The current unprecedented combination of shocks (inflation, health crisis, geopolitical issues, energy crisis, climate, monetary issues) is likely to overburden the Eurozone resilience and push the region into recession over the coming quarters. The deterioration in confidence surveys this summer provides an early indication of this likely outcome. However, we expect the recession to be limited in scope, in large part due to budgetary support. This recession should be followed by a moderate recovery as the various shocks start to ease. Faced with the continued surge in inflation, the ECB has moved up a gear
An exceptional response to exceptional circumstances. There is a high probability that the ECB will raise its policy rates by 75 basis points at its meeting on 8 September. The fact is that the ECB has little choice but to respond with extraordinary measures to the continuing surge in inflation, despite the increased risk of recession. This is putting into practice the hawkish statements of Jackson Hole and the unconditional determination displayed to maintain price stability.
In the first half of 2022, large non-financial companies in the euro area were more inclined to take out new bank loans than to issue debt securities. According to the latest data available, bond issuance remained depressed in July and August. At the beginning of 2022, the average costs of negotiable debt and business bank loans were at comparable levels (for example, 1.1% for French companies in January 2022, according to calculations by the Banque de France1). The cost of bank loans is now, on a relative basis, markedly lower (1.65%) since the surge in inflation and tensions on the bond market have led to a much more perceptible average increase in the cost of negotiable debt issued by non-financial companies (3.69% in June 2022)
With strong acceleration since spring 2021, bank loans to private sector outstanding recorded, in June, its highest annual increase since 2009 (+6.1% year-on-year in June 2022). Annual increase and credit impulse for non-financial companies (NFC) reached levels not seen since 2006 (+6.8% and +4.9%, respectively). According to the banks surveyed by the ECB in June as part of its Bank Lending Survey (published on 19 July), supply chain bottlenecks and the rise in commodity prices increased working capital requirements and strengthened demand for loans with a maturity of less than a year.
The ECB Governing Council has surprised markets by a 50 bp rate hike and by dropping its forward guidance and moving to a data-dependent tightening cycle. This may reflect unease about how quickly the euro area economy might react to the policy moves and about the consequences of uncertainty about gas supply during the winter months. Another key decision was the introduction of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), a tool to address unwarranted spread widening that would weigh on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. The data dependency of further rate hikes and the vagueness about the triggers for using the TPI may lead to an increase of the volatility in interest rates and sovereign spreads whereby investors try to understand the ECB’s reaction function.
Next Thursday’s meeting of the ECB Governing Council is eagerly awaited. The rate hike decision has been pre-announced so the more important question is whether the new tool to address unwarranted sovereign spread widening will be unveiled. The rationale for such an instrument is well understood but its design and use raise several questions. One is easy to answer. To avoid a conflict with the monetary policy stance, bond purchases by the central bank would need to sterilized. The others are more challenging. Where is the threshold to call a spread widening ‘unwarranted’? Should the ECB be clear or ambiguous on this threshold and on its reaction when it would be reached? The final question concerns moral hazard and, hence, conditionality
Outstanding amounts of overdrafts, revolving loans, convenience and extended credits granted by banks to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) in the euro area stood at EUR 535 bn as of May 2022 after five months of consecutive increases, a level comparable to May 2020. From their low point of EUR 452 bn in August 2021, NFCs' overdrafts have increased by 18.3%, following a fall of 35.6% which began in February 2015.The fall in the outstanding amounts of NFC overdrafts became more marked in 2020, probably as a result of public support measures implemented in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic
On the economic front the eurozone has seen a succession of similar-looking months, with inflation continuing to rise and confidence surveys continuing to fall to different extents. Although there is a clear deterioration in the economic situation and outlook, its scale and duration remain uncertain. A recession is getting more likely but is not (yet) a certainty, first because activity levels remain strong and not all the economic indicators are flashing red (particularly when it comes to the labour market) and secondly because growth has some tailwinds or, at the very least, shock-absorbers.
Until May, Eurozone growth has been relatively resilient to the series of shocks that have swept the region, but its pace should slow more significantly in the months ahead. We cannot rule out the possibility of a recession, even though that is not our base case given the numerous sources of growth: post Covid-19 catch-up potential, surplus savings, investment needs and fiscal support measures. Our scenario appears to signal stagflation (inflation will be much higher than growth in 2022 and 2023), but with the big difference that the unemployment rate is not expected to rise much. The ECB is preparing to begin raising its key policy rates to counter the inflationary shock. We are looking for a cumulative 250bp increase in the deposit rate, bringing it to 2% by fall 2023.
