Turkish economic growth is slowing down. Excluding changes in inventories, final demand contracted in Q2 2025, after slowing significantly in Q1. In doing so, it rebalanced with less consumption and more investment. The contribution of foreign trade has become negative, but for the time being, the current account deficit remains contained thanks to lower energy bills and tourism revenues. Persistent inflation remains the main obstacle to growth, not only because of its detrimental effects on purchasing power and external competitiveness (through the appreciation of the real exchange rate), but also because of the constraints it imposes on monetary policy in a context of temporary but recurring financial instability
Poland is expected to join the group of the world's 20 largest economies by 2025. Its GDP in nominal terms is expected to exceed USD 1 trillion this year. The country could also see its GDP per capita (in volume and PPP terms) surpass that of Japan, according to IMF forecasts. The Polish economy continues to outperform in the region. In 2025 and 2026, investment and consumption will be the key drivers of growth. Inflation has returned to the official target range since July, thus providing greater flexibility for monetary policy. On the other hand, fiscal room for manoeuvre is more limited, even if consolidation will be gradual.
Electoral uncertainty weighed heavily on Romania's economic activity last year. In 2025 and 2026, real GDP growth is expected to improve only slightly. Inflation has accelerated over the past two months and will continue to rise in the short term, while it is ticking lower in all Central European countries. However, the monetary authorities are not expected to change gear and will likely maintain a status quo in the short term. As for fiscal policy, the scope for supporting the economy is significantly reduced due to significant consolidation measures.
As a result of monetary tightening, Brazil's economic growth has been losing momentum over the last two quarters. Nevertheless, the slowdown in domestic demand is facilitating the disinflationary process, which is further bolstered by decreasing food and oil prices, along with the appreciation of the real. Despite highly restrictive monetary conditions, labour and credit markets continue to exhibit areas of resilience within the economy. The impact of trade tensions with the United States are currently limited, as lost exports find alternative destinations. Diplomatic efforts, combined with Brazil's geostrategic position, point to a possible easing of tensions ahead
Mexican economic growth held up well in the first half of 2025. The slowdown is expected to be more pronounced in the coming quarters: export momentum is likely to diminish due to the implementation of US tariffs, while domestic demand is expected to remain sluggish. Inflation is expected to decelerate moderately, and the cycle of monetary policy easing is likely to continue in 2026. Public finances represent a structural weakness in the Mexican economy. Consistent support for the oil company Pemex, fiscal spending rigidity and overly optimistic projections used by the government when setting its annual budget have resulted in the failure of the consolidation policies proposed by successive administrations. Consequently, the fiscal deficit has been widening since 2019
Since the spring, the macroeconomic and financial situation has deteriorated significantly. The successful stabilisation of 2024 was ultimately short-lived. The economy is expected to have formally entered recession in the third quarter. The current account is once again in deficit despite very restrictive fiscal policy, and despite massive support from the IMF since April, official foreign exchange reserves remain low compared with upcoming external debt repayments in 2026. Since September, the government has benefited from the support of the US Treasury, and President Milei's party emerged victorious from the mid-term elections, which has reassured investors
In Colombia, economic growth is rebounding after two years of poor performance, but several sectors are still lagging behind and investment is still weak. Attention is now turning to the 2026 parliamentary and presidential elections, which could lead to major shifts in economic and fiscal policy. The next administration will inherit a record-high fiscal deficit and a rapidly rising public debt. With the fiscal rule suspended for three years, it will need to act quickly to lay the foundations for fiscal consolidation before investor confidence is eroded further.
The gradual stabilisation of the Egyptian economy is ongoing, driven by the restoration of foreign currency liquidity, even though the pace of reforms has been uneven. The rebound in activity, bolstered by household consumption, has exceeded expectations, despite a restrictive fiscal and monetary environment. The decrease in inflation appears to be sustained and should allow for continued monetary easing in the coming quarters. The outlook for foreign currency liquidity is positive, thanks in particular to substantial financing from bilateral and multilateral creditors. The public finance landscape is more complex: consolidation efforts are genuine, despite the slow pace of some reforms, yet the interest burden continues to be a significant source of vulnerability
The Moroccan economy continues to gain momentum. Largely unaffected by the tightening of US tariff policy, it has recorded solid GDP growth since the beginning of the year. Domestic demand is strong, driven by investment. Despite headwinds in the automotive sector, macroeconomic risks are contained, and the economic outlook is positive. However, current social pressures could have a negative impact on public finances, which have remained under control until now. Improved financing conditions should enable Morocco to cope with any deterioration.
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Against all odds, Argentine President Javier Milei’s party emerged victorious in the 26 October midterm elections, despite suffering an electoral setback less than two months earlier. What was behind this turnaround, given that the economic and social situation has deteriorated significantly since the spring? Will the easing of tensions on the peso and the risk premium be enough to avoid a recession? Will US financial support be enough to avert any risk of default on foreign debt?
In September, inflation rebounded slightly in the United States, the Eurozone and Japan, while remaining stable in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the inflationary impact of tariffs has so far been contained (see chart of the month). In the other countries, there are positive signs, as inflation expectations are stable at around 2% in the Eurozone, wage growth is moderating in the UK and producer prices are falling in Japan.
The Fed eased its monetary policy, with two expected announcements: the end of the central bank's balance sheet reduction process from 1st December; and a second straight cut (-25 bp) in the Fed Funds target, without unanimity, bringing it to +3.75% - +4.0%, due to downside risks in the labour market. We anticipate a further 25bp cut in December, driven by the Fed's bias towards employment and downward revisions to our inflation forecasts for the coming quarters. However, this easing cannot be taken for granted, as J. Powell insisted on keeping options open ahead of the upcoming meeting.
The unexpected element lies in the (highly likely) lack of surprises. The suspense surrounding the outcome of the FOMC meeting on 28-29 October and the ECB meeting on 30 October is, in reality, quite limited: a further 25 bp cut by the Fed and a continuation of the stance for the ECB are expected. In doing so, by narrowing the gap between policy rates and the extent of restriction in US monetary policy, the Fed's stance is aligning more closely with that of the ECB rather than moving away from it. Such a simultaneous lack of suspense for both central banks is uncommon, especially given the overall economic environment, which remains fraught with uncertainty.
Anxious relief, such was the mood in Washington DC last week during the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), from official and private sector participants alike. Relief that the global economy, and all its regional parts, are doing much better than expected in the Spring despite the US tariff shock. Anxiety that underneath the recent benign economy and markets, tectonic shifts are underway, still in their early stages and poorly understood.
Modernity sometimes conceals, under new guises, a return to old precepts: a currency backed 100% by the safest assets, bank deposits guaranteed by tangible reserves, the search for unfailing financial stability. Stablecoins (digital tokens backed by highly safe and liquid assets) are part of this logic. However, in our modern economies, banks only keep a small fraction of deposits in reserve with the Central Bank: this is the principle of "fractional reserves" which gives them the ability to create money (the remaining deposits can be allocated to credit). Beyond the intellectual interest that they attract, stablecoins raise a broader question: if their use were to become widespread, would they not risk making it more difficult to finance the economy?
