The global manufacturing PMI continues its sideways movement since March, when it had declined due to the war in Ukraine. May saw a weakening in the US and the euro area, where in particular Italy recorded a considerable decline. In Australia the PMI recorded a big drop. China saw a rebound following the easing of mobility restrictions. In India the PMI has been stable at a high level for several months and Vietnam saw a sizeable improvement in May. The services PMI was down in the US and the euro area, where in particular Germany was confronted with weaker data, although still well above the 50 mark. In the UK, the index recorded a huge drop. Japan is benefiting from better data and in India the already elevated index moved higher again in May.
US GDP growth was revised slightly downwards (-0.1 point) for Q1 2022, bringing the contraction in the annualised quarterly growth rate to -1.5%, contrary to expectations of a smaller contraction of only -1.3%. This correction can be attributed to a lower-than-expected private inventory investment (contribution of -1.1 points) as well as to the smaller contribution of investment (+1.2 point), especially residential investment. These revisions were partly offset by an increase in consumer spending of both goods and services (+2.1 points). Increases in exports and imports of goods cancelled each other out, leaving foreign trade’s net contribution unchanged (-3.2 points).
At its 10 March meeting, the ECB paved the way for raising its key deposit rate, although the timing of the first rate increase remained uncertain at the time: the odds of a September move had declined compared to a few weeks ago and July was excluded, which left December. The wait-and-see approach still seemed appropriate given the increasing downside risks to growth, aggravated by the current inflationary shock, the war in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid strategy. Yet economic data reported in the meantime, as well as the hawkish tone of several ECB members, seems to have accelerated the tempo. Concerning data, it is the combination of high inflation, a weak euro and relatively resilient growth that has moved forward the lift-off date.
Our different uncertainty gauges are complementary, in terms of scope and methodology. US economic policy uncertainty based on media coverage has eased slightly after a significant increase, reflecting concern about the impact of aggressive monetary policy tightening. In the US, business uncertainty about sales revenue growth has been stable but uncertainty about employment growth has rebounded somewhat, probably reflecting ongoing difficulties in filling vacancies. The European Commission’s uncertainty index, after having jumped following the war in Ukraine, has stabilised.
Uncertainty matters greatly for households and businesses when taking decisions. It can have many causes: economic, economic policy, political or even geopolitical. Survey data of the European Commission show that the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a huge jump in uncertainty, followed by a gradual decline. The war in Ukraine has triggered another, albeit more limited, increase. It will be important to monitor the development of uncertainty in the coming months at the level of consumers, businesses and individual countries. In the absence of a decline, one should expect that the negative impact shows up in spending and activity data.
China’s economic growth started to slow down in March, then activity contracted in April (industrial production: -2.9% year-on-year, services production: -6.1% y/y). This rapid deterioration has principally resulted from mobility restrictions implemented in various provinces of the country in response to the epidemic wave. Most importantly, stringent lockdowns have been imposed in some major industrial and port regions (notably Shanghai), which has dampened activity in manufacturing factories, disturbed transport of goods and leading to supply chain disruptions in many sectors. Overall, the health situation and the level of mobility restrictions in China are improving in May. Local economic activity may therefore be able to recover at least slightly.
The Italian economy began 2022 on a wrong footing, with a 0.2% q/q contraction in real GDP in the first quarter. The country has been hit hard by the war in Ukraine and by lasting disruption in world trade. These factors are having a particularly strong effect on economies with a large industrial base, as is the case in Italy. Inflation, which was 6.3% y/y in April (down from 6.8% y/y in March), has also had a significant negative effect on household confidence. According to the European Commission, consumer confidence increased very slightly in April (the balance of opinion rose 1.9 points to -22), but March had been the worst month since January 2014.
The resilience of Manufacturing PMI through to April was surprising, given the extent to which constraints on supply and pressure on input prices have increased since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine on 24 February. This is particularly true in Germany where, despite an industrial sector with considerable exposure to the shock, Manufacturing PMI remained well above 50 (54.6 in April 2022). This suggests that activity in the sector remained comfortably in the expansion zone, whereas industrial production contracted by 4.4% between January and March 2022. This conflicting message is due mainly to a methodological bias: the inclusion of delivery lags in the aggregate PMI index. This bias may be an issue when the PMI is used as a nowcast for industrial production or GDP growth
Although Germany returned to positive economic growth in the first quarter of 2022 – with GDP up 0.2 % q/q according to the initial estimate published by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) – March figures already showed the impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and strict lockdowns in several regions of China. Industrial production, which accounts for 24 % of German GDP, fell sharply in March (by 4.6 % m/m) after almost zero growth in February. Industrial production remains well below its pre-Covid level: in Q1 2022, it was 5.2 % lower than in Q4 2019. Worse, the rapid decline in March created a sharply negative growth overhang for the second quarter (-3 %).