Once protected by the logic of “whatever the cost”, household purchasing power in Europe is now threatened by inflation. After the pandemic, public policies are being solicited once again to help reduce the loss of purchasing power, albeit without really succeeding. In 2022, the real disposable income of Eurozone households is expected to decline by about 2.5%. Consumption is still rising, but only because the household savings rate is declining, a trend that masks extremely diverse situations.
A lasting, unwarranted widening of sovereign spreads in the euro area would represent an excessive tightening of financial conditions and weigh on activity and demand. It would run into conflict with the objectives of the ECB in the context of its monetary policy normalisation. Spreads are influenced by various fundamental variables that are directly or indirectly related to debt sustainability issues. These tend to be slow-moving. Sovereign spreads also depend on the level of risk aversion, a variable that fluctuates a lot and which is influenced by global factors. This complicates the assessment of whether an observed spread widening is warranted or not.
In recent weeks, the prospect of several ECB rate hikes has caused an increase in Bund yields and, unexpectedly, several sovereign spreads. Beyond a certain point, higher spreads may become unwarranted. Under such circumstances, the ECB might consider stepping in to avoid that its policy transmission would be impacted. Determining whether sovereign spreads have increased too much is a real challenge. Historically, based on a 20-week moving window, the relationship (beta) between the BTP-Bund spread and Bund yields fluctuates a lot, so this calls for taking a longer perspective. Using data since 2013, the current spread is in line with an estimate based on current Bund yields. Clearly, other economic variables should be added to the analysis
At its 10 March meeting, the ECB paved the way for raising its key deposit rate, although the timing of the first rate increase remained uncertain at the time: the odds of a September move had declined compared to a few weeks ago and July was excluded, which left December. The wait-and-see approach still seemed appropriate given the increasing downside risks to growth, aggravated by the current inflationary shock, the war in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid strategy. Yet economic data reported in the meantime, as well as the hawkish tone of several ECB members, seems to have accelerated the tempo. Concerning data, it is the combination of high inflation, a weak euro and relatively resilient growth that has moved forward the lift-off date.
The sharp rise in energy prices since April 2021 has been the main driving force behind the current surge in Eurozone inflation. The outbreak of war in Ukraine on 24 February accentuated this trend, sending the energy component of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) up 44.4% y/y in March 2022. Faced with this situation, the governments of the four main Eurozone economies under review in this article have acted to try to buffer the shock on economic players, and notably on household purchasing power, via direct subsidies, tax cuts, price regulations and measures to boost nominal incomes
At first glance, higher inflation seems like good news for governments. After all, inflation erodes the real value of debt and lowers the public debt/GDP ratio through a higher nominal GDP. However, the impact of inflation on public finances depends on whether higher inflation was anticipated by financial markets and on its expected persistence. Both factors would influence the borrowing cost and hence the dynamics of the debt ratio through the difference between this cost and nominal GDP growth. Public finances should benefit from having a central bank that is credible in its ability to keep inflation expectations well anchored and is not afraid of tightening policy when inflation has moved well above target
In the space of just a few months, growth prospects in the eurozone have deteriorated markedly. So much so that the risk of a recession is looming this year. Between our growth forecast from early 2021 – when it peaked at 5.5% – and our current scenario, drawn up in mid-March 2022, expected growth has been about halved; we now expect a figure of 2.8%. As recently as November 2021, we were still forecasting 4.2%. This figure of 2.8% still looks very high, as it is well above the long-term trend rate of 1.6% per year on average between 1996 and 2019. However, it relies on an exceptionally high growth carry-over of 2.1% in Q1 2022 and, for the subsequent quarters, on projected weak but positive growth
At first glance, the significant depreciation of the euro looks like a blessing for the ECB. Via its mechanical effect on import prices, it should remove any remaining doubt about the necessity of hiking the deposit rate. However, upon closer inspection, there is concern that the weaker euro, through its effect on inflation and hence households’ purchasing power, will weigh on growth. This would warrant a cautious approach in terms of policy tightening. On balance, a deposit rate hike in the second half of the year looks like a certainty, but the real question is about the scale and timing of subsequent rate increase. This will depend on how the inflation outlook develops.
