Switzerland differs from other European countries in that it has significantly lower inflationary pressures, protected as it is by its strong currency and by resilient business activity which should continue to grow for the rest of 2022 and during 2023. Although the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is likely to argue that 3.5% inflation year-on-year in August is a reason to raise its key rate by 75 bps on 22 September, and so exit from its policy of negative interest rates, it is unlikely that this monetary tightening will last over the longer term, as inflation is already showing signs of slowing down.
The results of Italy's parliamentary elections have handed power to the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni. The new administration will quickly be put to the test, since it will take over an increasingly struggling economy exposed to a high risk of recession this winter. Our current forecast is that real GDP will fall by 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in the fourth quarter, followed by a 0.2% q/q drop in the following quarter. The industrial sector, the first section of the economy affected by disruption linked to the war in Ukraine and the rise in production costs, is experiencing a downturn.
In recent months, the huge and rising gap between observed and target inflation has confronted central banks with an urgency to act. It could be called the panic phase of the tightening cycle. What followed was a swift succession of significant rate increases. Tightening was frontloaded, rather than gradual, to avoid an unanchoring of inflation expectations. This perseverance phase will be followed by a long wait-and-see attitude once the terminal rate -the cyclical peak of the policy rate- will have been reached. During this patience phase of the monetary cycle, the central bank will monitor how inflation evolves. With the risk of further rate hikes having declined, the government bond market should stabilize, which can have positive spillovers to other asset classes
There is a large consensus that 2023 should be a year of disinflation. Monetary tightening will play an important role in that respect. However, it is difficult if not impossible to estimate when and at which level of official interest rates, inflation will have sufficiently converged to target. This explains why the Federal Reserve and the ECB have decided to frontload their rate hikes. It should reduce the risk of inflation surprising to the upside. A lot will depend on how inflation expectations evolve. Recent research shows that firms use price information to which they are directly exposed to form an opinion of future, aggregate inflation
In Chile, a large majority of voters (nearly 62%, with an exceptional voter turnout) rejected the draft new constitution in the referendum held on 4 September. The draft, which contains almost 400 articles, did not propose a profound reform of the Chilean economic model; the Central Bank had to remain independent, while property and labour rights were not called into question. But it guaranteed better access for the population to a set of social rights (housing, education and access to healthcare), whereas the State currently only pays for those needs not covered by the private sector. This meant a substantial and long-term increase in public spending
An exceptional response to exceptional circumstances. There is a high probability that the ECB will raise its policy rates by 75 basis points at its meeting on 8 September. The fact is that the ECB has little choice but to respond with extraordinary measures to the continuing surge in inflation, despite the increased risk of recession. This is putting into practice the hawkish statements of Jackson Hole and the unconditional determination displayed to maintain price stability.
At the Jackson Hole symposium, Fed chair Powell and Banque de France governor Villeroy de Galhau have insisted that their responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It gives a new meaning to ‘whatever it takes’. Faced with uncertainty about the persistence of elevated inflation, the Federal Reserve and the ECB will increase their policy rates to bring inflation under control, whatever the short-run cost to the economy, because not doing enough now would entail an even bigger economic cost subsequently. Equity markets declined and bond yields moved higher. Tighter financial conditions will help the monetary tightening in achieving the desired slowdown in growth
The IMF and the Government of Pakistan have reached an agreement to complete the combined 7th and 8th reviews of Pakistan’s Extended Fund Facility which has been interrupted since March. If the IMF Executive Board approves the deal in the coming weeks, Pakistan will receive the equivalent of almost USD 1.2 billion. An extension of the support programme from September 2022 to June 2023 could allow the country to receive an additional SDR 720 million (i.e. approximately USD 947 million). Although this agreement will partially and temporarily ease pressure on the country’s external accounts, the risk of a balance-of-payments crisis remains high. The high pressures on the Pakistani rupee have not eased
The ECB Governing Council has surprised markets by a 50 bp rate hike and by dropping its forward guidance and moving to a data-dependent tightening cycle. This may reflect unease about how quickly the euro area economy might react to the policy moves and about the consequences of uncertainty about gas supply during the winter months. Another key decision was the introduction of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), a tool to address unwarranted spread widening that would weigh on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. The data dependency of further rate hikes and the vagueness about the triggers for using the TPI may lead to an increase of the volatility in interest rates and sovereign spreads whereby investors try to understand the ECB’s reaction function.
