Argentina’s economy is in turmoil. Since Q4 2022, it has been mired in a recession that is bound to extend at least through H1 2023. The farm sector has been plagued by misfortune: for the third consecutive year it has been hit by drought – whose intensity has been compounded by climate change – and an outbreak of avian influenza. Inflation has soared, forcing the central bank to tighten monetary policy. Despite fiscal efforts, the balance of payments and foreign reserves are coming under increasingly fierce pressures, even with IMF support. The government has rolled out a series of measures to avoid wasting foreign reserves and defaulting on its external debt with official creditors. It has also had to offer a proposal to reschedule domestic debt in the local currency.
Trade integration with China (including Hong Kong and Macau) has changed tremendously over the past 20 years. In 2022, bilateral trade amounted to some USD 150 bn – a 37-fold increase relative to trade in 2001. Since 2009, China has been Brazil’s main trading partner absorbing today close to 27% of its exports (vs 11% for the US).
The political crisis worsened in Peru over the last two months. In the very short term, political instability should continue, and weigh on the economic outlook.
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva started his third term as President of Brazil amidst a tense socio-political climate and more benign economic environment. Despite the many obstacles lying ahead of him, Lula bolsters ambitious social and environmental objectives. Their realisation will rely, amongst other, on an increase in public spending and a more interventionist credit policy. In the absence of a credible redefinition of the fiscal framework, market participants and the Central Bank fear that the use of these policies will come at the expense of greater macroeconomic imbalances.
Chile is unlikely to escape a recession in 2023. The slowdown in global demand will weigh on exports, while domestic demand continues to be eroded by high inflation and interest rates due to restrictive monetary policy. The investment outlook remains closely linked to the political climate in the country, and in particular to the implementation of the two principal reforms announced by the government: the new constitutional process (which is expected to continue throughout 2023), and the implementation of pensions reform.
Gabriel Boric, the candidate of the very broad left-wing coalition, won the second round of the presidential election last December. He took office in mid-March, and is already facing numerous challenges. His general policy speech at the beginning of June, and then the tax reforms he brought forward at the end of June, have confirmed his intention to implement economic and social policies which differ from those of previous governments. His ambitious objective for his term of office is to begin a rapid "green transition", but also to find the "right balance" between the need for reforms in favour of greater social justice and the need to remain "fiscally responsible"
Accelerating growth, slowing inflation, falling unemployment and the interruption of monetary tightening differentiate Brazil from most of the world’s major economies. These developments, which are largely attributable to fiscal stimuli (higher social transfers, reduction in taxes and fuel prices), are complicating the task of monetary authorities by partially diluting the restrictive effects of their policy. In the second half of the year, the maintenance of fiscal stimulus should again help limit the slowdown in activity. Brazil’s solid economic performance has allowed financial assets to hold up well despite the general elections and a deteriorating global environment.
The economic dynamism seen in the first half of 2022 is waning. The rebound in private consumption is being held back by rising inflationary pressures, while exports are weakening due to slowing growth in the United States and global demand. Structural weaknesses in the economy (low investment, lack of infrastructure) are also limiting the growth recovery. Moreover, a deterioration in public finances is increasingly likely in the medium term. The very limited rise in fiscal income will not be enough to compensate for the necessary increase in government spending that is expected in the coming years. In addition, sovereign wealth funds have been used over the past two years and the government no longer has any reserves.
In Chile, a large majority of voters (nearly 62%, with an exceptional voter turnout) rejected the draft new constitution in the referendum held on 4 September. The draft, which contains almost 400 articles, did not propose a profound reform of the Chilean economic model; the Central Bank had to remain independent, while property and labour rights were not called into question. But it guaranteed better access for the population to a set of social rights (housing, education and access to healthcare), whereas the State currently only pays for those needs not covered by the private sector. This meant a substantial and long-term increase in public spending
Economic activity held up well in the first half of the year, but a slowdown in GDP growth is coming and expected to intensify over the second semester. The recovery of the labour market continues. However, the retreat of unemployment has come at the cost of a temporary drop in productivity. Inflation, which has registered double digits growth over the past nine months, is spreading more widely throughout the economy. Looking forward, monetary policy could be increasingly constrained by the announcement of new fiscal support. The latter coupled with the continued weakening of the main fiscal rule could weigh on risk premia and inflation expectations. The enthusiasm that prevailed earlier in the year for Brazilian assets is losing steam.
