Economic growth in emerging countries held up well in the first half of 2025. So far, US tariff measures have had little impact on global trade and therefore on their exports. Furthermore, domestic demand, another driver of growth in these countries, remains strong, in particular thanks to the support of domestic credit. Bank lending growth has returned to its pre-COVID level for a large number of countries, it exceeds potential GDP growth in real terms. This is a trend to watch, as it could lead to a deterioration in foreign trade and/or an increase in non-performing loans.
Following on from the first part of our EcoInsight series on US Treasuries, which focused on the US administration's budget plans (US federal debt: the risks of abundance), this second part we are examining how president Trumps’ excesses have harmful effects on the demand for federal paper.The profile of US Federal Government creditors has changed significantly over the past 20 years. The appeal of Treasuries for so-called ‘long-term’ investors (i.e. foreign central banks, resident pension funds and insurers) has waned. More ‘short-term’ investors (i.e. leveraged funds), who favour procyclical strategies, are now very active in this market. This shift has contributed to undermining the safe-haven status of Treasuries, which are now more sensitive to periods of stress
The Genius Act, signed into law on July 18 by President Donald Trump, aims to stimulate stablecoin holdings and demand for T-bills from their issuers. This legislation could ultimately have a significant impact on the scope of monetary policy, banking intermediation, and financial stability. However, the U.S. administration's hope that the increase in net demand for short-term Treasury securities will match that of stablecoins may not entirely come to fruition.
After a long decline of real long-term interest rates in advanced economies, the direction has changed in recent years. The prospect of rising private- and public-sector financing needs is raising concern that this movement is not over. Empirical research shows that the long-run dynamics of long-term interest rates are predominantly driven by economic growth, demographic factors (life expectancy and working-age population growth) and financing needs (public debt and pensions). The first two factors are expected to continue exerting downward pressure, whereas upward pressure should come from the huge financing needs. Empirical estimates of the relationship between long-term interest rates and expected borrowing requirements point towards an impact that should be rather limited, all in all
Considered the safest and most liquid assets in the world, US Treasuries are the first choice of investors seeking security. However, the turmoil that hit their market last April, in the wake of the announcement of new US tariffs, revived memories of the dysfunction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Despite the magnitude of the shock, the market's loss of liquidity at the time came as a surprise, given Treasuries' safe-haven status. As a matter of fact, more than the shock per se, this fragility is due to structural factors.This first part of our EcoInsight series on Treasuries analyses how the US administration's fiscal plans threaten to exacerbate this fragility
The number of corporate bankruptcies continued to rise in the first quarter of 2025. However, the momentum slowed, and the increase was uneven. Record highs were broken in the United Kingdom, where a slight decline was nevertheless observed. In contrast, the increase remains much more limited in Italy and Germany, where it continues. In France, the figures are high, but the increase has slowed. In terms of business sectors, services, trade, and construction are the most affected, but to varying degrees depending on the country. In contrast, industry appears to be relatively unscathed. An analysis of bank balance sheets, particularly in France, puts the impact of bankruptcies into perspective
Despite the slowdown in inflation and the increase in household purchasing power (measured by real gross disposable income), private consumption in the Eurozone remains weak compared to the pre-Covid period. This sluggishness can be explained by the gap between harmonised inflation and households' perception of price trends. Recent developments in inflation and households' opinions on past price trends show a more marked divergence than before. Since early 2025, the associated opinion balances have not moderated much. This reflects the persistence of inflation in households' perceptions despite the observed slowdown. Households probably still have in mind (at least in part) the cumulative increase over the entire inflationary episode, rather than that over the last 12 months.
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of non-financial corporations declined in most EU/EEA banking systems between 2019 and 2024. On average, the ratio fell significantly to 3.38% in Q4 2024 (-2.4 percentage points since Q1 2019). Only the German, Austrian and Luxembourg banking systems recorded an increase, but they started from a level significantly below the EU/EEA average NPL ratio.
The decline in borrowing rates in the Eurozone resumed, except for investment loans. New investment loan rates (IRF > 5 years) to non-financial corporations in the eurozone remained stable in May 2025, at 3.67%, for the third consecutive month. By contrast, rates on new treasury loans (variable rate and IRF < 3 months) to corporates continued to fall (-25 bps m/m) to 3.38%. Rates on new loans for house purchases and loans for consumption to households also declined, but much more modestly (-2 bps m/m). They stood at 3.32% and 7.48%, respectively.
Each year, summer is bookended by two landmark central banking conferences where central bankers, academics and a few members of the private financial sector congregate to discuss new research of interest for monetary policy and compare notes on the outlook: in late June, the ECB Forum held in the windy coastal town of Sintra, Portugal; and in late August in the scenic Rocky Mountains valley of Jackson Hole, Wyoming. This year, the Sintra winds were blustery and relentless, but the discussions as calm, focused and insightful as ever, an apt metaphor for central bankers’ condition these days. Some key takeaways.
Faced with the need to find the necessary funding for the massive investments required for the energy and technological transitions identified by Mario Draghi in his report, and for Europe's defence remobilisation (Readiness 2030), on 19 March, the European Commission unveiled its strategy for a Savings and Investments Union (SIEU), of which securitisation is an essential part. On 17 June, the Commission also proposed new measures to boost securitisation activity in the EU while preserving financial stability. These measures are a good basis for relaunching the securitisation market. However, certain aspects could benefit from improvement.
