Despite the war in Iran, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the temporary surge in energy prices, emerging economies have so far avoided a crisis scenario. Their growth is slowing marginally, inflation remains contained in most countries and financial markets have not collapsed. The most powerful growth engine is coming from Asia: global demand for chips, data centers and electronic goods linked to artificial intelligence is offsetting part of the oil shock and reshaping the external balances of several emerging countries.
A few months after the onset of a new global energy crisis, one might wonder about its implications for the low-carbon transition in emerging countries. The answer is not straightforward, as geopolitical uncertainties and the low-carbon transition are progressing according to different timelines, at least in part. The energy shock triggered by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz calls for immediate action to secure hydrocarbon supplies, such as using strategic reserves. Conversely, the transition to low-carbon energy is a long-term process. However, the current circumstances are unusual: the low-carbon transition was initiated several years ago, and the Hormuz crisis marks the second major energy crisis in four years.
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Key indicators for emerging countries: Real GDP, inflation, credit, current account balance, fiscal balance, public debt.
Panoramas as of 13 July 2026: a severe shock with varying effects in the North Africa/Middle East region; heightened fragilities in Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America less exposed to the energy shock; Asia with strengths to face the energy crisis.
China’s economic growth continues to be characterised by a significant disparity between the robust performance of the export sector and the fragility of sectors that rely on domestic demand. This gap has even widened this year, fuelling concerns about China’s growth model and its imbalances with its trade partners. In recent months, China has once again demonstrated its resilience to external shocks. The impact of the energy crisis caused by the war in Iran on economic activity and inflation has been limited. Furthermore, exports have benefited from the surge in global demand for goods linked to AI and green technologies. This momentum is expected to continue in the short term.
South Korea is one of the countries most exposed to the global energy shock, yet it also reaps substantial benefits from soaring demand for artificial intelligence-related products. Despite the country's dependence on hydrocarbon imports, with the vast majority transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, short-term growth forecasts remain highly optimistic, bolstered by a robust export sector. Factors such as inflationary pressures, the depreciation of the won, and rising household debt, justify monetary tightening. In the longer term, the government is banking on an integrated AI ecosystem, encompassing data centres, robotics and advanced materials) to strengthen its key position in global value chains.
India is currently in a stronger position than it was in 2022 to cope with the new energy shock. The fiscal capacity to support the economy has increased, and inflation is more contained. Although a slowdown is anticipated (from 7.7% for FY 2025/2026 to 6.7% for the current year), economic growth is expected to remain robust. However, the government’s subsidy policy is likely to delay the consolidation of public finances. Despite the expected reduction in energy subsidies—supported by lower oil prices — food subsidies could rise due to a poor monsoon.
Indonesia is facing two external shocks: rising energy prices and capital outflows. The decline in governance quality has indeed impacted foreign investor confidence. Assuming that the conflict in the Middle East subsides, pressures on external accounts and energy subsidy costs are expected to ease. However, oil prices are expected to remain consistently above their early-2026 levels, perpetuating the risk of fiscal slippage. Investors remain cautious, and rupiah volatility is high.
Despite the energy shock, Poland’s economic growth is expected to remain robust and could even accelerate slightly in 2026. This growth is being driven by a recovery in investment, while consumption, although slowing, will continue to be one of its main pillars. Inflation remains moderate despite rising fuel prices and is expected to stay within the Central Bank’s target range. The external accounts, meanwhile, are very solid and can accommodate for the rise in energy costs. However, the trajectory of public debt is a cause for concern, particularly given that the government’s lack of a qualified majority is hampering fiscal consolidation.
