The Brazilian economy continues to withstand an ultra-restrictive monetary policy stance. In an election year, fiscal policy has become increasingly active to help cushion the impact of high interest rates and mitigate the effects of the oil shock on households' purchasing power. The resilience of economic activity comes at the cost of slower disinflation and a shift in the fiscal burden towards public banks. The policy mix—protective fiscal policy versus restrictive monetary policy—complicates the adjustments of prices, public finances, and inflation expectations amid more frequent supply shocks. The oil price shock has helped strengthen both external accounts and the reais
The presidential election on 21 June 2026 was won by Abelardo de la Espriella, an outsider who distances himself from the traditional figures of the Colombian right. His programme, which represents a total departure from that of the outgoing government, draws clear inspiration from the economic liberalisation advocated by Argentine President Javier Milei and the security measures of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. His accession to power in August therefore heralds major shifts in economic and fiscal policy, as well as in the fight against drug trafficking. Although economic growth has remained largely unaffected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is expected to slow in 2026, primarily due to more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies
Mexico’s economic outlook remains modest. It is characterised by a slowdown in private consumption and investment still held back by uncertainty and a lack of new infrastructure projects. Exports, the main drivers of economic activity, have benefited from the US regionalisation strategy, but the USMCA renegotiation is introducing new constraints. The US is tightening the conditions for accessing its market, threatening the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, which remains dependent on Asian inputs. At the same time, rising public debt, continued support for Pemex and falling oil revenues are drastically reducing fiscal margins, exacerbating the country’s economic challenges.
Saudi Arabia may not be the Gulf economy most vulnerable to the conflict in Iran, but it is by no means unaffected. This year’s growth forecasts have been significantly downgraded due to the decline in oil production. Nevertheless, excluding hydrocarbons, economic activity remains resilient. Crucially, the country has been able to capture some of the trade flows blocked in the Strait of Hormuz thanks to its infrastructure on the Red Sea. In the short term, the rise in oil exports will improve its external accounts. On the other hand, the recovery in public finances will be less pronounced due to soaring budgetary expenditures. However, there is still ample fiscal headroom. Public debt levels are moderate and the conflict has not undermined creditors’ confidence
The impact of the war in Iran and the energy crisis on the Egyptian economy are currently limited. The economy has benefited from macroeconomic fundamentals strengthened by international support and the increased credibility of its economic policy. The momentum for economic recovery and disinflation, which began in 2025, remains intact. The main source of vulnerability – foreign exchange liquidity – has only slightly deteriorated, supported by increased flexibility in exchange rates. Nevertheless, while the Egyptian economy’s vulnerability to external shocks is diminishing, it remains high, particularly due to the growing imbalance in the energy sector and dependence on volatile capital flows
For the first time since 2009 (excluding COVID), the GDP of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to contract this year (-0.8%), whereas pre-conflict forecasts had predicted growth of 4.7%. Far from benefiting from the sharp rise in energy prices triggered by the conflict, the scale of the downturn reflects the severity of a shock that is undermining many of the pillars of the Gulf economies. Nevertheless, the consequences are varying from one country to another, depending on the level of diversification and, above all, on the degree of vulnerability to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
The concept of ‘emerging economies’ as opposed to advanced economies is multifaceted and often poorly defined. The simplest and most commonly used indicator is GDP per capita, on which the classification used by international financial institutions (IFIs) is largely based
When we compare the impact on economic activity of the current energy shock with that of 2022 (following the conflict in Ukraine), the favorable point in 2026, for the euro area, is the business climate in the manufacturing sector, which is holding up better than in 2022. Consumer confidence has fallen sharply but to a lesser extent in 2026 than in 2022. As for the deterioration in the business climate in the services sector, it was immediate in 2026, whereas it occurred with a few months' delay in 2022. The assessment of the June data is positive and reinforces the encouraging signals from May data.
