Advanced economies proved resilient in 2025 despite a tariff shock that disrupted global trade. By early 2026, they were on track for faster growth and lower inflation. A fresh shock linked to the war in the Middle East, however, is reigniting inflation while slowing growth. This mix primarily reflects the impact of a likely decline in purchasing power on consumer spending. However, many of the factors that underpinned 2025 growth — AI development, higher defense spending (especially in Europe), and continued trade growth — are set to persist in 2026. They would be reinforced by an acceleration of electrification, against a backdrop of rising oil prices and an AI-driven rise in electricity demand.
Equity indices, currencies, commodities, bond markets.
It’s a major trend, one that can be observed all over the world: since the early 1970s, the average number of children per woman, the ‘fertility rate’, has been falling almost continuously.
Inflation continues to rise globally, in both advanced and emerging economies, and remains largely driven by energy prices.
Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the war in Iran and the resulting surge in oil and gas prices lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that seen in 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those for the war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy shock? Although there are similarities, there are many uncertainties.
The assessment of the available data for April is more negative than in March. Inflation rose by 1.1 percentage points in two months, an increase that is however still solely driven by the "energy" component. Excluding energy as well as excluding “energy and food," inflation recorded a new slight decline in April. However inflationary pressures are mounting, through rising input prices and — new development in April — the beginning of an increase in output prices according to PMIs surveys.
CPI inflation recorded its largest monthly increase since 2022 in March, before reaching 3.8% y/y in April (+1.4pp in two months and a highest since 2023) – almost entirely on the back of gasoline prices, with the non-energy index edging up only moderately.
China’s rise is undermining major sectors of European industry. However, as the German economy illustrates most clearly, Europe is shifting, driven by investment cycles in defence, electrification and artificial intelligence. It is redirecting its exports and managing to maintain strong positions, particularly in high value-added services, where exports to China are trending upwards. Yet this repositioning remains fragile and could be hampered by the economic costs of the conflict in the Middle East. To consolidate its positions, Europe must accelerate the unification of its internal market and do more to strengthen its industrial policy. This is the aim of the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda.
The energy-led rise in inflation remains contained. But pressures are building and consumer and services confidence is suffering.
In this new issue: General dynamics of inflation: A clear rebound, driven by energy prices, now spreading across all countries. Inflation and survey data: Price pressure indicators are surging, signaling an early warning for further sharp increases ahead. Inflation expectations (households, forecasters, markets): For now, short-term inflation expectations – whether from households (especially in the US), forecasters, or markets – are rising noticeably. Longer-term expectations remain stable. Inflation-wage dynamics: A wage-price spiral is unlikely at this stage, and the risk remains contained. Under the impact of the war in the Middle East, inflation is returning to the forefront in advanced economies. Our barometer will be regularly updated to track its repercussions.
The latest economic news.
Before the outbreak of war in the Middle East in late February, our 2026 forecasts for the major advanced economies pointed to higher growth and lower inflation. However, this new conflict in the Persian Gulf is a game-changer. The resulting energy shock is of a stagflationary nature: growth forecasts are being revised downward and inflation forecasts upward, with variations observed across different countries. Most of the supportive factors that were present in 2025 are expected to remain in place in 2026, providing some buffer against the shock. Under the central scenario of the conflict losing intensity by the end of the second quarter, growth forecasts for 2026 are lowered by 0
US growth remains robust, exhibiting strong momentum, but is still reliant on a narrow base – AI on the activity side and healthcare for jobs. The energy shock presents a new challenge, and its impact will depend on both the duration and severity of the Iran war. In any case, this situation is likely to drive inflation further above the target. Our baseline scenario projects 2.4% annual GDP growth in 2026 (down 0.3pp vs. the pre-conflict outlook) and 2.5% in 2027 (+0.3pp). Inflation is expected to reach 3.2% y/y in 2026. Against this backdrop, we expect the Fed to adopt a two-sided stance, with balanced risks around the Fed Funds rate and a hold as the baseline scenario
According to our forecasts, the impact of the conflict in the Middle East is likely to restrict GDP growth to 1.0% in 2026 and 1.3% in 2027 (down from 1.6% for both years prior to the conflict). Private consumption will be hit by falling real wages (with inflation projected at 3.0% in 2026 and 3.3% in 2027, compared to initial estimates of 1.9% and 2.3%). However, the high savings rate will enable households to mitigate the impact over time. Economic activity could suffer from less favourable interest rate dynamics (we anticipate a 50bp increase in ECB rates in 2026). However, the ongoing investment in defence, AI and electrification is expected to continue and boost intra-EU trade. The expected deterioration in public finances in 2026 will be significantly less severe than in 2022.
