The protectionist shock imposed by the United States will lead to further adjustments in production chains and global trade. Will emerging countries (excluding China) be able to benefit once again, even as competition from Chinese products intensifies on their domestic markets? Will they be able to gain market share in the United States, or even in China? Will they be able to reduce their dependence on either of the two superpowers?
The sharp increase in US tariffs on Chinese imports is a major blow to Chinese exports and economic growth. However, Beijing has prepared for this, and the impact will be partially offset by its response strategy. In the short term, this strategy consists of redirecting exports to other markets, continuing monetary and fiscal policy easing, and boosting private consumption. The redeployment of exports has begun, but it could quickly run into new protectionist barriers. Domestically, the challenge will be to restore household confidence while the labour market may suffer as a result of the slowdown in the manufacturing sector.
India's economic growth is slowing down. Household consumption is sluggish, hampered by slower real wage growth and rising debt burdens, and private investment is weak. Given its low degree of openness, India will be little affected by US tariff increases, but it is unlikely to be spared altogether. Its room for negotiation with the Trump administration is limited. However, its domestic market is vast and allows for diversification of production in Asia. In order to take advantage of the Sino-US trade war, India will need to address the structural constraints weighing on the development of its industry quickly. However, the government's room for manoeuvre to push through reforms in the short term is very limited.
Thailand's real GDP growth remained solid in Q1 2025, but downside risks are high. Thailand is one of the Asian countries that has benefitted most from the trade tensions between the US and China, but the effects of the further tightening of US trade policy could be more painful. Its products might be taxed more heavily than those of its competitors in the US market, while the influx of Chinese goods could increase significantly. However, it could also benefit from new investment from foreign companies seeking to diversify their production chains. It has many advantages over some of its neighbours.
Poor trend in business surveys. According to the May JibunBank survey, the Composite PMI moved into contraction at 49.8 (-1.4pp). The slight rise in the manufacturing PMI – still in contraction territory at 49.0 (+0.3pp) -– was not enough to offset the steep decline in the services PMI (50.8, -1.6pp).
Fragility of the manufacturing sector. The official manufacturing PMI improved slightly in May (to 49.5 from 49 in April) but remained in contraction territory. The Caixin manufacturing PMI fell sharply from 50.4 in April to 48.3 in May, its lowest level since September 2022. Caixin covers a smaller sample of companies than the NBS but includes more private-sector SMEs. These are particularly vulnerable to US tariff policy and the deterioration in export prospects.
Services Driving Business Climate Up. Growth in activity resumed in April according to the Composite PMI (51.1, +2.2pp), supported by the Services PMI (52.2, +2.2pp). By contrast, the Manufacturing PMI remained in contraction territory (48.5, +0.1pp), penalized by the largest deterioration in new orders since February 2024.
Widespread deterioration. The official PMI for the manufacturing sector fell to 49 in April (from 50.5 in March) and the Caixin PMI fell to 50.4 (from 51.2 in March). The decline is widespread across all sub-components and heralds a significant slowdown in activity after the rebound in March. These are the immediate consequences of the new 145% tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese imports.
The tariff offensive led by Donald Trump since his return to the White House has quickly shifted into a face-off with China. Following a cycle of announcements and retaliation, the extra-tariffs applied by the United States to China amount to 145%, compared to 125% in the opposite direction. The shock is of unprecedented magnitude, and the two superpowers are engaged in a negative-sum game.
Japan is heading for a year without quarterly growth. Domestic demand is still constrained, with nominal wages rising at a slower pace than inflation. In addition, the trade policy of the United States, Japan’s largest export market, poses a downside risk.
The vulnerability of ASEAN countries to US trade protectionism has increased significantly since 2017. The US has become a key destination for these countries, which export low-intensity tech products (such as textiles and footwear) as well as medium-intensity tech products (mobile phones) and high-intensity tech products (integrated circuits and semiconductors). Vietnam, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia have the largest trade surpluses with the US and are therefore the most exposed to a change in US tariff policy.On 2 April, the US government announced an increase in tariffs on ASEAN countries that goes well beyond simple reciprocity
How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
In a 1933 article on national self-sufficiency, British economist John Maynard Keynes advised “those who seek to disembarrass a country from its entanglements” to be “very slow and wary” and illustrated his point with the following image: “It should not be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction”. Nearly a century later, what are the precepts of the author of the General Theory worth?
The upward trend in nominal wages continued in January, with contractual wages scheduled to rise by 3.2% y/y, a record since 1992. However, the real wages index fell sharply to -1.8% y/y in January (-2.1 pp), its lowest level since March 2024. At the same time, the unemployment rate was stable at 2.5%.
