public deficit and public debt: key indicators for the second quarter of 2026
The drivers of economic growth in each country examined.
A pillar of the NextGenerationEU programme, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will expire on December 31, 2026. As of the end of August 2026, slightly more than three-quarters of the total budget had been disbursed (EUR 440 billion out of EUR 573 billion). Disbursing the remaining quarter (EUR 133 billion) by the end of the year will require a significant increase compared with the historical pace (EUR 90 billion per year). The goal of channeling these funds toward productive investment appears to have been achieved.
Among emerging markets, Argentina and Türkiye stand out for their particularly high consumer price inflation, currently standing at around 30% year-on-year in both countries. However, the monthly increase rate has fallen sharply – from around 8% in Argentina and 4% in Türkiye on average in 2023 to around 2% for both countries during the summer of 2026. The economic policy strategies adopted by governments and monetary authorities to bring inflation under control are very different. However, their consequences are too, and they are not positive for Argentina.
“Germany is too dependent on the US for its security, on Russia for its energy and on China for its exports.” That was, in essence, Brookings’ Constanze Stelzenmüller’s diagnosis in June 2022, and it was – and is – valid as well for Europe as a whole. But does this dependency also apply to technological and industrial products? The European Commission’s EXternal Vulnerability Index (EXVI) answers that very question, mapping out the EU’s exposure to foreign supply chains.
The FOMC meeting on September 15–16 is expected to mark a turning point with the Fed’s first rate hike since May 2023. While there may have been economic reasons to hold off and maintain the status quo until now (some negative signals on the employment front and some encouraging ones on the inflation front), the conditions for a necessary recalibration now appear to be in place.
Six months have passed since the start of America’s and Israel’s military intervention in Iran and Lebanon. What picture is emerging around the impact of this external shock on the financing conditions of the major emerging economies and on exchange rate movements? And what parallels can be drawn with the 2022 energy shock?
Due to robust economic growth, India’s contribution to global GDP has increased by 1.8 times over the past twenty years, reaching 8.2% in 2025. However, this achievement conceals a significant issue: India is failing to develop a substantial, consumer-driven middle class. The underlying cause is the predominance of employment in low-value-added and largely informal sectors. The few high-value-added manufacturing sectors with strong job potential such as electrical equipment, electronics, automotive, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are hindered by an unfavourable business environment, while a skills shortage is obstructing their advancement up the value chain. Furthermore, the highest-paying service jobs, particularly in IT, are threatened by artificial intelligence.
Overall, based on data available through August 2026, the inflationary impact and the negative effect on activity of the current energy shock remain significantly lower than the 2022 shock. Due to renewed tensions in the conflict in Iran and, consequently, on hydrocarbon prices, inflation is moving up again, but still in a limited way for now and driven solely by energy prices. Overall, confidence surveys do not show any signs of these negative trends.
In the Eurozone, the overall picture from the data available for August is positive in terms of confidence surveys and reinforces the encouraging signs seen in previous months. According to PMI surveys, inflationary pressures continue to ease, while supply-side tensions have stabilised. Business sentiment in the services sector remains stable, anchoring its previous gains, while confidence in the manufacturing sector shows a further—and marked—improvement. Another notable and encouraging development is the recovery in consumer confidence for the fourth consecutive month.
The US economy has held up well since the shock began. Consumption and business investment grew at a 4.1% annualized pace in Q2. At the same time, the scope for energy-driven disinflation has narrowed: WTI (the US reference) has averaged USD 82/bbl since 8 July, ranging between USD 72-92.
Inflation eased in June and July. The average CPI inflation rate across the fifteen leading emerging economies fell to 4.3% year-on-year in July, down from 4.8% in April. The inflationary impact remains weaker than in 2022, due in particular to reduced spillover effects on agricultural and food prices. Manufacturers’ views on the trend in input and finished product prices have returned to their pre-conflict levels. However, against a backdrop of increasingly frequent and destructive extreme weather events, pressure on agricultural and food prices is likely to continue.
