Surveys suggest a healthy level of activity in Q1 but are already showing signs of deterioration from Q2 onwards. Business sentiment indicators were fairly positive at the start of 2026. However, they now point to a downturn, with a resurgence of supply constraints and an expected deterioration in demand (from both businesses and households). The manufacturing output index is contracting for the first time in six months.?
Business sentiment surveys point to a healthy economy, despite the energy shock. In March, business sentiment (ISM PMI) remained in expansion territory in both the manufacturing (which hit a four-year high) and non-manufacturing sectors, but supplier delivery times extended and, above all, input-price growth accelerated (and stood at a high not seen since 2022). By contrast, consumer sentiment (Michigan) has dipped sharply. Expectations deteriorated, particularly around 1-year inflation.
The economy was in good health before the energy shock. Business sentiment (PMI) reached a high not seen since 2013 in Q1 2026, but March data pointed to a slowdown. New household concerns were evident that same month in the decline in consumer confidence (following a post-COVID high in February), which was widespread across its sub-components (overall livelihood, willingness to buy durable goods). This brought an end to an upward trend spanning several months.
Economic growth accelerated in Q1, driven by the export-oriented manufacturing sector. The improvement in the business climate within the industry had signalled a strengthening of activity. Industrial production growth reached 6.1% year-on-year in Q1, vs. 5.0% in Q4 2025, supported by a sharp rise in exports – particularly of electronic goods. This momentum contributed to a slight recovery in investment in Q1. Growth in services, meanwhile, slowed from 5.6% y/y in Q4 2025 to 5.0% in Q1 2026. The rebound in retail sales observed in January–February did not last, due in particular to the waning impact of government subsidy schemes. The consumer confidence index has been recovering slowly for several months, but remains very low
Despite the war and energy shocks unfolding in parallel to the Meetings, finance officials, central bankers and other delegates took the situation with a poise that contrasted with the sense of shock that followed Liberation Day. Unable to predict with any degree of confidence how the war would evolve, and hence how large the economic damage would be, delegates focused more than usual on what lies beyond the near-term outlook: regime changes in geopolitics, economics and markets; how to explain and preserve recent resilience; and the multiple ongoing re-wirings of the fabric of the global economy and financial markets. Here are some personal key takeaways.
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This week, Washington DC will host two gatherings that should be important in their own right, and yet are unlikely to be: one is the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), which brings into town thousands of top finance and central banking officials as well as private sector delegates from the financial sector and civil society; the other is the peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. The former is traditionally an opportunity to take stock and send a combination of reassuring messages to markets and stern admonitions to policymakers. The latter could have been history-making just for taking place. Yet both are certain to be overshadowed by developments in the Persian Gulf and US-Iran talks
Most developed countries are ageing rapidly. According to the United Nations population database, the proportion of people aged 65 and over in the group of “more developed countries” is projected to rise from 21.5% in 2026 to 32.3% by 2100. There are however significant differences between countries. Such increases pose a threat to social security systems. Without any specific reforms, pension and healthcare spending will rise while contributions from the shrinking working-age population will decline. Which countries are financially most vulnerable to ageing? We analysed this question for 16 developed countries using five ratios in our ageing vulnerability index.
The war in the Middle East has caused significant disruptions in the market for refined petroleum products, affecting not only Asia but also Europe. For the time being, the situation in Europe remains under control, largely thanks to stock levels that provide visibility for around one month. Nevertheless, Europe’s dual reliance on suppliers in the Gulf and Asia calls for caution. Supply status in the European market will be influenced by geopolitical developments in the Gulf and whether Asian producers choose to prioritise supplying their domestic markets.
Two measures of inflation (including and excluding energy) and six survey data points to track the impact of the latest energy shock—caused by the war in the Middle East—on economic activity and prices in the euro area. This Focus also highlights how closely the current situation mirrors that of 2022, when the conflict in Ukraine began.
Will the same causes produce the same effects? In other words, will the outbreak of war in Iran and the associated surge in oil prices (+44% to date) and gas prices (+64%) lead to an inflationary shock comparable to that of 2022? Will their negative effects on growth be the same as those of the war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy shock (a rise in oil prices of around 30% between 23 February and its peak in early June 2022, and a rise in gas prices of around 210% between 23 February and the peak in late August 2022)? The risk cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there are similarities and numerous uncertainties.
Asset prices have been moving in unusual ways since the onset of the Gulf War (no safe havens, limited dollar rally and de-risking). Do financial markets know something we don’t, has something fundamentally changed in the way asset prices reflect economic expectations, or are they simply malfunctioning and about to swing wildly as things normalise? Unfortunately, it is impossible to know for sure, and what’s more, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. So far, markets appear to expect an inflation spike, met with a firm central response, with limited damage to growth, and a relatively swift return of inflation to target range. That may turn out to be correct. But far worse outcomes are also very plausible
According to INSEE, the French public deficit in 2025 improved by 0.7pp at 5.1% of GDP (the government targeted 5.4%). This improvement is due to the rebound in the rate of compulsory levies (CL). The public debt ratio is also below projections (115.6% versus 116.2%), although its increase in 2025 was as expected (+3pp). This evolution, along with the repercussions of the shock in Iran, particularly regarding interest rates, suggest to stick with fiscal consolidation efforts in 2026. The deficit is expected to benefit from a better starting point, the anticipated increase in the CL included in the 2026 budget, and the likely favourable impact on revenue from higher nominal growth in 2026
The conflict in the Gulf has escalated in recent days, with an increase in strikes targeting oil and gas facilities (on both sides). The impact on energy prices has therefore intensified. A relatively rapid de-escalation of the conflict is unlikely, whilst there is a growing prospect of the conflict worsening along with its macroeconomic effects (higher inflation, lower growth). Central banks have taken note of this this week, but are waiting for greater clarity on how events will unfold before deciding how to respond. The markets, too, are taking a more cautious stance and anticipate that central bank will adopt more restrictive policies than previously expected for over the rest of the year. So do we.
The week of 16–20 March was particularly busy on the monetary policy front. No fewer than 21 central banks met against the backdrop of a common exogenous factor: the conflict in the Middle East that broke out in late February 2026. Prior to the onset of the conflict, 12 to 15 of these banks were either in an easing cycle or preparing to implement rate cuts. Ultimately, regarding policy rates, sixteen banks maintained the status quo, two opted for an increase and three for a cut
