The vast majority of Latin American countries have been subject to 10% tariffs, the minimum rate, since April 2, imposed by the Trump administration. This leniency is due to the composition of their exports (raw materials and energy, whereas the Trump administration's “reciprocal” tariffs mainly targeted exporters of manufactured goods) and the fact that most of them have a trade deficit with the US.
Every Spring and Fall, economic and financial policymakers from the whole world gather in Washington DC for the IMF/WB Meetings. Thousands of private financial sector professionals tag along. All over town, in both formal and informal settings, participants share and compare with their peers their own assessments of the world’s economic prospects. In my 25 years of taking part in these Meetings, this was one of the most interesting ones, with a pervasive sense among participants of living through a pivotal moment of economic history. In what follows, I offer a distillation of what this global pulse-check revealed.
For several years now, Italy has had to generate primary budget surpluses in order to stabilize its public debt. The current level of fiscal deficits and the foreseeable increase in interest payments are likely to put the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in a similar situation in the coming years. These countries will ultimately have to balance their primary budgets if they want to stabilize their public debt.
• The euro area government deficit decreased in 2024 to -3.1% of GDP.• Italy and Greece posted primary surpluses even though their interest costs remain high• The fiscal adjustment that still needs to be provided by the countries whose deficits increased in 2024 (France, Austria, Belgium, Finland) will nevertheless act as a brake on growth in the zone.
The announcements on April 2, featuring a massive and widespread (albeit differentiated by country) increase in US tariffs, constitute a historic shock. The final extent of the damage and the aftershocks remain to be seen, but there is no doubt that the economic consequences will be negative, starting with the United States. They are already evident in the turbulence on US financial markets. Even if there is a de-escalation in the trade war, which is our base case scenario, uncertainty remains extremely high, and activity will be penalized for a long time.
On Wednesday 5 March, the 10-year Bund yield increased 30bp, the biggest rise since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It continued to move higher the following days, reaching a peak on 11 March. The trigger was the announcement by Friedrich Merz (CDU) and the heads of the CSU and SPD during an evening press conference on Tuesday 4 March 2025 that they agreed to reform the debt brake, that defence spending above 1 percent of GDP would be exempt from this debt brake and that a EUR 500bn fund for infrastructure investments would be created. The developments in the German bond market had sizeable spillover effects across markets in the Eurozone. This didn’t come as a surprise.
By accelerating the fall in oil prices, the timing between OPEC+'s decision to accelerate quota easing, and the Trump administration’s announcement of the start of a tariff war could limit inflationary pressures for US consumers and put pressure on the cartel's undisciplined members. However, the convergence of interests between the heavyweights of the oil market is likely to be short-lived. This policy is likely to make the economic equation increasingly difficult for US producers. At the same time, by putting pressure on public finances, it poses a risk to the cohesion of the cartel.
Faced with US disengagement, the European Union has decided to close ranks and reinvest massively in its defence. On 6 March, the European Council therefore approved a plan that would theoretically raise EUR800 billion. This plan is split into two parts. The first will allow each Member State to deviate from its spending trajectory by 1.5% of GDP on average over a four-year period, without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In theory, this mechanism would provide an additional EUR650 billion of budgetary leeway. For the time being, several national governments have announced that they will not make use of the escape clause (France) or are not favourable to it (Italy, Spain).
Last week, the Trump administration announced tariffs against the entire world which, added to those of previous weeks, will raise the average external tariff of the United States to 22%, compared with 2.5% at the end of 2024. Financial markets have reacted extremely badly, and suggest even more serious fears for US growth than for global growth. Many unknowns remain, but this scenario is the most plausible. For the United States' trading partners, it would be better to resist the temptation to escalate and instead to double down on strengthening the engines of domestic growth. Europe is particularly well placed to do this.
The vulnerability of ASEAN countries to US trade protectionism has increased significantly since 2017. The US has become a key destination for these countries, which export low-intensity tech products (such as textiles and footwear) as well as medium-intensity tech products (mobile phones) and high-intensity tech products (integrated circuits and semiconductors). Vietnam, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia have the largest trade surpluses with the US and are therefore the most exposed to a change in US tariff policy.On 2 April, the US government announced an increase in tariffs on ASEAN countries that goes well beyond simple reciprocity
How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
As a result of the post-Covid debts surge and rising interest rates, the financial burden on governments is increasing. In the OECD, it has reached 3.3% of GDP, its highest level since 2010. For the European Union, the end of the period of cheap money coincides with a substantial increase in its borrowing requirements, partly linked to the need of rearmament. Public finances, already confronted with climate change and ageing populations, are under pressure and will not be able to meet all the challenges alone.