Oil and gas markets remain volatile and followed different trajectories during August. The gas market does not benefit from the buffers in place in the crude oil market. Oil prices have stabilised at a high level, widening the gap compared to the 2022 crisis. While the increase in gas prices remains lower than that seen following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the pace of the price increase is high.
Statistical agencies often revise growth figures a posteriori, and generally upwards. But this takes time, as their data often become more comprehensive and accurate after two years. France is seeing the largest upward revisions over this timeframe, and, generally, these revisions are more pronounced in Europe than in the United States.
Central bank independence is not as hard-wired in modern institutions as they might appear to anyone born after the 1970s. That it went largely unchallenged in its first thirty years of history owes much to economic circumstances. But in today’s world of supply shock-driven inflation and large public debts, central banks face a much harder task. A series of controversial decisions since the global financial crisis, and years of above-target inflation leaves them more vulnerable than ever to political attacks on their independence. It is imperative to defend it, as there will be large costs to pay if it is lost.
Both the Eurozone and the US grew 0.4% q/q in Q2 2026. For Europe, that is a welcome upside surprise: growth landed in line with expectations (France, Germany) or above them (Eurozone overall, Spain, Italy), even as the Middle East conflict delivered an energy-driven inflation shock. It confirms that European growth rests on foundations solid enough to absorb this kind of shock. Country-level detail was incomplete on the day, but manufacturing business sentiment held firm across the board in H1, underwritten by a set of drivers (AI, defence, electrification, aerospace). US growth, by contrast, undershot expectations. But it remained robust, powered by AI investment and accelerating household consumption. Both, however, drew in imports fast enough to weaken the headline growth figure.
Shocks are mounting, but growth is holding up. Although GDP figures for the Eurozone, France, Germany and the United States are due to be published on 30 July, our nowcasts indicate that growth returned to its trend rate in the second quarter. This rate is approximately 1% per annum in the Eurozone, France and Germany, and 2% per annum in the United States. In Q2, the Eurozone is expected to benefit from sustained growth in Germany, with investment plans gaining momentum, while France is expected to see a rebound in exports and residential construction after a poor start in Q1. In the United States, growth is expected to remain driven by non-residential investment and household consumption but will be held back by strong imports.
The concept of ‘emerging economies’ as opposed to advanced economies is multifaceted and often poorly defined. The simplest and most commonly used indicator is GDP per capita, on which the classification used by international financial institutions (IFIs) is largely based
In Colombia, the right-wing populist candidate Abelardo de la Espriella won the second round of the presidential election on Sunday, 21 June, which achieved a record voter turnout of 63.4%. Preliminary estimates indicate that he secured 49.7% of the votes, narrowly surpassing left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, who garnered 48.7% and represented a continuation of the policies of outgoing President Gustavo Petro (2022-2026). This election marks a significant shift to the right for the country, following the lead of Argentina and Chile, now governed by President Javier Milei (since December 2023) and President Antonio Kast (since March 2026), respectively
The independence of the Federal Reserve (Fed) has been challenged by the US administration, but it remains intact. As the Kevin Warsh era begins with the 16-17 June FOMC meeting, the simultaneous strength of inflation and the labour market set the stage – should it persist, as we anticipate – for monetary tightening to start by the end of the year. Yet the turbulence at the end of Jerome Powell’s term is a reminder that central bank independence is not a given. The stakes go beyond price stability alone and extend to the global financial architecture itself.
Equity indices, currencies, commodities, bond markets.
Out of the spotlight, Europe is quietly preparing to emerge from its post-pandemic underwater years like a nymph turns into a stunning dragonfly. The turmoil of the last year and a half has brought about “Europe’s moment” in more ways than is being recognized. Europe isn’t just emerging as the alternative safe haven of choice. It can count on five powerful boosters: rebounding industrial strength, established services dominance, tech acceleration, a governance sea-change, and favorable geopolitical winds.
