Highly vulnerable to the commodity price shock
Morocco will be hard hit by the indirect consequences of the conflict in Ukraine. Trade relations are limited, since Russia and Ukraine account for only 3% of Morocco’s external trade, and almost non-existent for tourism activity and investment. However, around 20% of Morocco’s cereal imports come from the two countries, which means it will have to find new sources at a time when global prices are soaring and when Morocco’s domestic production is about to fall dramatically because of a serious drought during the winter.
Morocco depends on external supply to cover around 60% of its needs. In addition, the weight of food in the consumer price basket is heavy (37.5%). Although Morocco has relatively large wheat reserves (five months), the higher cost of cereals will put serious pressure on Morocco’s trade position and inflation. The energy shock may be even greater. With hydrocarbon imports over 6% of GDP in the last five years, Morocco’s economy is one of the most vulnerable to oil price movements in the MENA region. Nevertheless, it is also one of the most robust to deal with the shock.
External liquidity: significant buffers
Morocco’s external stability is not under threat. Although imports are expected to rise sharply – each $10 increase in the Brent crude price raises energy imports by 1% of GDP – exports will also perform well. This is due in particular to high global prices for phosphates (20-25% of Morocco’s exports). They rose 67% in 2021 to their highest level since 2012, and the outlook is well oriented in tandem with the strong dynamic of agricultural commodity prices. Morocco is the world’s fifth-largest exporter of fertilisers and could even gain market share. Other factors should also be taken into account, starting with the rebound of tourism. Although the Covid-19 pandemic still represents a risk, the progress of vaccination programmes in both Morocco and Europe gives grounds for hope that tourism will start to recover after two difficult seasons. A rise in tourism receipts by 50-60% is thus hoped this year before moving back close to its pre-pandemic level in 2023. Receipts were still 56% below that level in 2021. In addition, remittances from the Moroccan diaspora will continue to play a shock-absorbing role, although they could fall from the record of MAD93.2 billion (10.7% of GDP) seen in 2021.
In the circumstances, the current account deficit is expected to widen significantly to 5.7% of GDP in 2022, before narrowing to 4.8% in 2023. Although the widening of Morocco’s sovereign spreads on foreign currency bonds has remained limited at 260bp compared with 350bp for the average of emerging countries, external financing conditions are also likely to be less favourable than in the last two years. However, the Moroccan economy has some significant buffers. FX reserves currently cover seven months of goods and services imports. Limited exposure to portfolio investment flows is also a stabilizing factor in the current context. In addition, the authorities are not ruling out asking the IMF for a new precautionary and liquidity line should pressure on the balance of payments becomes too strong. At the moment, that pressure appears manageable. The fluctuation of dirham does not point out any particular sign of stress chart 1). Its fall against the US dollar just after the conflict broke out is mainly linked to the weakening of the euro against the dollar. The dirham also remains within fluctuating bands and forward rates show limited currency risk at this stage.
No change in fiscal policy...
Public finances also offer some room for manoeuvre, at least in the short term. Unlike other countries in the region, the Moroccan government has not been subsiding petroleum prices since 2015. It has announced targeted measures to support transport companies, but these remain limited to 0.2% of GDP. However, subsidies for butane and wheat flour will increase sharply. According to the latest estimates, they are likely to reach 2.4% of GDP this year against 1.4% initially budgeted, and this additional cost will come on top of other support measures for the tourism and agriculture sectors. In response, the government is planning to mobilize additional revenues thanks notably to excellent performances of state-owned phosphates producer OCP.
The deficit target of 6.3% of GDP in 2022 (5.9% including privatisation proceeds) remains unchanged. Although some assumptions are still fragile, the government has already declared that a supplementary financing bill will be not necessary. There are also no plans of spending reallocations despite the historically high public investment of more than 20% of GDP – including state-owned enterprises, local authorities and the Mohammed VI strategic fund- budgeted in 2022 and the launch of the social protection extension, which will cost an estimated 1.5% of GDP per year in the next five years.
The fact that the government is not planning to use the SDRs (0.9% of GDP) allocated by the IMF in August 2021 is another sign of confidence. In any case, the government will still be able to rely on a liquid, captive domestic market in order to continue accessing funding at favourable conditions. Although the central government debt is high at 75% of GDP, interest payments absorbs only 12% of revenue thanks to one of the lowest apparent interest rates in the region (3.3%). The debt structure is also favourable, with 77% denominated in local currency and held by Moroccan residents, limiting vulnerability to external shocks.