The economy has been recovering gradually since March, and the rebound in real GDP was strong enough in Q2 2020 to enable it to recover rapidly the ground lost in Q1. Yet the shock triggered by the pandemic and the ensuing lockdown measures has severely weakened some sectors (such as export-oriented industries), some corporates (notably micro-enterprises and SMEs) and some households (especially low-income earners). The central bank has cautiously eased credit conditions and the government has introduced a stimulus plan estimated at about 5 points of GDP for 2020. Public investment in infrastructure projects remains the instrument of choice, but direct support to corporates and households is also expected to boost private demand.
India should report an unprecedented contraction in real GDP this year. The big question is how strong will it rebound thereafter? The rating agencies have begun to doubt whether India will return to its potential growth rate in the years ahead because its economic slowdown began much earlier than the Covid-19 crisis. India’s slowdown dates back at least to 2018, and could even be an extension of the 2009 financial crisis. Since 2014, real GDP growth seems to have been driven solely by positive external shocks, creating the illusion of robust growth. Yet the banking sector is still much too fragile to restore GDP to the growth rates of the past.
While the Covid-19 epidemic continues to spread, restrictions have started to ease in parts of the country. A severe contraction of economic activity is anticipated in Q2 with the latest data indicating that a low point was reached in April. A rapid recovery of economic activity will be constrained by the economy’s weak growth engines, especially investment. Fiscal and monetary policy measures have continued to be deployed or extended to help cushion the impact of the crisis. While the currency continues to exhibit weakness and fiscal balances keep deteriorating, continued monetary easing has helped boost the stock market.
The Russian economy is more solid today than it was five years ago. After the 2014-15 crisis, the government managed to rebuild its sovereign wealth fund, which is now enabling it to offset the loss of oil revenue. Public finances are less dependent on oil revenues, thanks to the VAT increase in 2019, and the government should have no trouble meeting its short-term commitments. Yet lockdown restrictions and the collapse of commodity prices will have a big impact on both growth and the banking sector, which is still fragile, although it is less vulnerable to a forex shock.
The Polish economy has to smooth the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit not only through the decline in foreign demand but also through the lockdown’s impact on domestic consumption. Yet the country has enough policy leeway to do so, thanks notably to a reasonable level of public debt before the slowdown began. GDP is unlikely to return to pre-crisis levels before mid-2021, which is bound to curb investment. Thereafter, Poland is expected to return to its robust growth trajectory since its strengths remain intact (competitiveness, labour supply, low wage costs and productivity gains), which have transformed the country into the European Union’s 5th biggest industrial sector.
Ukraine is usually quite prone to boom bust cycles. Yet high volatility has not allowed to stabilize growth towards a higher level, and fickle capital inflows have reinforced the importance of funding from foreign institutions, notably from the IMF and the European Union. Such official financing, coupled with the structural progress it has made in recent years, seem to have helped the country to cope with the Covid-19 crisis, at least for the moment, with fewer negative financial consequences than initially feared. Strong foreign demand for Ukraine’s grain, lower oil prices and the foreign financing are all favourable factors that have helped the country weather the crisis, and raise hopes for a rapid economic recovery once the Covid-19 crisis is over.
Growth prospects are deteriorating constantly in Mexico. In the short term, several factors are weakening the economy, including the impact of lockdown restrictions on domestic demand, the decline in oil prices, the disruption of supply chains and sluggish external demand. Without a fiscal stimulus package, the support measures announced by the central bank will not suffice to offset the enormous shock. In the medium term, the economy’s capacity to rebound is limited. The downturn in the business climate and other pre-crisis factors that contributed to the slowdown, coupled with the government’s contradictory signals, will continue to weigh on investment.
The economic rebound expected in H2 2020 has been slow in the making. For the moment, the pandemic seems to be under control, and there have already been several phases of reopening, but domestic demand remains sluggish. Exports also fell sharply again in May. Above all, it is the absence of international tourists that is straining growth prospects, at least in the short term, because fiscal and monetary support measures – though massive – will not suffice to totally absorb the shock. As a result, the recovery is likely to be more restrained than in the other Asian countries.
The massive use of expatriate workers, a key element in the Gulf states’ economic models, has been called into question by the economic recession, widening budget deficits and employment nationalisation programmes, particularly in the public sector. The construction and services sectors, which also depend massively on foreign workers, are suffering as a result of cuts in public spending. However, it is far from certain that the expected reduction in expatriate employment in the short term will result in a significant and lasting increase in employment for Gulf nationals. The Gulf states are likely to have difficulties to go without foreign labour.
The shock triggered by the Covid-19 epidemic has been violent and has hit an already very fragile economy. Over the past five years, economic growth has averaged only 0.8% and the country has slipped into recession since mid-2019. The economic contraction and the deterioration in public finances will be on an unprecedented scale in 2020. Real GDP may well not return to its pre-crisis level before 2025. The government has been adept in adjusting its financing strategy to cover its needs, which have increased steeply following the introduction of the fiscal stimulus plan. The support expected from multilateral lenders in the short term is reassuring, but trends in government debt will continue to be a concern over the medium term.
Although the pandemic is well contained from a health perspective, the Covid-19 crisis combined with the downturn in oil prices will have severe economic consequences. With no real fiscal leeway, the government has implemented a very modest economic stimulus plan, while massive capital outflows and the collapse of oil exports have fuelled the rapid erosion of foreign reserves, bringing the naira under pressure. The deterioration in public and external accounts despite support from donor funds hampers any prospects of a recovery. Just four years after the last recession, real GDP is expected to contract significantly again in 2020. Without an upturn in oil prices, the rebound will be mild in 2021.