Next Thursday’s meeting of the ECB Governing Council is eagerly awaited. The rate hike decision has been pre-announced so the more important question is whether the new tool to address unwarranted sovereign spread widening will be unveiled. The rationale for such an instrument is well understood but its design and use raise several questions. One is easy to answer. To avoid a conflict with the monetary policy stance, bond purchases by the central bank would need to sterilized. The others are more challenging. Where is the threshold to call a spread widening ‘unwarranted’? Should the ECB be clear or ambiguous on this threshold and on its reaction when it would be reached? The final question concerns moral hazard and, hence, conditionality
Emerging countries have recently faced a series of unexpected and severe shocks that will significantly dampen their economic performance in 2022. Global inflation has increased due to rising commodity prices and world supply disruptions resulting from the conflict in Ukraine. The lockdowns in China’s industrial regions during the spring have aggravated supply problems and further worsened the global economic outlook. Moreover, monetary policies have tightened in most countries, while external financing conditions have also deteriorated due to the weakening in global investor sentiment and US monetary policy tightening. Emerging markets have already faced a bout of large capital outflows since the beginning of the year
Currency liquidity in Egypt continues to deteriorate at a rapid pace. The banking sector’s net foreign assets (commercial banks and the central bank) are deeply negative (USD -16.6 billion in May 2022) and significantly exceed the lowest level reached during the 2016 crisis (USD -13.8 billion in October 2016). This deterioration comes as no surprise and the effects of the war in Ukraine on commodity prices have only exacerbated a pre-existing trend. Given a large recurring current account deficit (at least USD 20 billion this year) and significant external debt repayments (around USD 9 billion over a whole year), the Egyptian economy relies heavily on volatile portfolio investments
The level of activity in the US and the euro area is very high but growth has already slowed down significantly and quarter over quarter growth should remain low for the remainder of the year. Worries about the cyclical outlook are on the rise due to a combination of elevated inflation, geopolitical uncertainty and monetary policy tightening. Survey data on input prices and delivery times have eased but the levels are still very high. Wage growth remains strong in the US and is picking up in the euro area, creating concern that inflation would decline more slowly than expected. In addition, assessing the true state of demand has become very difficult.
Inflation’s unexpected rebound in May forced the Federal Reserve (Fed) to accelerate the normalisation of its monetary policy. In mid-June, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided to raise the fed funds rate by 75 basis points (bp). At the same time, the Fed began to shrink its balance sheet through Quantitative Tightening (QT). For the moment, the US economy is holding up well, supported by robust fundamentals such as employment. Yet activity is beginning to slow under the impact of tighter lending conditions and deteriorating global economic prospects. The US economy will come under fierce pressure as it navigates towards a hard or soft landing.
Since early 2022, inflation has been rising, albeit moderately, for the first time since 2014, while growth contracted in Q1. The yen has depreciated sharply due to the Bank of Japan’s very accommodating monetary policy, which is out of step with the other major central banks, who have already begun to tighten their monetary policy. In June 2022, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda still thought it was “necessary” to maintain a yield curve control policy to boost core inflation to a “stable and sustainable” level. Yet currency depreciation aggravates imported inflation and further erodes household purchasing power. A few weeks before the legislative elections of 25 July, the government is likely to reinforce measures to support household purchasing power.
After being severely hit by the Omicron variant, economic activity picked up again as of February, and the recovery is expected to continue with growth reaching 4% in 2022. Through no fault of its own, Norway is one of the big winners of the Russia-Ukraine conflict thanks to a substantial increase in oil and gas revenues, which are expected to reach NOK 1,500 bn in 2022 (about EUR 143 bn). Although inflation is milder than in the other European countries, the Norwegian central bank has expressed its determination to tighten monetary conditions as much as necessary to break the inflationary momentum. To bring inflation within its target range, NorgesBank plans to gradually raise its key deposit rate to 2.5% by the end of 2023.
A lasting, unwarranted widening of sovereign spreads in the euro area would represent an excessive tightening of financial conditions and weigh on activity and demand. It would run into conflict with the objectives of the ECB in the context of its monetary policy normalisation. Spreads are influenced by various fundamental variables that are directly or indirectly related to debt sustainability issues. These tend to be slow-moving. Sovereign spreads also depend on the level of risk aversion, a variable that fluctuates a lot and which is influenced by global factors. This complicates the assessment of whether an observed spread widening is warranted or not.