Inflation is continuing to spread among the various components of the consumer price index (CPI). The energy component fell slightly in April (-2.5% m/m) after the government introduced a fuel rebate, but that decline was more than offset by faster inflation in other components of the CPI. Food prices in particular rose by 1.4% m/m in April, the sharpest increase for 20 years, beating figures seen in previous waves of food price inflation in 2007-08 and 2011. Food was the main contributor (0.2 points) to monthly inflation in April (0.4% m/m).
Latest inflation figures give the Spanish government a little respite. Having approached 10% in March (9.8%), consumer price inflation fell to 8.4% in April. Measures taken by the authorities to stem the rise in energy prices – mainly through subsidies and tax cuts – had a beneficial effect. However, food price inflation rose to 10.1% y/y in April. In addition, its contribution to overall inflation (1.98 percentage points) is now roughly the same as other energy-related components of expenditure, i.e., transport (1.98 points) and electricity, gas and other fuels (2.30 points).
The UK economy grew 0.8% q/q in Q1 2022, taking GDP 0.7% above its pre-Covid level of Q4 2019 but falling short of the 1% expansion expected. Since the ONS also publishes monthly GDP figures, it is possible to see how the economy fared over the course of the quarter. After a positive January (+0.7% m/m), output was flat in February (growth of 0% m/m as opposed to the initial estimate of +0.1%), and GDP even contracted slightly in March (-0.1% m/m). Although Q1 GDP was disappointing, its composition is also worrying looking ahead.
The global manufacturing PMI edged lower in April. The US and the UK recorded a small increase but there was a big improvement in Australia, Russia and even more so in Hong Kong. The euro area saw a decline but amongst its countries divergences trends were noted with an increase in France and the Netherlands and a decline in Germany and Italy. In China, Covid-19 infections led to a drop in the PMI to 46.0. The services PMI saw a significant decline in the US and a large improvement in the euro area. These developments are the mirror image of what we saw in manufacturing. France and Germany had better data but sentiment jumped in Italy and Spain. Japan had a moderate improvement. Data were significantly better in Brazil
Contrary to expectations (annualised quarterly growth of 1%) US GDP contracted by an annualised quarterly rate of 1.4% in Q1 2022. This surprise fall hides a more nuanced and less negative reality. The economic engines of household consumption and business investment are robust and contributed 1.8 points and 1.3 points of growth respectively. However, reduced inventories at companies (contribution from changes in inventory of -0.8 of a point) and a reduction in public spending (contribution of -0.5 of a point), due to the ending of several support programmes, had a negative effect on growth. But the biggest negative contribution came from international trade (-3.2 points), which was the main reason for the drop in quarterly GDP
In the space of just a few months, growth prospects in the eurozone have deteriorated markedly. So much so that the risk of a recession is looming this year. Between our growth forecast from early 2021 – when it peaked at 5.5% – and our current scenario, drawn up in mid-March 2022, expected growth has been about halved; we now expect a figure of 2.8%. As recently as November 2021, we were still forecasting 4.2%. This figure of 2.8% still looks very high, as it is well above the long-term trend rate of 1.6% per year on average between 1996 and 2019. However, it relies on an exceptionally high growth carry-over of 2.1% in Q1 2022 and, for the subsequent quarters, on projected weak but positive growth
US economic policy uncertainty based on media coverage has declined since the start of the year. In the US, business uncertainty about sales revenue growth has been edging higher whereas uncertainty about employment growth continues its downtrend. The European Commission’s uncertainty index has jumped following the war in Ukraine. This has also caused an exceptionally large increase in the geopolitical risk index, which is based on media coverage. The cross-sectional standard deviation of daily stock market returns of individual companies – a measure of financial uncertainty – has risen in the US and the euro area, albeit to a limited degree.
China’s economic growth reached 4.8% year-on-year (y/y) in Q1 2022. It improved slightly over the first two months of the year, both in industry and in services, but this recovery was cut short in March. Economic conditions have worsened rapidly, as our barometer shows (narrowing of the blue area relative to the dotted area). This deterioration has resulted primarily from the resurgence of Covid-19 and mobility restrictions imposed in a number of regions in the country. In addition, short-term growth prospects are also looking bleaker due to deterioration in the international climate triggered by the war in Ukraine.
