Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of the war in Iran and the resulting surge in oil and gas prices lead to a comparable inflationary shock to the one seen in 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those for the war in Ukraine and the subsequent energy shock? Although there are similarities, there are many uncertainties.
Today, inflationary pressure should be less strong, as demand is less dynamic and supply is less constrained. Therefore, the conditions are seemingly not met for a significant propagation of the rise in energy prices. However, this will need to be closely monitored as transmission lags matter, and the return to normal will take time.
In addition, central banks have learned from the inflationary shock of 2021–2023. They are ready to react more quickly to counter any spillovers, any second-round effects and any spiral between price increases, inflation expectations and wages.
We have selected a set of indicators to track the impact of this new energy shock, caused by the war in the Middle East, on activity and prices in the Eurozone, the United States, oil and gas markets and emerging countries, and to see how much the current situation resembles the situation in 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.
This dashboard featuring graphs and comments will be updated on a monthly basis for as long as necessary.
