US macroeconomic performance has remained solid since the onset of the shock, as illustrated in particular by Q2 growth of +3.8% and +9% (annualized quarterly rate) in consumer spending and private nonresidential investment, respectively. In the manufacturing sector, business sentiment has gained momentum despite the shock, while the impact of this shock on the services sector has remained very limited. The immediate reaction of consumer confidence was, however, more negative before beginning to improve, which was nevertheless interrupted in August.
US growth remains resilient despite successive shocks. According to our forecasts, it is expected to reach 2.2% in 2026 and 2.3% in 2027. Its main driver is still investment in artificial intelligence (AI), which has remained entirely unaffected by the energy crisis. The labour market has seen a marked improvement in job creation and a fall in the unemployment rate. Core inflation remains stubbornly high and above the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s target. Against this backdrop, the Fed has begun a hiking cycle in September, which, according to our scenario, would bring the Fed Funds target to 4.50% (upper limit) by Q1 2027. At the same time, long-term rates are under upward pressure.
The scope for manoeuvre available to fiscal policy depends heavily on the interest rate environment, and this has tightened significantly in recent months.Guillaume Derrien, economist in the advanced economies team, explains where we stand today in the advanced economies, against a backdrop of high debt-to-GDP ratios and moderate growth.
“Germany is too dependent on the US for its security, on Russia for its energy and on China for its exports.” That was, in essence, Brookings’ Constanze Stelzenmüller’s diagnosis in June 2022, and it was – and is – valid as well for Europe as a whole. But does this dependency also apply to technological and industrial products? The European Commission’s EXternal Vulnerability Index (EXVI) answers that very question, mapping out the EU’s exposure to foreign supply chains.
The FOMC meeting on September 15–16 is expected to mark a turning point with the Fed’s first rate hike since May 2023. While there may have been economic reasons to hold off and maintain the status quo until now (some negative signals on the employment front and some encouraging ones on the inflation front), the conditions for a necessary recalibration now appear to be in place.
The US economy has held up well since the shock began. Consumption and business investment grew at a 4.1% annualized pace in Q2. At the same time, the scope for energy-driven disinflation has narrowed: WTI (the US reference) has averaged USD 82/bbl since 8 July, ranging between USD 72-92.
Statistical agencies often revise growth figures a posteriori, and generally upwards. But this takes time, as their data often become more comprehensive and accurate after two years. France is seeing the largest upward revisions over this timeframe, and, generally, these revisions are more pronounced in Europe than in the United States.
Central bank independence is not as hard-wired in modern institutions as they might appear to anyone born after the 1970s. That it went largely unchallenged in its first thirty years of history owes much to economic circumstances. But in today’s world of supply shock-driven inflation and large public debts, central banks face a much harder task. A series of controversial decisions since the global financial crisis, and years of above-target inflation leaves them more vulnerable than ever to political attacks on their independence. It is imperative to defend it, as there will be large costs to pay if it is lost.
The memorandum of understanding, signed in mid-June between the US and Iran, improved US data before hostilities resumed in mid-July. Headline CPI posted its first monthly drop (-0.4% m/m) since 2020 in June, driven by gasoline prices (-9.7% m/m). It stood at 3.5% y/y, down sharply from May’s 4.2% but still 1.1pp above pre-conflict levels. Inflation excl. energy eased as well (-0.2pp to 2.7% y/y), edging back towards its February reading.
In advanced economies, June inflation declined temporarily but bounced back in July, reflecting the moves in energy prices. Forward indicators of price pressures eased again in July. Long-term inflation expectations held steady as near-term expectations pulled back (UK excepted). At this stage, there is no sign of a wage-price spiral. In emerging economies, average CPI inflation fell back slightly in June after three months of increase. As for commodities, we see a broad-based rebound as tensions resurface.
Both the Eurozone and the US grew 0.4% q/q in Q2 2026. For Europe, that is a welcome upside surprise: growth landed in line with expectations (France, Germany) or above them (Eurozone overall, Spain, Italy), even as the Middle East conflict delivered an energy-driven inflation shock. It confirms that European growth rests on foundations solid enough to absorb this kind of shock. Country-level detail was incomplete on the day, but manufacturing business sentiment held firm across the board in H1, underwritten by a set of drivers (AI, defence, electrification, aerospace). US growth, by contrast, undershot expectations. But it remained robust, powered by AI investment and accelerating household consumption. Both, however, drew in imports fast enough to weaken the headline growth figure.
Business sentiment, which was on an upward trajectory before the shock, stayed resilient but signaled a faster input-price growth and longer delivery times, both directly linked to Middle East turmoil and coming on top of the issue of tariffs. Meanwhile, the outlook of households, which were already low on optimism has further deteriorated.
The US regulatory framework is becoming more favourable to intermediation conditions within the US Treasuries market. The easing of leverage requirements has enabled the largest banks, known as Global Systemically Important Banks, or G-SIBs, to fulfil their role as intermediaries during the first months of the year. The ongoing reassessment of the G-SIB capital surcharge calculation method could also benefit market liquidity. However, the capacity of large US banks to absorb federal debt is expected to remain limited.
