Globally, based on the data available up to October 2026, the 2026 energy shock has had a less pronounced impact on activity and inflation than that of 2022. The deterioration in business climate surveys following the outbreak of the conflict in Iran was, overall, less severe, and an improvement followed fairly quickly, driven by the positive impact of the AI boom. Household confidence has been more affected by the rise in energy prices, without benefiting from the cushioning effect of the AI boom. On the emerging markets side, while non-resident portfolio investment flows have been highly volatile since the start of the conflict in Iran, financing conditions have held up well and continue to withstand both the energy shock and the pressures on advanced economies' sovereign rates
The overall picture from the confidence surveys available for October is one of contained erosion. According to the PMIs, the business climate in the services sector showed a significant decline (seen as a technical backlash from September’s strong print) and a slight decrease in the manufacturing sector. The two indices remain well above the 50 threshold, indicating expansion. Household confidence also deteriorated, quite significantly, affected by the rise in inflation, concerns about unemployment and purchasing power.
The US macroeconomic performance has seemingly been unaffected by the energy shock. GDP growth came in at 3.4% AR in Q3 2026 (up 0.8pp), its highest print since Q3 2025. This result was underpinned by buoyant private domestic demand. Consumer spending held at 3.8% AR, despite higher inflation and still-gloomy household sentiment. Business investment jumped 12.7M AR, the fastest since Q3 2020, on the back of the AI capex cycle.
The average CPI inflation rate of the fifteen leading emerging economies rose again year-on-year in September (4.6% compared with 4.3% in August); a similar acceleration had already been observed in the Spring. However, the inflationary impact of the conflict remains lower than in 2022. Manufacturers’ views on trends in the prices of inputs and finished goods have returned to their pre-conflict levels. However, agricultural and food prices have been rising more rapidly in recent months against a backdrop of increasingly frequent and destructive extreme weather events.
Oil and gas markets remained tilted to the upside in October due to the increased risk of re-escalation in the Gulf conflict. Added to this geopolitical risk premium is a regional component for gas: the beginning of the winter season with historically low inventories in Europe. The price variations for oil and gas are currently greater than those recorded during the 2022 crisis, but in terms of levels, gas prices remain well below 2022 levels.
Energy accounts for almost half of the euro area inflation and for more than one percentage point in the UK. It is also the main driver of the pick-up in 3m/3m annualised inflation in the United States. Core inflation remains below 3% y/y, except in Spain, but the 3m/3m annualised rate is firming in the United States, France, Italy and Japan. In the euro area, producer prices are rising almost three times as fast as the HICP. The gap is also marked in the United States and the UK. Long-term expectations remain close to 2% in the United States and the euro area. They are easing in Japan and remain stable, albeit at a higher level, in the UK.
Brazil’s recent post-election yield shock risks leaving a lasting imprint on public finances — compounded by already high interest rates and a changing debt structure. Large refinancing needs and a rising share of floating-rate debt will transmit rapidly and significantly higher interest rates to the debt service through distinct but reinforcing channels.
Incoming data confirmed a picture of resilient growth overall. The Bank of England hiked its policy rate by 25 bps and signaled it could do more.
The week was dominated by large market swings triggered by the US midterms results. In the end, energy prices end the week much lower, bond yields somewhat lower and stock prices down in tech-heavy markets and slightly up elsewhere, notably in Europe. Market pressure on France eased somewhat.
In the United States, growth is holding up, unemployment remains low and consumer spending shows no sign of slowing. On paper, that should flatter the president’s party ahead of the midterms. Yet, Republicans could lose control of Congress. The rise in the cost of living, which weighs on households far more than macroeconomic aggregates suggest, could be one of the reasons. On top of persistent inflation, rekindled by the war in Iran, there is also a slowdown in wage growth and rising housing costs. The election could hinge on affordability, yet whichever party wins will lack the means to address it. A change in the majority in Congress will nonetheless have an impact on the country’s economy.