Shock and resilience: These are, once again, the key words of the first half of 2026. In 2025, the global economy had already faced the US tariff shock (less severe than initially feared) and demonstrated remarkable resilience. Today, faced with the new energy shock caused by the conflict in Iran, how resilient is the global economy?
Gathered in Sintra, Portugal, from 29 June to 1st July, the members of the ECB Governing Council adopted a notably cautious stance, just three weeks after raising key interest rates. This unanimous decision was in response to the energy shock triggered by the conflict in the Middle East. Since then, energy prices have fallen sharply, and the inflation and survey data from June have shown positive trends. However, the indirect effects of the energy shock are still difficult to assess fully. We maintain our scenario of an additional ECB rate hike in September, despite the easing of inflation risks, which makes such a move less likely.
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In the years following the pandemic, labour productivity in Italy has stalled. Artificial intelligence is identified as a potential catalyst for reversing this trend, with projections indicating possible annual productivity growth increases of up to 1.1 p.p. in a scenario of rapid adoption. However, the actual adoption of AI in Italy is still low, despite a faster growth rate compared with its main Euro area counterparts. As of 2025, only 16.4% of Italian companies with more than 10 employees were using AI. In the financial and insurance sectors, adoption rates are above average (39%, peaking at 70% in insurance)
In the European Union (EU), the post-Covid period was marked by a significant slowdown in productivity, which contrasts with the dynamic trend observed in the United States. However, there are reasons to put Europe's decline into perspective. Over a twenty-year period, real GDP per hour worked has grown more in the EU-27 than in Japan or the United Kingdom. The lag behind the United States is not continuous, but is linked to periods of crisis during which the US federal government intervened on a massive scale to support private-sector companies. The result is a public finance situation which appears much more favourable in Europe, allowing it to address a challenging future.
Over a year has passed since the German government announced substantial investment plans in defence and infrastructure. As we assess the situation in mid 2026, the implementation of these plans is progressing as we had anticipated. However, the current impact of these investments on growth is proving to be more subdued than expected (notably because a portion of the infrastructure funds has been used to finance government current expenditure). Nonetheless, the rebound in industrial orders is becoming evident, and the increase in intra European trade directed towards Germany indicates that a positive momentum is developing.
The energy shock triggered by the war in Iran is reviving inflation, but to a lesser extent than in 2022. May data supports this view. However, the situation still needs to be monitored closely. The U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding provides some relief, yet many uncertainties remain. A return to normal conditions on the oil markets will take time, and the current easing of oil prices must prove durable. Inflation—driven by the lagged effects of tensions on oil, commodities and value chains—is expected to stay elevated for several more months. This will justify a more restrictive stance from central banks.
The US regulatory framework is becoming more favourable to intermediation conditions within the US Treasuries market. The easing of leverage requirements has enabled the largest banks, known as Global Systemically Important Banks, or G-SIBs, to fulfil their role as intermediaries during the first months of the year. The ongoing reassessment of the G-SIB capital surcharge calculation method could also benefit market liquidity. However, the capacity of large US banks to absorb federal debt is expected to remain limited.
23 June will mark the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum, which led to the UK’s official exit from the European Union on 31 January 2020 (followed by a transition period). Since then, the country has indeed regained control over certain policy domains, such as trade, migration and regulatory frameworks. However, both the anticipation of Brexit and its actual implementation in 2021 have been linked to a decline in the country’s performance across several key indicators. Against a backdrop of escalating geopolitical tensions and mounting shared challenges, the UK is now seeking to re-establish practical collaboration with its main economic partner: the European Union.
The independence of the Federal Reserve (Fed) has been challenged by the US administration, but it remains intact. As the Kevin Warsh era begins with the 16-17 June FOMC meeting, the simultaneous strength of inflation and the labour market set the stage – should it persist, as we anticipate – for monetary tightening to start by the end of the year. Yet the turbulence at the end of Jerome Powell’s term is a reminder that central bank independence is not a given. The stakes go beyond price stability alone and extend to the global financial architecture itself.
