In the UK, like elsewhere, the upsurge in inflation is proving a constant source of surprise, and is prompting the central bank to act. Annual inflation is currently over 5% and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) expects it to hit 7% in April, its highest level for three decades. In response, the Bank of England is raising interest rates. Set at 0.1% during the crisis, its base rate was raised to 0.25% in December and then by a further quarter-point in February. Further rate hikes will follow, since the MPC, in line with market expectations, is aiming to increase the base rate to 1.50% by mid-2023.
Despite a significant improvement in macroeconomic indicators over the past five years, foreign currency liquidity remains a major source of vulnerability for the Egyptian economy. The net foreign asset position of commercial banks has steadily deteriorated over the past year and was in deficit by USD10 billion in December 2021, by far its lowest level for a decade. Meanwhile, gross currency reserves at the central bank grew only very slightly over the year. This deterioration of the external position of the banking system as a whole reflects that of the external accounts. The current account deficit is increasing following a sharp rise in imports
Based on Christine Lagarde’s latest press conference, it is clear that the ECB’s Governing Council view on the inflation outlook has evolved quite significantly. Since the December meeting, upside risks to inflation have increased, raising unanimous concern within the Council. Financial markets interpreted this as a signal that the first rate hike might come earlier than previously expected and bond yields moved significantly higher. The ECB’s forward guidance, which can also be considered as a description of its reaction function, suggests a rule-based approach to setting interest rates with clear conditions in terms of inflation outlook and recent price developments. In reality, a lot of judgment will be used as well
In his press conference last week, Fed chairman Jerome Powell was very clear. Based on the FOMC’s two objectives – inflation and maximum employment – the data warrant to start hiking interest rates in March and, probably, to move swiftly thereafter. In doing so, it will be “led by the incoming data and the evolving outlook”. This data-dependency reflects a concern of tightening too much and makes monetary policy harder to predict. The faster the Fed tightens, the higher the likelihood of having it take a pause to see how the economy reacts.
The latest US economic data can be viewed in two ways. The optimistic approach would be to welcome strong Q4 2021 growth (6.7% annualised) and the fact that the economy is now almost no remaining Covid after-effects, since output has already moved back to its pre-pandemic trajectory. The second and more cautious approach would be to point out that investment has moved sideways and that growth would have been much weaker (1.6% annualised) without the exceptional contribution of inventories.
For emerging economies, the balance prospects/risks has been deteriorating since end-2021. For 2022, a bigger than expected growth slowdown is very likely, sometimes with social instability as already seen in Kazakhstan. Over the last three months, Turkey has experienced a mini financial crisis again. Monetary and exchange rate policy is betting on exports and investment to support growth and rebuild the major economic balances over the medium term, albeit at the price of short-term financial instability. This is a daring gamble that could force the authorities to introduce genuine foreign exchange controls instead of the incentive measures they have implemented so far.
For the first time since May 2019, 10-year Bund yields have moved back in positive territory. Three factors explain this development. Firstly, the traditional international spillover effect of developments in the US Treasury market where following a more hawkish tone from the Federal Reserve, yields have been on a rising trend since early December 2021. Secondly, markets are pricing the end of PEPP and the tapering of net asset purchases by the ECB. Finally, there is the prospect that, at some point, the ECB will raise its policy rate. Bond markets in the US and Germany have become highly correlated since 2021. This is an important factor given the imminent start of a rate hike cycle in the US and its possible influence on Treasury yields and, by extension, yields in the euro area.
Chinese economic growth slowed to 4% year-on-year in Q4 2021 from 4.9% in Q3. In the industrial sector, the situation improved slightly in Q4 after a summer that was badly disrupted by power cuts and supply-chain problems. Industrial growth accelerated from 3.1% y/y in September to 4.3% in December, driven by the still strong performance of exports (up 22.9% y/y in Q4). In the immediate future, however, manufacturing output and exports are likely to suffer from repercussions arising from the latest wave of the pandemic.
Since November 2020, there has been a significant increase in repurchase1 agreements by the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) with foreign central banks as part of the Foreign Repo Pool (FRRP). Two statistical series can be used to identify the Fed’s main counterparts.The structure of official foreign reserves2 indicates the amount of deposits (in the broad sense of the term, including repurchase agreements) made by each economy with “foreign central banks, the Bank of International Settlements, and the International Monetary Fund”. Given the weight of the USD, EUR, JPY and GBP in global foreign reserves, the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bank of England are probably the main beneficiaries
The Fed gets serious. Faced with an unprecedented increase in inflation (6.9% y/y in November, probably scarcely less in December) the Federal Reserve will tighten monetary policy more than previously expected.
Gabriel Boric, the candidate heading up the very broad left-wing coalition, won the second round of voting in Chile’s presidential election on 19 December, beating J. Kast, the far-right candidate. While the country’s economic fundamentals have held up relatively well over the past two years, the incoming administration (taking office in March) will have to deal with a number of very thorny issues. Chile’s health situation, high inflation and restrictive monetary policy will be a drag on growth in the short to medium term. What’s more, expectations among the country’s population are very high concerning pension system reforms, access to healthcare and education
It was a rare coincidence that last week, four major central banks – the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan – held their monetary policy meeting. Considering that they all target 2% inflation, their decisions shed light on the role of differences in terms of approach as well as in the economic environment and outlook. However, they share a preparedness to react when circumstances require. Given the mounting concern about the Omicron variant, more than ever, monetary policy is data-dependent.
After last year’s sudden, deep and a-typical recession, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, this year has also been a-typical in several respects. Supply bottlenecks and supply disruption have been dominant themes throughout the year, acting as a headwind to growth, both directly but also indirectly, by causing a pick-up in inflation to levels not seen in decades. Under the assumption that the pandemic is gradually becoming less of an issue thanks to the vaccination levels, 2022 should see a normalisation in terms of growth, inflation and monetary policy.