After two years of recession, German growth began to recover in 2025. We expect it to strengthen in 2026, driven by the ramp-up of investment plans. We are, however, revising our forecasts downwards, as the German economy remains vulnerable to the current shock to energy prices (+0.8% in 2026 [-0.6pp] and +1.1% in 2027 [-0.4pp]). This will weigh on private consumption due to the impact of rising inflation (3.2% in 2026 [+1.6pp] et +3.5% in 2027 [+1.2pp]) on the purchasing power of wages. The fiscal trajectory, meanwhile, is expected to remain broadly unchanged. Public debt is set to continue rising towards 70% of GDP by 2030, which, in the current context, would maintain upward pressure on long-term interest rates.
Since rebounding in Q2 2025, French growth has been relatively robust. Things are not expected to have changed in Q1 2026, with growth supported in particular by precautionary spending. In Q2, higher inflation (and thus lower purchasing power) should weigh on household consumption, whilst support from public finances is expected to be more moderate than in 2022. However, French growth is expected to remain resilient, driven in particular by public investment (both French and European) in defence and private investment in AI. Overall, we are revising our growth forecasts to 1% in 2026 (-0.3 pp) and 1.1% in 2027 (-0.2 pp); and our inflation forecasts to 2.4% in 2026 (+1.3 pp) and 1.9% in 2027 (+0.4 pp)
Italy entered 2026 with moderate momentum, posting a real GDP growth of +0.3% q/q in Q4 2025. However, the economy faces increasing risks due to its reliance on LNG and its exposure to the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, growth is projected to be around +0.7% in 2026 (-0.3 pp), accompanied by weaker investment, consumption and exports. Inflationary pressures are also mounting, as are energy costs for businesses. Despite these challenges, foreign trade remains adaptable. Fiscal consolidation is progressing, although fiscal capacity remains limited.
The Spanish economy is in a favourable long-term cycle, characterised by strong growth, underpinned by domestic demand. In 2026, outperformance relative to the Eurozone is expected to continue, but growth is projected to decelerate due to the weakening of its structural foundations (available labour), a lack of momentum (low productivity) and the inflationary shock. It is projected to reach 2.3% in 2026 (revised downwards by 0.2pp). Inflation is expected to rise to 3.3% (revised upwards by 1pp), which will impact household purchasing power. However, public finances are expected to have the capacity to mitigate this impact without jeopardising the trajectory of public debt ratio reduction.
Following a strong performance in 2025, the UK economy will suffer in 2026 as a result of its dependence on imported commodities, with little fiscal headroom to address the situation. GDP growth is expected to fall to 0.7%. Inflation is expected to remain persistently above the Bank of England’s (BoE) 2% target, standing at 3.6% in 2026 and 3.3% in 2027 (though this forecast will depend on the scale and duration of the conflict). However, demand is significantly less robust than in 2022, which should limit second-round effects. Nevertheless, the BoE is expected to respond. According to our forecasts, it will raise its key interest rate by 25 basis points in Q2 and then in Q3; it is expected to lower it again in 2027
The improved health of the Japanese economy is evident. Consumer confidence and the Tankan business-conditions index hit post-COVID highs before the energy shock began. The shock, however, is expected to weigh on growth, which is projected at 0.5% in 2026 (revised -0.3pp). Inflation, at 2.7% in 2026 (revised up 0.7pp), is set to remain the BoJ. The two pillars of the policy mix could remain at odds in light of the new energy shock, with the government favouring an expansionary fiscal stance while the central bank is expected to keep raising its policy rate, projected to reach 2% by end-2027.
A series of six charts showing key economic indicators (GDP, inflation, unemployment, current account balance, budget balance, public debt ratio) and comparing the situations of the major advanced economies.
Contributions of the various components of demand to quarterly growth (quarter-on-quarter, non-annualized).
Economic and financial forecasts for major economies as of April 2026.
The war in the Middle East has caused prices of several commodities to rise, in particular oil which has neared historic highs. Although conflict’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, weaker supply and demand constraints compared to 2022 should limit the upward pressure on inflation. Household consumption and sectors least able to pass on rising production costs to sales prices (primarily consumer goods) are likely to be hit hardest. The ultimate effect on GDP growth will depend on the duration and severity of the damage. According to our baseline scenario, a recession should be avoided. However, if the conflict were to escalate to the point of causing shortages (of fuel or inputs), its impact on growth and inflation could lead to such a recessionary outcome
Activity indices are holding up, but household confidence is eroding. Business sentiment indicators did not falter in March, and prospects of price rises are confined to a few sectors (oil and chemicals). The downturn is, at this stage, less pronounced in services and construction. Household confidence is deteriorating more noticeably against a backdrop of significantly rising inflation expectations and gloomier prospects for economic activity and unemployment.