In recent weeks, with the erratic announcements and implementation of the first Trumponomics 2.0 measures, a less favorable wind has been blowing across the US economy, whether it be Main Street or Wall Street. Between rising fears about inflation and growth, how long can the Fed extend the status quo on its policy rates?
President Donald Trump has promised to bring manufacturing jobs back to the USA and make America again “the manufacturing superpower of the world that it once was”. This, of course, is the foremost objective of his radical tariff policy (alongside raising revenue and pressuring trading partners to deliver non-trade-related concessions). In his analysis, the US persistent trade deficit is evidence that the rest of the world is “ripping off” the US, through unfair trade barriers and overly weak exchange rates. As a result, the argument goes, the US industrial base is being hollowed out, undermining the living standards of Americans.
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
The FOMC kept the target range for the Fed Funds rate at 4.25% - 4.5% at the 18-19 March meeting, as widely expected. Jerome Powell and the committee have started to price in downward risks to economic activity and upward risks to inflation. In the short term, the stability of the dot plots, the downplaying of the long-term tariff related risks and the consistent message of patience are aimed, implicitly, at providing stability in the midst of the current turmoil. In our scenario, the FOMC is expected to cut the rates quite sharply in 2026.
In a 1933 article on national self-sufficiency, British economist John Maynard Keynes advised “those who seek to disembarrass a country from its entanglements” to be “very slow and wary” and illustrated his point with the following image: “It should not be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction”. Nearly a century later, what are the precepts of the author of the General Theory worth?
They say the Davos consensus is always wrong, but it usually takes longer than a couple of months to be apparent. Not so in 2025.
Concerns are mounting over US growth. Fears of a rebound in inflation and the shock of political uncertainty are weighing on households and businesses. Initial hard data for Q1 are adding to fears of an ongoing deterioration. And at this stage it is unlikely that the Fed will come to the rescue of the economy. Here is a quick overview of the warning signals sent out by the US economy.
We are almost a week away from a vote that could change the face of Germany. On 18 March, the Bundestag will decide on the adoption of two structural defence and infrastructure projects. A massive budget plan that could exceed EUR 1,000 billion over the next ten years and revive German growth, which has been absent for almost 3 years.
Against a backdrop of falling interest rates, new banking loans (excluding renegotiations) to households and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the Eurozone continued to accelerate in January 2025. Cumulated over one year, new loans to the non-financial private sector (NFPS) increased by 8.6% year-on-year, after 7.4% in December 2024, to EUR 3,437 bn.
Resilience of external financing conditions overall. The election of Donald Trump to the White House has caused a rally in the US dollar and revived uncertainties about the external financing conditions of emerging countries. The Argentinean peso, the Turkish lira and the South African rand are among the emerging market currencies that recorded the largest depreciations between November 5th, 2024, and February 24th, 2025, losing 6.3%, 5.7% and 5.2% of their value against the US dollar, respectively. Overall, emerging sovereigns should be relatively resilient against a stronger dollar and the risk of increased investor selectivity towards risky assets. However, all of them are not in the same boat
The result of the German election reveals a clear winner: the CDU/CSU. Only five parties were able to enter parliament, thereby reducing the fragmentation of the Bundestag. A grand coalition with the SPD is possible. Negotiations should begin soon to establish a common roadmap. When they come to an end, changes are to be expected: a German government that takes more initiative in European affairs, more public investment, increased defence spending and, as a result, a German budget deficit and public debt that could increase.
Peace talks have started. We do not know how soon or exactly where they will land. But things are moving fast. While much of the focus is, rightly, on the unexpectedly daunting geostrategic challenges, it’s not too soon to start mapping out the key economic implications for Europe.
The German elections of 23 February have high stakes. German GDP has been stagnating for three years and production capacity in the manufacturing sector has suffered its first decline since reunification. The question of the relevance of the German territory as a production site (standort deutschland) was again raised. In this context, will these elections open a new era (zeitenwende) in German economic policy, as was the case with the Hartz laws twenty years ago? Two main issues will need to be monitored: the reform of the debt brake and the decrease of energy costs.