With the inflationary surge in the US showing no signs of stopping, the Federal Reserve is no longer taking a accommodative stance and could accelerate the tapering of quantitative easing. Inflation has also spread to asset prices: real estate and stock prices have climbed to peak levels. Unless the emergence of the Omicron variant radically changes the situation, everything points to a key rate hike in 2022, possibly as early as next summer.
To raise or not to raise interest rates? That is the question facing the Bank of England as inflation accelerates and the number of Covid-19 cases surges again, this time with Omicron, the new Covid-19 “variant of concern”. After rebounding strongly through summer 2021, economic growth has also lost the support of public spending, and is showing a few signs of levelling off.
The recovery in emerging economies since mid-2020 has been accompanied by a tightening of monetary policy in Latin America and Europe but not in Asia so far (except South Korea). The main reasons for this lie in the level and dynamics of inflation. Inflation is strong and accelerating in Latin America and Europe, more modest and still contained in Asia
In most European countries, the structural primary deficit should shrink next year. This reduction represents a negative fiscal impulse, raising concern that it would act as a headwind to growth. However, the level of the primary deficit is such that it still corresponds to an accommodative fiscal stance. Taking into account national fiscal policies as well as expenditures financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU grants, fiscal policy in the euro area should have a significant positive impact on GDP growth next year, thereby accompanying and strengthening the ongoing recovery. In addition, it should enhance the effectiveness of the ECB’s accommodative policy.
The ECB’s meeting on 16 December is highly anticipated, primarily for the central bank’s new growth and inflation forecasts. When it comes to growth, the ECB’s September forecast was for annual average growth of 5% in 2021, 4.6% in 2022 and 2.1% in 2023. It could leave its 2021 forecast unchanged, with the positive figures for Q3 offset by a less positive view of Q4, due to the effect of supply constraints, inflationary pressures and a resurgence of the pandemic. Growth in 2022 will be weakened by the same factors. The scale of the forecast downward revision will indicate the level of the ECB’s concerns. It will also be interesting to see whether any growth ‘lost’ in 2022 will be shifted, in part at least, into a higher forecast for 2023.
In his testimony to a commission of the US Senate, Jerome Powell has acknowledged that inflation is less transitory than considered hitherto, adding that, as a consequence, a faster tapering seems warranted. Despite this hawkish tone, the reaction of US Treasuries was muted. This may, amongst other things, reflect concern about how the pandemic might evolve. The new Omicron variant undeniably represents an uncertainty shock for households and companies. It comes on top of a negative supply shock that is already a clear headwind to demand. It clearly makes the task of central banks more complicated than ever when deciding how much of a monetary headwind they can create.
Last July, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded its scope of intervention in the money markets. It now has a permanent repo facility (Standing Repo Facility or SRF) in addition to its reverse repo facility (Reverse Repo Program or RRP). These tools should allow the Fed to modulate its supply of central bank money, downwards as well as upwards, in periods of pressure on short-term market rates. In the current context of abundant central bank liquidity and limited supply of government securities, money market funds have made considerable use of the RRP. The ability of the SRF to reduce tension in the event of a drying up of central bank liquidity could, however, be countered by various factors such as the leverage constraints to which primary dealers and banks are subject.
Over the past 15 days, the Turkish lira has depreciated 21% against the euro, including a single-day decline of more than 10% on 23 November. At the same time, 10-year government bond yields have risen above the 20% threshold. This bout of weakness was triggered by 1) another cut in the central bank’s key rate on 19 November, from 16% to 15%, despite surging inflation, which reached 19.9% year-on-year in October, and 2) President Erdogan’s statements justifying the easing of monetary policy as part of a new economic policy, after the President demanded that the National Security Council declare an “economic war of independence”. The President also lashed out at the opportunistic speculative behaviour that took advantage of the lira’s depreciation to raise prices
The ECB insists on the need for patience before considering a policy tightening, despite current elevated levels of inflation. It believes that inflation will decline next year and that a wage-price spiral is unlikely to develop. Moreover, inflation expectations remain well anchored. Demand in the euro area is suffering from the headwind created by the jump in energy prices. Reacting to this type of inflation by tightening monetary policy would create the risk of reducing demand even more. To avoid such an outcome, it makes sense for the central bank to wait for more information to arrive, thereby adopting a risk management approach of monetary policy
Markets have been pricing in an early lift-off of the ECB’s deposit rate. The ECB argues that, considering its inflation outlook, this is not warranted. This difference in view could reflect a loss of central bank credibility. More likely is that market participants and the ECB disagree on the inflation outlook. Another explanation is that investors focus on the distribution of possible inflation outcomes and are concerned about the risks of inflation surprising to the upside.
Successful market timing between equities and cash requires high skill levels. Very low official interest rates, through their impact on market rates, create a disincentive for doing market timing because they increase the break-even skill level. The same applies for quantitative easing. These considerations are important from a financial stability perspective. Growing investor reluctance to do market timing will probably lead to a decline in equity market volatility and an increase in equity valuations. The former provides a false sense of safety whereas the latter increases the sensitivity to negative news and hence increases the riskiness.
Monetary desynchronisation between the US and the Eurozone seems unavoidable due to a very different performance in terms of inflation. Whether this will complicate the ECB’s task of reaching its inflation target depends, in the short run, on the impact on financial conditions in the euro area. This influence will probably be small. In the medium run, when the US tightening cycle is well underway, US domestic demand growth will be slowing down, which will weigh on imports and hence Eurozone exports to the US. This would complicate matters for the ECB if by then, inflation has not yet reached its target.
