After a record contraction in the economy in 2020, South Africa’s GDP grew by 4.9% in 2021. This was the highest growth rate since 2007. The strong recovery in the first half of 2021 was held back by rioting over the summer and the return of health protection measures in the face of the Omicron variant in the fourth quarter of 2021. The pace of recovery is likely to continue to slow, with GDP forecast to grow by 1.3% in 2022, according to our estimates. Economic activity will remain structurally constrained by weak potential growth. Inflation keeps accelerating. By the end of 2021, inflation had hit 6% year-on-year (3
In Ghana, the warning signs are multiplying. Although economic growth has been fairly resilient, public finances have deteriorated sharply at a time of surging inflation. This is unsettling investors and threatening economic prospects. The central bank has already reacted by raising its key policy rate. But the authorities must reassure that they are capable of reducing the fiscal deficit. For the moment, they have failed to do so. Yet severe financial constraints and a dangerously high debt burden could force them to make adjustments.
In Ethiopia, the coronavirus pandemic triggered an economic crisis that has jeopardised the country’s development model of the past decade. Belated reforms, major logistics costs and a shortage of foreign currency have sharply slowed economic modernisation. Civil war in the Tigray region also threatens the country’s political stability and worsens the humanitarian crisis. With no resources, Ethiopia lacks the means to face up to the pandemic’s economic fallout, and is still highly dependent on international aid. The ratio of foreign currency debt to export receipts has become excessively high. The country has requested foreign debt treatment as part of the G20s’ common framework for debt restructuring
Following the 12 August presidential election in which opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema defeated incumbent President Edgar Lungo, Zambia’s macroeconomic situation has become clearer thanks to progress towards strengthening relations with the IMF with a long-awaited loan agreement on a financing programme in the coming months. External liquidity has increased with the new allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) on 23 August 2021. The allocation amounts to USD 1.3bn, the largest amount behind South Africa, Nigeria and DRC. FX reserves now account for 7% of GDP and cover around 4.7 months of imports, up from 2.5 months before the allocation
After declining 1.9% in 2020, Nigeria’s GDP is unlikely to rebound but mildly in 2021 due to persistent and significant macroeconomic imbalances. Despite the first signs of stabilization, inflation is still very high, and several adjustments to the naira have failed to correct the dysfunctions in the foreign exchange market. Although the rebound in oil prices should help reduce somewhat the squeeze on external liquidity, it will surely take more than that to restore the confidence of investors. Without reforms and with no fiscal manoeuvring room, the economy will continue to be vulnerable to external shocks.
South Africa has been severely hit by the Covid-19 crisis, after already several years of very low economic growth and social and political tensions. Real GDP collapsed by 7% in 2020 and public finances have deteriorated significantly. However, South Africa has also benefitted from a strong improvement in its external accounts. The boom in export receipts has supported the rebound in activity and fiscal revenue over the past year. This better-than-expected macroeconomic performance has reassured investors and facilitated the coverage of the government’s financing needs. However, in the medium term, challenges remain unchanged: large and difficult reforms remain necessary to elevate the country’s growth potential and improve public debt sustainability.
So far, the economy has posted a fairly good resilience to the pandemic shock. Although economic growth slowed sharply in 2020, it nonetheless remained in positive territory. Above all, the economy is expected to rebound strongly this year, buoyed by domestic demand and easing political tensions after a busy electoral calendar. The country’s debt situation is also not as alarming compared to the other African countries. Even so, the sharp deterioration in public finances in 2020 calls for fiscal consolidation, which could prove to be difficult without a sustainable increase in fiscal revenue. This could weigh on the growth prospects of an economy that is increasingly dependent on public investment.
Although Kenya was spared a recession in 2020, the Covid-19 shock exacerbated the country’s economic vulnerabilities. The risk of excessive public debt is especially high, and despite financial support provided by multilateral and bilateral creditors, budget management will remain a big challenge in the short and medium terms. The level and structure of the debt expose the government to solvency risk. Fortunately, reforms are expected to reduce this risk, and the IMF financing programme recently granted to the Kenyan authorities should support these efforts and help reassure non-resident investors.