Manufacturing PMIs rebounded in February, returning to their average level of Q4 2024 (50.2 for the NBS index and 50.8 for the Caixin index). In services, the PMIs remain below their Q4 level but are above the expansion threshold (50 for the NBS index and 51.4 for the Caixin index). The latest activity data confirm this reassuring but rather lacklustre performance: growth in industrial production slowed in January-February after accelerating in December, but held steady at almost 6% y/y. The slowdown in growth in production in services was more marked (+5.6% y/y in January-February, vs. +6.3% in Q4).
After a good start to the year, Chinese economic growth will slow down in 2025 due to still weak domestic demand and the effects of the upcoming protectionist shock on exports. China has tools at its disposal to respond to President Trump’s new tariff plans, even though its room for manoeuvre to offset the effects of rising tariff barriers with a depreciation of the yuan and a drop in export prices has narrowed compared to 2018. The authorities will continue to ease their monetary and fiscal policies in the short term to stimulate activity and boost private consumption, and try to support a rebalancing of China’s economic growth model.
Economic growth forecasts for the fiscal year 2024/2025, which ends on 31 March, have been revised significantly downwards. The outlook for the next three years could also be downgraded unless the government and the private sector significantly increase their investment. However, the international economic climate is not conducive to either domestic or foreign investment, even if the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs on Indian economic growth would be limited. The recent downward pressure on emerging currencies has not spared the Indian rupee, and the depreciation trend is likely to continue, especially as the new Governor of the Central Bank seems to be focusing on supporting economic growth rather than currency stability.
South Korea's economic growth slowed throughout 2024, with limited prospects for a rebound. The political crisis and unprecedented government instability in the country are likely to result in a marked slowdown in domestic demand. The outlook for the export sector (mainly semiconductors) will depend in part on the trade policy adopted by the new US administration. South Korea is not directly targeted by tariff measures for the time being, but the resulting upheaval in value chains will adversely affect exports. Economic policy will remain accommodative: the Central Bank and the interim government have already proposed support measures, but the stimulus will not be enough to significantly boost growth, which is likely to continue to slow in 2025.
GDP growth remained robust in 2024 and the outlook for 2025 is favourable. Consumer spending is expected to remain strong, but investment is expected to slow. Monetary easing by the central bank is expected to be constrained by pressures on the rupiah, while real interest rates - already high - have risen further. In fiscal terms, the government is expected to favour its social policy over capital expenditure. This will impact economic growth in the short and medium term. Exports are expected to suffer from the Chinese economic slowdown. In addition, although modest, the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs could also have a negative impact on the Indonesian economy.
The Vietnamese economy posted strong growth of 7.1% in 2024. The conditions for this success could continue on into 2025: the export sector is benefiting from buoyant global demand for electronic goods and is continuing to increase its production capacities thanks to FDI; the property sector is recovering from the 2022-2023 crisis; private consumption is likely to increase further; and the government has some room for manoeuvre for increasing its spending and investment. However, Vietnam’s economic outlook is also exposed to high downside risks. Firstly, a strong dollar and unchanged interest rates in the US pose a risk of capital outflows, and pressures on the dong and external liquidity would then constrain monetary policy
According to the Jibun Bank PMI survey, the Japanese economy has started 2025 in different directions. The manufacturing PMI fell to 48.7 in January (-0.9 pp, the lowest since March 2024), against a backdrop of a wider deterioration in production and new orders. By contrast, the services PMI accelerated according to the flash estimate, with Business Activity rising from 50.9 to 52.7.
Chinese economic growth accelerated in Q4 2024 (+1.6% q/q and +5.4% y/y), driven by strong export performance and a recovery in private consumption. These supporting factors should persist in early 2025, but economic growth will then resume its downward trend. Domestic demand is likely to remain fragile and the rise in US tariffs will be a significant negative shock to exports.
The Japanese economy continues to be characterised by weak growth, which slowed in Q3. The positive momentum in inflation and wages is in line with the Bank of Japan's objectives. This picture should enable the Bank to continue its gradual monetary tightening. However, domestic political developments (general elections resulting in a loss of political strength for the government), as well as external ones (Donald Trump's victory) are not helping stability.
The Japanese economy slowed down in the third quarter, with GDP growth declining to +0.2% q/q (-0.3 pp) – a pace that is expected to continue in the fourth quarter. However, it is worth highlighting the acceleration in private consumption (+0.9% q/q, +0.2 pp). Conversely, investment figures were negative, both for the residential component (-0.1% q/q, -1.5 pp) and the non-residential component (-0.2% q/q, -1.1 pp). The largest negative contribution (-0.4 pp) came from net exports, with growth in imports (+2.1% q/q) significantly exceeding the exports one (+0.4% q/q).