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Conjoncture // July August 2017
economic-research.bnpparibas.com
investment (even though it has picked up as a share of GDP since
014) and the significant decline in total factor productivity. Reforms to
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the business climate are currently underway, including a new
investment law, and major capital expenditures have been made,
notably in infrastructure and energy production. Even so, some key
factors for boosting productivity, such as improving employability
through spending on education, seem to be missing, at least for the
moment, from the economic reform programme.
In a restrictive fiscal environment, economic activity in the second half
of fiscal year 2016/17 was driven by the positive dynamics created by
economic reforms. According to the government, real GDP growth is
expected to reach about 4% in 2016/17, compared to the previous
year’s performance of 4.3%. One growth engine was investment,
bolstered notably by foreign investment in the energy sector, and by a
very buoyant construction sector. Private consumption, the main growth
engine, remained rather resilient, even though it was curbed by high
inflation.
Contributions to real GDP growth
Net exports
Investment
Public consumption
%
1
1
2
0
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
Private consumption GDP
This momentum is expected to be confirmed in the short term, albeit
without fuelling a real acceleration in activity. Although the impact of
inflation on the disposable income of low income households can be
partially offset by social welfare transfers, it severely erodes the
purchasing power of the middle class. This category of the population is
a big spender on imported consumer goods (such as cars), but also on
education and healthcare services in the private sector, the costs of
which are rising rapidly. This means they will have to hedge their
purchases, which could end up having a negative impact on the overall
level of consumption.
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Chart 13
Sources: Ministry of Planning, BNP Paribas
As to investment, sharply higher interest rates will scale back the
investment decisions of national companies, at least in the short term.
For the moment, the increase in foreign direct investment is still
concentrated in the energy sector. Excluding the energy sector, non-
resident investment decisions are generally made by companies that
are already present in the Egyptian market, and many foreign
companies are taking a wait-and-see approach. An increase in public
investment, which is one of the government’s priorities, could provide
additional support. Investment expenditure accounts for only about 10%
of total fiscal spending, or 3.5% of GDP. Lastly, the net export
contribution could provide non-negligible support for activity in 2017/18.
Non-oil sector exports should regain competitiveness, but above all,
imports are likely to contract for three reasons: 1) the unfavourable
currency effect, 2) government restrictions on importers, and 3) the
start-up of production at natural gas fields, which should reduce
hydrocarbon imports. All in all, we expect growth to accelerate to more
than 5% in the medium term.
The year 2017 is a transition year for the Egyptian economy. Through
major economic reforms, the authorities are aiming to foster a sustained
recovery in a stabilised macroeconomic environment. Three factors
threaten this scenario: persistent political risks, the difficult coordination
of economic policy, and international market fluctuations.
Egypt, like the Middle East region as a whole, is plagued by political
tensions. The tourism sector has virtually collapsed since 2011. The
number of tourists has plunged from 15 million a year in 2010 to 5.4
million in 2016. We can see a timid recovery in this sector (+11% at an
annualised rate in Q3 2016/17), thanks notably to the reopening of
certain air routes. Some routes have not reopened yet (Russia, for
example), and the development of new tourism business (China) is a
very gradual process.
Yet, looking beyond short-term trends and the rebound in growth since For the moment, the political crisis between the Gulf States (Egypt is a
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011, there are reasons to doubt the Egyptian economy’s capacity to partner in the coalition behind the Qatar embargo) is having only a
reach sustainable growth strong enough to create sufficient jobs and to limited impact on the Egyptian economy. Yet the crisis represents a
reduce the role of the informal sector. According to the International potential economic risk given Egypt’s strong presence in Qatar (about
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Institute of Finance (IIF) , Egypt’s potential growth rate has been 250,000 Egyptians work in Qatar, mainly in skilled jobs). Tighter
declining for the past ten years, to 3.5% presently, from 4.4% over the sanctions could trigger retaliation from Qatar. Yet the relative
period 2007-10. This decline can be attributed to both the slowdown in dependence of the two economies limits such an outcome: Qatar is
present in certain key sectors of the Egyptian economy (industry,
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G. Iradian, Y. Yakhshilikov, B. Markovic, 2017, Egypt research note. “Major adjustment
is underway", IIF.