Nigeria’s economy contracted by 1.8% in 2020 due to the pandemic and the downturn in oil prices. The prospects of a rebound are slim, with growth expected at 2.5% in 2021 according to the IMF. The lack of visibility over the evolution of exchange rate regime is one of the main factors curbing growth. The Finance Minister recently declared that the government was going to use the Nafex rate, the market’s benchmark exchange rate, implying a 7.5% devaluation of the official exchange rate. The Governor of the Central Bank denied this announcement, but pressure is growing. Unifying various exchange rates is one of the conditions for unlocking financial aid, which would ease the external liquidity pressures generated by the drop-off in oil exports
Zambia’s recent sovereign default has cast a shadow of a looming wave of debt restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Covid shock has brought a significant risk of debt distress in several African countries, by exacerbating vulnerabilities that have built up over the past decade. While liquidity facilities through the DSSI and emergency lines have provided temporary support to many countries in the region, solvency issues remain and the prospect of debt restructuring is gaining ground. In this context, the methodology of the IMF and the World Bank remains the most suitable tool for assessing debt sustainability for low-income countries. The framework for common treatment of restructuring has recently been extended to all creditors
Ethiopia is expected to report its lowest growth rate since 2003. Although the population has been relatively spared by the brunt of the Covid-19 pandemic, the cyclical economic environment has deteriorated sharply. The country has been hard hit by both a domestic shock and a decline in external revenues, which is squeezing its structurally low foreign reserves. Support from multilateral creditors will limit liquidity risk in the short term, but the current situation largely underscores the need for reforms. At the same time, political risk is rising with the emergence of socio-political tensions that pose significant challenges for Ethiopia’s political and economic stability.
The Covid-19 crisis has hit an economy that had already been in recession since mid-2019. In Q2 2020 (which was the period when lockdown measures were the tightest), real GDP collapsed by 16% q/q seasonally-adjusted. Activity contracted sharply across all sectors in April before reviving slowly. The economic growth rebound from H2 2020 is expected to be difficult. Real GDP is projected to contract by 8.5% in 2020 and should increase by a mere 2.5% in 2021. Economic growth will remain constrained by South Africa’s very low potential growth, resulting notably from deep structural brakes such as weak human capital and deficient transport and energy infrastructure. The social context, with very high levels of poverty, income inequality and unemployment, is worsening further this year
With the country in recession for the fifth consecutive year (latest estimates put the contraction in 2020 at 4%), the current crisis is acting as a catalyst for existing weaknesses and further damaging the country’s economic prospects. The combined effect of lower oil prices and production and the depreciation of the currency has increased pressure on the capacity for external financing and the sustainability of Angola’s debt. The country has seen a significant decline in its currency reserves, which could become insufficient as the financing deficit increases. Currently under negotiation, the expected support of bilateral creditors (most notably China) is becoming crucial.
According to the government, the Covid-19 crisis will push the budget deficit up to 11.4% of GDP this year, from the 4.7% initially expected. More importantly, medium-term forecasts do not predict a return of the deficit to below 5% of GDP before 2024. This is a worrying trend. Covering financing requirements will prove to be challenging. With the bulk of external financing having already materialized, the government will have to turn to the local debt market. However, conditions here are onerous, resulting in interest costs rising to a very high level (50% of government revenue in 2020). Another option would be to make use of monetary financing. The central bank already has an asset purchase programme in place (2.6% of GDP)
The shock triggered by the Covid-19 epidemic has been violent and has hit an already very fragile economy. Over the past five years, economic growth has averaged only 0.8% and the country has slipped into recession since mid-2019. The economic contraction and the deterioration in public finances will be on an unprecedented scale in 2020. Real GDP may well not return to its pre-crisis level before 2025. The government has been adept in adjusting its financing strategy to cover its needs, which have increased steeply following the introduction of the fiscal stimulus plan. The support expected from multilateral lenders in the short term is reassuring, but trends in government debt will continue to be a concern over the medium term.
Although the pandemic is well contained from a health perspective, the Covid-19 crisis combined with the downturn in oil prices will have severe economic consequences. With no real fiscal leeway, the government has implemented a very modest economic stimulus plan, while massive capital outflows and the collapse of oil exports have fuelled the rapid erosion of foreign reserves, bringing the naira under pressure. The deterioration in public and external accounts despite support from donor funds hampers any prospects of a recovery. Just four years after the last recession, real GDP is expected to contract significantly again in 2020. Without an upturn in oil prices, the rebound will be mild in 2021.
Kenya’s real GDP growth was subdued last year and it will come under stress in 2020 due to coronavirus outbreak effects. The lower GDP growth will further constrain the fiscal policy space whereas the country’s forex receipts are also weakened by adverse climatic conditions. While political rivalries continue to complicate the implementation of fiscal policy, failure to reduce budget deficits will challenge the sovereign’s debt solvency in the medium term. Meanwhile, monetary policy easing and emergency measures in the banking sector could hamper banking sector prospects, which had started to improve following the recent removal of the interest-rate cap law.
