In this special edition of Economic Research devoted to interest rate cuts, we introduce you to Isabelle Mateos y Lago, who succeeds William De Vijlder as Chief Economist of the BNP Paribas Group and Director of the Economic Research department. The Fed and the ECB are cutting rates. How much of a good sign is this? This is the subject we then tackle with Hélène Baudchon, before discussing the effects of the rate cuts on European banks with Laurent Quignon. Finally, we end with Christine Peltier analysing the effects of the Chinese slowdown on emerging countries.
Meet Isabelle Mateos y Lago who succeeds William De Milder as Chief Economist of the BNP Paribas Group and Director of the Economic Research department.
The ECB made its first rate cut at the beginning of the summer, followed by the Fed, which lowered rates by 50 basis points. After three cuts of 25 basis points by the ECB,Hélène Baudchon explores. Is this a good sign or a bad one?
After a long, unfavourable period of low rates lasting almost six years, European banks have seen their interest margins and profitability improve overall with the rise in ECB rates in 2022 and 2023. As we now enter a period of falling rates, Laurent Quignon talks to us about their effects on the interest margins of European banks.
Last week’s news made for grim reading for many in Europe. First came the choice by our American friends to bring back to the White House a man who said just weeks ago that the EU would have to “pay a big price” if he won. Then the German governing coalition collapsed. Following factory closure announcements by VW in Germany a week before, the two largest German banks reported massive increases in their provisions for bad loans. Meanwhile, in France, lay-offs were announced by two high profile French companies in the automotive industry but also in retail a sector hitherto thought to be fine
GDP growth, inflation, exchange and interest rates.
The second-last FOMC Meeting of 2024 has resulted in a 25bps cut in the Fed Funds Target Range, to +4.5% - +4.75%. The steps ahead promise to prove trickier for the Fed, as the landing is still pending, and in view of Trump’s win. Indeed, the President-elect’s hostility towards Powell is common knowledge, while many of his policy plans are associated with an increased inflation-risk.
The presidential election on 5 November is associated with underlying but potentially decisive economic issues.Political aspects: The election pits Vice President Kamala Harris (Democrat) against former President Donald Trump (Republican). The winner will take office on 20 January 2025. The election looks set to be particularly closely contested, despite the momentum in Donald Trump's favour at the end of the campaign. At the same time, voters will be deciding on the composition of the next Congress, which will significantly affect the new administration's room for manoeuvre.Economic context: The vote comes against a backdrop of an apparently stronger economy. This is illustrated by solid macroeconomic performances, despite recent shocks, which are seemingly auguring a soft landing
GDP growth, inflation, interest and exchange rates.
The sun was shining last week in Washington, DC during the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the imminent US elections cast a shadow over the meetings of the Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors, and private sector economists and finance professionals from all around the world who gathered in town. The better-than-expected state of the global economy was obscured, and all other conversations relegated to second or third billing, including the IMF’s usual warnings about various dangers (excessive debt, insufficient growth, protectionism), the outlook for Europe (improving), for China (as well), for other EM (generally good) and digital finance (further gaining status).
In the main emerging economies, the pace of disinflation is slowing and the cycle of monetary easing began more than a year ago. Egypt is an exception to this trend, due to a severe balance-of-payments crisis that affected its economy until early 2024. Inflation only began to moderate in Q2 2024, and the Central Bank of Egypt decided to leave its key rates unchanged at its Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 17 October 2024.
Discussions on the 2025 draft finance law (PLF) have just begun in the French National Assembly. The backdrop for this PLF must be outlined. France is setting out to consolidate its budget, which is a major yet necessary task. However, things are hanging in the balance due to power struggles in the National Assembly. Over the past few years, a high fiscal deficit has been run up, with the 2024 fiscal deficit and interest burden (which is expected to increase by nearly 1 point of GDP by 2027) leaving the French government with no choice but to take action. In order to stabilise its public debt ratio, France will have to bring its fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP and therefore reduce it each year for at least five years
On 30 September, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced its intention to raise counterparty exposure limits on the deposit accounts of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) to the same level as those limits set for their federal funds loans, an approach already discussed in its December 2023 report. This harmonisation could lead FHLBs to favour deposits with banks, as these are better remunerated. Supply on the federal funds market, on which FHLBs occupy a prominent position as lenders, would be reduced, driving up the effective rate of federal funds.
Would you rather find yourself barreling down towards a cliff edge, or mis-stepping onto a slippery slope? The answer seems obvious. The former predicament typically ends with multiple traumas, the latter with bruises at worst, albeit ultimately it also leads to the bottom if one keeps going. European policymakers have shown a knack for U-turning at cliff edges; they now need to learn to get off slippery slopes. It may prove even harder.
Reflecting Jerome Powell's statement that it is time to adjust (i.e., loosen) monetary policy and subsequent action, it is also time to adjust fiscal policy in Europe and the United States, in the direction of tightening in both cases. This is a good time, given the context of monetary easing, falling inflation and positive economic growth. Even more than monetary easing, this fiscal consolidation must be gradual so as not to weigh too much on growth. Like the central banks that have been determined in their response to the inflationary shock, governments will have to show the same determination and perseverance in the coming fiscal consolidation efforts, given their necessity and significance.
Less than 2 years after spiking to decades highs, inflation is back in the neighbourhood of central bank targets in most of the world. Yet it is too soon to declare victory, as there are still cross currents for economic policy-makers to navigate. As they have earned a good track record of it, and room to act, the year-ahead baseline scenario is fairly benign for both advanced economies and emerging markets, with gradually easing financial conditions (from lower interest rates and a likely weaker US dollar) allowing activity to stabilize around trend growth.
In September, the U.S. Federal Reserve at last followed suit with the ECB and the Bank of England and cut its policy rates for the first time since March 2020. But the Fed marked its difference, favoring a significant 50-basis-point cut instead of a more gradual 25. At least on that point, the suspense is over. But the rest of the story has yet to be written.
Bank Indonesia unexpectedly cut its monetary policy rates on 18 September (-25 bps). This easing was largely due to the rupiah strengthening against the USD since August (+6.4%).
The September FOMC meeting kick-started the Fed’s easing cycle with a significant 50bps cut in the Federal Funds Target Rate, leaving it at +4.75% - +5.0%. Unusually, this large step was taken even as the US economy remains strong, and explicitly with a view to keeping it so. Effectively, macroeconomic conditions having induced a shift in the Fed’s priorities towards the ‘maximum employment’ component of its dual mandate, while still not declaring mission accomplished on the inflation side