Peruvian GDP returned to its pre-crisis level thanks to the strong upturn in activity recorded in 2021. However, the country’s capacity to rebound further is limited and short-to-medium-term growth prospects are moderate. Firstly, inflation pressures are weighing on private consumption and disruptions in the value chains are hampering the export sector. Secondly, the continuing political crisis is dampening the investment outlook. In addition, public finances have deteriorated over the past two years. It is not so much the level of debt, which is still moderate, but its composition which is worrying and is making the country more vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment.
As of late, political risk has not weighed as heavily as expected on investment flows into Colombia. The strong rise in oil prices this year (+50% for a barrel of WTI crude year-to-date) coupled to the country’s distance from the Ukrainian conflict and the Central Bank’s more aggressive stance since January (+300 bps rate hikes) have helped support investment inflows and have trumped, so far, concerns over the high level of uncertainty surrounding the upcoming presidential election (1st round on May 29th). Foreign direct investments (FDI) in the hydrocarbon sector (2/3 of total FDI on average) have continued to recover quite strongly and have not been fazed by the possible interruption of new oil and gas developments – proposed by poll-leading candidate Gustavo Petro
Brazil ended 2021 on a stronger footing than expected, but the economic picture remains fragile. Activity tends to progress in spurts, curbed by internal brakes (Omicron wave, climatic vagaries, elections) and a more degraded external environment (war in Ukraine, trading partners’ economic slowdown, etc.). Meanwhile, inflationary pressures are building up and raise the specter of continued monetary tightening. Since the start of the year, the improvement in Brazil’s terms of trade and wide interest rate differentials with developed economies have fueled the rebound of the equity market and spurred a strong appreciation of the real. Such developments highlight a form of dissonance between the real economy and assessments of financial markets.
The direct consequences of the war in Ukraine on the Mexican economy should remain limited, because trade links are almost non-existent. However, indirect consequences could have a significant impact on an economy that has already been weakened by the Covid-19 crisis. Higher commodity prices will increase inflation pressure and worsen the current account deficit in Mexico, which has been a net importer of energy since 2015. In addition, supply chain disruption arising from the conflict and new coronavirus variants could drag down exports. The investment outlook is continuing to deteriorate as discussions about reforming the energy sector continue.
Colombia’s public finances have come under the spotlight in recent years amidst recurrent adverse external shocks, rising social spending pressures, ongoing challenges in raising revenues, persistent (optimistic) biases in fiscal planning and, as of late, the back loading of fiscal consolidation plans following the Covid-19 shock. The rapid progression of the public debt ratio and the capacity for future policy adjustment have, in particular, become points of concern and have, since the summer 2021, materialized in Colombia losing its investment grade status
Despite the acceleration of the vaccination campaign, the anticipated rebound of growth in H2 2021 did not materialize. Instead, the economy fell into a recession in Q3 while available indicators for Q4 continued to show signs of weakness. Meanwhile, binding aspects of the spending cap have been called into question translating into an increased defiance of the market towards the sovereign. As the general election looms (October), economic prospects are expected to be very mild. Uncertainties regarding the evolution of the epidemic, the electoral cycle, the fiscal trajectory, the persistence of inflation and the tightening of monetary and financial conditions are all expected to act as potential brakes on the recovery.
Looking beyond the strong recovery in 2021, the Argentine economy remains fragile. Production in primary and secondary sectors has returned to its pre-pandemic levels. However, the economy remains constrained by high though largely repressed inflation, which is hitting household consumption and services. Since December 2021, a new wave of Covid-19 infections has introduced additional uncertainty. The mid-term elections have weakened the government coalition, which is still negotiating with the IMF. Monetary policy is tightening and the normalisation of budget deficit financing will require a slowdown in expenditures, although a drastic consolidation is unlikely. However, time is running out
Gabriel Boric won the second-round presidential election in December. He will take up his post in mid-March and will face many challenges during his term. The new government will have to deal with a fragmented legislative assembly and high levels of popular expectation. Economic growth is likely to slow as exceptional support measures are gradually withdrawn. Although vaccination levels are high, activity could be weakened by new waves of infection and the accompanying restrictions. Lastly, consolidating public finances whilst fulfilling promises to reform education, healthcare and pensions would seem to be the biggest difficulty.
