Like the vast majority of economies, Japan will go into recession in 2020. The expected rebound in 2021 is likely to be relatively mild. The latest economic indicators reveal an economic situation that is still highly deteriorated compared to normal times. Once again, massive fiscal stimulus has been set in motion. The Bank of Japan’s monetary policy, notably through the Yield Curve Control, should largely reduce the risk of higher financing costs due to the expected rise in public debt.
Like most economies, Japan was hard hit by the Covid-19 crisis in the first half of 2020. The rebound of the Japanese economy will depend notably on an upturn in private consumption, which has been in a slump since year-end 2019. Retail sales plunged sharply again in May, for the third consecutive month. Sales were down 12.3% year-on-year (y/y), after declining 13.9% in April and 4.7% in March [...]
The shock of the Covid-19 pandemic comes hard on the heels of a difficult second half of 2019 for the Japanese economy. Like many others, the country is exposed to the economic fallout from this crisis. Its significant economic dependence on China, for imports, exports and tourist flows, further weakens the Japanese economy. The latest economic indicators suggest that the shock will be important. Japan will thus go into recession this year. Lacking adequate room for manoeuvre on the monetary front, fiscal policy will need to provide support. To this end, the Abe government would be preparing a major stimulus package.
The Japanese economy ended 2019 on a negative note. As has happened before, consumer spending was hit by the VAT hike introduced in October. Typhoon Hagibis also put a significant dent in domestic demand, particularly in the area of private sector business investment. The start of 2020 looks difficult given the Coronavirus outbreak and the close economic relations between Japan and China.
In December 2019, the Japanese authorities decided to launch a major fiscal stimulus for the years ahead. A large part of the programme will target disaster prevention after the country was hit by a series of natural disasters recently. The stimulus will also limit the negative impact of last October’s VAT hike, which probably strained private consumption in the year-end period. Buoyed in part by early purchases ahead of the VAT hike, household spending continued at a dynamic pace in Q2 and Q3 2019. The export sector, in contrast, was hard hit by the sluggish global environment. In 2020, public investment is expected to partially offset weak private consumption.
The Japanese government bond yield curve has been flattening in recent months, with very long maturities coming dangerously close to 0%. This is creating concerns amongst institutional investors with long-dated liabilities (insurance companies, pension funds) Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda has argued that an excessive decline in super-long-term interest rates could negatively impact economic activity This has raised expectations that the central bank could shift to a policy of controlling the slope as well as the level of the yield curve. This could influence bond yields abroad. In the eurozone it would intensify the debate about the impact of ECB policy on pension funds and insurers.
Japanese GDP growth was stronger than expected in early 2019. Despite the current troubles in the export sector, for the moment domestic demand - both public and private - is picking up the slack. In the short term, two sources of concern loom over Japan’s macroeconomic scenario. First, Japan is highly exposed to the slowdown in both the Chinese economy and international trade. Second, the VAT increase in October will curb consumption during the year-end period and possibly in 2020 as well. Faced with these internal and external uncertainties, Japan will maintain accommodative monetary and fiscal policies, the effectiveness of which remains to be seen.
Alongside the quasi-uninterrupted decline in Japanese interest rates since the early 1990s, the household savings rate has declined by more than 10 percentage points, from a net rate of 12.9%(1) in 1994(2) to 2.5% in 2017(2). The savings rate consists of a net financial savings rate (gross financial savings flow minus borrowings flow) and a net housing investment rate (gross housing investment flow minus (in Japan) fixed capital consumption). The decrease in the financial savings rate resulted from the decline in the gross financial savings flow rather than from a rise in the borrowings flow. Thus, the flow of gross financial savings not only contracted, but was also reshaped in favour of monetary deposits, owing to the decline in opportunity costs
Although Japan’s economic openness is relatively limited, the high concentration of Japanese exports to China, and the other Asian countries in general, creates a major external risk for the dynamics of Japanese growth. This situation is squeezing the manufacturing sector, but for the moment, its difficulties do not seem to have carried over to the other sectors of the economy. The VAT increase planned for October should encourage households to make some early purchases, while the high level of uncertainty is hampering corporate investment. In this environment, the Bank of Japan is expected to maintain a very accommodating monetary policy, although this is unlikely to trigger a sustainable upturn in price inflation.
Economic activity in Japan remains in a slump, and the slowdown observed in 2018 seems set to last. Manufacturing activity deteriorated in the first quarter. In the short and medium term, Japan will continue to be hard hit by the slowdown in China, its main trading partner. Demographics are still a major problem in a country where the over-65 age group continues to swell and now accounts for more than a quarter of Japan’s total population. It serves as a constant incentive to boost productivity gains through large-scale structural reforms in the goods and services markets as well as in the labour market.
Japanese economic growth was particularly volatile in 2018. All in all, it decreased sharply in full-year 2018 to 0.7%, from 1.9% in 2017. The country was hit by a typhoon in the third quarter of 2018 that weakened most of the components of demand, and thus growth (-0.7% q/q). In the fourth quarter, activity picked up mildly (+0.3% q/q). Investment regained vigour after a particularly morose third quarter, while private consumption began supporting growth again. Inversely, external trade continued to strain growth. At a time of reinvigorated domestic demand, the sharp upturn in imports was only partially offset by higher exports. Japan’s growth dynamics will face several challenges in 2019 and beyond
Japan is the world’s fourth largest economy. The country has one of the largest financial systems in the world. The country experienced remarkable growth after WW2, which ended with the bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s. It was followed by a period known as the ‘lost decade’. Real economic growth dropped and inflation started to inch down, turning negative in the latter half of the 1990s. Fiscal stimulus and loose monetary policy were not successful in reviving the economy, but resulted in huge government debt.
The election of Shinzo Abe in 2012 has led to a reinforcement of loose monetary and fiscal policy to reinvigorate the economy. The so-called Abenomics strategy was built around three arrows: fiscal stimulus, a very loose monetary stance and structural reforms.
Progress on structural reforms needs to be further intensified to raise the economy’s potential growth and tackle significant demographic challenges. Progress has been made, for example, in increasing women’s participation in the workforce. However, one of Japan’s most serious structural problems is the rapidly ageing population. According to official projections, the Japanese population could shrink by over 25% in the next 40 years. This would have a significantly negative impact: in addition to negative effects on productivity and potential growth, for example a rise in the dependency ratio will reduce the tax base and limit the reduction of the primary deficit.