Since 1 June, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has been scaling back its balance sheet, limiting the reinvestment of maturing debt in its securities portfolio. Assuming that the pace of disposals stays at the announced level, the Fed could shrink its balance sheet by around USD1,600 billion over eighteen months. The Fed’s securities portfolio (assets on its balance sheet) will automatically reduce, whilst a share of its liabilities, the cash placed with the Fed by commercial banks and/or money market funds, will be destroyed. In 2019, the Fed’s first experiment in quantitative tightening (QT1) had to be halted: it had exhausted the “excess” reserves over and above the liquidity constraints applied to the banks1 and caused the money markets to seize up
In recent weeks, the prospect of several ECB rate hikes has caused an increase in Bund yields and, unexpectedly, several sovereign spreads. Beyond a certain point, higher spreads may become unwarranted. Under such circumstances, the ECB might consider stepping in to avoid that its policy transmission would be impacted. Determining whether sovereign spreads have increased too much is a real challenge. Historically, based on a 20-week moving window, the relationship (beta) between the BTP-Bund spread and Bund yields fluctuates a lot, so this calls for taking a longer perspective. Using data since 2013, the current spread is in line with an estimate based on current Bund yields. Clearly, other economic variables should be added to the analysis
Unsurprisingly, the 16 June meeting of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) led to a further increase in its policy rate, the fifth consecutive 25 basis point increase, taking it to 1.25%. This tightening of monetary policy, relatively modest when compared to the Fed’s 75bp hike, aims to control inflation, which is continuing to rise steeply (2.5% m/m NSA in April, giving a year-on-year figure of 9%), without putting excessive constraints on an economy already hit by the inflation shock.
After an unprecedented contraction in activity in 2020, the strong rebound in 2021 did not allow South Africa to return to its pre-crisis level of GDP contrary to most emerging economies. In 2022, activity should remain subdued and growth below 2% in the medium term. The economic outlook remains largely constrained by the need for fiscal consolidation in order to contain the high risk of debt distress, the tense socio-political climate, and structurally by strong infrastructure constraints, first of which the electricity supply. The shock induced by the conflict in Ukraine is also exerting significant pressures that could make fiscal consolidation efforts difficult
At its 10 March meeting, the ECB paved the way for raising its key deposit rate, although the timing of the first rate increase remained uncertain at the time: the odds of a September move had declined compared to a few weeks ago and July was excluded, which left December. The wait-and-see approach still seemed appropriate given the increasing downside risks to growth, aggravated by the current inflationary shock, the war in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid strategy. Yet economic data reported in the meantime, as well as the hawkish tone of several ECB members, seems to have accelerated the tempo. Concerning data, it is the combination of high inflation, a weak euro and relatively resilient growth that has moved forward the lift-off date.
Over the past year, growth in the M2 measure of money supply in the USA1 has slowed from 27.1% y/y in February 2021 to 9.5% y/y in March 2022. This has mainly been due to the moderation in purchases, by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and banks, of Treasuries (blue bars) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS, hatched green bars). With the Fed having ended its net purchasing at the end of February 2022, the effect of QE was even smaller in Q1 2022. Since Q2 2021, the Fed’s repo arrangements with money market funds (light grey bars) have also resulted in the (temporary) destruction of money2. Other factors have pulled in the opposite direction
Elevated inflation, if left unaddressed, could cause a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, an increase in risk premia, greater price distortion and hence longer-term costs for the economy. Although at first glance, central banks face a dilemma - hiking interest rates to lower inflation at the risk of causing an increase in unemployment or focusing on the labour market and accepting the risk that inflation stays high for longer -, they can only choose between acting swiftly or face an even bigger challenge later to bring inflation back under control. Recent statements by officials of the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of England acknowledge the need to act but their decisions and guidance are very different and reflect the differences in the macro environment.
At first glance, the significant depreciation of the euro looks like a blessing for the ECB. Via its mechanical effect on import prices, it should remove any remaining doubt about the necessity of hiking the deposit rate. However, upon closer inspection, there is concern that the weaker euro, through its effect on inflation and hence households’ purchasing power, will weigh on growth. This would warrant a cautious approach in terms of policy tightening. On balance, a deposit rate hike in the second half of the year looks like a certainty, but the real question is about the scale and timing of subsequent rate increase. This will depend on how the inflation outlook develops.