After a strong start in 2022, China’s economic growth slowed in March. Headwinds are expected to persist in the very short term. Firstly, the rapid surge in the number of Covid-19 cases has led many regions to impose severe mobility restrictions. Secondly, the property market correction continues. Thirdly, producers and exporters will be affected by the impact of the war in Ukraine on commodity prices and world trade. Therefore, China’s official economic growth target, which has been set at 5.5% for 2022, seems highly ambitious. The Chinese authorities are accelerating the pace of fiscal and monetary easing.
The economic growth recovery has been unbalanced since the health shock in early 2020 and has rapidly lost steam. It was then interrupted in the first quarter of 2022, due to a very sharp rise in the number of Covid-19 infections and deaths linked to the Omicron variant. The epidemic wave is starting to recede, but Hong Kong will now have to face the effects of a slowing global trade, rising commodity prices and the tightening of US monetary policy. Despite these unfavourable conditions, sovereign solvency remains very robust and the government keeps a strong capacity to continue an expansionary fiscal policy.
Brazil ended 2021 on a stronger footing than expected, but the economic picture remains fragile. Activity tends to progress in spurts, curbed by internal brakes (Omicron wave, climatic vagaries, elections) and a more degraded external environment (war in Ukraine, trading partners’ economic slowdown, etc.). Meanwhile, inflationary pressures are building up and raise the specter of continued monetary tightening. Since the start of the year, the improvement in Brazil’s terms of trade and wide interest rate differentials with developed economies have fueled the rebound of the equity market and spurred a strong appreciation of the real. Such developments highlight a form of dissonance between the real economy and assessments of financial markets.
Poland is well equipped to deal with the economic consequences of the conflict in Ukraine. Its economy had fully absorbed the shock from Covid-19 by the end of 2021. Output was 5% higher than in late 2019, the recovery was well balanced and the unemployment rate had returned to a frictional level. In addition, Poland’s budget deficit fell sharply in 2021 and its public debt/GDP ratio remained well below the Maastricht limit due to a substantial gap between growth and interest rates. The current-account balance is in deficit again, but still comfortably covered by non-debt generating capital flows. The only cloud on the horizon is the acceleration in inflation which has prompted the central bank to tighten monetary policy more aggressively since autumn 2021
Romania’s economy slowed sharply in H2 2021, with rising inflation causing wages to decline in real terms for the first time since 2010. Growth also remained imbalanced and both public- and private-sector debt increased between 2019 and 2021. Monetary tightening started too late in 2021 and has remained very limited since the start of 2022. The external shock caused by the conflict in Ukraine will only make the slowdown worse. Any improvement in the budget deficit will be delayed by the cost of dealing with refugees. It will be the task of monetary policy to ensure financial stability in the current exceptional circumstances.
The impact on Serbia’s economy caused by the war in Ukraine is likely to remain moderate. However, the war will adversely affect all macroeconomic indicators. Growth forecasts have been downgraded because of sharply higher inflation, trade exposure to Russia and a weaker European economy. Serbia’s central bank has carried out only moderate monetary tightening so far, expecting that the jump in inflation will be short-lived. External accounts are likely to deteriorate because of the wider current account deficit and a possible slowdown in foreign direct investment flows, but the central bank should still be able to defend the dinar stability. This is crucial for Serbia’s macroeconomic stability given that commercial bank balance sheets and government debt are highly exposed to the euro
Egypt’s economic prospects have worsened with the outbreak of war in Ukraine and its consequences for commodity prices. The widespread increase in prices will result in a significant drop in consumer purchasing power and will thus stall the main engine of economic activity. The erosion of foreign currency liquidity has accelerated over the last month, with massive outflows of capital and an expected widening of the current account deficit due to the difficulty in reducing imports, a drop in tourist frequentation and the limited effect on exports of the Egyptian pound’s depreciation. This highlights the continued vulnerability of the economy to external shocks and its reliance on external support
The US yield curve has flattened, giving rise to comments that, given the historical experience, risk of a recession is increasing. Yet, when drawing conclusions, caution is warranted. Market-based inflation expectations, which are very high, should decline after a number of rate hikes. This could pull down long-term nominal bond yields, leading to a further flattening or even an inversion of the curve. However, a decline in inflation is growth-supportive. Another reason for caution is that due to past central bank asset purchases, the slope of the yield curve is less steep. Past QE may thus reduce its quality as a leading indicator of economic growth. For these reasons, an alternative indicator has been developed