Donald Trump has, for the most part, taken a wait-and-see approach following his destabilising announcements on trade tariffs. Nevertheless, the damage has been done and uncertainty remains high. Both growth and financing of the US economy could be affected. For the time being, the oil sector appears to be holding up well.
“Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted to resolve these crises,” wrote Jean Monnet. Faced with tariffs and the isolationist temptation of the United States, Europe has cards to play, such as intra-zone trade. The momentum of European growth over the next decade will depend on the financing and implementation of the European rearmament programme and Germany's ambitious investment plan.
The quantitative theory of money — the idea that inflation in an economy depends on the quantity of means of payment in circulation — is a very old one. It is generally attributed to the French philosopher and jurist Jean Bodin, who, around the middle of the 16th century, was the first to have the intuition that the causes of the "rise in the price of all things" in Europe were to be found in the influx of precious metals from the New World.
In the coming months, a relaxation of the Basel leverage ratio (Supplementary Leverage Ratio, SLR) could be proposed in the United States. The aim is to ease the balance sheet constraints on primary dealers, most of which are subsidiaries of large banks, and thereby improve intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market.
The investment required to meet the challenges of competitiveness and energy and technology transition in the European Union is huge, and the need for it is imminent (2025-2030). To this must now be added expenditure to strengthen the European Union's military capabilities. To finance this, the EU must of course speed up its roadmap towards a Savings and Investment Union. But given the urgency, it must also take account of its financial ecosystem and rely on its banks. The postponement of the FRTB (Fundamental Review of Trading Book) until 2027 and the European Commission's legislative proposal on securitisation, expected in June, are steps in this direction.
The recovery in loans for house purchase spread to all eurozone countries in March 2025, but the picture is still mixed. New loans to households for house purchase, excluding renegotiations, saw a year-on-year increase in all eurozone countries in March 2025, which is unprecedented since April 2022. However, it was a very mixed picture in terms of year-on-year increases, ranging from 4.3% in Croatia to 48.6% in Lithuania, with a volume-weighted average of 24.3% across the eurozone. As a result, new loans in the eurozone (EUR 60.3 billion) has returned in March 2025 to its August 2022 level, after hitting a low in January 2024 (EUR 37.0 billion).
Every Spring and Fall, economic and financial policymakers from the whole world gather in Washington DC for the IMF/WB Meetings. Thousands of private financial sector professionals tag along. All over town, in both formal and informal settings, participants share and compare with their peers their own assessments of the world’s economic prospects. In my 25 years of taking part in these Meetings, this was one of the most interesting ones, with a pervasive sense among participants of living through a pivotal moment of economic history. In what follows, I offer a distillation of what this global pulse-check revealed.
Since June 2022, the U.S. Federal Reserve has largely reduced its holdings of U.S. Treasury debt as part of its quantitative tightening program, or QT, after having massively expanded them between March 2020 and May 2022, as part of its quantitative easing program, or QE.
Faced with US disengagement, the European Union has decided to close ranks and reinvest massively in its defence. On 6 March, the European Council therefore approved a plan that would theoretically raise EUR800 billion. This plan is split into two parts. The first will allow each Member State to deviate from its spending trajectory by 1.5% of GDP on average over a four-year period, without being subject to an excessive deficit procedure. In theory, this mechanism would provide an additional EUR650 billion of budgetary leeway. For the time being, several national governments have announced that they will not make use of the escape clause (France) or are not favourable to it (Italy, Spain).
How will Beijing react to the imminent US protectionist measures? Will the central bank allow the yuan to depreciate in order to offset the effect of tariff hikes on the price competitiveness of Chinese exports?
The message delivered by Beijing at the annual meeting of the National People's Congress at the beginning of March was clear: whatever the difficulties linked to trade and technological rivalries with the United States, the Chinese economy must achieve growth of close to 5% in 2025. The target has remained unchanged since 2023. It seems particularly ambitious this year, given that external demand, the driving force behind Chinese growth in 2024, is set to weaken significantly due to the rise in protectionist measures against China. The authorities are counting on domestic demand to pick up the slack, but this is still coming up against powerful obstacles
After being left reeling by the unexpected money-market crisis during its first round of quantitative tightening (QT1), the US Federal Reserve (Fed) intends to manage the second (QT2) with the utmost caution. This means reducing its securities portfolio without creating a shortage in central bank money, in view of the liquidity requirements imposed on banks under the Basel 3 framework. As it is unable to estimate the optimum amount of central bank reserves needed to ensure that its monetary policy is properly implemented, the Fed aims to reduce the stock of reserves to a sufficiently "ample" level.If QT2 is ended too early, it would have to activate its liquidity draining tools in order to limit the downwards pressure on short-term market rates
Against a backdrop of falling interest rates, new banking loans (excluding renegotiations) to households and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the Eurozone continued to accelerate in January 2025. Cumulated over one year, new loans to the non-financial private sector (NFPS) increased by 8.6% year-on-year, after 7.4% in December 2024, to EUR 3,437 bn.
The impulse of bank lending to the private sector continued to recover in the Eurozone in Q4 2024 (1.5 after between 1.1 and 1.2 since September 2024). It was back in positive territory since August (0.8), and in December 2024 it reached its highest level since November 2022 (2.7). The ECB bank lending survey in the Eurozone confirms the recovery in the demand for loans in Q4 2024. However, political uncertainties have resulted in a tightening of credit standards for lending to companies in France and Germany.
