The gradual easing of lockdown measures has for the month of May, as expected, led to an improvement in the manufacturing PMIs in all countries with the exception of the Netherlands and Japan. The extent of the rebound however varies greatly between countries [...]
The Covid-19 crisis will not be without its consequences for the Russian economy, which faces twin supply and demand side shocks against the background of collapsing commodity prices. According to forecasts from the IMF and the Russian central bank, economic activity could contract by between 4% and 6%. Macroeconomic fundamentals are likely to worsen, but without undermining the government’s ability to meet its obligations. However, this latest shock will weaken a banking sector that is in full restructuring mode and could delay the important government development projects that will be essential to boosting growth over the medium term. Against this background, on 2 June the government announced a new plan of RUB 5 trn (4
The European Commission is proposing a comprehensive plan to support growth and achieve the EU ambitions in terms of climate policy and digital strategy. Such an effort is necessary in order to avoid that the current crisis would increase the economic divergence between member states. Such a development would weaken the functioning of the Single Market and weigh on long-term growth. The Commission proposes a combination of grants and loans at favourable terms, funded by debt issued directly by the EU. Given the resistance of certain countries to grants, negotiations on the proposal will be tough.
Without a doubt, the eurozone GDP will contract much more sharply in Q2 than in Q1 (-3.8% on a quarterly basis, q/q). Yet this deterioration generally seems to have been halted. After a timid upturn in the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) in May, the eurozone Economic Sentiment Index (ESI) also seems to have bottomed out. After dropping to an all-time low of 64.9 in April 2020, the ESI picked up slightly to 67.5 in May [...]
Households’ confidence will be a key determinant in the current recovery. The deterioration – felt or anticipated – in the labour market has weighed on consumers’ optimism: the European Commission (EC) unemployment expectations index dropped to a 11-year low in April (63.0). However, the Purchasing Managers indices (PMI) indicate that the economic downturn has started to ease in May. This could filter through into a pick-up of households’ confidence. Indeed, the chart below shows that the EC unemployment expectations index follows closely the employment PMI indicator. The latter improved in May, although staying at a very low level. The gradual reopening of shops, restaurants, and some cultural sites could also support consumers’ confidence in the coming weeks.
Across time and countries, financial crises and, more broadly, recessions and recoveries, have had much in common. Recessions predominantly impact the demand side whereas the influence on the supply side is more limited. This time is different. The pandemic-induced recession will have a longer lasting influence on the allocation of household expenditures, if not on the level of spending. More than a normal recession, it will also have major repercussions on the supply side, through changes in global value chains, working from home or the disruption of the economics of businesses which are confronted with a forced capacity reduction on social distancing grounds.
Economic activity contracted sharply in February, the first month of the lockdown, before rebounding very gradually in March and April. The recovery is bound to be very slow after this brutal first-quarter shock [...]
Central Europe has registered a better growth performance in Q1 (-1% q/q), compared to -3.3% in the European Union. In Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria economic growth had even remained positive during this period. However, this Q1 growth performance is rather the consequence of a late impact of the Covid-19 than a byproduct of a lower impact. Manufacturing production figures show that the economic downturn has gathered pace in Central Europe in March. This downturn is now stronger in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia than in European Union’s average. Exports should be one of the main drivers of the contagion towards Central Europe
Fed Chair Powell’s comment about what would happen in case of a prolonged recession has weighed heavily on equity markets. Historically, recessions are accompanied by major equity market drawdowns. The year-to-date decline is more limited, which stands in stark contrast with the plunge of activity. Massive monetary and fiscal policy support has led to a reassessment of the distribution of risks, which goes a long way in explaining the rebound of equity markets. The focus is now shifting to the outlook for corporate earnings, hence the importance of the debate on the shape of the recovery.
In the USA, as elsewhere, the paralysis of activity caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has affected the production of statistics, which have become harder to interpret. The rebound in hourly wages in April indicated by the “pulse” is a false signal and should be treated with caution: it can be explained by the collapse in hours worked, against which wages always show a certain inertia. Not only is the information gathered from companies incomplete, but there may well have been a lag between the shutdown of businesses and the stopping of wages [...]
Following the judgment of the German Constitutional Court on 5 May, the ECB Governing Council needs to demonstrate that the monetary policy objectives of its PSPP are not disproportionate to the economic and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme. In most cases, monetary, economic and fiscal policies are mutually reinforcing. When assessing whether monetary policy is appropriate, one should take into account the stance of economic and fiscal policy. The necessity to have adequate transmission to all jurisdictions as well as the likelihood and extent of tail risks due to insufficient policy action also play a role in the assessment.
The Spanish data has sharply deteriorated – well below their historical averages – since the beginning of the lockdown in March. The trend in exports and industrial output remains positive on the graphic below but the latest figures are only for February. They will also plunge in March/April [...]
Major central banks have stepped up their efforts to attenuate the economic impact of the pandemic, raising the question whether there is a limit to balance sheet expansion. An asset purchase program (QE) can continue for a long time, given the possibility to broaden the investable universe. Quite likely, asset price distortions and concern about the riskiness of the central bank balance sheet will act as the true constraint. For this reason, a central bank could decide to finance the budget deficit directly, considering that this should have a bigger growth impact for a given expansion of the balance sheet. The real challenge under such a strategy is to keep inflation under control once the output gap is closing.