The independence of the Federal Reserve (Fed) has been challenged by the US administration, but it remains intact. As the Kevin Warsh era begins with the 16-17 June FOMC meeting, the simultaneous strength of inflation and the labour market set the stage – should it persist, as we anticipate – for monetary tightening to start by the end of the year. Yet the turbulence at the end of Jerome Powell’s term is a reminder that central bank independence is not a given. The stakes go beyond price stability alone and extend to the global financial architecture itself.
As US regulators had hoped, the easing of the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) applied to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) has improved intermediation conditions in the US Treasury market. However, this measure has not prompted banks to significantly increase their Treasury holdings.
Advanced economies proved resilient in 2025 despite a tariff shock that disrupted global trade. By early 2026, they were on track for faster growth and lower inflation. A fresh shock linked to the war in the Middle East, however, is reigniting inflation while slowing growth. This mix primarily reflects the impact of a likely decline in purchasing power on consumer spending. However, many of the factors that underpinned 2025 growth — AI development, higher defense spending (especially in Europe), and continued trade growth — are set to persist in 2026. They would be reinforced by an acceleration of electrification, against a backdrop of rising oil prices and an AI-driven rise in electricity demand.
The outperformance of US growth is underpinned by productivity gains that are significantly higher than those of the previous decade. This acceleration is due more to the spillover effects of past investments and post-pandemic changes (such as remote working) than to artificial intelligence (AI). The roll-out of AI is too recent for productivity gains to have already made their mark at the macroeconomic level. In the medium term, however, AI is expected to support the upward trend.
CPI inflation recorded its largest monthly increase since 2022 in March, before reaching 3.8% y/y in April (+1.4pp in two months and a highest since 2023) – almost entirely on the back of gasoline prices, with the non-energy index edging up only moderately.
US banking regulators have recently launched a sweeping overhaul of capital requirements. Their primary goal is to restore banks to the forefront of mortgage origination. Yet it seems unlikely that the new credit-risk calibration, taken alone, will reshape the market. The widespread use of loan securitization and leverage constraints could limit its impact. By reducing risk weights on credit lines extended to non-bank mortgage lenders, the reform could even undermine its intended purpose—potentially encouraging banks to remain in the shadow of non-banks.
The central banks of the world’s leading advanced economies met this week, and all decided to leave their policy rates unchanged despite significantly higher inflation prints and outlooks. In the words of Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey, these were “active holds”. They are not fully hawkish yet, but the hawks have made their dissent heard while still in the minority. But they are no longer in a pure passive “wait-and-see” mode. We expect hikes to come through in June, at least for the BoE, BoJ and ECB.
US growth remains robust, exhibiting strong momentum, but is still reliant on a narrow base – AI on the activity side and healthcare for jobs. The energy shock presents a new challenge, and its impact will depend on both the duration and severity of the Iran war. In any case, this situation is likely to drive inflation further above the target. Our baseline scenario projects 2.4% annual GDP growth in 2026 (down 0.3pp vs. the pre-conflict outlook) and 2.5% in 2027 (+0.3pp). Inflation is expected to reach 3.2% y/y in 2026. Against this backdrop, we expect the Fed to adopt a two-sided stance, with balanced risks around the Fed Funds rate and a hold as the baseline scenario
The war in the Middle East has caused prices of several commodities to rise, in particular oil which has neared historic highs. Although conflict’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, weaker supply and demand constraints compared to 2022 should limit the upward pressure on inflation. Household consumption and sectors least able to pass on rising production costs to sales prices (primarily consumer goods) are likely to be hit hardest. The ultimate effect on GDP growth will depend on the duration and severity of the damage. According to our baseline scenario, a recession should be avoided. However, if the conflict were to escalate to the point of causing shortages (of fuel or inputs), its impact on growth and inflation could lead to such a recessionary outcome
Business sentiment surveys point to a healthy economy, despite the energy shock. In March, business sentiment (ISM PMI) remained in expansion territory in both the manufacturing (which hit a four-year high) and non-manufacturing sectors, but supplier delivery times extended and, above all, input-price growth accelerated (and stood at a high not seen since 2022). By contrast, consumer sentiment (Michigan) has dipped sharply. Expectations deteriorated, particularly around 1-year inflation.
Despite the war and energy shocks unfolding in parallel to the Meetings, finance officials, central bankers and other delegates took the situation with a poise that contrasted with the sense of shock that followed Liberation Day. Unable to predict with any degree of confidence how the war would evolve, and hence how large the economic damage would be, delegates focused more than usual on what lies beyond the near-term outlook: regime changes in geopolitics, economics and markets; how to explain and preserve recent resilience; and the multiple ongoing re-wirings of the fabric of the global economy and financial markets. Here are some personal key takeaways.
We have selected a set of indicators to track the impact of this new energy shock, caused by the war in the Middle East, on activity and prices in the Eurozone, the United States, oil and gas markets and emerging countries, and to see how much the current situation resembles the situation in 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.This dashboard featuring graphs and comments will be updated on a monthly basis for as long as necessary.
