Growth was stronger than expected in Q2 and is set to strengthen further in the coming quarters. According to our forecasts, it will reach 1.5% in 2027 after 1.1% in 2026. This growth is expected to be driven by investment and its knock-on effect on exports. On an annual average basis, inflation is expected to stand at 3% in 2026 and 2.8% in 2027, peaking at the end of 2026. The ECB is expected to continue its monetary tightening. At this stage, a single further rate rise, aimed at keeping inflation expectations anchored, is expected in December. The impact of rising interest rates (key policy rates and market rates) on public finances and private sector borrowing conditions will be worth monitoring.
Growth, which began in the fourth quarter of 2025, gained momentum in the first half of 2026. This momentum should continue, with expected growth of 1.1% in 2026 and 1.3% in 2027. In the short term, the main driver will still be exports, particularly to Europe, which will contribute to restructuring industry. The impact of investment plans is expected to strengthen in 2027, while domestic demand is likely to remain constrained by inflation (2.7 % in 2026 and 2.6 % in 2027), which will weigh on purchasing power. Fiscal stimulus and structural reforms are expected to continue to support growth. However, the rise in the deficit and debt levels means that the increase in long-term interest rates observed so far is mostly structural.
French economic growth will underperform in 2026, partly due to a number of exceptional setbacks. In 2027, it is expected to rebound to 1% (compared with 0.5% in 2026), supported by rising external demand (particularly from Europe). So far, businesses and households appear to be weathering the rise in inflation relatively well, although it is expected to continue (we are forecasting 2.3% inflation in 2027, following 2.4% in 2026). Fiscal consolidation remains challenging, complicated by the weak growth seen in 2026, and is expected to be implemented gradually. As a result, public debt is expected to rise, with a moderate upside risk due to the rise in sovereign-bond yields.
Italian GDP grew 0.2% q/q in Q2 2026, bolstered by household consumption and investment financed by European funds, while the manufacturing sector is not benefitting from the same improvement seen elsewhere in Europe (due to lower exposure to the tech sector). As a result, we expect growth to remain quite stable in 2026 and 2027 (0.9% and 0.8%, respectively), despite an improving momentum in the Eurozone. Inflation acceleration is mainly driven by energy prices, which are weighing on the recovery of purchasing power. Disinflation should be observed in 2027, with inflation standing at 2.1%, after 2.9% in 2026. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.1% of GDP in 2025 on the back of a stronger primary surplus, but the rising debt burden points to increasingly tight fiscal margins.
According to our forecasts, Spanish growth is set to remain stable at a healthy level (2.6% in 2026 and 2.2% in 2027), significantly higher than that of the euro area. Growth is being driven by consumption, investment and a labour market that is still buoyant. The industrial recovery is more pronounced than the European average due to advantages in terms of labour and energy (mix and cost). Nevertheless, in the absence of productivity gains, the labour market is approaching its structural limits, as reflected in particular by inflation that is higher than the European average. At the same time, the fiscal trajectory remains favourable, with a falling deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio, as well as a contained spread.
A pillar of the NextGenerationEU programme, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will expire on December 31, 2026. As of the end of August 2026, slightly more than three-quarters of the total budget had been disbursed (EUR 440 billion out of EUR 573 billion). Disbursing the remaining quarter (EUR 133 billion) by the end of the year will require a significant increase compared with the historical pace (EUR 90 billion per year). The goal of channeling these funds toward productive investment appears to have been achieved.
As we begin the 2026 financial year, long-term sovereign bond yields are reaching unprecedented highs not seen for decades. Why is this happening? Is it sustainable? What are the implications for the world’s various economies? These are just some of the questions addressed in this new Special Edition video, introduced by Chief Economist Isabelle Mateos y Lago.Drawing on insights from the banking sector and teams specialising in emerging and advanced economies, the economists from Economic Research will explain why the rise in bond yields is problematic.
The scope for manoeuvre available to fiscal policy depends heavily on the interest rate environment, and this has tightened significantly in recent months.Guillaume Derrien, economist in the advanced economies team, explains where we stand today in the advanced economies, against a backdrop of high debt-to-GDP ratios and moderate growth.
Against the backdrop of rising bond yields in the Eurozone, Thomas Humblot, economist in the banking economics team, analyses the implications for the cost of bank financing and for borrowers, whether individuals or businesses.
“Germany is too dependent on the US for its security, on Russia for its energy and on China for its exports.” That was, in essence, Brookings’ Constanze Stelzenmüller’s diagnosis in June 2022, and it was – and is – valid as well for Europe as a whole. But does this dependency also apply to technological and industrial products? The European Commission’s EXternal Vulnerability Index (EXVI) answers that very question, mapping out the EU’s exposure to foreign supply chains.
In the Eurozone, the overall picture from the data available for August is positive in terms of confidence surveys and reinforces the encouraging signs seen in previous months. According to PMI surveys, inflationary pressures continue to ease, while supply-side tensions have stabilised. Business sentiment in the services sector remains stable, anchoring its previous gains, while confidence in the manufacturing sector shows a further—and marked—improvement. Another notable and encouraging development is the recovery in consumer confidence for the fourth consecutive month.
Statistical agencies often revise growth figures a posteriori, and generally upwards. But this takes time, as their data often become more comprehensive and accurate after two years. France is seeing the largest upward revisions over this timeframe, and, generally, these revisions are more pronounced in Europe than in the United States.