Data releases confirmed resilient to strong growth and above-forecast inflation in most advanced economies, with France lagging behind and earning a rating outlook downgrade from Fitch as a result. Fed, ECB and BoJ remained on hold, as expected, and on track for December hikes. Oil continues to fluctuate between escalation fears and hopes for a return to the negotiating table. The tech sell-off in equity markets intensified despite strong earnings, as markets balk at large capex plans. This helped bond yields ease from recent highs.
Equity indices, currencies, commodities, bond markets. A deep selloff in tech stocks entered a third consecutive week, taking the Nasdaq down by 10% since its last peak. Europe outperformed and bonds rallied on investor demand for safety. The bund OAT spread is back to 164, however.
Eurozone growth continues to prove resilient, notwithstanding the volatility of the Irish figures. The Q3 data reinforce our forecast of 1.1% growth this year, which could even be slightly exceeded, as German and Spanish momentum shows no sign of fading. In France, the negative surprise (-0.1% q/q against a consensus of +0.1% q/q) stems from a new one-off factor (the sharp fall in aerospace output caused by delays in input deliveries) and masks an encouraging rebound in household consumption. In the United States, growth reached its highest level since Q2 2025 (0.8% q/q), driven by buoyant private domestic demand.
As expected, the Fed, the ECB, and the BoJ left their rates unchanged this week. This pause, however, does not mark the end of the cycle. The ECB’s tone is becoming more balanced, weighing inflationary risks against tightening financial conditions, but one final rate hike in December remains our base case. Across the Atlantic, Kevin Warsh describes an environment conducive to further tightening, while remaining cautious about the risk of a credit shock. In Japan, the lasting exit from the deflationary cycle is taking shape, and monetary policy adjustment is expected to continue gradually. We anticipate two rate hikes by the Fed by January and four by the BoJ by the second half of 2028.
European households are now facing a new energy shock, following that of 2022. Since the start of the year, Eurozone inflation has climbed from 1.9% y/y in February to 3.8% in September. Energy is the main driver, in the wake of the conflict in the Middle East. The shock is feeding straight through to consumer prices, mainly via fuel and gas prices.
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Growth looks to have held up in Q3 despite successive shocks, as it did in 2025 and H1 2026. A longer Middle East conflict has fed into more persistent inflation; drought has worsened in many countries, and interest rates have risen further – at the short end, with both the ECB and the Fed raising policy rates in September, and even more at the long end. However, our nowcasts show that growth is bending without breaking in most advanced economies.
The 2022 energy crisis clearly highlighted the issue of electricity prices in Europe – and, more broadly, the issue of energy prices. As a result, European manufacturers’ competitiveness has been severely undermined when compared with the United States and China. By reigniting tensions over electricity prices, the conflict that began in the Middle East in late February 2026 further underscores the continent’s vulnerability to fossil fuel imports, despite the expansion of renewable energy. Faced with an environment of potential sharp and sudden price rises, European governments do not have the same room for manoeuvre.
In this new podcast, we review the macroeconomic outlook for advanced economies. Despite a series of geopolitical and energy shocks, the global economy continues to show unexpected resilience.
Seven months after the start of the war in the Middle East, which has led to a sharp rise in oil prices, sub-Saharan Africa is holding up well overall. The deterioration in external accounts and the rise in inflation are more contained than in 2022, during the last oil shock. However, this resilience is fragile and is eroding as the conflict drags on. Furthermore, an exceptional El Niño event could significantly worsen the macroeconomic environment in 2027.
The global economy’s unexpected resilience might have invited the self-congratulation that is a trademark of international official meetings. But policymakers gathered in Bangkok for the 2026 IMF Annual Meetings were wearily aware that “continued resilience cannot be taken for granted”, as noted in the prologue to the closing Chair’s Statement to the International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting. Growth forecasts remain in line with those made a year ago, when interest rates were much lower and no energy shock was in the cards, and even with those made in April, when a short shock was the base case