Since March 2020, the deterioration in the global economic environment has stopped the appreciation of the Egyptian pound. In 2019, the pound appreciated by 12% against the USD with the rise in current account receipts and sustained portfolio inflows. Since March, massive portfolio outflows have entailed the pound’s moderate 1.2% depreciation and a decline in the official foreign reserves of the Central Bank (CBE) by 11%. In the short term, current account revenues should weather the drop in Suez Canal and tourism revenues (20% of current account receipts in total). The CBE’s fx liquidity (8 months of imports of goods and services including tier-2 reserves) and the IMF financial support should allow the CBE to ease pressure on the pound in order to limit imported inflation
Clear progress has been made at the European Council meeting this week. The proposals of the recent Eurogroup meeting on the creation of three safety nets have been endorsed. There is agreement to work on a recovery fund intended for the most affected sectors and geographical areas in Europe. Its financing would be linked with the multiannual financial framework. Importantly, Chancellor Merkel has declared that, in the spirit of solidarity, one should be prepared to temporarily pay a higher contribution to the European budget.
Our Pulse for Turkey shows good resilience of the economy until February/March. So far, the government has not imposed a generalized lockdown therefore the supply shock is less severe than for other European economies. Besides, the Central Bank has lowered its policy rate by 200 basis points since mid-March and one third of the support program announced by the government (2.3% of GDP) has been already spent at mid-March. We expect recession to be limited to -2% for 2020 as a whole.
The Covid-19 pandemic shows that the supply side warrants greater attention when conducting macroeconomic analyses. Very long global value chains may be optimal from a cost and price perspective, but operationally may be very complex and, in particular, fragile. A more resilient supply side comes with a cost, both at the micro and macro level. Solving this trade-off in a market economy is difficult, which, to some degree, leaves a role for public policy.
Emerging countries have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic even though the official number of confirmed cases and deaths (excluding China) is still low compared to the figures for the developed countries. A wave of slowdowns and recessions is only just beginning, and the economic fallout will probably spread beyond 2020, because the real shock (shutdown of business due to confinement measures) is compounded by a financial shock and commodity price shock. Capital outflows and the freeze on bond issues in international markets increases refinancing risk in US dollars. Preventative safety nets are being set up to reduce defaults, but the solution for the most vulnerable countries is probably a sovereign debt moratorium or a debt relief.
China’s population and its economy were the first to be struck by the coronavirus epidemic. Activity contracted abruptly during the month of February before rebounding thereafter at a very gradual pace. Although the situation on the supply side is expected to return to normal in Q2, the demand shock will persist. Domestic investment and consumption will suffer from the effects of lost household and corporate revenues while world demand is falling. The authorities still have substantial resources to intervene to help restart the economy. Central government finances are not threatened. However, after the shock to GDP growth, the expected upsurge in domestic debt ratios will once again aggravate vulnerabilities in the financial sector.
India was not spared the coronavirus pandemic. The economic slowdown will be all the more severe with a protracted lockdown of the population. The government also lacks the fiscal capacity of the other Asian countries to bolster its economy. Already strained by the economic slowdown of the past two years, public finances are bound to deteriorate further. Public debt could reach 75% of GDP by 2022. Refinancing risks are low, but the cost of borrowing could rise for the long term if the rating agencies were to sanction its public debt and deficit overruns. India still has sufficient foreign reserves to cover its short-term liabilities.
The massive economic shock resulting from the coronavirus sanitary crisis will delay Brazil’s economic recovery, suspend the process of fiscal consolidation and stall progress on reforms. While the extent of the recessionary shock remains highly uncertain, measures – both fiscal and monetary – have been taken to mitigate the impact of confinement measures on economic activity, prevent a sharp upturn in unemployment and ensure that tensions over liquidity do not materialize into solvency problems. Intervention capacities on the monetary side are ample and contrast with those on the fiscal side, which are more limited due to the fragilities of public accounts. Brazil’s financial markets, which came under significant stress in Q1, will continue to be challenged.
The Turkish economy is facing problems of a sort it has dealt with in the past: a global crisis, that will trigger a sharp fall in exports, coupled with a contraction of external financing. Unlike in 2018, Turkey’s economy does not appear to be overheating, whilst the fall in oil prices and the emergence of a current account surplus are two factors that will reduce the risk. That said, the relatively weak levels of currency reserves, the high level of external debt and the recent rise in non-performing loans are all significant risk factors. In front of the current shock, the economic policy response will have to address foreign currency liquidity needs properly in a context of dwindling capital flows.
Romania’s economy has become gradually unbalanced in recent years, ending 2019 with significant twin deficits, i.e. both a fiscal deficit and a current account deficit. An accommodative fiscal policy has stimulated growth and should continue to do so. Even so, Romania will not avoid a contagion effect due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic fallout. The country is bound to slip into recession even though growth has already dwindled. Though foreign currency liquidity is still sufficient, its relatively low level could constrain monetary policy: a stable exchange rate is key for an economy that still has a significant amount of euro-denominated debt, albeit much less than before.
The COVID-19 crisis will have a huge impact on an economy that was already weakened slightly by the slowdown in global trade in 2019. Yet Indonesia’s macroeconomic fundamentals are strong: its public finances are solid, the banking sector is robust and both companies and households have very little debt. The country has sufficient foreign reserves to cover its short-term financing needs. Yet the rupiah is bound to remain under fierce downward pressure: the current account deficit is only partially financed by foreign direct investment, and capital outflows have reached unprecedented levels since 31 January.
The coronavirus crisis has hit a fast-growing economy, which expanded by more than 6% year-on-year in H2 2019 and looked set to continue at the same pace in 2020. The pandemic and the very strict lockdown imposed by the Duterte government will cause all the engines of growth to seize up: production will stop in the country’s economic centre, the fall in domestic demand will be exacerbated by reductions in remittances from workers abroad and losses in the informal economy, tourism will collapse and exports of goods and services will follow suit. This is a substantial shock, but the strong macroeconomic fundamentals and the modest level of government debt give the authorities scope to introduce support measures.