Recent political tensions are once again drawing attention to Romania. The next government’s priority will be to further consolidate public finances; otherwise, the public debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to deteriorate. In addition, Romania appears to be the Central European country most adversely affected by the energy shock, although the situation is still manageable. Economic growth has been sluggish since 2024 and is not expected to improve in 2026. Inflation has now exceeded 10%, but it is expected to ease from September as the effects of the VAT rate hike subside. Monetary authorities are expected to adopt a cautious approach in the short term
Turkish growth has slowed significantly since Q4 2025, and the oil shock since March has led to a significant erosion of foreign exchange reserves, a more pronounced depreciation in the lira than in other emerging-market currencies, and pressure on domestic bond yields. The risk of disruptions to hydrocarbon and fertilizer supplies is limited. However, the revision of official inflation forecasts, the subsequent tightening of monetary policy, and warnings of the finance minister about potential budget slippage have dampened investor sentiment, which is further unsettled by the AKP’s strategy of systematically sidelining potential rivals in the presidential elections. There are often recurring financial tensions in Türkiye
The Brazilian economy continues to withstand an ultra-restrictive monetary policy stance. In an election year, fiscal policy has become increasingly active to help cushion the impact of high interest rates and mitigate the effects of the oil shock on households' purchasing power. The resilience of economic activity comes at the cost of slower disinflation and a shift in the fiscal burden towards public banks. The policy mix—protective fiscal policy versus restrictive monetary policy—complicates the adjustments of prices, public finances, and inflation expectations amid more frequent supply shocks. The oil price shock has helped strengthen both external accounts and the reais
The presidential election on 21 June 2026 was won by Abelardo de la Espriella, an outsider who distances himself from the traditional figures of the Colombian right. His programme, which represents a total departure from that of the outgoing government, draws clear inspiration from the economic liberalisation advocated by Argentine President Javier Milei and the security measures of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. His accession to power in August therefore heralds major shifts in economic and fiscal policy, as well as in the fight against drug trafficking. Although economic growth has remained largely unaffected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is expected to slow in 2026, primarily due to more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies
Mexico’s economic outlook remains modest. It is characterised by a slowdown in private consumption and investment still held back by uncertainty and a lack of new infrastructure projects. Exports, the main drivers of economic activity, have benefited from the US regionalisation strategy, but the USMCA renegotiation is introducing new constraints. The US is tightening the conditions for accessing its market, threatening the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, which remains dependent on Asian inputs. At the same time, rising public debt, continued support for Pemex and falling oil revenues are drastically reducing fiscal margins, exacerbating the country’s economic challenges.
Saudi Arabia may not be the Gulf economy most vulnerable to the conflict in Iran, but it is by no means unaffected. This year’s growth forecasts have been significantly downgraded due to the decline in oil production. Nevertheless, excluding hydrocarbons, economic activity remains resilient. Crucially, the country has been able to capture some of the trade flows blocked in the Strait of Hormuz thanks to its infrastructure on the Red Sea. In the short term, the rise in oil exports will improve its external accounts. On the other hand, the recovery in public finances will be less pronounced due to soaring budgetary expenditures. However, there is still ample fiscal headroom. Public debt levels are moderate and the conflict has not undermined creditors’ confidence
The impact of the war in Iran and the energy crisis on the Egyptian economy are currently limited. The economy has benefited from macroeconomic fundamentals strengthened by international support and the increased credibility of its economic policy. The momentum for economic recovery and disinflation, which began in 2025, remains intact. The main source of vulnerability – foreign exchange liquidity – has only slightly deteriorated, supported by increased flexibility in exchange rates. Nevertheless, while the Egyptian economy’s vulnerability to external shocks is diminishing, it remains high, particularly due to the growing imbalance in the energy sector and dependence on volatile capital flows
For the first time since 2009 (excluding COVID), the GDP of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to contract this year (-0.8%), whereas pre-conflict forecasts had predicted growth of 4.7%. Far from benefiting from the sharp rise in energy prices triggered by the conflict, the scale of the downturn reflects the severity of a shock that is undermining many of the pillars of the Gulf economies. Nevertheless, the consequences are varying from one country to another, depending on the level of diversification and, above all, on the degree of vulnerability to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
When we compare the impact on economic activity of the current energy shock with that of 2022 (following the conflict in Ukraine), the favorable point in 2026, for the euro area, is the business climate in the manufacturing sector, which is holding up better than in 2022. Consumer confidence has fallen sharply but to a lesser extent in 2026 than in 2022. As for the deterioration in the business climate in the services sector, it was immediate in 2026, whereas it occurred with a few months' delay in 2022. The assessment of the June data is positive and reinforces the encouraging signals from May data.
Shock and resilience: These are, once again, the key words of the first half of 2026. In 2025, the global economy had already faced the US tariff shock (less severe than initially feared) and demonstrated remarkable resilience. Today, faced with the new energy shock caused by the conflict in Iran, how resilient is the global economy?
Gathered in Sintra, Portugal, from 29 June to 1st July, the members of the ECB Governing Council adopted a notably cautious stance, just three weeks after raising key interest rates. This unanimous decision was in response to the energy shock triggered by the conflict in the Middle East. Since then, energy prices have fallen sharply, and the inflation and survey data from June have shown positive trends. However, the indirect effects of the energy shock are still difficult to assess fully. We maintain our scenario of an additional ECB rate hike in September, despite the easing of inflation risks, which makes such a move less likely.
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The Bank of Japan delivered its first rate hike of 2026 at its June meeting, raising the policy rate by 25bps to 1.0%, its highest level since 1995. This marks a further step in the cautious “adjustment of the degree of monetary accommodation”, as framed by the BoJ.