Growth in outstanding bank loans to NFCs decelerated in March 2022 (4.2%, from 4.5% in February) for the first time since September 2021 (by way of comparison, real year-on-year GDP growth was 5% in Q1 2022, from 4.7% in Q4 2021 according to Eurostat’s preliminary estimate, masking a slowdown on a quarterly basis, +0,2% q/q in Q1 2022 against +0,3% q/q in Q4 2021). Because of a substantial comparison effect (between March and August 2021, the virtual cessation of new guaranteed loans to NFCs and a first wave of loan repayments put the brakes on growth in lending), the impulse of credit to NFCs (reflecting the change, over a year, of the annual growth in outstanding loans) continued to improve – whilst remaining negative – to -1.0% in March 2022, from -2.6% in February.
The outstanding amounts of loans and advances that are still subject to banking support measures, introduced in response to the Covid-19 pandemic[1], continues to decrease in the eurozone. It was EUR444 billion in the fourth quarter of 2021, or 3.1% of total loans, from EUR494 billion, 3.5% of the total, in the third quarter of 2021. This decrease related nearly exclusively to loans subject to moratoria compliant with the European Banking Authority guidelines[2], for which preferential prudential treatment came to an end on 31 December 2021. The outstanding amounts of loans subject to public guarantee schemes and loans subject to forbearance measures almost stabilised in the fourth quarter of 2021, at EUR438 billion
The war in Ukraine compounds the ECB’s task of balancing the fight against inflationary risks with the need to support growth. At the monetary policy meeting on 10 March, inflation was the predominant concern and the central bank announced that net securities purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) would probably end in Q3. This paves the way for the first increase in the key deposit rate, although the timing of the move is still highly uncertain. The inflationary shock is spreading while growth faces ever greater threats. Even so, pre-existing cyclical momentum, excess savings, investment needs and fiscal support measures should all help ease the risk of stagflation.
An exceptionally high number of Eurozone companies plan to raise selling prices. It is unlikely that, at this stage, unit labour cost growth would already be a key driver. Rising input costs and strong demand are playing a crucial role, whereby well-filled order books make it easier for companies to increase their prices. Selling price expectations of euro area companies are much higher than what would be expected based on their historical relationship with input prices and order book levels. It seems that when more companies are raising prices, others will be inclined to do the same. This broad-based nature of the increase of inflation could slow down the reaction of inflation to slower demand growth.
A priori, rising inflation and inflation expectations, reflecting robust growth in demand and economic activity, should boost household spending by reducing real interest rates. Today’s situation is different. In many advanced economies, inflation is exceptionally high and to a considerable degree explained by negative supply shocks. In the EU and the euro area, household confidence recorded a big drop in March. Although unemployment expectations have increased, the main reason seems to be concern about high and rising inflation. Eurozone consumer confidence measures provide information about spending up to three quarters into the future. Given their recent decline, one should expect below-average consumer spending growth over the coming months
Eurostat’s flash estimate puts eurozone inflation for March at 7.5% y/y, representing another very substantial increase (up 1.6 points on the February figure). Inflation continues to be driven mainly by energy prices – the energy component contributed 4.9 percentage points to this figure, thus explaining 65% of the total – but the other components (food, manufactured goods, services) are also seeing increases and each contributed around one point. Thus, inflation is getting more widespread and all eurozone countries have been affected by its recent acceleration, albeit to varying degrees.
Since its launch, the ECB’s asset purchase programme has had, through various transmission channels, a significant impact on financial markets, activity and inflation. In recent months, doubts about the positive effects of additional purchases and concerns about possible negative consequences have increased. Against this background, the ECB has cut the link between the timing of the end of net asset purchases and the rate lift-off. This is a welcome decision that increases the governing council’s optionality. The new staff macroeconomic projections remind us of the pervasive uncertainty we are facing. In such an environment, monetary policy can be nothing else than data-dependent.
Abundant job creations in the Eurozone helped bring down the unemployment rate to a historically low level in 2021, but this has also led to hiring difficulties and labour shortages. Labour shortages seem to be having the most restrictive impact in Germany (in all sectors), given the already low unemployment rate. They seem to be weakest in Italy where the job market is less dynamic, and this hierarchy was confirmed regardless of the sector. In France, labour market tensions are the highest in the construction, and comparatively less important in the manufacturing and services sectors. Production constraints due to labour shortages have reached a record high in the services sector, especially in Germany