Following the example of the Term Funding Scheme (TFS) introduced by the Bank of England (BoE) in the summer of 2016, the Term Funding Scheme Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (TFSME) announced in March 2020 aims to support the supply of loans to businesses via a four-year refinancing program granted to credit institutions at a lower rate than that of the main refinancing operations[1]. Unlike the TFS, the TFSME more specifically targets the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Above all, operational since April 15, the scheme resulted in GBP11.9bn drawdown from credit institutions on 27 May and already came with a significant drop in average borrowing rates of the all private non-financial companies (SNFs), and even more so in the case of SMEs
With 50,000 new cases reported daily – twice as many as at the beginning of June – and the number of hospitalisations on the rise, the Covid-19 pandemic is in the midst of an alarming resurgence in the United States. Granted the number of cases increases with the increase in testing, but this alone is not a sufficient explanation. The government’s response to the crisis is also to blame. In the European Union, where lockdown restrictions and business closures were implemented earlier and more systematically than in the United States, the situation seems to be better under control. Estimates of economic losses must be approached cautiously. The economy is rebounding on both sides of the Atlantic after reporting historically big contractions of about 10% in the second quarter
In the past decades, German enterprises have been offshoring activities, in particular to Central and Eastern Europe and China. Despite the slowing of the globalisation pace in recent years, German industry is still losing ground in textiles, chemical and pharmaceuticals, and computers, electronic and electrical equipment. Despite China’s dominance in global manufacturing production, Germany has remained an important global and regional player. Supply chains disruptions related to Covid-19 have increased calls for a reassessment. However, it is unlikely to lead to radical changes in global supply chains. Only in case of market failures, as seen in the field of pharmaceuticals, policies should be developed to correct them.
Mexican real GDP fell by 19.9% year- on- year in April. At the same time, industrial production plunged by 30% (the manufacturing component fell by more than 35%). In addition to the domestic impact of lockdown measures, economic activity has been hit by the fall in the oil price, disruption in supply chains, and the sharp decline in external demand (especially from the US) affecting both the export and tourism sectors. The Central Bank has lowered its policy rate (by 225 basis points since January, to 5%) and announced several series of measures aimed at supporting the economy, but this will not be sufficient to cushion the shock. Indeed, the government, preferring to stick to its fiscal austerity policy, has not announced a major fiscal plan to support the economy
Our barometer shows an improvement in China’s economic momentum during the period between March and May 2020, compared to the preceding three months. This came as no surprise as economic activity collapsed in February, the first month of the lockdown, before beginning a very gradual recovery in March...
Having contracted by 5.8% in March, the UK’s GDP plummeted by more than 20% in April, with industrial production and retail sales down 24.3% and 18.7%, respectively. This is its biggest monthly fall since the data series began in 1997. However, economic growth will probably return quickly, due to the gradual easing of lockdown measures – most ‘non-essential’ shops have reopened this week – and to monetary and fiscal support...
The European Commission has recently published the 2020 Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI). DESI is a weighted average of five indicators: connectivity, citizens’ digital skills, use of internet, integration of digital technology in businesses, and digital public services. Scandinavian countries perform the best, with Finland, Sweden and Denmark at the top of the ranking. Italy is only 25th, while France (16th), Germany (12th) and Spain (11th) are close to the EU average. The Covid-19 crisis and the lockdown have led to a greater use of digital technology
Major economic policy responses have been introduced to try to attenuate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the economy. This document reviews the key measures taken by central banks and governments in a large number of countries as well as those taken by international organisations. It includes measures that were introduced through 15 June. It will be updated regularly.
One of the longer-lasting consequences of this crisis is a forced increase in corporate gearing A high level of corporate leverage can act as a drag on growth. Research shows that firms with higher leverage invest less than others. This reduces the effectiveness of monetary accommodation. Highly indebted companies may also suffer a lasting loss in competitiveness vis-à-vis their better capitalised competitors. It implies that policies aimed at recapitalising companies should have lasting favourable effects on growth.
Industrial output and retail sales both plunged in April – by 19.1% and 10.5%, respectively on a month-on-month basis. Furthermore, the latest labour market figures show a misleadingly decline in the unemployment rate of 6.3% in April. Indeed, this was due to a record contraction in the labour force; employment also fell sharply...
There were no exceptions. As expected, the US economic barometer, which covers all or part of the data available through May 2020, is signalling the worst recession to have hit the United States since 1946 ...
The publication by the ECB of different economic scenarios illustrates the extent of uncertainty which at present surrounds the forecasts for key macroeconomic variables. As a consequence, companies may hold off investing, preferring to wait for better visibility. While understandable at the micro level, such a wait-and-see attitude could act as a drag on growth and reinforce the view of companies that their caution was warranted. The large increase in the dispersion of earnings forecasts points to huge uncertainty at the individual company level. However this has not stopped the US equity market from rallying. Although several factors help to explain these different reactions to uncertainty, such dissension cannot last forever
The gradual easing of lockdown measures has for the month of May, as expected, led to an improvement in the manufacturing PMIs in all countries with the exception of the Netherlands and Japan. The extent of the rebound however varies greatly between countries [...]
The Covid-19 crisis will not be without its consequences for the Russian economy, which faces twin supply and demand side shocks against the background of collapsing commodity prices. According to forecasts from the IMF and the Russian central bank, economic activity could contract by between 4% and 6%. Macroeconomic fundamentals are likely to worsen, but without undermining the government’s ability to meet its obligations. However, this latest shock will weaken a banking sector that is in full restructuring mode and could delay the important government development projects that will be essential to boosting growth over the medium term. Against this background, on 2 June the government announced a new plan of RUB 5 trn (4