The assessment of the July data is positive and reinforces the encouraging signals from May and June data. According to PMI business climate surveys, price pressures continued to ease, as did supply tensions through slightly shorter delivery times. The business climate in the manufacturing sector resumed improving, almost erasing the two months of previous decline. The business climate in the services sector and consumer confidence continues to recover. The July surveys are not impacted by the resurgence of tensions in the Middle East and by the ensuing rise in energy prices, partly because responses were, for the most part, collected beforehand. A relapse in August is highly likely if the geopolitical situation remains degraded
In advanced economies, June inflation declined temporarily but bounced back in July, reflecting the moves in energy prices. Forward indicators of price pressures eased again in July. Long-term inflation expectations held steady as near-term expectations pulled back (UK excepted). At this stage, there is no sign of a wage-price spiral. In emerging economies, average CPI inflation fell back slightly in June after three months of increase. As for commodities, we see a broad-based rebound as tensions resurface.
The Recovery and Resilience Facility, or the so-called RRF, has been drawing heightened attention lately as two deadlines are looming: August 2026 for reform milestones and December 2026 to secure all disbursements. The stakes are high. Countries failing to fulfill the EU’s reform milestones risk losing entitled funds.
Both the Eurozone and the US grew 0.4% q/q in Q2 2026. For Europe, that is a welcome upside surprise: growth landed in line with expectations (France, Germany) or above them (Eurozone overall, Spain, Italy), even as the Middle East conflict delivered an energy-driven inflation shock. It confirms that European growth rests on foundations solid enough to absorb this kind of shock. Country-level detail was incomplete on the day, but manufacturing business sentiment held firm across the board in H1, underwritten by a set of drivers (AI, defence, electrification, aerospace). US growth, by contrast, undershot expectations. But it remained robust, powered by AI investment and accelerating household consumption. Both, however, drew in imports fast enough to weaken the headline growth figure.
In June 2026, corporate creations cumulated over one year remained dynamic, reaching a historic peak according to INSEE, with 1,233,123 corporates set up, representing a 11.1% year-on-year increase. This momentum is not a recent phenomenon, as corporate creations have doubled over the last decade. During this same period, the rise in bankruptcies has been ten times lower, which serves to put current levels (approximately 70,000 bankruptcies cumulated over one year in March 2026) into perspective. Historically, the peaks and troughs in corporate bankruptcies are following those of corporate creations, with an average lag of 24 to 36 months
Despite the energy shock, Poland’s economic growth is expected to remain robust and could even accelerate slightly in 2026. This growth is being driven by a recovery in investment, while consumption, although slowing, will continue to be one of its main pillars. Inflation remains moderate despite rising fuel prices and is expected to stay within the Central Bank’s target range. The external accounts, meanwhile, are very solid and can accommodate for the rise in energy costs. However, the trajectory of public debt is a cause for concern, particularly given that the government’s lack of a qualified majority is hampering fiscal consolidation.
Recent political tensions are once again drawing attention to Romania. The next government’s priority will be to further consolidate public finances; otherwise, the public debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to deteriorate. In addition, Romania appears to be the Central European country most adversely affected by the energy shock, although the situation is still manageable. Economic growth has been sluggish since 2024 and is not expected to improve in 2026. Inflation has now exceeded 10%, but it is expected to ease from September as the effects of the VAT rate hike subside. Monetary authorities are expected to adopt a cautious approach in the short term
When we compare the impact on economic activity of the current energy shock with that of 2022 (following the conflict in Ukraine), the favorable point in 2026, for the euro area, is the business climate in the manufacturing sector, which is holding up better than in 2022. Consumer confidence has fallen sharply but to a lesser extent in 2026 than in 2022. As for the deterioration in the business climate in the services sector, it was immediate in 2026, whereas it occurred with a few months' delay in 2022. The assessment of the June data is positive and reinforces the encouraging signals from May data.
The share of intra-EU exports in total European exports currently stands at around 62%, a level comparable to that seen in the early 2000s. Behind this apparent stability, however, lies a deep reshuffling of the major blocs that make up the European Union.
In the years following the pandemic, labour productivity in Italy has stalled. Artificial intelligence is identified as a potential catalyst for reversing this trend, with projections indicating possible annual productivity growth increases of up to 1.1 p.p. in a scenario of rapid adoption. However, the actual adoption of AI in Italy is still low, despite a faster growth rate compared with its main Euro area counterparts. As of 2025, only 16.4% of Italian companies with more than 10 employees were using AI. In the financial and insurance sectors, adoption rates are above average (39%, peaking at 70% in insurance)
In the European Union (EU), the post-Covid period was marked by a significant slowdown in productivity, which contrasts with the dynamic trend observed in the United States. However, there are reasons to put Europe's decline into perspective. Over a twenty-year period, real GDP per hour worked has grown more in the EU-27 than in Japan or the United Kingdom. The lag behind the United States is not continuous, but is linked to periods of crisis during which the US federal government intervened on a massive scale to support private-sector companies. The result is a public finance situation which appears much more favourable in Europe, allowing it to address a challenging future.
Over a year has passed since the German government announced substantial investment plans in defence and infrastructure. As we assess the situation in mid 2026, the implementation of these plans is progressing as we had anticipated. However, the current impact of these investments on growth is proving to be more subdued than expected (notably because a portion of the infrastructure funds has been used to finance government current expenditure). Nonetheless, the rebound in industrial orders is becoming evident, and the increase in intra European trade directed towards Germany indicates that a positive momentum is developing.
The assessment of the available data for May is rather positive. Granted, inflation keeps rising, but the contribution of the "energy" component remains dominant. Confidence enjoys a respite: business confidence in services and consumer confidence are sources of good news.