In order to support economic growth, the Ethiopian government is transitioning from the traditional debt investment strategy to a foreign equity-based one, by privatizing some state-owned entities and removing foreign investments’ barriers. The recently approved IMF program is targeted to address foreign-exchange shortages as well as to contain debt vulnerabilities by strengthening state-owned enterprises management. Nevertheless, the moving towards a more liberalized exchange rate will be done gradually to avoid triggering inflationary pressures and consequent social unrests.
Mozambique urgently needs to resume a medium-term agreement with the IMF, the latter having suspended its cooperation in 2016, after discovering a hidden debt of around 1.2 billion dollars. Already, a first default of a Eurobond issued on 2013 for an amount of 850 billion dollars, in order to finance patrol vessels, had led to a first restructuring. Following a second default in January 2017, a new restructuring agreement for about 900 billion dollars has been reached last September. Nonetheless, the Mozambican state creditworthiness remains very fragile. A part of the hidden debt (around 8% of GDP) remains in default and a judicial battle is underway against Mozambican’s state. The latter is asking for the deletion of one of the two state guarantees issued
Economic growth has averaged only 1% per year since 2015, and weakened further in H1 2019. Exports have suffered from slower world demand growth while structural constraints have weighed heavily on investment, which has declined continuously since early 2018. Major power outages have disrupted activity in 2019: they result from the severe troubles of state-owned company Eskom, and illustrate well the country’s lack of infrastructure. Only steady progress in the structural reform process will allow investment to recover in the medium term. Meanwhile, real GDP growth is expected to remain low (projected at 0.4% in 2019 and 0.8% in 2020) and policymakers’ room for manoeuvre to boost domestic demand is very narrow
The country has renewed relationship with the IMF and obtained its financial support in late 2018. Under the Fund supervision, a mild recovery is expected in the near term but outlook remains weak due to a still tight foreign currency liquidity, a troubled banking system and a poor external environment. Amid higher oil price volatility, Angola continues to rely on the oil sector as a source of economic growth, fiscal income and foreign exchange earnings. Despite supportive measures to attract international investors, important deficiencies keep FDI weak. Some fiscal reforms are also ongoing, but governement room for maneuver remains slim.
Economic growth is forecast at only 0.4% in 2019, after averaging 1% a year in 2015-2018. The Ramaphosa government has little manoeuvring room to implement reforms, and strong structural headwinds continue to hamper economic activity. Illustrating the country’s enormous lack of infrastructure, major power outages disrupted activity in the first months of the year. To address the severe financial troubles at Eskom, the state-owned company behind the power outages, the government had to unblock additional funds to come to its rescue. The latest rescue package will accelerate fiscal deficit slippage and further weaken sovereign solvency in the medium term.
The sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economy is having hard time to recover. External rebalancing has showed some progress. But imports remain well below pre-crisis levels. In addition, the rebuilding of FX reserves is being accompanied by increased financial vulnerability, which puts pressure on monetary policy as the authorities give the priority to exchange rate stability. Weak public finances are an additional constraint. In the short term, and despite its strong potential, the economy is expected to grow more slowly than the population. As well as improving macroeconomic stability, the authorities will have to address the deep-seated factors that are holding back the economy as a whole.
The political appeasements along with several reforms to improve the business climate have allowed a macroeconomic recovery since 2018 in Kenya. However, the fiscal position remains weak: on one side, budget deficits have reached an average of 8% of GDP over the last five years; on the other side, debt interests have attained 21% of estimated revenues in 2018 against 13% in 2014. Moreover, the increasing tapping of non-concessional external loans is a growing vulnerability: in May, Kenya issued its third Eurobond for an amount of 2.1 billions of dollars, in two tranches with 7-year and 12-year tenors
Nigeria is having a hard time recovering from the 2014 oil shock. Although the economy has pulled out of recession, growth remains sluggish at 1.9% in 2018. Moreover, the central bank’s recent decision to cut its key policy rate is unlikely to change much. With inflation holding at high levels, it is still too early to anticipate further monetary easing. Defending the currency peg is another constraint at a time when the stability of the external accounts is still fragile. Between soaring debt interest payments and the very low mobilisation of public resources, there is only limited fiscal manoeuvring room. It is hard to imagine a rapid economic turnaround without the intensification of reforms.