Gabriel Boric, the candidate heading up the very broad left-wing coalition, won the second round of voting in Chile’s presidential election on 19 December, beating J. Kast, the far-right candidate. While the country’s economic fundamentals have held up relatively well over the past two years, the incoming administration (taking office in March) will have to deal with a number of very thorny issues. Chile’s health situation, high inflation and restrictive monetary policy will be a drag on growth in the short to medium term. What’s more, expectations among the country’s population are very high concerning pension system reforms, access to healthcare and education
The recovery has failed to consolidate in Q2 2021, with production stalling over the quarter despite the dynamism of external demand and the normalization of activity in the service sector. The slowdown of the epidemic since the summer and the acceleration of the vaccination campaign, however, point to a rebound in the second half of the year. But upside risk to growth will be challenged by the persistence of supply constraints in industry, the risk of electricity rationing, the slowdown in China and aggressive monetary tightening to counter soaring inflation. Against this backdrop, the real is still struggling to appreciate despite the rise in rates and the good performance of external accounts. The currency’s weakness make the process of controlling inflation more difficult
Mexico’s medium-term economic prospects continue to deteriorate. The robust recovery already seems to be running out of steam, while the economy’s structural weaknesses (low investment and competitiveness) have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis and by the government’s lack of fiscal support. Yet economic policy is unlikely to change much over the next two years. Following mid-term elections, the governing coalition managed to maintain a simple majority in the Chamber of Deputies. And the government’s 2022 budget proposal confirms its determination to maintain austerity through the end of its mandate in 2024
The Covid-19 crisis is expected to have a lasting negative impact on potential growth in the emerging countries. IMF economists are forecasting per capita GDP growth of only 2.5% in 2025. Granted, that is higher than the 1.8% annual average over the past decade, but it is far from the 4% growth rates of the early 2000s, during which the emerging countries were buoyed by a commodity super cycle. Can we hope to see a repeat performance? It seems highly improbable. According to our estimates, even using a scenario of a new price cycle, potential growth in the Latin American countries—all commodity producers and exporters to various degrees—is unlikely to exceed 3% by 2025
The Brazilian economy has been surprisingly resilient given the challenging sanitary situation it faced in Q1. A more supportive external environment, a stronger recovery in services and a rebound in confidence, should help support the short-term outlook – especially as the epidemic slows down with improving vaccination coverage. Accelerating inflation continues to be a concern and could lead to a more vigorous tightening of monetary policy at the end of the summer. While the currency and portfolio investments stand to benefit from more aggressive rate hikes, the latter also risk slowing down the recovery and adversely affecting public finances. So far though, the sovereign has recorded better fiscal metrics than expected, which have translated into lower risk premiums.
The economy should rebound strongly in 2021 thanks to a successful vaccination campaign, improved prospects for global growth and higher copper prices. According to the monthly economic index, in early Q2, real GDP returned to the pre-pandemic level of December 2019. Looking beyond 2021, economic growth prospects could be marred by persistent political tensions plaguing the country. Debates over the presidential election on the one hand and the process of drawing up a new constitution on the other will probably disrupt the implementation of economic policy as well as private sector investment decisions by both resident and non-resident investors.
Close to 2/3 of public debt in Central America* is owed to non-residents. Costa Rica is the least dependent on external funding. Nicaragua and Panama are the most dependent – however with diametrically opposed creditor profiles. The former’s external commitments are due to official creditors (e.g. multilaterals or bilateral creditors such as Taiwan) while ¾ of the latter’s are owed to private creditors (primary bondholders) – a share comparable to Latin America’s third largest sovereign bond issuer in 2020 – the Dominican Republic. In a context of increasing debt burdens (+12 percentage points across the region in 2020), a high dependence on external funding is a source of financial vulnerability – especially for those countries whose external debt is mostly held by private creditors (e
