How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
The latest economic news.
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
After being left reeling by the unexpected money-market crisis during its first round of quantitative tightening (QT1), the US Federal Reserve (Fed) intends to manage the second (QT2) with the utmost caution. This means reducing its securities portfolio without creating a shortage in central bank money, in view of the liquidity requirements imposed on banks under the Basel 3 framework. As it is unable to estimate the optimum amount of central bank reserves needed to ensure that its monetary policy is properly implemented, the Fed aims to reduce the stock of reserves to a sufficiently "ample" level.If QT2 is ended too early, it would have to activate its liquidity draining tools in order to limit the downwards pressure on short-term market rates
The FOMC kept the target range for the Fed Funds rate at 4.25% - 4.5% at the 18-19 March meeting, as widely expected. Jerome Powell and the committee have started to price in downward risks to economic activity and upward risks to inflation. In the short term, the stability of the dot plots, the downplaying of the long-term tariff related risks and the consistent message of patience are aimed, implicitly, at providing stability in the midst of the current turmoil. In our scenario, the FOMC is expected to cut the rates quite sharply in 2026.
Concerns are mounting over US growth. Fears of a rebound in inflation and the shock of political uncertainty are weighing on households and businesses. Initial hard data for Q1 are adding to fears of an ongoing deterioration. And at this stage it is unlikely that the Fed will come to the rescue of the economy. Here is a quick overview of the warning signals sent out by the US economy.
We are almost a week away from a vote that could change the face of Germany. On 18 March, the Bundestag will decide on the adoption of two structural defence and infrastructure projects. A massive budget plan that could exceed EUR 1,000 billion over the next ten years and revive German growth, which has been absent for almost 3 years.
Inflation is no longer the No. 1 economic problem that it has been for the past three years, but it remains a major challenge. While it has not reached its 2% target yet, and the last pockets are slowly deflating, new inflationary pressures are mounting. At this stage, those pressures are limited but not negligible and new inflationary risks, linked to the economic and geopolitical context, are taking shape. The Fed's task is becoming more complicated by the risk of a US stagflation, and the ECB's one happens to be slightly trickier when balancing between downside and upside risks on growth.
The Main recent economic news.
Against a backdrop of falling interest rates, new banking loans (excluding renegotiations) to households and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the Eurozone continued to accelerate in January 2025. Cumulated over one year, new loans to the non-financial private sector (NFPS) increased by 8.6% year-on-year, after 7.4% in December 2024, to EUR 3,437 bn.
The two most recent shocks to emerging countries (the 2022-2023 tightening of US monetary policy, and the election of Donald Trump at the end of 2024) have not affected their financing conditions. However, supporting factors have weakened since the second half of last year. In the coming months, financing conditions could tighten as a result of rising geopolitical risk in particular. However, the adverse impact on emerging economies should be viewed in perspective, given the low transmission of the two recent external shocks to interest rates. Although exchange rates have continued to depreciate against the dollar, the vulnerability of debt to foreign exchange risk is moderate or low for households and non-financial companies
Resilience of external financing conditions overall. The election of Donald Trump to the White House has caused a rally in the US dollar and revived uncertainties about the external financing conditions of emerging countries. The Argentinean peso, the Turkish lira and the South African rand are among the emerging market currencies that recorded the largest depreciations between November 5th, 2024, and February 24th, 2025, losing 6.3%, 5.7% and 5.2% of their value against the US dollar, respectively. Overall, emerging sovereigns should be relatively resilient against a stronger dollar and the risk of increased investor selectivity towards risky assets. However, all of them are not in the same boat
Inflation has probably eased in February, particularly in France due to the marked cut in the regulated electricity price. However, this overall movement masks divergent trends. Although disinflation is becoming more widespread (two-thirds of the components in Insee’s index show inflation below 2% y/y in January in France), prices continue to rise rapidly in services, in France as well as elsewhere in the Eurozone. In the short term, a return of energy price inflation is possible in the Eurozone, but this is likely to be short-lived. The ECB is likely to continue to cut rates at its 6 March meeting, but the persistence of core inflation (below but close to 3% y/y) could change the pace of cuts thereafter.
Peace talks have started. We do not know how soon or exactly where they will land. But things are moving fast. While much of the focus is, rightly, on the unexpectedly daunting geostrategic challenges, it’s not too soon to start mapping out the key economic implications for Europe.
While the Fed lowered its target rate by 100 bps from 18 September 2024, bond yields rose by around 80 bps (as at 7/2/2025). This rare divergence is reminiscent of an inverse version of the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ (2004–2005): during this episode, which spread to Europe, the rise in short-term rates had little effect on long-term rates. What are the reasons for these contrary movements between short- and long-term rates, and what might the implications be?
Since taking office, President Trump has confirmed his threats to raise tariffs, but fears of universal and widespread application have abated somewhat. He will decide whether to carry out his threats once an audit of the United States' trade relations with all its trading partners has been completed, which should be by the beginning of April. Between now and then, and even over 2025 as a whole, the divergence in the trajectory of world trade between advanced countries and emerging and developing countries (EMDs) is set to increase. Trade between EMDs is expected to grow significantly faster in 2025 (5%) than during the 2012-2018 pre-COVID period (+3.9% per annum on average), whereas it will be the opposite for advanced countries
After a good start to the year, Chinese economic growth will slow down in 2025 due to still weak domestic demand and the effects of the upcoming protectionist shock on exports. China has tools at its disposal to respond to President Trump’s new tariff plans, even though its room for manoeuvre to offset the effects of rising tariff barriers with a depreciation of the yuan and a drop in export prices has narrowed compared to 2018. The authorities will continue to ease their monetary and fiscal policies in the short term to stimulate activity and boost private consumption, and try to support a rebalancing of China’s economic growth model.
Economic growth forecasts for the fiscal year 2024/2025, which ends on 31 March, have been revised significantly downwards. The outlook for the next three years could also be downgraded unless the government and the private sector significantly increase their investment. However, the international economic climate is not conducive to either domestic or foreign investment, even if the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs on Indian economic growth would be limited. The recent downward pressure on emerging currencies has not spared the Indian rupee, and the depreciation trend is likely to continue, especially as the new Governor of the Central Bank seems to be focusing on supporting economic growth rather than currency stability.
South Korea's economic growth slowed throughout 2024, with limited prospects for a rebound. The political crisis and unprecedented government instability in the country are likely to result in a marked slowdown in domestic demand. The outlook for the export sector (mainly semiconductors) will depend in part on the trade policy adopted by the new US administration. South Korea is not directly targeted by tariff measures for the time being, but the resulting upheaval in value chains will adversely affect exports. Economic policy will remain accommodative: the Central Bank and the interim government have already proposed support measures, but the stimulus will not be enough to significantly boost growth, which is likely to continue to slow in 2025.
GDP growth remained robust in 2024 and the outlook for 2025 is favourable. Consumer spending is expected to remain strong, but investment is expected to slow. Monetary easing by the central bank is expected to be constrained by pressures on the rupiah, while real interest rates - already high - have risen further. In fiscal terms, the government is expected to favour its social policy over capital expenditure. This will impact economic growth in the short and medium term. Exports are expected to suffer from the Chinese economic slowdown. In addition, although modest, the direct impact of a potential increase in US tariffs could also have a negative impact on the Indonesian economy.
